


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
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VOLUME 3



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THE
ANCIENT HISTORY

OF THE

EGYPTIANS,		MEDES AND PERSIANS,
CARTHAGINIANS,		MACEDONIANS,
ASSYRIANS,		AND
BABYLONIANS,		GRECIANS.

BY MR. ROLLIN,
LATE PRINCIPAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS,
&c. &c. &c.

IN EIGHT VOLUMES.

VOL. III.

CONTAINING THE HISTORY OF THE
PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

THE NINTH EDITION.

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THE
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PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CHAPTER II.

THE HISTORY OF XERXES, INTERMIXED WITH THAT OF
THE GREEKS.

XERXES's reign lasted but 12 years, but abounds with
great events.

SECTION I.

XERXES REDUCES EGYPT, &c. &c.

XERXES* having ascended the throne, employed the first year of his reign in carrying on the preparations begun by his father, for the reduction of Egypt. He also confirmed to the Jews at Jerusalem, all the privileges granted them by his father, and particularly that which assigned them the tribute of Samaria, for the supplying of them with victims for the temple of God.

† In the second year of his reign he marched against the Egyptians, and having reduced and subdued those rebels, he made the yoke of their subjection more heavy; then giving the government of that province to his brother Achemenes, he returned about the latter end of the year to Susa.

‡ Herodotus, the famous historian, was born this same year at Halicarnassus in Caria; for he was 53 years old when the Peloponnesian war first began.

§ Xerxes, puffed up with his success against the Egyptians, determined to make war against the Grecians. He || did not

* A. M. 3519. Ant. J. C. 485. Her. l. vii. c. 5. Jos. Antiq. l. xi. c. 5.

† Her. l. vii. c. 7. A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484.

‡ Aul. Gel. l. xv. c. 23. § Her. l. vii. c. 8—18.

|| Plut. in Apoph. p. 173.

intend, he said, to buy the figs of Attica, which were very excellent, any longer, because he would eat no more of them till he was master of the country. But before he engaged in an enterprize of that importance, he thought proper to assemble his council, and take the advice of all the greatest and most illustrious persons of his court. He laid before them the design he had of making war against Greece, and acquainted them with his motives; which were, the desire of imitating the example of his predecessors, who had all of them distinguished their names and reigns by noble enterprizes; the obligation he was under to revenge the insolence of the Athenians, who had presumed to fall upon Sardis, and reduce it to ashes; the necessity he was under, to avenge the disgrace his country had received at the battle of Marathon; and the prospect of the great advantages that might be reaped from this war, which would be attended with the conquest of Europe, the most rich and fertile country in the universe. He added further, that this war had been resolved on by his father Darius, and he meant only to follow and execute his intentions; he concluded, with promising ample rewards to those who should distinguish themselves by their valour in the expedition.

Mardonius, the same person that had been so unsuccessful in Darius's reign, grown neither wiser, nor less ambitious by his ill success, and extremely affecting the command of the army, was the first who gave his opinion. He began by extolling Xerxes above all the kings that had gone before, or should succeed him. He endeavoured to show the indispensable necessity of avenging the dishonour done to the Persian name; he disparaged the Grecians, and represented them as a cowardly, timorous people, without courage, without forces, or experience in war. For a proof of what he said, he mentioned his own conquest of Macedonia, which he exaggerated in a very vain and ostentatious manner, as if that people had submitted to him without any resistance. He presumed even to affirm, that not any of the Grecian nations would venture to come out against Xerxes, who would march with all the forces of Asia; and if they had the temerity to present themselves before him, they would learn to their cost, that the Persians were the bravest and most warlike nation in the world.

The rest of the council, perceiving that this flattering discourse extremely pleased the king, were afraid to contradict it, and all kept silence. This was almost an unavoidable consequence of Xerxes's manner of proceeding. A wise prince, when he proposes an affair in council, and really desires that every

every one should speak his true sentiments, is extremely careful to conceal his own opinion, that he may put no constraint upon that of others, but leave them entirely at liberty. Xerxes, on the contrary, had openly discovered his own inclination, or rather resolution to undertake the war. When a prince acts in this manner, he will always find artful flatterers, who being eager to insinuate themselves and to please, and ever ready to comply with his passions, will not fail to second his opinion with specious and plausible reasons: whilst those that would be capable of giving good counsel, are restrained by fear; there being very few courtiers who love their prince well enough, and have sufficient courage to venture to displease him, by disputing what they know to be his taste or opinion.

The excessive praises given by Mardonius to Xerxes, which are the usual language of flatterers, ought to have rendered him suspicious to the king, and made him apprehend, that, under an appearance of zeal for his glory, that nobleman endeavoured to cloak his own ambition, and the violent desire he had to command the army. But these sweet and flattering words, which glide like a serpent under flowers, are so far from displeasing princes, that they captivate and charm them. They do not consider, that men flatter and praise them, because they believe them weak and vain enough to suffer themselves to be deceived by commendations, that bear no proportion to their merits and actions.

This behaviour of the king made the whole council mute. In this general silence, Artabanes, the king's uncle, a prince very venerable for his age and prudence, made the following speech. "Permit me, great prince," says he, addressing himself to Xerxes, "to deliver my sentiments to you on this occasion, with a liberty suitable to my age and to your interest. "When Darius, your father and my brother, first thought of making war against the Scythians, I used all my endeavours to divert him from it. I need not tell you what that enterprise cost, or what was the success of it. The people you are going to attack are infinitely more formidable than the Scythians. The Grecians are esteemed the very best troops in the world, either by land or sea. If the Athenians alone could defeat the numerous army commanded by Datis and Artaphernes, what ought we to expect from all the states of Greece united together? You design to pass from Asia into Europe, by laying a bridge over the sea. And what will become of us, if the Athenians, proving victorious, should advance to this bridge with their fleet, and break it down?" I

“ still tremble when I consider, that, in the Scythian expedition, the life of the king your father, and the safety of all his army, were reduced to depend upon the fidelity of one single man; and that if Hyftiaüs the Milesian had, in compliance with the strong instances made to him, consented to break down the bridge which had been laid over the Danube, the Persian empire had been entirely ruined. Do not expose yourself, Sir, to the like danger, especially since you are not obliged to do it. Take time at least to reflect upon it. When we have maturely deliberated upon an affair, whatever happens to be the success of it, we have nothing to impute to ourselves. Precipitation, besides its being imprudent, is almost always unfortunate, and attended with fatal consequences. Above all, do not suffer yourself, great prince, to be dazzled with the vain splendor of imaginary glory, or with the pompous appearance of your troops. The highest and most lofty trees have the most reason to dread the thunder. As God alone is truly great, he is an enemy to * pride, and takes pleasure in humbling every thing that exalteth itself: and very often the most numerous armies fly before an handful of men, because he inspires these with courage, and scatters terror among the others.”

Artabanus, after having spoken thus to the king, turned himself towards Mardonius, and reproached him with his want of sincerity or judgment, in giving the king a notion of the Grecians so directly contrary to truth; and showed how extremely he was to blame for desiring rashly to engage the nation in a war, which nothing but his own views of interest and ambition could tempt him to advise. “ If a war be resolved upon,” added he, “ let the king, whose life is dear to us all, remain in Persia: and do you, since you so ardently desire it, march at the head of the most numerous army that can be assembled. In the mean time, let your children and mine be given up as a pledge, to answer for the success of the war. If the issue of it be favourable, I consent that mine be put to death†: but if it proves otherwise, as I well foresee it will, then I desire that your children, and you yourself, on your return, may be treated in such a manner as you deserve, for the rash counsel you have given your master.”

* Φιλεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ εὐπεριχειοντα πάντα κολέειν. ἔ γὰρ εἰα φρονέειν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ θεός, ἢ ἑαυτόν.

† Why should the children be punished for their father's faults?

Xerxes, who was not accustomed to have his sentiments contradicted in this manner, fell into a rage: "Thank the gods," says he to Artabanes, "that you are my father's brother; were it not for that, you should this moment suffer the just reward of your audacious behaviour. But I will punish you for it in another manner, by leaving you here among the women, whom you too much resemble in your cowardice and fear, whilst I march at the head of my troops, where my duty and glory call me."

Artabanes had expressed his sentiments in very respectful and inoffensive terms: Xerxes nevertheless was extremely offended. It is the * misfortune of princes, spoiled by flattery, to look upon every thing as dry and austere, that it is sincere and ingenuous; and to regard all counsel, delivered with a generous, and disinterested freedom, as a seditious presumption. They do not consider, that even a good man never dares to tell them all he thinks, or discover the whole truth; especially in things that may be disagreeable to their humour: and that what they stand most in need of, is a sincere and faithful friend, that will conceal nothing from them. A prince ought to think himself very happy, if in his whole reign he finds but one man born with that degree of generosity, who certainly ought to be considered as the most valuable treasure of the state; as he is (if the expression may be admitted) both the most necessary; and, at the same time, the most rare instrument † of government.

Xerxes himself acknowledged this upon the occasion we are speaking of. When the first emotions of his anger were over, and he had time to reflect on his pillow upon the different counsels that were given him, he confessed he had been to blame to give his uncle such harsh language, and was not ashamed to confess his fault the next day in open council, ingenuously owning, that the heat of his youth, and his want of experience, had made him negligent in paying the regard due to a prince so worthy of respect as Artabanes, both for his age and wisdom; and declaring at the same time, that he was come over to his opinion, notwithstanding a dream he had had in the night, wherein a vision had appeared to him, and warmly exhorted him to undertake that war. All the lords who composed the council, were ravished to hear the king speak in this

* Ita formatis principum auribus, aut aspera quæ utilia, nec quicquam nisi jucundum et lætum accipiant. Tacit. Hist. l. iii. c. 56.

† Nullum majus boni imperii instrumentum quam bonus amicus. Tacit. Hist. l. iv. c. 7.

manner; and to testify their joy, they fell prostrate before him, striving who should most extol the glory of such a proceeding. Nor could their praises on such an occasion be at all suspected; * for it is no hard matter to discern, whether the praises given to princes proceed from the heart, and are founded upon truth, or whether they drop from the lips only, as an effect of mere flattery and deceit. That sincere and humble declaration of the king's, far from appearing as a weakness in him, was looked upon by them as the effort of a great soul, which rises above its faults, in bravely confessing them, by way of reparation and atonement. They admired the nobleness of this procedure the more, as they knew that princes educated, like Xerxes, in a vain haughtiness and false glory, are never disposed to own themselves in the wrong, and generally make use of their authority to justify, with pride and obstinacy, whatever faults they have committed through ignorance or imprudence. We may venture, I think, to say, that it is more glorious to rise in this manner, than it would be never to have fallen. Certainly there is nothing greater, and, at the same time, more rare and uncommon, than to see a mighty and powerful prince, and that in the time of his greatest prosperity, acknowledge his faults, when he happens to commit any, without seeking pretexts or excuses to cover them; pay homage to truth, even when it is against him, and condemns him; and leave other princes, who have a false delicacy concerning their grandeur, the shame of always abounding with errors and defects, and of never owning that they have any.

The night following, the same phantom, if we may believe Herodotus, appeared again to the king, and repeated the same solicitations with new menaces and threatenings. Xerxes communicated what passed to his uncle; and, in order to find out whether this vision was divine or not, entreated him earnestly to put on the royal robes, to ascend the throne, and afterwards to take his place in his bed for the night. Artabanes hereupon discoursed very sensibly and rationally with the king upon the vanity of dreams: and then coming to what personally regarded him: † “I look upon it,” says he, “almost equally

* Nec occultum est quando ex veritate, quando adumbrata lætitia facta imperatorum celebrantur. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 31.

† This thought is in Hesiod, Opera et dies, v. 293. Cic. pro Cluent. n. 84. et Tit. Liv. l. xxii. n. 19. Sæpe ego audiui, milites, cum primum esse virum, qui ipse consulat quid in rem sit; secundum eum, qui bene monenti obediat: qui nec ipse consulere, nec alteri parere sciat, cum ex-
tremi ingenii esse.

“ commendable to think well one’s self, or to hearken with
 “ docility to the good counsels of others. You have both
 “ these qualities, great prince ; and if you followed the natu-
 “ ral bent of your own temper, it would lead you entirely to
 “ sentiments of wisdom and moderation. You never take any
 “ violent measures or resolutions, but when the arts of evil
 “ counsellors draw you into them, or the poison of flattery
 “ misleads you ; in the same manner as the ocean, which of
 “ itself is calm and serene, and never disturbed but by the ex-
 “ traneous impulse of other bodies. What afflicted me in the
 “ answer you made me the other day, when I delivered my
 “ sentiments freely in council, was not the personal affront to
 “ me, but the injury you did yourself, by making so wrong a
 “ choice between the different counsels that were offered ; re-
 “ jecting that which led you to sentiments of moderation and
 “ equity ; and embracing the other, which, on the contrary,
 “ tended only to nourish pride, and to enflame ambition.”

Artabanès, through complaisance, passed the night in the king’s bed, and had the same vision which Xerxes had before ; that is, in his sleep he saw a man, who made him severe reproaches, and threatened him with the greatest misfortunes, if he continued to oppose the king’s intentions. This so much affected him, that he came over to the king’s first opinion, believing that there was something divine in these repeated visions ; and the war against the Grecians was resolved upon. These circumstances I relate, as I find them in Herodotus.

Xerxes, in the sequel, did but ill support this character of moderation. We shall find, that he had but very short intervals of wisdom and reason, which shone out only for a moment, and then gave way to the most culpable and extravagant excesses. We may judge, however, even from thence, that he had very good natural parts and inclinations. But the most excellent qualities are soon spoiled and corrupted by the poison of flattery, and the possession of absolute and unlimited power :

* *Vi dominationis convulsus.*

It is a fine sentiment in a minister of state, to be less affected with an affront to himself, than with the wrong done his master by giving him evil and pernicious counsel.

Mardonius’s counsel was pernicious ; because, as Artabanès observes, it tended only to nourish and increase that spirit of haughtiness and violence in the prince, which was but too pre-

valent in him already, *ἡρῶν αὐξήσεως*; and *in that it disposed and accustomed his mind still to carry his views and desires beyond his present fortune, still to be aiming at something farther, and to set no bounds to his ambition. † This is the predominant passion of those men whom we usually call Conquerors; and whom, according to the language of the holy scripture, we might call, with greater propriety, ‡ “robbers of nations.” If you consider and examine the whole succession of Persian kings, says Seneca, will you find any one of them that ever stopped his career of his own accord? that was ever satisfied with his past conquests; or that was not forming some new project or enterprise, when death surprised him? Nor ought we to be astonished at such a disposition, adds the same author: for ambition is a gulf and a bottomless abyss, wherein every thing is lost that is thrown in, and where, though you were to heap province upon province, and kingdom upon kingdom, you would never be able to fill up the mighty void.

SECTION II.

XERXES BEGINS HIS MARCH, AND PASSES FROM ASIA
INTO EUROPE, BY CROSSING THE STRAITS OF THE
HELLESPONT UPON A BRIDGE OF BOATS.

THE war being resolved upon, Xerxes, that he might omit nothing which might contribute to the success of his undertaking, entered into a confederacy with the Carthaginians, who were at that time the most potent people of the west, and made an agreement with them, that whilst the Persian forces should attack Greece, the Carthaginians should fall upon the Grecian colonies that were settled in Sicily and Italy, in order to hinder them from coming to the aid of the other Grecians. The Carthaginians made Amilcar their general, who did not content himself with raising as many troops as he could in Africa,

* Ὅς κακὸν εἶη διδάσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν πλέον τι διζέσθαι αἰεὶ ἔχειν τὴν πα-
ρόντος.

† Nec hoc Alexandri tantum vitium fuit, quem per Liberi Herculisque
vulgigia felix temeritas egit; sed omnium, quos fortuna irritavit implendo.
Totum regni Persici stemma perculse: quem invenies, cui modum imperii
fatieta fecerit? qui non vitam in aliqua ulterius procedendi cogitatione
finierit? Nec id mirum est. Quicquid cupiditati contigit, penitus hauri-
tur et conditur: nec interest quantum eo, quod inexplebile est, congeras.
Senec. l. vii. de beneficiis. c. 7.

‡ Jer. ix. 7.

‡ A. M. 3523. Ant. J. C. 481.

but, with the money that Xerxes had sent him, engaged a great number of foldiers out of Spain, Gaul, and Italy, in his service ; so that he collected an army of 300,000 men, and a proportionate number of ships, in order to execute the projects and stipulations of the league.

Thus Xerxes, agreeably to the prophet * Daniel's prediction, " having, through his great power and his great riches, stirred up all the nations of the then known world against the realm of Greece ;" that is to say, of all the west, under the command of Amilcar, and of all the east, that was under his own banner, † set out from Susa, in order to enter upon this war, in the fifth year of his reign, which was the tenth after the battle of Marathon, and marched towards Sardis, the place of rendezvous for the whole land-army, whilst the fleet advanced along the coasts of Asia Minor towards the Hellespont.

‡ Xerxes had given orders to have a passage cut through mount Athos. This is a mountain in Macedonia, now a province of Turkey in Europe, which extends a great way into the Archipelago, in the form of a peninsula. It is joined to the land only by an isthmus of about half a league over. We have already taken notice, that the sea in this place was very tempestuous, and occasioned frequent shipwrecks. Xerxes made this his pretext for the orders he gave for cutting through the mountain: but the true reason was the vanity of signalizing himself by an extraordinary enterprise, and by doing a thing that was extremely difficult ; as Tacitus says of Nero: *Erat incredibilium cupitor*. Accordingly Herodotus observes, that this undertaking was more vain-glorious than useful, since he might, with less trouble and expence, have had his vessels carried over the isthmus, as was the practice in those days. The passage he caused to be cut through the mountain was broad enough to let two galleies with three banks of oars each pass through it a-breast. § This prince, who was extravagant enough to believe, that all nature and the very elements were under his command, in consequence of that opinion, writ a letter to mount Athos in the following terms: " Athos, thou " proud and aspiring mountain, that liftest up thy head unto " the heavens, I advise thee not to be so audacious, as to put " rocks and stones, which cannot be cut, in the way of my " workmen. If thou givest them that opposition, I shall cut

* Dan. xi. 2. † Herod. l. vii. c. 26. A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 21, 24.

§ Plut. de ira cohib. p. 455.

“ thee entirely down, and throw thee headlong into the sea.”

* At the same time he ordered his labourers to be whipt, in order to make them carry on the work the faster.

† A traveller, who lived in the time of Francis the First, and who wrote a book in Latin concerning the singular and remarkable things he had seen in his travels, doubts the truth of this fact; and takes notice, that as he passed near mount Athos, he could perceive no traces or footsteps of the work we have been speaking of.

‡ Xerxes, as we have already related, advanced towards Sardis. Having left Cappadocia, and passed the river Halys, he came to Cylene, a city of Phrygia, near which is the source of the Mæander. Pythius, a Lydian, had his residence in this city, and, next to Xerxes, was the most opulent prince of those times. He entertained Xerxes and his whole army with an incredible magnificence, and made him an offer of all his wealth towards defraying the expences of his expedition. Xerxes, surpris'd and charmed at so generous an offer, had the curiosity to inquire to what sum his riches amounted. Pythius made answer, that having the design of offering them to his service, he had taken an exact account of them, and that the silver he had by him amounted to 2000 § talents, which make 6,000,000 French money; and the gold to 4,000,000 of darics||, wanting 7000, (that is to say, to 40,000,000 of livres, wanting 70,000, reckoning ten livres French money to the daric). All this money he offered him, telling him, that his revenues were sufficient for the support of his household. Xerxes made him very hearty acknowledgments, entered into a particular friendship with him; and, that he might not be undone in generosity, instead of accepting his offers, obliged him to accept of a present of the 7000 darics, which were wanting to make up his gold to a round sum of 4,000,000.

After such a conduct as this, who would not think that Pythius's** peculiar character and particular virtue had been generosity, and a noble contempt of riches? And yet he was one of the most penurious princes in the world; and who, besides his sordid avarice with regard to himself, was extremely cruel and inhuman to his subjects, whom he kept continually employed in hard and fruitless labour, always digging in the

* Plut. de anim. tranq. p. 470.

† Bellon. singul. rer. observ. p. 78.

‡ Herod. l. vii. c. 26—29.

§ About-L. 255,000 Sterling.

|| About L. 1,700,000 Sterling.

** Plutarch calls him Pythis. Plut. de virt. mulier. p. 262.

gold and silver mines which he had in his territories. When he was absent from home, all his subjects went with tears in their eyes to the princess his wife, laid their complaints before her, and implored her assistance. Commiserating their condition, she made use of a very extraordinary method to work upon her husband, and to give him a clear sense and a kind of palpable demonstration of the folly and injustice of his conduct. On his return home, she ordered an entertainment to be prepared for him, very magnificent in appearance, but which in reality was no entertainment. All the courses and services were of gold and silver; and the prince, in the midst of all these rich dishes and splendid rarities, could not satisfy his hunger. He easily divined the meaning of this enigma, and began to consider, that the end of gold and silver was not merely to be looked upon, but to be employed and made use of; and that to neglect, as he had done, the business of husbandry and the tilling of lands, by employing all his people in digging and working of mines, was the direct way to bring a famine both upon himself and his country. For the future therefore he only reserved a fifth part of his people for the business of mining. Plutarch has preserved this fact in a treatise, wherein he has collected a great many others to prove the ability and industry of ladies. We have the same disposition of mind designed in fabulous story, in the example of a * prince, who reigned in this very country, for whom every thing that he touched was immediately turned into gold, according to the request which he himself had made to the gods, and who by that means was in danger of perishing with hunger.

† The same prince, who had made such obliging offers to Xerxes, having desired as a favour of him some time afterwards, that out of his five sons who served in his army, he would be pleased to leave him the eldest, in order to be a support and comfort to him in his old age; the king was so enraged at the proposal, though so reasonable in itself, that he caused the eldest son to be killed before the eyes of his father; giving the latter to understand, that it was a favour he spared him and the rest of his children: and then causing the dead body to be cut in two, and one part to be placed on the right, and the other on the left, he made the whole army pass between them, as if he meant to purge and purify it by such a sacrifice. What a monster in nature is a prince of this kind!

* Midas, king of Phrygia.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 38, 39. Sen. de ira. l. iii. c. 17.

How is it possible to have any dependence upon the friendship of the great, or to rely upon their warmest professions and protestations of gratitude and service?

* From Phrygia Xerxes marched, and arrived at Sardis, where he spent the winter. From hence he sent heralds to all the cities of Greece, except Athens and Lacedæmon, to require them to give him earth and winter, which, as we have taken notice before, was the way of exacting and acknowledging submission.

As soon as the spring of the year came on, he left Sardis, and directed his march towards the Hellespont. † Being arrived there, he was desirous to see a naval engagement for his curiosity and diversion. To this end, a throne was erected for him upon an eminence; and, in that situation, seeing all the sea crowded with his vessels, and the land covered with his troops, he at first felt a secret joy diffuse itself through his soul, in surveying with his own eyes the vast extent of his power, and considering himself as the most happy of mortals: but reflecting soon afterwards, that of so many thousands, in an hundred years time there would not be one living soul remaining, his joy was turned into grief, and he could not forbear weeping at the uncertainty and instability of human things. He might have found another subject of reflection, which would have more justly merited his tears and affliction, had he turned his thoughts upon himself, and considered the reproaches he deserved for being the instrument of shortening that fatal term to millions of people, whom his cruel ambition was going to sacrifice in an unjust and unnecessary war.

Artabanes, who neglected no opportunity of making himself useful to the young prince, and of instilling into him sentiments of goodness for his people, laid hold of this moment, in which he found him touched with a sense of tenderness and humanity, and led him into further reflections upon the miseries with which the lives of most men are attended, and which render them so painful and unhappy; endeavouring at the same time to make him sensible of the duty and obligation of princes, who, not being able to prolong the natural life of their subjects, ought at least to do all that lies in their power, to alleviate the pains, and allay the bitterness of it.

In the same conversation Xerxes asked his uncle, if he still persisted in his first opinion, and if he would still advise him not to make war against Greece, supposing he had not seen

* Herod. l. vii. c. 30—32.

† Ibid. c. 44. et 46.

the vision, which occasioned him to change his sentiments. Artabanus owned, he still had his fears; and that he was very uneasy concerning two things. What are those two things? replied Xerxes. The land and the sea, says Artabanus: the land, because there is no country that can feed and maintain so numerous an army; the sea, because there are no ports capable of receiving such a multitude of vessels. The king was very sensible of the strength of this reasoning; but, as it was now too late to go back, he made answer, that in great undertakings men ought not so narrowly to examine all the inconveniences that may attend them; that if they did, no signal enterprises would ever be attempted; and that if his predecessors had observed so scrupulous and timorous a rule of policy, the Persian empire would never have attained its present height of greatness and glory.

Artabanus gave the king another piece of very prudent advice, which he thought fit to follow no more than he had done the former. This advice was, not to employ the Ionians in his service against the Grecians, from whom they were originally descended, and on which account he ought to suspect their fidelity. Xerxes, however, after these conversations with his uncle, treated him with great friendship, paid him the highest marks of honour and respect, sent him back to Susa to take the care and administration of the empire upon him during his own absence, and to that end vested him with his whole authority.

* Xerxes, at a vast expence, had caused a bridge of boats to be built upon the sea, for the passage of his forces from Asia into Europe. The space that separates the two continents, formerly called the Hellespont, and now called the Strait of the Dardanelles, or of Gallipoli, is seven stadias in breadth, which is near an English mile. A violent storm rising on a sudden, soon after broke down the bridge. Xerxes hearing this news on his arrival, fell into a transport of passion; and, in order to avenge himself of so cruel an affront, commanded two pair of chains to be thrown into the sea, as if he meant to shackle and confine it, and that his men should give it three hundred strokes of a whip, and speak to it in this manner: "Thou troublesome and unhappy element, thus does thy master chastise thee for having affronted him without reason. Know, that Xerxes will easily find means to pass over thy

* Herod. l. vii. c. 33—36.

“waters in spite of all thy billows and resistance.” The extravagance of this prince did not stop here: but making the undertakers of the work answerable for events, which do not in the least depend upon the power of man, he ordered all the persons to have their heads struck off, that had been charged with the direction and management of that undertaking.

* Xerxes commanded two other bridges to be built, one for the army to pass over, and the other for the baggage and beasts of burden. He appointed workmen more able and expert than the former, who went about it in this manner. They placed 360 vessels across, some of them having three banks of oars, and others 50 oars a-piece, with their sides turned towards the Euxine sea; and on the side that faced the Ægean sea, they put 314. They then cast large anchors into the water on both sides, in order to fix and secure all these vessels against the violence of the winds, and against the current † of the water. On the east side they left three passages or vacant spaces between the vessels, that there might be room for small boats to go and come easily, as there was occasion, to and from the Euxine sea. After this, upon the land on both sides, they drove large piles into the earth, with huge rings fastened to them, to which were tied six vast cables, which went over each of the two bridges; two of which cables were made of hemp, and four of a sort of reeds called *βίλα*, which were made use of in those times for the making of cordage. Those that were made of hemp must have been of an extraordinary strength and thickness, since every cubit of those cables weighed a talent‡. The cables, laid over the whole extent of the vessels lengthways, reached from one side to the other of the sea. When this part of the work was finished, quite over the vessels lengthways, and over the cables we have been speaking of, they laid the trunks of trees, cut purposely for that use, and flat boats again over them, fastened and joined together, to serve as a kind of floor or solid bottom: all which they covered over with earth, and added rails or battlements on each side, that the horses and cattle might not be frightened with seeing the sea in their passage. This was the form of those famous bridges built by Xerxes.

* Herod. l. vii. c. 33—36.

† Polybius remarks, that there is a current of water from the lake Mæotis and the Euxine sea into the Ægean sea, occasioned by the rivers which empty themselves into those two seas. Pol. l. iv. p. 307, 308.

‡ A talent in weight consisted of 60 minæ, that is to say, of 42 pounds of our weight; and the mina consisted of 100 drachms.

When the whole work was completed, a day was appointed for their passing over: and as soon as the first rays of the sun began to appear, sweet odours of all kinds were abundantly spread over both the bridges, and the way was strewed with myrtle. At the same time Xerxes poured out libations into the sea, and turning his face towards the sun (the principal object of the Persian worship), he implored the assistance of that god in the enterprise he had undertaken, and desired the continuance of his protection till he had made the entire conquest of Europe, and had brought it into subjection to his power. This done, he threw the vessel which he used in making his libations, together with a golden cup, and a Persian scymitar, into the sea. The army was seven days and seven nights in passing over these straits; those who were appointed to conduct the march, lashing the poor soldiers all the while with whips, in order to quicken their speed, according to the custom of that nation; which, properly speaking, was only a huge assemblage of slaves.

SECTION III.

THE NUMBER OF XERXES' FORCES, &c. &c.

XERXES*, directing his march across the Thracian Chersonesus, arrived at Dor, a city standing at the mouth of the Hebrus in Thrace; where, having encamped his army, and given orders for his fleet to follow him along the shore, he reviewed them both.

He found the land-army, which he had brought out of Asia, consisted of 1,700,000 foot, and of 80,000 horse, which, with 20,000 men that were absolutely necessary at least for conducting and taking care of the carriages and camels, made in all 1,800,000 men. When he had passed the Hellespont, the other nations that submitted to him, made an addition to his army of 300,000 men; which made all his land-forces together amount to 2,100,000 men.

His fleet, as it was when it set out from Asia, consisted of 1207 vessels, or galleys, all of three banks of oars, and intended for fighting. Each vessel carried 200 men, natives of the country that fitted them out, besides 30 more, that were either Persians or Medes, or of the Sacæ: which made in all 277,610 men. The European nations augmented his fleet

* Herod. l. vii. c. 56—99, et 184—187.

with 120 vessels, each of which carried 200 men, in all 24,000: these added to the other, amount together to 301,610 men.

Besides this fleet, which consisted all of large vessels, the small galleys of 35 oars, the transport-ships, the vessels that carried the provisions, and that were employed in other uses, amounted to 3000. If we reckon but 80 men in each of these vessels, one with another, that made in the whole 240,000 men.

Thus, when Xerxes arrived at Thermopylæ, his land and sea-forces together made up the number of 2,641,610 men, without including servants, eunuchs, women, sutlers, and other people of that sort, who usually follow an army, and of which the number at this time was equal to that of the forces: so that the whole number of souls that followed Xerxes in this expedition, amounted to 5,283,220. This is the computation which Herodotus makes of them, and in which Plutarch and Mocrates agree with him. * Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Ælian, and others, fall very short of this number in their calculation: but their accounts of the matter appear to be less authentic than that of Herodotus, who lived in the same age this expedition was made, and who repeats the inscription engraved, by the order of the Amphictyons, upon the monument of those Grecians who were killed at Thermopylæ, which expressed that they fought against 3,000,000 of men.

† For the sustenance of all these persons, there must be every day consumed, according to Herodotus's computation, above 110,340 medimni's of flour, (the medimnus was a measure, which, according to Budæus, was equivalent to six of our bushels,) allowing for every head the quantity of a choenix, which was the daily portion or allowance that masters gave their slaves among the Grecians. We have no account in history of any other army so numerous as this; and amongst all these millions of men, there was not one that could vie with Xerxes in point of beauty, either for the comeliness of his face, or the tallness of his person. But this is a poor merit or pre-eminence for a prince, when attended with no other. Accordingly Justin, after he has mentioned the number of these troops, adds, that this vast body of forces wanted a chief: *Huic tanto agmini dux defuit.*

We should hardly be able to conceive how it was possible to

* Diod. l. xi. p. 3. Plin. l. xxxiii. c. 10. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 3.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 187.

find a sufficient quantity of provisions for such an immense number of persons, if the * historian had not informed us, that Xerxes had employed four whole years in making preparations for this expedition. We have seen already how many vessels of burden there were, that coasted along continually to attend upon and supply the land-army; and doubtless there were fresh ones arriving every day, that furnished the camp with a sufficient plenty of all things necessary.

† Herodotus acquaints us with the method they made use of to calculate their forces; which were almost innumerable. They assembled 10,000 men in a particular place, and ranked them as close together as was possible; after which they described a circle quite round them, and erected a little wall upon that circle about half the height of a man's body; when this was done, they made the whole army successively pass through this space, and thereby knew to what number it amounted.

Herodotus gives us also a particular account of the different armour of all the nations this army consisted of. Besides the generals of every nation, who each of them commanded the troops of their respective country, the land-army was under the command of six Persian generals; viz. Mardonius, the son of Gobryas; Tirintatechimus, the son of Artabanes, and Smerdonus, son to Otanes, both near relations to the king; Masistius, son of Darius and Atossa; Gergis, son of Ariazes; and Megabyfus, son of Zopyrus. The 10,000 Persians, who were called the Immortal Band, were commanded by Hydarnes. The cavalry had its particular commanders.

There were likewise four Persian generals who commanded the fleet. In ‡ Herodotus we have a particular account of all the nations by which it was fitted out. Artemisa, queen of Halicarnassus, who, from the death of her husband, governed the kingdom for her son, who was still a minor, brought but five vessels along with her; but they were the best equipped, and the lightest ships in the whole fleet, next to those of the Sidonians. This princess distinguished herself in this war, by her singular courage, and still more by her prudence and conduct. Herodotus observes, that among all the commanders in the army, there was not one who gave Xerxes so good advice and such wise counsel as this queen: but he was not prudent enough to apply it to his advantage.

When Xerxes had numbered his whole forces by land and

* Herod. l. vii. c. 20.

† Ibid. c. 60.

‡ Ibid. l. vii. c. 89, 90.

sea, he asked Demaratus, if he thought the Grecians would dare to expect him. I have already taken notice, that this Demaratus was one of the two kings of Sparta, who, being exiled by the faction of his enemies, had taken refuge at the Persian court, where he was entertained with the greatest marks of honour and beneficence. * As the courtiers were one day expressing their surprise that a king should suffer himself to be banished, and desired him to acquaint them with the reason of it: "It is," says he, "because the law is more powerful than the kings at Sparta." This prince was very much considered in Persia: but neither the injustice of the Spartan citizens, nor the kind treatment of the Persian king, could make him forget his country †. As soon as he knew that Xerxes was making preparations for the war, he found means to give the Grecians secret intelligence of it. And now, being obliged on this occasion to speak his sentiments to the king, he did it with such a noble freedom and dignity, as became a Spartan, and a king of Sparta.

‡ Demaratus, before he answered the king's question, desired to know whether it was his pleasure that he should flatter him, or that he should speak his thoughts to him freely and truly. Xerxes having declared that he desired him to act with entire sincerity, he spoke in the following terms: "Great prince," says Demaratus, "since it is agreeable to your pleasure and commands, I shall deliver my sentiments to you with the utmost truth and sincerity. It must be confessed, that, from the beginning of time, Greece has been trained up, and accustomed to poverty: but then she has introduced and established virtue within her territories, which wisdom cultivates, and the vigour of her laws maintains. And it is by the use which Greece knows how to make of this virtue, that she equally defends herself against the inconveniences of poverty, and the yoke of servitude. But, to speak only of the Lacedæmonians, my particular countrymen, you may assure yourself, that as they are born and bred up in liberty, they will never hearken to any proposals that tend to slavery. Though they were deserted and abandoned by all the other Grecians, and reduced to a band of 1000 men, or even to a more inconsiderable number, they will still come out to meet you, and not refuse to give you battle." Xerxes, upon hearing this discourse, fell a laughing; and as he could

* Plut. in Apoph. Lacon. p. 220.

† Amicior patriæ post fugam, quam regi post beneficia. Justin.

‡ Herod. l. viii. c. 101—105.

not comprehend how men, in such a state of liberty and independence, as the Lacedæmonians were described to enjoy, who had no master to force and compel them to it, could be capable of exposing themselves in such a manner to danger and death; Demaratus replied: * “The Spartans indeed are free, and “under no subjection to the will of any man; but, at the same “time, they have laws, to which they are subject, and of which “they stand in greater awe than your subjects do of your “majesty. Now, by these laws they are forbid ever to fly in “battle, let the number of their enemies be ever so superior; “and are commanded, by abiding firm in their post, either to “conquer or to die.”

Xerxes was not offended at the liberty wherewith Demaratus spoke to him, and continued his march.

SECTION IV.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS AND ATHENIANS SEND TO THEIR ALLIES IN VAIN TO REQUIRE SUCCOURS FROM THEM.—THE COMMAND OF THE FLEET IS GIVEN TO THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

LACEDÆMON† and Athens, which were the two most powerful cities of Greece, and the cities against which Xerxes was most exasperated, were not indolent or asleep, whilst so formidable an enemy was approaching. Having received intelligence long before, of the designs of this prince, they had sent spies to Sardis, in order to have a more exact information of the number and quality of his forces. These spies were seized, and as they were just going to be put to death, Xerxes countermanded it, and gave orders that they should be conducted through his army, and then sent back without any harm being done to them. At their return, the Grecians understood what they had to apprehend from so potent an enemy.

They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily to Gelon tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Corcyra and Crete, to desire succours from them, and to form a league against the common enemy.

‡ The people of Argos offered a very considerable succour, on condition they should have an equal share of the authority and command with the Lacedæmonians. The latter consented, that the king of Argos should have the same authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them

* Herod. l. vii. c. 145, 146.

† Ibid.

‡ Ibid. c. 148—152.

a great deal: but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honour, and a foolish jealousy of command! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to enter into the league with the Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow.

* The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince of the Greeks at that time. He promised to assist them with 200 vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of 20,000 foot and 2000 horse, 2000 light-armed soldiers, and the same number of bowmen and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedæmonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians, who made answer, that they alone had a right to command the fleet in case the Lacedæmonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided of troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, which consisted of 300,000 men.

† The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favourable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of 60 vessels. But they advanced no farther than to the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engagement, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror.

‡ The people of Crete, having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what resolution they were to take on this occasion, absolutely refused to enter into the league.

§ Thus were the Lacedæmonians and Athenians left almost to themselves, all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and of Platæa. || In so pressing a danger, their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves; for which

* Herod. l. vii. c. 153—162.

† Ibid. c. 169—171.

§ Ibid. c. 132.

‡ Ibid. c. 168.

|| Ibid. c. 145.

reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Ægina, with whom they were actually at war.

* Their next care was to appoint a general: for there never was any occasion wherein it was more necessary to chuse one capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole forces of Asia. The most able and experienced captains, terrified at the greatness of the danger, had taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicycles, who had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disreputation for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice; notwithstanding all which, it was apprehended, that, in the assembly of the people, the votes would run in his favour. Themistocles, who was sensible†, that in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced, that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicycles was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear that he was not proof against the Persian gold. There are occasions, when, in order to act wisely, I had almost said regularly, it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor: ‡ and having found means to make the ambition of Epicycles amends, by gratifying his avarice, he got himself elected general in his stead. We may here, I think, very justly apply to Themistocles what Titus Livius says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were going to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own credit, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raised against him; and he succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds, “ § The conjuncture of affairs, and the
“ extreme

* Plut. in Themist. p. 114.

† Quilibet nautarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare potest: ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro et gubernatore opus est. Liv. l. xxiv. n. 8.

‡ Χρήμασι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν ἐζωνήσατο παρὰ τῷ Ἐπικύδῃ.

§ Tempus ac necessitas belli, ac discrimen summæ rerum, faciebant nequis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem

“extreme danger the commonwealth was exposed to, were arguments of such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all suspicion of Fabius’s having acted upon any motive of interest or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul, in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country.”

* The Athenians also passed a decree to recall home all their people that were in banishment. They were afraid lest Aristides should join their enemies, and lest his credit should carry over a great many others to the side of the barbarians. But they had a very false notion of their citizen, who was infinitely remote from such sentiments. Be that as it would, on this extraordinary juncture they thought fit to recall him; and Themistocles was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing in them of that implacable, bitter, and outrageous spirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the latter times of the republic. The danger of the state was the means of their reconciliation, and when their service was necessary to the preservation of the republic, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancour: and we shall see, by the sequel, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his ancient rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.

The alarm increased in Greece in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedæmonians had been able to make no other resistance than with their land-forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of The-

sulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod, cum summo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque eum haud dubie esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reip. fecisset. Liv. l. xxiv. n. 9.

* Plat. in Arist. p. 322, 323.

themistocles,

Themistocles, who, upon some other pretext, had caused 100 galleys to be built. Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he, on the contrary, considered it rather as the beginning, or as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people: and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to make the Athenian power entirely maritime, perceiving very plainly, that, as she was so weak by land, she had no other way to render herself necessary to her allies, or formidable to her enemies. His opinion herein prevailed among the people in spite of the opposition of Miltiades, whose difference of opinion undoubtedly arose from the little probability there was, that a people entirely unacquainted with fighting at sea, and that were only capable of fitting out and arming very small vessels, should be able to withstand so formidable a power as that of the Persians, who had both a numerous land-army, and a fleet of above 1000 ships.

* The Athenians had some silver mines in a part of Attica called Laurium, the whole revenues and products of which used to be distributed amongst them. Themistocles had the courage to propose to the people, that they should abolish these distributions, and employ that money in building vessels with three benches of oars, in order to make war upon the people of Ægina, against whom he endeavoured to inflame their ancient jealousy. No people are ever willing to sacrifice their private interests to the general utility of the public: for they seldom have so much generosity or public spirit, as to purchase the welfare or preservation of the state at their own expence. The Athenian people, however, did it upon this occasion: moved by the lively remonstrances of Themistocles, they consented that the money which arose from the product of the mines, should be employed in the building of 100 galleys. Against the arrival of Xerxes they doubled the number, and to that fleet Greece owed its preservation.

† When they came to the point of naming a general for the command of the navy, the Athenians, who alone had furnished the two-thirds of it, laid claim to that honour, as appertaining to them, and their pretensions were certainly just and well grounded: It happened, however, that the suffrages of the allies

* Plut. in Themist. p. 113.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 213.

all concurred in favour of Eurybiades, a Lacedæmonian. Themistocles, though very aspiring after glory, thought it incumbent upon him on this occasion to neglect his own interests for the common good of the nation: and giving the Athenians to understand, that, provided they behaved themselves with courage and conduct, all the Grecians would quickly desire to confer the command upon them of their own accord, he persuaded them to consent, as he would do himself, to give up that point at present to the Spartans. It may justly be said, that this prudent moderation in Themistocles was another means of saving the state: for the allies threatened to separate themselves from them, if they refused to comply; and if that had happened, Greece must have been inevitably ruined.

SECTION V.

THE BATTLE OF THERMOPYLÆ.—THE DEATH OF LEONIDAS.

THE only thing that now remained to be discussed*, was to know in what place they should resolve to meet the Persians, in order to dispute their entrance into Greece. The people of Thessaly represented, that as they were the most exposed, and likely to be first attacked by the enemy, it was but reasonable, that their defence and security, on which the safety of all Greece so much depended, should first be provided for; without which they should be obliged to take other measures, that would be contrary to their inclinations, but yet absolutely necessary, in case their country was left unprotected and defenceless. It was hereupon resolved, that 10,000 men should be sent to guard the passage which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, near the river Peneus, between the mountains of Olympus and Ossa. But Alexander, the son of Amyntas, king of Macedonia, having given them to understand, that if they waited for the Persians in that place, they must inevitably be overpowered by their numbers, they retired to Thermopylæ. The Thessalians finding themselves thus abandoned, without any farther deliberation submitted to the Persians.

† Thermopylæ is a strait or narrow pass of mount Ceta, between Thessaly and Phocis, but 25 feet broad, which therefore might be defended by a small number of forces, and

* A. M. 3524. Ant. J. C. 480. Herod. l. vii. c. 172, 173.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 175, 177.

which was the only way through which the Persian land-army could enter Achaia, and advance to besiege Athens. This was the place where the Grecian army thought fit to wait for the enemy: the person who commanded it was Leonidas, one of the two kings of Sparta.

* Xerxes in the mean time was upon his march: he had given orders for his fleet to follow him along the coast, and to regulate their motions according to those of the land-army. Wherever he came, he found provisions and refreshments prepared beforehand, pursuant to the orders he had sent; and every city he arrived at gave him a magnificent entertainment, which cost immense sums of money. The vast expence of these treats gave occasion to a witty saying of a certain citizen of Abdera in Thrace, who, when the king was gone, said, they ought to thank the gods, that he ate but one meal a-day.

† In the same country of Thrace, there was a prince who showed an extraordinary greatness of soul on this occasion: it was the king of the Bisaltes. Whilst all the other princes ran into servitude, and basely submitted to Xerxes, he bravely refused to receive his yoke, or to obey him. Not being in a condition to resist him with open force, he retired to the top of the mountain Rhodope, into an inaccessible place, and forbade all his sons, who were six in number, to carry arms against Greece. But they, either out of fear of Xerxes, or out of a curiosity to see so important a war, followed the Persians, in contradiction to their father's injunction. On their return home, their father, to punish so direct a disobedience, condemned all his sons to have their eyes put out. Xerxes continued his march through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly, every thing giving way before him till he came to the Strait of Thermopylæ.

‡ One cannot see, without the utmost astonishment, with what an handful of troops the Grecians opposed the innumerable army of Xerxes. We find a particular account of their number in Pausanias. All their forces joined together, amounted only to 11,200 men, of which number 4000 only were employed at Thermopylæ to defend the pass. But these soldiers, adds the historian, were all determined to a man either to conquer or die. And what is it that an army of such resolution is not able to effect?

§ When Xerxes advanced near the Straits of Thermopylæ,

* Herod. l. vii. c. 108. 132.

† Ibid. l. viii. c. 116.

‡ Paus. l. x. p. 645. § Herod. l. vii. c. 207—231. Died. l. xi. p. 5—10.

He was strangely surpris'd to find that they were prepared to dispute his passage. He had always flattered himself, that on the first hearing of his arrival, the Grecians would betake themselves to flight: nor could he ever be persuaded to believe, what Demaratus had told him from the beginning of his project, that at the first pass he came to, he would find his whole army stopped by an handful of men. He sent out a spy before him to take a view of the enemy. The spy brought him word, that he found the Lacedæmonians out of their intrenchments, and that they were diverting themselves with military exercises, and combing their hair: this was the Spartan manner of preparing themselves for battle.

Xerxes, still entertaining some hopes of their flight, waited four days on purpose to give them time to retreat; * and in this interval of time he used his utmost endeavours to gain Leonidas, by making him magnificent promises, and assuring him, that he would make him master of all Greece, if he would come over to his party. Leonidas rejected his proposal with scorn and indignation. Xerxes, having afterwards wrote to him to deliver up his arms, Leonidas, in a style and spirit truly laconical, answered him in these words; “ †Come and “ take them.” Nothing remained, but to prepare themselves to engage the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes first commanded his Median forces to march against them, with orders to take them all alive, and bring them to him. These Medes were not able to stand the charge of the Grecians; and being shamefully put to flight, they showed, says Herodotus ‡, that Xerxes had a great many men, and but few soldiers. The next that were sent to face the Spartans, were those Persians called the Immortal Band, which consisted of 10,000 men, and were the best troops in the whole army. But these had no better success than the former.

Xerxes, out of all hopes of being able to force his way through troops so determined to conquer or die, was extremely perplexed, and could not tell what resolution to take, when an inhabitant of the country came to him, and discovered a secret § path to the top of an eminence, which overlooked and

* Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225.

† Ἀντίραψε, μολὼν λάβε.

‡ Ὅτι πολλοὶ μὲν ἄνθρωποι ἦεν, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄνδρες.

Quod multi homines essent, pauci autem viri.

§ When the Gauls, 200 years after this, came to invade Greece, they possessed themselves of the Straits of Thermopylæ by means of the same by-path, which the Grecians had still neglected to secure, Pausan. l. i. p. 7. et 8.

commanded the Spartan forces. He quickly dispatched a detachment thither; which, marching all night, arrived there at the break of day, and possessed themselves of that advantageous post.

The Greeks were soon apprised of this misfortune; and Leonidas, seeing that it was now impossible to repulse the enemy, obliged the rest of the allies to retire, but staid himself with his 300 Lacedæmonians, all resolved to die with their leader; who being told by the oracle, that either Lacedæmon or her king must necessarily perish, determined, without the least difficulty or hesitation, to sacrifice himself for his country. The Spartans lost all hopes either of conquering or escaping; and looked upon Thermopylæ as their burying-place. The king, exhorting his men to take some nourishment, and telling them at the same time, that they should sup together with Plutō, they set up a shout of joy, as if they had been invited to a banquet, and full of ardour advanced with their king to battle. The shock was exceedingly violent and bloody. Leonidas himself was one of the first that fell. The endeavours of the Lacedæmonians to defend his dead body were incredible. At length, not vanquished, but oppressed by numbers, they all fell, except one man, who escaped to Sparta, where he was treated as a coward and traitor to his country, and nobody would keep company or converse with him. But soon afterwards he made a glorious amends for his fault at the battle of Platæa, where he distinguished himself in an extraordinary manner. * Xerxes, enraged to the last degree against Leonidas for daring to make head against him, caused his dead body to be hung up on a gallows, and made his intended dishonour of his enemy his own immortal shame.

Some time after these transactions, by order of the Amphictyons, a magnificent monument was erected at Thermopylæ to the honour of these brave defenders of Greece; and upon the monument were two inscriptions; one of which was general, and related to all those that died at Thermopylæ, importing, that the Greeks of Peloponnesus, to the number only of 4000, had made head against the Persian army, which consisted of 3,000,000 of men: the other related to the Spartans in particular. It was composed by the poet Simonides, and is very remarkable for its simplicity. It is as follows:

* Herod. l. vii. c. 338.

* Ὡς ἔειπεν, ἀγγεῖλον Λακεδαιμονίοις, ὅτι τῇ δὲ
Κεῖμεθα, τοῖς κείνων περὶθόμενοι νομίμοις.

That is to say, "Go, passenger, and tell at Lacedæmon, that
"we died here in obedience to her sacred laws." Forty years
afterwards, Pausanias, who obtained the victory of Platæa, caused the bones of Leonidas to be carried from Thermopylæ to Sparta, and erected a magnificent monument to his memory; near which was likewise another erected for Pausanias. Every year at these tombs was a funeral oration pronounced to the honour of these heroes, and a public game, wherein none but Lacedæmonians had a right to partake, in order to shew, that they alone were concerned in the glory obtained at Thermopylæ.

† Xerxes in that affair lost above 20,000 men, among whom were two of the king's brothers. He was very sensible, that so great a loss, which was a manifest proof of the courage of their enemies, was capable of alarming and discouraging his soldiers. In order, therefore, to conceal the knowledge of it from them, he caused all his men that were killed in that action, except 1000, whose bodies he ordered to be left upon the field, to be thrown together into large holes, which were secretly made, and covered over afterwards with earth and herbs. This stratagem succeeded very ill; for when the soldiers in his fleet, being curious to see the field of battle, obtained leave to come thither for that purpose, it served rather to discover his own littleness of soul, than to conceal the number of the slain.

‡ Dismayed with a victory that had cost him so dear, he asked Demaratus, if the Lacedæmonians had many such soldiers. That prince told him, that the Spartan republic had a great many cities belonging to it, of which all the inhabitants were exceeding brave; but that the inhabitants of Lacedæmon, who were properly called Spartans, and who were about 8000 in number, surpassed all the rest in valour, and were all of them such as those who had fought under Leonidas.

I return a little to the battle of Thermopylæ, the issue of which, fatal in appearance, might make an impression upon the minds of the readers to the disadvantage of the Lacedæmo-

* *Pari animo Lacedæmonii in Thermopylis occiderunt, in quos Simonides.*

Dic, hospes, Spartæ, nos te hic vidisse jacentes,

Dum sanctis patriæ legibus obsequimur.

Cic. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. p. 101.

† *Herod. l. viii. c. 24, 25.*

‡ *Ibid. l. vii. c. 134—137.*

nians,

nians, and occasion their courage to be looked upon as the effect of a presumptuous temerity, or a desperate resolution.

That action of Leonidas, with his 300 Spartans, was not the effect of rashness or despair, but was a wise and noble conduct, as * Diodorus Siculus has taken care to observe, in the magnificent encomium upon that famous engagement, to which he ascribes the success of all the ensuing victories and campaigns. Leonidas, knowing that Xerxes marched at the head of all the forces of the east, in order to overwhelm and crush a little country by the dint of his numbers, rightly conceived, from the superiority of his genius and understanding, that if they pretended to make the success of that war consist in opposing force to force, and numbers to numbers, all the Grecian nations together would never be able to equal the Persians, or to dispute the victory with them; that it was therefore necessary to point out to Greece another means of safety and preservation, whilst she was under these alarms; and that they ought to show the whole universe, who had all their eyes upon them, what glorious things may be done, when greatness of mind is opposed to force of body, true courage and bravery against blind impetuosity; the love of liberty against tyrannical oppression, and a few disciplined veteran troops against a confused multitude, though ever so numerous. These brave Lacedæmonians thought it became them, who were the choicest soldiers of the chief people of Greece, to devote themselves to certain death, in order to make the Persians sensible how difficult it is to reduce free men to slavery, and to teach the rest of Greece, by their example, either to vanquish or to perish.

I do not copy these sentiments from my own invention, or ascribe them to Leonidas without foundation: they are plainly comprised in that short answer which that worthy king of Sparta made a certain Lacedæmonian; who, being astonished at the generous resolution the king had taken, spoke to him in this manner: †“Is it possible then, Sir, that you can think
“of marching with an handful of men against such a mighty
“and innumerable army?” “If we are to reckon upon num-
“bers,” replied Leonidas, “all the people of Greece toge-
“ther would not be sufficient, since a small part of the Persian
“army is equal to all her inhabitants: but if we are to reckon
“upon valour, my little troop is more than sufficient.”

The event showed the justness of this prince's sentiments. That illustrious example of courage astonished the Persians, and

* Lib. xi. p. 9.

† Plut. in Lacon. Apoph. p. 225.

gave new spirit and vigour to the Greeks. The lives then of this heroic leader and his brave troop were not thrown away, but usefully employed; and their death was attended with a double effect, more great and lasting than they themselves had imagined. On one hand, it was in a manner the seed of their ensuing victories, which made the Persians for ever after lay aside all thoughts of attacking Greece; so that, during the seven or eight succeeding reigns, there was neither any prince who durst entertain such a design, nor any flatterer in his court who durst propose the thing to him. On the other hand, such a signal and exemplary instance of intrepidity made an indelible impression upon all the rest of the Grecians, and left a persuasion deeply rooted in their hearts, that they were able to subdue the Persians, and subvert their vast empire. Cimon was the man who made the first attempt of that kind with success. Agesilaus afterwards pushed that design so far, that he made the great monarch tremble in his palace at Susa. Alexander at last accomplished it with incredible facility. He never had the least doubt, no more than the Macedonians who followed him, or the whole country of Greece that chose him general in that expedition, but that with 30,000 men he could reduce the Persian empire, as 300 Spartans had been sufficient to check the united forces of the whole east.

SECTION VI.

NAVAL BATTLE NEAR ARTEMISA..

THE very same day * on which passed the glorious action at Thermopylæ, there was also an engagement at sea between the two fleets. That of the Grecians, exclusive of the little galleys and small boats, consisted of 271 vessels. This fleet had lain by near Artemisa, a promontory of Eubœa upon the northern coast towards the straits. That of the enemy, which was much more numerous, was near the same place, but had lately suffered in a violent tempest, which had destroyed above 400 of their vessels. Notwithstanding this loss, as it was still vastly superior in number to that of the Grecians, which they were preparing to fall upon, they detached 200 of their vessels with orders to wait about Eubœa, to the end that none of the enemy's vessels might be able to escape them. The Grecians having got intelligence of that separation, immediately set sail in the night, in order to attack that detachment at day-break

* Herod. l. vii. c. 1—18. Diod. l. xi. p. 11 et 10.

the next morning. But not meeting with it, they went, towards the evening, and fell upon the bulk of the enemy's fleet, which they treated very roughly. Night coming on, they were obliged to separate, and both parties retired to their post. But the very night that parted them, proved more pernicious to the Persians than the engagement which had preceded, from a violent storm of wind, accompanied with rain and thunder, which distressed and harassed their vessels till break of day: and the 200 ships also, that had been detached from their fleet, as we mentioned before, were almost all cast away upon the coasts of Eubœa; it being the will of the gods, says Herodotus, that the two fleets should become very near equal.

The Athenians having the same day received a reinforcement of 53 vessels, the Grecians, who were apprised of the wreck that had befallen part of the enemy's fleet, fell upon the ships of the Cilicians at the same hour they had attacked the fleet the day before, and sunk a great number of them. The Persians, being ashamed to see themselves thus insulted by an enemy that was so much inferior in number, thought fit the next day to appear first in a disposition to engage. The battle was very obstinate this time, and the success pretty near equal on both sides, excepting that the Persians, who were incommoded by the largeness and number of their vessels, sustained much the greater loss. Both parties however retired in good order.

* All these actions, which passed near Artemisa, did not bring matters to an absolute decision, but contributed very much to animate the Athenians; as they were convinced, by their own experience, that there is nothing really formidable, either in the number and magnificent ornaments of vessels, or in the barbarians' insolent shouts and songs of victory, to men that know how to come to close engagement, and that have the courage to fight with steadiness and resolution; and that the best way of dealing with such an enemy, is to despise all that vain appearance, to advance boldly up to them, and to charge them briskly and vigorously without ever giving ground.

The Grecian fleet having at this time had intelligence of what had passed at Thermopylæ, resolved upon the course they were to take without any further deliberation. They immediately sailed away from Artemisa, and advancing toward the heart of Greece, they stopped at Salamin, a little isle very near and over against Attica. Whilst the fleet was retreating, Themis-

* Plut. in Themist. p. 115, 117. Herod. l. viii. c. 21, 22.

toacles passed through all the places where it was necessary for the enemy to come to land, in order to take in fresh water or other provisions, and in large characters engraved upon the rocks and the stones the following words, which he addressed to the Ionians: "Be of our side, ye people of Ionia: come over to the party of your fathers, who expose their own lives for no other end than to maintain your liberty: or, if you cannot possibly do that, at least do the Persians all the mischief you can, when we are engaged with them, and put their army into disorder and confusion." By * this means, Themistocles hoped either to bring the Ionians really over to their party, or at least to render them suspected to the barbarians. We see this general had his thoughts always intent upon his business, and neglected nothing that could contribute to the success of his designs.

SECTION VII.

THE ATHENIANS ABANDON THEIR CITY, WHICH IS TAKEN
AND BURNT BY XERXES.

XERXES in the mean time was entered into the country of Phocis by the upper part of Doris, and was burning and plundering the cities of the Phocians. The inhabitants of Peloponnesus, having no thoughts but to save their own country, resolved to abandon all the rest, and to bring all the Grecian forces together within the isthmus, over which they intended to build a strong wall from one sea to the other, a space of near five miles English. The Athenians were highly provoked at so base a desertion, seeing themselves ready to fall into the hands of the Persians, and likely to bear the whole weight of their fury and vengeance. Some time before they had consulted the oracle of Delphos, which had given them for answer, "† That there would be no way of saving the city but by walls of wood." The sentiments of the people were much divided about this ambiguous expression: some thought it was to be understood to mean the citadel, because heretofore it had been surrounded with wooden palisades. But Themistocles gave another sense to the words, which was much more natural, understanding it to intend shipping; and demonstrated, that the only measures they had to take were to leave the city empty, and to embark all the inhabitants. But this was a resolution the people would not at all give ear to, as thinking themselves

* Herod. l. viii. c. 40, 41.

† Ibid. l. vii. 139—143.

inevitably lost, and not even caring to conquer; when once they had abandoned the temples of their gods and the tombs of their ancestors. Here Themistocles had occasion for all his address and all his eloquence to work upon the people. After he had represented to them, that Athens did not consist either of its walls, or its houses, but of its citizens, and that the saving of these was the preservation of the city, he endeavoured to persuade them by the argument most capable of making an impression upon them in the unhappy, afflicted, and dangerous condition they were then in, I mean the argument and motive of divine authority; giving them to understand by the very words of the oracle, and by the prodigies which had happened, that their removing for a time from Athens was manifestly the will of the gods.

* A decree was therefore passed, by which, in order to soften what appeared so hard in the resolution of deserting the city, it was ordained, “That Athens should be given up in trust into the hands, and committed to the keeping and protection of Minerva, patroness of the Athenian people; that all such inhabitants as were able to bear arms, should go on shipboard; and that every citizen should provide, as well as he could, for the safety and security of his wife, children, and slaves.”

† The extraordinary behaviour of Cimon, who was at this time very young, was of great weight on this singular occasion. Followed by his companions, with a gay and cheerful countenance, he went publicly along the street of the Ceramichus to the citadel, in order to consecrate a bit of a bridle, which he carried in his hand, in the temple of Minerva, designing to make the people understand by this religious and affecting ceremony, that they had no farther business with land-forces, and that it behoved them now to betake themselves entirely to the sea. After he had made an offering of this bit, he took one of the shields that hung upon the wall of the temple, paid his devotions to the goddess, went down to the water side, and was the first who, by his example, inspired the greatest part of the people with confidence and resolution, and encouraged them to embark.

The major part of them sent their fathers and mothers, that were old, together with their wives and children, to the city

* Herod. l. viii. c. 51—54. Plut. in Themist. p. 117.

† Plut. in Cim. p. 421.

of † Trezene, the inhabitants of which received them with great humanity and generosity : for they made an ordinance, that they should be maintained at the expence of the public, and assigned for each person's subsistence two oboli a-day, which were worth about twopence English money. Besides this, they permitted the children to gather fruit wherever they pleased, or wherever they came, and settled a fund for the payment of the masters who had the care of their education. What a beautiful thing it is to see a city, exposed as this was to the greatest dangers and calamities, extend her care and generosity in the very midst of such alarms, even to the education of other people's children !

When the whole city came to embark, so moving and melancholy a spectacle drew tears from the eyes of all that were present, and at the same time occasioned great admiration with regard to the steadiness and courage of those men, who sent their fathers and mothers another way and to other places, and who, without being moved either at their grief and lamentations, or at the tender embraces of their wives and children, passed over with so much firmness and resolution to Salamin. But that which extremely raised and augmented the general compassion, was the great number of old men that they were forced to leave in the city on account of their age and infirmities, and of which many voluntarily remained there, on a motive of religion, believing the citadel to be the thing meant by the oracle in the forementioned ambiguous expression of wooden walls. There was no creature, (for history has judged this circumstance worthy of being remembered) ; there was no creature, I say, even to the very domestic animals, but what took part in this public mourning, nor was it possible for a man to see those poor creatures run howling and crying after their masters, who were going a ship-board, without being touched and affected. Among all the rest of these animals, particular notice is taken of a dog belonging to Xanthippus, the father of Pericles, which, not being able to endure to see himself abandoned by his master, jumped into the sea after him, and continued swimming as near as he could to the vessel his master was on board of, till he landed quite spent at Salamin, and died the moment after upon the shore. In the same place, even in Plutarch's time, they used to show the spot wherein this faith-

* This was a small city situated upon the sea-side, in that part of the Peloponnesus called Argolis.

ful animal was said to be buried, which was called the “dog’s burying place.”

* Whilst Xerxes was continuing his march, some deserters from Arcadia came and joined his army. The king having asked them what the Grecians were then doing, was extremely surprised when he was told, that they were employed in seeing the games and combats then celebrating at Olympia: and his surprise was still increased, when he understood that the victor’s reward in those engagements was only a crown of olive. What men must they be, cried one of the Persian nobles with great wonder and astonishment, that are affected only with honour, and not with money!

† Xerxes had sent off a considerable detachment of his army to plunder the temple at Delphos, in which he knew there were immense treasures, being resolved to treat Apollo with no more favour than the other gods, whose temples he had pillaged. If we may believe what Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus say of this matter, as soon as ever this detachment advanced near the temple of Minerva, surnamed the Provident, the air grew dark on a sudden, and a violent tempest arose, accompanied with impetuous winds, thunder and lightning; and two huge rocks having severed themselves from the mountain, fell upon the Persian troops, and crushed the greatest part of them.

‡ The other part of the army marched towards the city of Athens, which was deserted by all its inhabitants, except a small number of citizens who had retired into the citadel, where they defended themselves with incredible bravery, till they were all killed, and would hearken to no terms of accommodation whatsoever. Xerxes, having stormed the citadel, reduced it to ashes. He immediately dispatched a courier to Susa, to carry the agreeable news of his success to Artabanes his uncle; and at the same time sent him a great number of pictures and statues. § Those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, the ancient deliverers of Athens, were sent with the rest. One of the Antiochus’s, king of Syria (I do not know which of them, nor at what time it was), returned them to the Athenians, being persuaded he could not possibly make them a more acceptable present.

* Herod. l. viii. c. 16.

† Ibid. l. viii. c. 35—39. Diod. l. xi. p. 12.

‡ Herod. l. ii. c. 50—54.

§ Pausan. l. i. p. 14.

SECTION VIII.

THE BATTLE OF SALAMIN, &c. &c.

AT this time a division arose among the commanders * of the Grecian fleet; and the confederates, in a council of war which was held for that purpose, were of very different sentiments concerning the place for engaging the enemy. Some of them, and indeed the major part, at the head of whom was Eurybiades, the generalissimo of the fleet, were for having them advance near the isthmus of Corinth, that they might be nearer the land-army, which was posted there to guard that pass under the command of Cleombrotus, Leonidas's brother, and more ready for the defence of Peloponnesus. Others, at the head of whom was Themistocles, alleged, that it would be betraying of their country to abandon so advantageous a post as that of Salamin. And as he supported his opinion with abundance of warmth, Eurybiades lifted up his cane over him in a menacing manner. "Strike," says the Athenian, unmoved at the insult, "but hear me:" and continuing his discourse proceeded to show of what importance it was for the fleet of the Grecians, whose vessels were lighter and much fewer in number than those of the Persians, to engage in such a strait as that of Salamin, which would render the enemy incapable of using a great part of their forces. Eurybiades, who could not help being surprised at this moderation in Themistocles, submitted to his reasons, or at least complied with his opinion, for fear the Athenians, whose ships made up above one half of the fleet, should separate themselves from the allies, as their general had taken occasion to insinuate.

† A council of war was also held on the side of the Persians, in order to determine whether they should hazard a naval engagement. Xerxes himself was come to the fleet to take the advice of his captains and officers, who were all unanimous for the battle, because they knew it was agreeable to the king's inclination. Queen Artemisa was the only person who opposed that resolution. She represented the dangerous consequences of coming to blows with people much more conversant and more expert in maritime affairs than the Persians; alleging, that the loss of a battle at sea would be attended with the ruin of their land-army; whereas, by protracting the war, and approaching Peloponnesus, they would create jealousies and divi-

* Herod. l. viii. c. 56, & 66. Plut. in Themist. p. 117.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 67—70.

sions among their enemies, or rather augment the division already very great amongst them; that the confederates in that case would not fail to separate from one another, to return and defend their respective countries; and that then the king without difficulty, and almost without striking a blow, might make himself master of all Greece. This wise advice was not followed, and a battle was resolved upon.

Xerxes, imputing the ill success of all his former engagements at sea to his own absence, was resolved to be witness of this from the top of an eminence, where he caused a throne to be erected for that purpose. This might have contributed in some measure to animate his forces; but there is another much more sure and effectual means of doing it, I mean, by the prince's real presence and example, when he himself shares in the danger, and thereby shows himself worthy of being the soul and head of a brave and numerous body of men ready to die for his service. A prince, that has not this sort of fortitude which nothing can shake, and which even takes new vigour from danger, may nevertheless be endued with other excellent qualities, but then he is by no means proper to command an army. No qualification whatsoever can supply the want of courage in a general: and the * more he labours to show the appearance of it, when he has not the reality, the more he discovers his cowardice and fear. There is, it must be owned, a vast difference between a general-officer, and a simple soldier. Xerxes ought not to have exposed his person otherwise than became a prince; that is to say, as the head, not as the hand; as he whose business it is to direct and give orders, not as those who are to put them in execution: But to keep himself entirely at a distance from danger, and to act no other part than that of a spectator, was really renouncing the quality and office of a general.

† Themistocles knowing, that some of the commanders in the Grecian fleet still entertained thoughts of sailing towards the isthmus, contrived to have notice given underhand to Xerxes, that as the Grecian allies were now assembled together in one place, it would be an easy matter for him to subdue and destroy them all together; whereas, if they once separated from one another, as they were going to do, he might never meet with another opportunity so favourable. The king gave into this opinion; and immediately commanded a great num-

* *Quanto magis occultare ac abdere paverem nitebantur, manifestius pavidi.* Tacit. Hist.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 74—88.

ber of his vessels to surround Salamin by night, in order to make it impracticable for the Greeks to quit their post.

* Nobody among the Grecians perceived that their army was surrounded in this manner. Aristides came the same night from Ægina, where he had some forces under his command, and with very great danger passed through the whole fleet of the enemy. When he came up to Themistocles's tent, he took him aside, and spoke to him in the following manner: "If we are wise, Themistocles, we shall from henceforward lay aside that vain and childish dissension that has hitherto divided us, and strive with a more noble and useful emulation which of us shall render the best service to his country; you by commanding, and doing the duty of a wise and able captain, and I by obeying your orders, and by assisting you with my person and advice." He then informed him of the army's being surrounded with the ships of the Persians, and warmly exhorted him to give them battle without delay. Themistocles, extremely astonished at such a greatness of soul, and such a noble and generous frankness, was somewhat ashamed, that he had suffered himself to be so much excelled by his rival; but without being ashamed to own it, he promised Aristides, that he would henceforward imitate his generosity, and even exceed it, if it were possible, in the whole of his future conduct. Then, after having imparted to him the stratagem he had contrived to deceive the barbarian, he desired him to go in person to Eurybiades, in order to convince him that there was no other means of safety for them, than to engage the enemy by sea at Salamin; which commission Aristides executed with pleasure and success; for he was in great credit and esteem with that general.

† Both sides therefore prepared themselves for the battle. The Grecian fleet consisted of 380 sail of ships, which in every thing followed the direction and orders of Themistocles. As nothing escaped his vigilance, and as, like an able commander, he knew how to improve every circumstance and incident to advantage, before he would begin the engagement he waited till a certain wind, which rose regularly every day at a certain hour, which was entirely contrary to the enemy, began to blow. As soon as this wind rose, the signal was given for battle. The Persians, who knew that their king had his eyes upon them, advanced with such a courage and impetuosity, as were

* Plut. in Arist. p. 323. Herod. l. viii. c. 78—82.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 84—96.

capable of striking an enemy with terror. But the heat of the first attack quickly abated, when they came to be engaged. Every thing was contrary to, and disadvantageous for them; the wind, which blew directly in their faces; the height, and the heaviness of their vessels, which could not move and turn without great difficulty; and even the number of their ships, which was so far from being of use to them, that it only served to embarrass them in a place so strait and narrow, as that they fought in: whereas, on the side of the Grecians, every thing was done with good order, and without hurry or confusion; because every thing was directed by one commander. The Ionians, whom Themistocles had advised by characters engraven upon stones along the coasts of Eubœa to remember from whom they derived their original, were the first that betook themselves to flight, and were quickly followed by the rest of the fleet. But Queen Artemisa distinguished herself by incredible efforts of resolution and courage; so that Xerxes, who saw in what manner she had behaved herself, cried out, * that the men had behaved like women in this engagement, and that the women had showed the courage of men. The Athenians, being enraged that a woman had dared to appear in arms against them, had promised a reward of 10,000 drachms to any one that should be able to take her alive: but she had the good fortune to escape their pursuits. If they had taken her, she could have deserved nothing from them but the highest commendations, and the most honourable and generous treatment.

† The manner in which that ‡ queen escaped ought not to be omitted. Seeing herself warmly pursued by an Athenian ship, from which it seemed impossible for her to escape, she

* Οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες γέγονασί μοι γυναῖκες, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες ἄνδρες.

Artemisia inter primos duces bellum acerrimè ciebat. Quippe, ut in viro muliebrem timorem, ita in muliere virilem audaciam cerueres. Just. l. ii. c. 12.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 87, 88. Polyæn. l. viii. c. 53.

‡ It appears, that Artemisa valued herself no less upon stratagem than courage, and at the same time was not very delicate in the choice of the measures she used. It is said, that being desirous of seizing Latmus, a small city of Caria, that lay very commodiously for her, she laid her troops in ambush, and, under pretence of celebrating the feast of the mother of the gods, in a wood consecrated to her near that city, that she repaired thither with a great train of eunuchs, women, drums, and trumpets. The inhabitants ran in throngs to see that religious ceremony; and in the mean time Artemisa's troops took possession of the place. Polyæn. Strateg. l. viii. c. 53.

hung out Grecian colours, and attacked one of the Persian vessels, on board of which was Damafithymus, king of * Calynda, with whom she had some difference, and sunk it: this made her pursuers believe, that her ship was one of the Grecian fleet, and give over the chase.

- Such was the success of the battle of Salamin, one of the most memorable actions related in ancient history, and which has, and will render the name and courage of the Grecians famous for ever. A great number of the Persian ships were taken, and a much greater sunk upon this occasion. Many of their allies, who dreaded the king's cruelty no less than the enemy, made the best of their way into their own country.

Themistocles, in a secret conversation with Aristides, proposed to his consideration, in order to sound him and to learn his true sentiments, whether it would not be proper for them to send some vessels to break down the bridge which Xerxes had caused to be built, to the end, says he, that we may take Asia into Europe: but though he made this proposal, he was far from approving it. Aristides believing him to be in earnest, argued very warmly and strenuously against any such project, and represented to him how dangerous it was to reduce so powerful an enemy to despair, from whom it was their business to deliver themselves as soon as possible. Themistocles seemed to acquiesce in his reasons; and, in order to hasten the king's departure, contrived to have him secretly informed, that the Grecians designed to break down the bridge. The point Themistocles seems to have had in view by his false confidence, was to strengthen himself with Aristides's opinion, which was of great weight against that of the other generals, in case they inclined to go and break down the bridge. Perhaps too he might aim at guarding himself by this means against the ill-will of his enemies, who might one day accuse him of treason before the people, if ever they came to know that he had been the author of that secret advice to Xerxes.

† This prince, being frightened on such news, made the best use he could of his time, and set out by night, leaving Mardonius behind him, with an army of 300,000 men, in order to reduce Greece, if he was able. The Grecians, who expected that Xerxes would have come to another engagement the next day, having learned that he was fled, pursued him as fast as they could, but to no purpose. ‡ They had destroyed

* A city of Lycia.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 115—120.

‡ Ibid. c. 130.

200 of the enemy's ships, besides those which they had taken. The remainder of the Persian fleet, after having suffered extremely by the winds in their passage, retired towards the coast of Asia, and entered into the port of Cuma, a city in Æolia, where they passed the winter, without daring afterwards to return into Greece.

Xerxes took the rest of his army along with him, and marched by the way of the Hellespont. As no provisions had been prepared for them beforehand; they underwent great hardships during their whole march, which lasted 45 days. After having consumed all the fruits they could find, the soldiers were obliged to live upon herbs, and even upon the bark and leaves of trees. This occasioned a great sickness in the army; and great numbers died of fluxes and the plague.

The king, through eagerness and impatience to make his escape, left his army behind him, and travelled on before with a small retinue, in order to reach the bridge with the greater expedition: but when he arrived at the place, he found the bridge broken down by the violence of the waves, in a great tempest that had happened, and was reduced to the necessity of passing the strait in a cock-boat. This was a spectacle very proper to show mankind the mutability of all earthly things, and the instability of human greatness; a prince, whose armies and fleets the land and sea were scarce able to contain a little while before, now stealing away in a little boat almost without any servants or attendants! Such was the event and success of Xerxes's expedition against Greece.

If we compare Xerxes with himself at different times and on different occasions, we shall hardly know him for the same man. When affairs were under consideration and debate, no person could show more courage and intrepidity than this prince: he is surprised and even offended, if any one foresees the least difficulty in the execution of his projects, or shows any apprehension concerning events. But when he comes to the point of execution, and to the hour of danger, he flies like a coward, and thinks of nothing but saving his own life and person. Here we have a sensible and evident proof of the difference between true courage, which is never destitute of prudence; and temerity, always blind and presumptuous. A wise and great prince weighs every thing, and examines all circumstances, before he enters into a * war, of which he is not afraid, but at the same time does not desire; and when the time of action

* Non times bella, non provocas, Plin. de Traj. Fortissimus in ipso discrimine, qui ante discrimen quietissimus. Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 14.

is come, the sight of danger serves only to animate his courage. Presumption inverts this order. * When she has introduced assurance and boldness, where wisdom and circumspection ought to preside, she admits fear and despair, where courage and intrepidity ought to be exerted.

† The first thing the Grecians took care of after the battle of Salamin, was to send the first fruits of the rich spoil they had taken to Delphos. Cimon, who was then very young, signalized himself in a particular manner in that engagement, and performed actions of such distinguished valour, as acquired him a great reputation, and made him be considered from henceforth as a citizen that would be capable of rendering the most important services to his country on future occasions.

‡ But Themistocles carried off almost all the honour of this victory, which was the most signal that ever the Grecians obtained over the Persians. The force of truth obliged even those who envied his glory most, to render him this testimony. It was a custom in Greece, that, after a battle, the commanding officers should declare who had distinguished themselves most, by writing in a paper the names of the man who had merited the first prize, and of him who had merited the second.

On this occasion, by a judgment which shows the good opinion natural for every man to have of himself, each officer concerned, adjudged the first rank to himself, and allowed the second to Themistocles; which was indeed giving him the preference to them all.

The Lacedæmonians, having carried him to Sparta, in order to pay him the honours due to his merit, decreed to their general Eurybiades the prize of valour, and to Themistocles that of wisdom, which was a crown of olive for both of them. They also made a present to Themistocles of the finest chariot in the city; and, on his departure, sent 300 young men of the most considerable families to wait upon him to the frontiers: an honour they had never shown to any person whatsoever before.

But that which gave him a still more sensible pleasure, were the public acclamations he received at the first Olympic games that were celebrated after the battle of Salamin, where all the people of Greece were met together. As soon as he appeared, the whole assembly rose up to do him honour: nobody regarded either the games or the combats; Themistocles was the only spectacle. The eyes of all the company were fixed upon him, and every body was eager to show him and point him out

* Ante discrimen feroces, in periculo pavidī. Tacit. Hist. l. i. c. 68.

† Herod. l. viii. c. 122. 125.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 120.

with the hand to the strangers that did not know him. He acknowledged afterwards to his friends, that he looked upon that day as the happiest of his life; that he had never tasted any joy so sensible and so transporting; and that this reward, the genuine fruits of his labours, exceeded all his desires.

The reader has undoubtedly observed in Themistocles two or three principal strokes of his character, which entitle him to be ranked amongst the greatest men. The design which he formed and executed, of making the whole force of Athens maritime, showed him to have a superior genius, capable of the highest view, penetrating into futurity, and judicious to seize the decisive point in great affairs. As the territory belonging to Athens was of a barren nature and small extent, he rightly conceived, that the only way that city had to enrich and aggrandize herself was by sea. And indeed that scheme may justly be looked upon as the source and cause of all those great events, which raised the republic of Athens in the sequel to so flourishing a condition.

But, in my opinion, though this wisdom and foresight is a most excellent and valuable talent, yet it is infinitely less meritorious than that uncommon temper and moderation, which Themistocles showed on two critical occasions, when Greece had been utterly undone, if he had listened to the dictates of an ill-judged ambition, and had piqued himself upon a false point of honour, as is usual among persons of his age and profession. The first of these occasions was, when, notwithstanding the crying injustice that was committed, both in reference to the republic, of which he was a member, and to his own person, in appointing a Lacedæmonian generalissimo of the fleet, he exhorted and prevailed with the Athenians to desist from their pretension, though never so justly founded, in order to prevent the fatal effects with which division among the confederates must have been necessarily attended. And what an admirable instance did he give of his presence of mind and coolness of temper, when the same Eurybiades not only affronted him with harsh and offensive language, but lifted up his cane at him in a menacing posture! Let it be remembered at the same time, that Themistocles was then but young; that he was full of an ardent ambition for glory; that he was commander of a numerous fleet; and that he had right and reason on his side. How would our young officers behave on the like occasion? Themistocles took all patiently, and the victory of Salamin was the fruits of his patience.

As to Aristides, I shall have occasion in the sequel to speak
more

more extensively upon his character and merit. He was, properly speaking, the man of the commonwealth: provided that was well and faithfully served, he was very little concerned by whom it was done. The merit of others was far from offending him; and instead of that, became his own by the approbation and encouragement he gave it. We have seen him make his way through the enemy's fleet, at the peril of his life, in order to give Themistocles some good intelligence and advice: and * Plutarch takes notice, that during all the time the latter had the command, Aristides assisted him on all occasions with his counsel and credit, notwithstanding he had reason to look upon him not only as his rival, but his enemy. Let us compare this nobleness and greatness of soul with the little spiritedness and meanness of those men, who are so nice, punctilious, and jealous in point of command; who are incompatible with their colleagues, using all their attention and industry to engross the glory of every thing to themselves; always ready to sacrifice the public to their private interests, or to suffer their rivals to commit blunders, that they themselves may reap advantage from them.

† On the very same day the action of Thermopylæ happened, the formidable army of the Carthaginians, which consisted of 300,000 men, was entirely defeated by Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse. Herodotus places this battle on the same day with that of Salamin. The circumstances of that victory in Sicily I have related in the history of the Carthaginians:

‡ After the battle of Salamin, the Grecians being returned from pursuing the Persians, Themistocles sailed to all the islands that had declared for them, to levy contributions, and exact money from them. The first he began with was that of Andros, from whose inhabitants he required a considerable sum, speaking to them in this manner: "I come to you accompanied with two powerful divinities, Persuasion and Force." The answer they made him was: "We also have two other divinities on our side, no less powerful than yours, and which do not permit us give the money you demand of us, Poverty and Impotence." Upon this refusal he made a feint of besieging them, and threatened that he would entirely ruin their city. He dealt in the same manner with several other islands, which durst not resist him as Andros had done, and drew great

* Πάντα συνέπραττε καὶ συνεβουλευεν, ἑνδοξότατον ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ κοινῇ ποίῳν τὸν ἕχθιστον. In vit. Arist. p. 323.

† Her. l. vii. c. 165. 167

‡ Ibid. l. viii. c. 111, 112 Plut. in Them. p. 122.

sums of money from them without the privity of the other commanders; for he was esteemed a lover of money, and to be desirous of enriching himself.

SECTION IX.

THE BATTLE OF PLATÆA.

MARDONIUS*, who staid in Greece with a body of 300,000 men, let his troops pass the winter in Thessaly, and in the spring following, led them into Bœotia. There was a very famous oracle in this country, the oracle I mean of Lebadia, which he thought proper to consult, in order to know what would be the success of the war. The priest, in his enthusiastic fit, answered in a language which nobody that was present understood; as much as to insinuate, that the oracle would not deign to speak intelligibly to a barbarian. At the same time Mardonius sent Alexander, king of Macedonia, with several Persian noblemen, to Athens, and by them, in the name of his master, made very advantageous proposals to the Athenian people, to divide them from the rest of their allies. The offers he made them were, to rebuild their city which had been burnt down, to give them a considerable sum of money, to suffer them to live according to their own laws and customs, and to give them the government and command of all Greece. Alexander, as their ancient friend, exhorted them in his own name to lay hold on so favourable an opportunity for re-establishing their affairs, alleging, that they were not in a condition to withstand a power so formidable as that of the Persians, and so much superior to that of Greece. On the first intelligence of this embassy, the Spartans also on their side sent deputies to Athens, in order to hinder it from taking effect. These were present when the others had their audience; where, as soon as Alexander had finished his speech, they began in their turn to address themselves to the Athenians, and strongly exhorted them not to separate themselves from their allies, nor to desert the common interest of their country; representing to them, at the same time, that their union in the present situation of their affairs was their whole strength, and would render Greece invincible. They added further, that the Spartan common-

* A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 497. Herod. l. viii. c. 113—131. 136—140. 144. Plut. in Arist. p. 524. Diod. l. xi. p. 22, 23. Plut. de Orac. Defect. p. 412.

wealth was very sensibly moved with the melancholy state which the Athenians were in, who were destitute both of houses and retreat, and who for two years together had lost all their harvests; that, in consideration of that calamity, she would engage herself, during the continuance of the war, to maintain and support their wives, their children, and their old men, and to furnish a plentiful supply for all their wants. They concluded by observing, on the conduct of Alexander, whose discourse, they said, was such as might be expected from one tyrant who spoke in favour of another; but that he seemed to have forgot, that the people to whom he addressed himself, had showed themselves, on all occasions, the most zealous defenders of the common liberty of their country.

Aristides was at this time in office, that is to say, principal of the Archons. As it was therefore his business to answer, he said, that as to the barbarians, who made silver and gold the chief objects of their esteem, he forgave them for thinking they could corrupt the fidelity of a nation, by large bounties and promises: but that he could not help being surprised and affected with some sort of indignation, to see that the Lacedæmonians, regarding only the present distress and necessity of the Athenians, and forgetting their courage and magnanimity, should come to persuade them to persist stedfastly in the defence of the common liberty of Greece, by arguments and motives of gain, and by proposing to give them victuals and provision: he desired them to acquaint their republic, that all the gold in the world was not capable of tempting the Athenians, or of making them desert the defence of the common liberty; that they had the grateful sense they ought to have, of the kind offers which Lacedæmon had made them; but that they would endeavour to manage their affairs so, as not to be a burden to any of their allies. Then turning himself towards the ambassadors of Mardonius, and pointing with his hand to the sun: "Be assured," says he to them, "that as long as that planet shall continue his course, the Athenians will be mortal enemies to the Persians, and will not cease to take vengeance of them for ravaging their lands, and burning their houses and temples." After which, he desired the king of Macedonia, if he was inclined to be truly their friend, that he would not make himself any more the bearer of such proposals to them, which would only serve to reflect dishonour upon him, without ever producing any other effect.

Aristides, notwithstanding his having made this plain and
peremptory

peremptory declaration, did not stop there : but that he might still imprint the greater horror for such proposals, and for ever to prohibit all manner of commerce with the barbarians by a principle of religion, he ordained that the Athenian priests should denounce anathemas and execrations upon any person whatsoever, who should presume to propose the making of an alliance with the Persians, or the breaking of their alliance with the rest of the Grecians.

* When Mardonius had learned by the answer which the Athenians had sent him, † that they were to be prevailed upon by no proposals or advantages whatsoever to sell their liberty, he marched with his whole army towards Attica, wasting and destroying whatever he found in his way. The Athenians, not being in a condition to withstand such a torrent, retired to Salamin, and for a second time abandoned their city. Mardonius, still entertaining hopes of bringing them to some terms of accommodation, sent another deputy to them to make the same proposals as before. A certain Athenian, called Lycidas, being of opinion, that they should hearken to what he had to offer, was immediately stoned ; and the Athenian women running at the same time to his house, did the same execution upon his wife and children ; so detestable a crime did they think it to propose any peace with the Persians. But notwithstanding this, they had a respect to the character wherewith the deputy was invested, and sent him back without offering him any indignity or ill treatment. Mardonius now found that there was no peace to be expected with them. He therefore entered Athens, burnt and demolished every thing that had escaped their fury the preceding year, and left nothing standing.

The Spartans, instead of conducting their troops into Attica, according to their engagements, thought only of keeping themselves shut up within the Peloponnesus for their own security, and with that view had begun to build a wall over the isthmus, in order to hinder the enemy from entering that way, by which means they reckoned they should be safe themselves, and should have no further occasion for the assistance of the Athenians. The latter hereupon sent deputies to Sparta, in order to complain of the slowness and neglect of their allies. But the Ephori did not seem to be much moved at their remonstrances ; and as

* Herod. l. ix. c. 1—11. Plut. in Arist.

† Posteaquam nullo pretio libertatem videt his venalem, &c. Justin. l. ii. c. 14.

that day was the feast of * Hyacinthus, they spent it in feasts, and rejoicing, and deferred giving the deputies their answer till the next day. And still procrastinating the affair as much as they could on various pretexts, they gained ten days time, during which the building of the wall was completed.— They were on the point of dismissing the Athenian envoys in a scandalous manner, when a private citizen expostulated with them, and represented to them, how base it would be to treat the Athenians in such a manner, after all the calamities and voluntary losses they had so generously suffered for the common defence of liberty, and all the important services they had rendered Greece in general. This opened their eyes, and made them ashamed of their perfidious design. The very next night following they sent off, unknown to the Athenian deputies, 5000 Spartans, who had each of them seven helotæ, or slaves, to attend him. In the morning afterwards the deputies renewed their complaints with great warmth and resentment, and were extremely surprised when they were told that the Spartan succours were on their march, and by this time were not far from Attica.

† Mardonius had left Attica at this time, and was on his return into the country of Bœotia. As the latter was an open and flat country, he thought it would be more convenient for him to fight there, than in Attica, which was uneven and rugged, full of hills and narrow passes, and which for that reason would not allow him space enough for drawing up his numerous army in battle-array, nor leave room for his cavalry to act. When he came back into Bœotia, he encamped by the river Asopus. The Grecians followed him thither, under the command of Pausanias, king of Sparta, and of Aristides, general of the Athenians. The Persian army, according to the account of Herodotus, consisted of 300,000, or, according to that of Diodorus, of 500,000 men. That of the Grecians did not amount to 70,000 men; of which there were but 5000 Spartans; but, as these were accompanied with 35,000 of the helotæ, viz. seven for each Spartan, they made up together

* Amongst the Lacedæmonians the feast of Hyacinthus continued three days: the first and the last of which were days of sorrow and mourning for the death of Hyacinthus; but the second was a day of rejoicing, which was spent in feasting, sports, and spectacles, and all kinds of diversions. This festival was celebrated every year in the month of August, in honour of Apollo and Hyacinthus.

† Herod. l. ix. c. 12—76. Plut. in Arist. p. 325—330. Diod. l. xi. p. 24, 26.

40,000; the latter of these were light-armed troops: the Athenian forces consisted but of 8000, and the troops of the allies made up the remainder. The right wing of the army was commanded by the Spartans, and the left by the Athenians, an honour which the people of Tegæa pretended to, and disputed with them, but in vain.

* Whilst all Greece was in suspense, expecting a battle that should determine their fate, a secret conspiracy, formed in the midst of the Athenian camp by some discontented citizens, who intended the subversion of their popular government, or to deliver up Greece into the hands of the Persians, gave Aristides a great deal of perplexity and trouble. On this emergency he had occasion for all his prudence. Not knowing exactly how many people might be concerned in this conspiracy, he contented himself with having eight of them taken up: and of those eight, the only two whom he caused to be accused, because they had the most laid to their charge, made their escape out of the camp, whilst their trial was preparing. There is no doubt but Aristides favoured their escape, lest he should be obliged to punish them, and their punishment might occasion some tumult and disorder. The others, who were in custody, he released, leaving them room to believe, that he had found nothing against them, and telling them, that the battle with the enemy should be the tribunal, where they might fully justify their characters, and show the world, how unlikely it was, that they had ever entertained a thought of betraying their country. This well-timed and wise dissimulation, which opened a door for repentance, and avoided driving the offenders to despair, appeased all the commotion, and quashed the whole affair.

Mardonius, in order to try the Grecians, sent out his cavalry, in which he was strongest, to skirmish with them. The Megarians, who were encamped upon a plain, suffered extremely by them; and, in spite of all the vigour and resolution with which they defended themselves, they were upon the point of giving way, when a detachment of 300 Athenians, with some troops armed with missile weapons, advanced to their succour. Masistius, the general of the Persian horse, and one of the most considerable noblemen of his country, seeing them advance towards him in good order, made his cavalry face about and attack them. The Athenians stood their ground, and waited to receive them. The shock was very fierce and violent, both

* Plut. in Arist. p. 326.

sides endeavouring equally to show, by the issue of this encounter, what would be the success of the general engagement. The victory was a long time disputed: but at last Masistius's horse, being wounded, threw his master, who was quickly after killed: upon which the Persians immediately after fled. As soon as the news of his death reached the barbarians, their grief was excessive. They cut off the hair of their heads, as also the manes of their horses and mules, filling the camp with their cries and lamentations, having lost, in their opinion, the bravest man of their army.

After this encounter with the Persian cavalry, the two armies were a long time without coming to any action; because the soothsayers and diviners, upon their inspecting the intrails of their victims, equally foretold both parties, that they should be victorious, provided they acted only upon the defensive; whereas, on the other hand, they threatened them equally with a total overthrow, if they acted offensively, or made the first attack.

They passed ten days in this manner in view of each other: but Mardonius, who was of a fiery, impatient nature, grew very uneasy at so long a delay. Besides, he had only a few days provisions left for his army; and the Grecians grew stronger every day by the addition of new troops, that were continually coming to join them. He therefore called a council of war, in order to deliberate whether they should give battle. Artabazus, a nobleman of singular merit and great experience, was of opinion, that they should not hazard a battle, but that they should retire under the walls of Thebes, where they would be in a condition to supply the army with provisions and forage. He alleged, that delays alone would be capable of diminishing the ardour of the allies; that they would thereby have time to tamper with them, and might be able to draw some of them off by gold and silver, which they would take care to distribute among the leaders, and among such as had the greatest sway and authority in their several cities; and that, in short, this would be both the easiest and surest method of subjecting Greece. This opinion was very wise, but was overruled by Mardonius, whom the rest had not courage to contradict. The result, therefore, of their deliberations was, that they should give battle next day. Alexander, king of Macedonia, who was on the side of the Grecians in his heart, came secretly about midnight to their camp, and informed Aristides of all that had passed.

Pausanias forthwith gave orders to the officers to prepare themselves

themselves for battle; and imparted to Aristides the design he had formed of changing his order of battle, by placing the Athenians in the right wing, instead of the left, in order to their opposing the Persians, with whom they had been accustomed to engage. Whether it was fear or prudence that induced Pausanias to propose this new disposition, the Athenians accepted it with pleasure. Nothing was heard among them but mutual exhortations, to acquit themselves bravely, bidding each other remember, that neither they nor their enemies were changed since the battle of Marathon, unless it were, that victory had increased the courage of the Athenians, and had dispirited the Persians. We do not fight, said they, as they do, for a country only, or a city, but for the trophies erected at Marathon and at Salamin, that they may not appear to be the work only of Miltiades, and of fortune, but the work of the Athenians. Encouraging one another in this manner, they went with all the alacrity imaginable to change their post. But Mardonius, upon the intelligence he received of this movement, having made the like change in his order of battle, both sides ranged their troops again according to their former disposition. The whole day passed in this manner without their coming to action.

In the evening the Grecians held a council of war, in which it was resolved, that they should decamp from the place they were in, and march to another, more conveniently situated for water. Night being come on, and the officers endeavouring, at the head of their corps, to make more haste than ordinary to the camp marked out for them, great confusion happened among the troops, some going one way and some another, without observing any order or regularity in their march. At last they halted near the little city of Platæa.

On the first news of the Grecians being decamped, Mardonius drew his whole army into order of battle, and pursued them with the hideous shouting and howling of his barbarian forces, who thought they were marching, not so much in order to fight, as to strip and plunder a flying enemy: and their general likewise, making himself sure of victory, proudly insulted Artabazus, reproaching him with his fearful and cowardly prudence, and with the false notion he had conceived of the Lacedæmonians, who never fled, as he pretended, before an enemy; whereas here was an instance of the contrary. But the general quickly found this was no false or ill-grounded notion. He happened to fall in with the Lacedæmonians, who were alone, and separated from the body of the Grecian army,

to the number of 50,000 men, together with 3000 of the Tegeatæ. The encounter was exceeding fierce and resolute : on both sides the men fought with the courage of lions ; and the barbarians perceived that they had to do with soldiers who were determined to conquer or die in the field. The Athenian troops, to whom Pausanias sent an officer, were already upon their march to their aid : but the Greeks who had taken part with the Persians, to the number of 50,000 men, went out to meet them on their way, and hindered them from proceeding any farther. Aristides with his little body of men bore up firmly against them, and withstood their attack, letting them see how insignificant a superiority of numbers is against true courage and bravery.

The battle being thus divided into two, and fought in two different places, the Spartans were the first who broke in upon the Persian forces, and put them into disorder. Mardonius, their general, falling dead of a wound he had received in the engagement, all his army betook themselves to flight ; and those Greeks who were engaged against Aristides did the same thing, as soon as they understood the barbarians were defeated. The latter ran away to their former camp, which they had quitted, where they were sheltered and fortified with an inclosure of wood. The Lacedæmonians pursued them thither, and attacked them in their intrenchment ; but this they did poorly and weakly, like people that were not much accustomed to sieges, and to attack walls. The Athenian troops, having advice of this, left off pursuing their Grecian adversaries, and marched to the camp of the Persians, which after several assaults they carried, and made an horrible slaughter of the enemy.

Artabazus, who, from Mardonius's imprudent management, had but too well foreseen the misfortune that befel them, after having distinguished himself in the engagement, and given all possible proofs of his courage and intrepidity, made a timely retreat with the 40,000 men he commanded ; and preventing his flight from being known by the expedition of his march, he arrived safe at Byzantium, and from thence returned into Asia. Of all the rest of the Persian army, not 4000 men escaped after that day's slaughter : all were killed and cut to pieces by the Grecians ; who by that means delivered themselves at once from all further invasions from that nation ; no Persian army having ever appeared after that time on this side of the Hellespont.

This

* This battle was fought on the fourth day of the month † Bædromion, according to the Athenian manner of reckoning. Soon after, the allies, as a testimony of their gratitude to heaven, caused a statue of Jupiter to be made at their joint and common expence, which they placed in his temple at Olympia. The names of the several nations of Greece, that were present in the engagement, were engraven on the right side of the pedestal of the statue; the Lacedæmonians first, the Athenians next, and all the rest in order.

‡ One of the principal citizens of Ægina came and addressed himself to Pausanias, desiring him to avenge the indignity that Mardonius and Xerxes had shown to Leonidas, whose dead body was hung up on a gallows by their order, and urging him to use Mardonius's body after the same manner. As a further motive for doing so, he added, that by thus satisfying the manes of those that were killed at Thermopylæ, he would be sure to immortalize his own name throughout all Greece, and make his memory precious to the latest posterity. "Carry thy base counsel elsewhere," replied Pausanias. "Thou must have a very wrong notion of true glory, to imagine, that the way for me to acquire it is to resemble the barbarians. If the esteem of the people of Ægina is not to be purchased but by such a proceeding, I shall be content with preserving that of the Lacedæmonians only, amongst whom the base and ungenerous pleasure of revenge is never put in competition with that of showing clemency and moderation to their enemies, and especially after their death. As for the souls of my departed countrymen, they are sufficiently avenged by the death of the many thousand Persians slain upon the spot in the last engagement."

§ A dispute, which arose between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, about determining which of the two people should have the prize of valour adjudged to them, as also which of them should have the privilege of erecting a trophy, had like to have sullied all the glory, and imbittered the joy of their late victory. They were just on the point of carrying things to the last extremity, and would certainly have decided the difference with their swords, had not Aristides prevailed upon them, by the wisdom of his counsel and reasonings, to refer the determination of the matter to the judgment of the Grecians

* A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Paus. l. v. p. 532.

† This day answers to the eighth of our September.

‡ Herod. l. ix. c. 77, 78.

§ Plut. in Arist. p. 431.

in general. This proposition being accepted by both parties, and the Greeks being assembled upon the spot to decide the contest, Theogiton of Megara, speaking upon the question, gave it as his opinion, that the prize of valour ought to be adjudged neither to Athens nor to Sparta, but to some other city; unless they desired to kindle a civil war, of more fatal consequences than that they had just put an end to. After he had finished his speech, Cleocritus of Corinth rose up to speak his sentiments of the matter: and when he began, no body doubted but he was going to claim that honour for the city of which he was a member and a native; for Corinth was the chief city of Greece in power and dignity after those of Athens and Sparta. But every body was agreeably deceived when they found, that all his discourse tended to the praise of the Platæans, and that the conclusion he made from the whole was, that, in order to extinguish so dangerous a contention, they ought to adjudge the prize to them only, against whom neither of the contending parties could have any grounds of anger or jealousy. This discourse and proposal were received with a general applause by the whole assembly. Aristides immediately assented to it on the part of the Athenians, and Pausanias on the part of the Lacedæmonians.

* All parties being thus agreed, before they began to divide the spoil of the enemy, they put fourscore talents † aside for the Platæans; who laid them out in building a temple to Minerva, in erecting a statue to her honour, and in adorning the temple with curious and valuable paintings, which were still in being in Plutarch's time, that is to say, above 600 years afterwards, and which were then as fresh as if they had lately come out of the hands of the painters. As for the trophy, which had been another article of the dispute, the Lacedæmonians erected one for themselves in particular, and the Athenians another.

The spoil was immense: in Mardonius's camp they found prodigious sums of money in gold and silver, besides cups, vessels, beds, tables, necklaces, and bracelets of gold and silver, not to be valued or numbered. It is observed by a certain historian ‡, that these spoils proved fatal to Greece, by becom-

* Herod. l. ix. c. 79, 80.

† About L. 18,000 Sterling, or 80,000 crowns French. ○

‡ *Visto Mardonio, castra referta regalis opulentia capta, unde primum Græcos, diviso inter se auro Persico, divitiarum luxuria cepit.* Justin. l. ii. c. 14.

ing the instruments of introducing avarice and luxury among her inhabitants. According to the religious customs of the Grecians, before they divided the treasure, they appropriated the tithe or tenth part of the whole to the use of the gods: the rest was distributed equally among the cities and nations that had furnished troops; and the chief officers, who had distinguished themselves in the field of battle, were likewise distinguished in this distribution. They sent a present of a golden tripod to Delphos, in the inscription upon which Pausanias caused these words to be inserted: * “That he had defeated the barbarians at Platæa; and that, in acknowledgment of that victory, he had made this present to Apollo.”

This arrogant inscription, wherein he ascribed the honour both of the victory and the offering to himself only, offended the Lacedæmonian people; who, in order to punish his pride in the very point and place where he thought to exalt himself, as also to do justice to their confederates, caused his name to be razed out, and that of the cities which had contributed to the victory, to be put in the stead of it. Too ardent a thirst after glory on this occasion did not give him leave to consider, that a man loses nothing by a discreet modesty, which forbears the setting too high a value upon one’s own services, and which, by screening a man from envy†, serves really to enhance his reputation.

Pausanias gave still a further specimen of his Spartan spirit and humour, in two entertainments which he ordered to be prepared a few days after the engagement; one of which was costly and magnificent, in which was served all the variety of delicacies and dainties that used to be served at Mardonius’s table; the other was plain and frugal, after the manner of the Spartans. Then comparing the two entertainments together, and observing the difference of them to his officers, whom he had invited on purpose: “What a madness,” says he, “was it in Mardonius, who was accustomed to such a luxurious diet, to come and attack a people like us, who know how to live without all dainties and superfluities, and want nothing of that kind!”

‡ All the Grecians sent to Delphos to consult the oracle, concerning the sacrifice it was proper to offer. The answer they received from the god was, That they should erect an

* Cor. Nep. in Pausan. c. i.

† Ipsa dissimulatione famæ famam auxit. Tacit.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p. 331, 332.

altar to Jupiter Liberator; but that they should take care not to offer any sacrifice upon it, before they had extinguished all the fire in the country, because it had been polluted and profaned by the barbarians: and that they should come as far as Delphos to fetch pure fire, which they were to take from the altar, called the Common Altar.

This answer being brought to the Grecians from the oracle, the generals immediately dispersed themselves throughout the whole country, and caused all the fires to be extinguished: and Euchidas, a citizen of Platæa, having taken upon himself to go and fetch the sacred fire with all possible expedition, made the best of his way to Delphos. On his arrival, he purified himself, sprinkled his body with consecrated water, put on a crown of laurel, and then approached the altar, from whence, with great reverence, he took the holy fire, and carried it with him to Platæa, where he arrived before the setting of the sun, having travelled 1000 stadia, which make 125 miles English, in one day. As soon as he came back, he saluted his fellow-citizens, delivered the fire to them, fell down at their feet, and died in a moment afterwards. His countrymen carried away his body, and buried it in the temple of Diana, surnamed Eucleia, which signifies “of good renown;” and put the following epitaph upon his tomb in the compass of one verse: “Here lies Euchidas, who went from hence to Delphos, and returned back the same day.”

In the next general assembly of Greece, which was held not long after this occurrence, Aristides proposed the following decree: that all the cities of Greece should every year send their respective deputies to Platæa, in order to offer sacrifices to Jupiter Liberator, and to the gods of the city (this assembly was still regularly held in the time of Plutarch); that every five years there should be games celebrated there, which should be called the Games of Liberty; that the several states of Greece together should raise a body of troops, consisting of 10,000 foot, and 1000 horse, and should equip a fleet of 100 ships, which should be constantly maintained for making war against the barbarians; and that the inhabitants of Platæa, entirely devoted to the service of the gods, should be looked upon as sacred and inviolable, and be concerned in no other function than that of offering prayers and sacrifices for the general preservation and prosperity of Greece.

All these articles being approved of and passed into a law, the citizens of Platæa took upon them to solemnize every year the anniversary festival in honour of those persons that were slain

slain in this battle. The order and manner of performing this sacrifice was as follows: * The 16th day of the month Maimacterion, which answers to our month of December, at the first appearance of day-break, they walked in a solemn procession, which was preceded by a trumpet that sounded to battle. Next to the trumpet marched several chariots, filled with crowns and branches of myrtle. After these chariots was led a black bull, behind which marched a company of young persons, carrying pitchers in their hands full of wine and milk, the ordinary effusions offered to the dead, and vials of oil and essence. All these young persons were freemen; for no slave was allowed to have any part in this ceremony, which was instituted for men who had lost their lives for liberty. In the rear of this pomp followed the Archon, or chief magistrate* of the Platæans, for whom it was unlawful at any other time even so much as to touch iron, or to wear any other garment than a white one. But upon this occasion, being clad in purple raiment, having a sword by his side, and holding an urn in his hands, which he took from the place where they kept their public records, he marched quite through the city to the place where the tombs of his memorable countrymen were erected. As soon as he came there, he drew out water with his urn from the fountain, washed with his own hands the little columns that stood by the tombs, rubbed them afterwards with essence, and then killed the bull upon a pile of wood prepared for that purpose. After having offered up certain prayers to the terrestrial † Jupiter and Mercury, he invited those valiant souls deceased to come to their feast, and to partake of their funeral effusions; then taking a cup in his hand, and having filled it with wine, he poured it out on the ground, and said with a loud voice: "I present this cup to those valiant men who died for the liberty of the Grecians." These ceremonies were annually performed even in the time of Plutarch.

‡ Diodorus adds, that the Athenians in particular embellished the monuments of their citizens, who died in the war with the Persians, with magnificent ornaments, instituted fune-

* Three months after the battle of Platæa was fought. Probably these funeral rites were not at first performed, till after the enemy were entirely gone, and the country was free.

† The terrestrial Jupiter is no other than Pluto; and the same epithet of terrestrial was also given to Mercury; because it was believed to be his office to conduct departed souls to the infernal regions.

‡ Lib. xi. p. 26.

ral games to their honour, and appointed a solemn panegyric to be pronounced to the same intent, which, in all probability, was repeated every year.

The reader will be sensible, without my observing it, how much these solemn testimonies and perpetual demonstrations of honour, esteem, and gratitude for soldiers who had sacrificed their lives in the defence of liberty, conduced to enhance the merit of valour, and of the services they rendered their country, and to inspire the spectators with emulation and courage: and how exceeding proper all this was for cultivating and perpetuating a spirit of bravery in the people, and for making their troops victorious and invincible.

The reader, no doubt, will be as much surpris'd, on the other hand, to see how wonderfully careful and exact these people were in acquitting themselves on all occasions of the duties of religion. The great event, which I have just been relating, viz. the battle of Platæa, affords us very remarkable proofs of this particular, in the annual and perpetual sacrifice they instituted to Jupiter Liberator; which was still continued in the time of Plutarch; in the care they took to consecrate the tenth part of all their spoil to the gods; and in the decree propos'd by Aristides, to establish a solemn festival for ever, as an anniversary commemoration of that success. It is a delightful thing, methinks, to see pagan and idolatrous nations thus publicly confessing and declaring, that all their expectations centre in the Supreme Being; that they think themselves oblig'd to ascribe the success of all their undertakings to him; that they look upon him as the author of all their victories and prosperities, as the sovereign ruler and disposer of states and empires, as the source from whence all salutary counsels, wisdom, and courage, are derived, and as entitled, on all these accounts, to the first and best part of their spoils, and to their perpetual acknowledgments and thanksgiving for such distinguished favours and benefits.

SECTION X.

THE BATTLE NEAR MYCALE.—THE DEFEAT OF THE PERSIANS.

ON * the same day the Greeks fought the battle of Platæa, their naval forces obtained a memorable victory in Asia over the remainder of the Persian fleet. For whilst that of the

* Herod. l. ix. c. 89—105. Diod. l. xi. p. 26—28

Greeks lay at Ægina, under the command of Leotychides, one of the kings of Sparta, and of Xanthippus the Athenian, ambassadors came to those generals from the Ionians to invite them into Asia to deliver the Grecian cities from their subjection to the barbarians. On this invitation they immediately set sail from Asia, and steered their course by Delos; where, when they arrived, other ambassadors arrived from Samos, and brought them intelligence, that the Persian fleet, which had passed the winter at Cumæ, was then at Samos, where it would be an easy matter to defeat and destroy it, earnestly pressing them at the same time not to neglect so favourable an opportunity. The Greeks hereupon sailed away directly for Samos. But the Persians receiving intelligence of their approach, retired to Mycale, a promontory of the continent of Asia, where their land-army, consisting of 100,000 men, who were the remainder of those that Xerxes had carried back from Greece the year before, was encamped. Here they drew their vessels ashore, which was a common practice among the ancients, and encompassed them round with a strong rampart. The Grecians followed them to the very place, and, with the help of the Ionians, defeated their land-army, forced their rampart, and burnt all their vessels.

The battle of Plataea was fought in the morning, and that of Mycale in the afternoon of the same day; and yet all the Greek writers pretend that the victory of Plataea was known at Mycale before the latter engagement was begun, though the whole Ægean sea, which requires several days sailing to cross it, was between those two places. But Diodorus, the Sicilian, explains us this mystery. He tells us, that Leotychides, observing his soldiers to be much dejected for fear their countrymen at Plataea should sink under the numbers of Mardonius's army, contrived a stratagem to reanimate them; and that, therefore, when he was just upon the point of making the first attack, he caused a rumour to be * spread among his troops, that the Persians were defeated at Plataea, though at that time he had no manner of knowledge of the matter.

† Xerxes, hearing the news of these two overthrows, left Sardis with as much haste and hurry, as he had done Athens before, after the battle of Salamin, and retired with great precipitation into Persia, in order to put himself, as far as he possibly

* What we are told also of Paulus Æmilus's victory over the Macedonians, which was known at Rome the very day it was obtained, without doubt happened in the same manner.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 28.

could, out of the reach of his victorious enemies*. But before he set out, he gave orders that his people should burn and demolish all the temples belonging to the Grecian cities in Asia: which order was so far executed, that not one escaped, except the temple of Diana at Ephesus†. He acted in this manner at the instigation of the Magi, who were professed enemies to temples and images. The second Zoroaster had thoroughly instructed him in their religion, and made him a zealous defender of it‡. Pliny informs us, that Ostanes, the head of the Magi, and the patriarch of that sect, who maintained its maxims and interests with the greatest violence, attended Xerxes upon his expedition against Greece§. This prince, as he passed through Babylon on his return to Susa, destroyed also all the temples in that city, as he had done those of Greece and Asia Minor; doubtless, through the same principle, and out of hatred to the sect of the Sabæans, who made use of images in their divine worship, which was a thing extremely detested by the Magi. Perhaps also, the desire of making himself amends for the charges of his Grecian expedition by the spoil and plunder of those temples, might be another motive that induced him to destroy them: for it is certain he found immense riches and treasure in them, which had been amassed together through the superstition of princes and people during a long series of ages.

The Grecian fleet, after the battle of Mycale, set sail toward the Hellespont, in order to possess themselves of the bridges which Xerxes had caused to be laid over that narrow passage, and which they supposed were still entire. But finding them broken by tempestuous weather, Leotychides and his Peloponnesian forces returned towards their own country. As for Xanthippus, he staid with the Athenians and their Ionian confederates, and they made themselves masters of Sestus and the Thracian Chersonesus: in which places they found great booty, and took a vast number of prisoners. After which, before winter came on, they returned to their own cities.

From this time all the cities of Ionia revolted from the Persians; and, having entered into confederacy with the Grecians, most of them preserved their liberty during the time that empire subsisted.

* Strab. l. i. p. 634.

Plin. l. xxx. c. 1.

† Cic. l. ii. de. Leg. n. 29.

§ Arrian. l. vii.

SECTION XI.

THE BARBAROUS AND INHUMAN REVENGE OF AMESTRIS,
THE WIFE OF XERXES.

DURING the residence of Xerxes at Sardis*, he conceived a violent passion for the wife of his brother Mafistus, who was a prince of extraordinary merit, had always served the king with great zeal and fidelity, and had never done any thing to disoblige him. The virtue of this lady, her great affection and fidelity to her husband, made her inexorable to all the king's solicitations. However, he still flattered himself, that by a profusion of favours and liberalities he might possibly gain upon her; and, among other kind things he did to oblige her, he married his eldest son Darius, whom he intended for his successor, to Artainta, this princess's daughter, and ordered that the marriage should be consummated as soon as he arrived at Susa. But Xerxes finding the lady still no less impregnable, in spite of all his temptations and attacks, immediately changed his object, and fell passionately in love with her daughter, who did not imitate the glorious example of her mother's constancy and virtue. Whilst this intrigue was carrying on, Amestris, wife to Xerxes, made him a present of a rich and magnificent robe of her own making. Xerxes, being extremely pleased with this robe, thought fit to put it on upon the first visit he afterwards made to Artainta; and, in the conversation he had with her, he mightily pressed her to let him know what she desired he should do for her; assuring her, at the same time, with an oath, that he would grant her whatever she asked of him. Artainta, upon this, desired him to give her the robe he had on. Xerxes, foreseeing the ill consequences that would necessarily ensue upon his making her this present, did all that he could to dissuade her from insisting upon it, and offered her any thing in the world in lieu of it. But, not being able to prevail upon her, and thinking himself bound by the imprudent promise and oath he had made to her, he gave her the robe. The lady no sooner received it, but she put it on, and wore it publicly by way of trophy.

Amestris being confirmed in the suspicions she had entertained, by this action, was enraged to the last degree. But, instead of letting her vengeance fall upon the daughter, who was the only offender, she resolved to wreak it upon the mother, whom she looked upon as the author of the whole intrigue, though

* A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479. Herod. l. ix. c. 107—112.

she was entirely innocent of the matter. For the better executing of her purpose, she waited until the grand feast, which was every year celebrated on the king's birth-day, and which was not far off; on which occasion the king, according to the established custom of the country, granted her whatever she demanded. This day then being come, the thing which she desired of his majesty was, that the wife of Masistus should be delivered into her hands. Xerxes, who apprehended the queen's design, and who was struck with horror at the thoughts of it, as well out of regard to his brother, as on account of the innocence of the lady, against whom he perceived his wife was so violently exasperated, at first refused her request, and endeavoured all he could to dissuade her from it. But not being able either to prevail upon her, or to act with steadiness and resolution himself, he at last yielded, and was guilty of the weakest and most cruel piece of complaisance that ever was acted, making the inviolable obligations of justice and humanity give way to the arbitrary laws of a custom, that had only been established to give occasion for the doing of good, and for acts of beneficence and generosity. In consequence then of this compliance, the lady was apprehended by the king's guards, and delivered to Amestris, who caused her breasts, tongue, nose, ears, and lips, to be cut off, ordered them to be cast to the dogs in her own presence, and then sent her home to her husband's house in that mutilated and miserable condition. In the mean time, Xerxes had sent for his brother, in order to prepare him for this melancholy and tragical adventure. He first gave him to understand, that he should be glad he would put away his wife; and to induce him thereto, offered to give him one of his daughters in her stead. But Masistus, who was passionately fond of his wife, could not prevail upon himself to divorce her: whereupon Xerxes in great wrath told him, that since he refused his daughter, he should neither have her nor his wife; and that he would teach him not to reject the offers his master had made him; and with this inhuman reply dismissed him.

This strange proceeding threw Masistus into the greatest anxiety; who, thinking he had reason to apprehend the worst of accidents, made all the haste he could home, to see what had passed there during his absence. On his arrival he found his wife in that deplorable condition we have just been describing. Being enraged thereat to the degree we may naturally imagine, he assembled all his family, his servants and dependents, and set out with all possible expedition for Bactriana, whereof he was governor, determined, as soon as he arrived there,

there, to raise an army and make war against the king, in order to avenge himself for his barbarous treatment. But Xerxes being informed of his hasty departure, and from thence suspecting the design he had conceived against him, sent a party of horse after him to pursue him; which having overtaken him, cut him in pieces, together with his children and all his retinue. I do not know whether a more tragical example of revenge than I have now related, is to be found in history.

* There is still another action, no less cruel or impious than the former, related of Amestris. She caused 14 children of the best families in Persia to be burnt alive, as a sacrifice to the infernal gods, out of compliance with a superstitious custom practised by the Persians.

† Masistius being dead, Xerxes gave the government of Bactriana to his second son Hytaspes; who being by that means obliged to live at a distance from the court, gave his younger brother Artaxerxes the opportunity of ascending the throne to his disadvantage, after the death of their father, as will be seen in the sequel.

Here ends Herodotus's history, viz. at the battle of Mycale, and the siege of the city of Sestus by the Athenians.

SECTION XII.

THE ATHENIANS REBUILD THE WALLS OF THEIR CITY,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE OPPOSITION OF THE
LACEDÆMONIANS.

THE war†, commonly called the war of Media, which had lasted but two years, being terminated in the manner we have mentioned, the Athenians returned to their own country, sent for their wives and children, whom they had committed to the care of their friends during the war, and began to think of rebuilding their city, which was almost entirely destroyed by the Persians, and to surround it with strong walls, in order to secure it from farther violence. The Lacedæmonians having intelligence of this, conceived a jealousy, and began to apprehend, that Athens, which was already very powerful by sea, if it should go on to increase its strength by land also, might take upon her in time to give laws to Sparta, and to deprive her of that authority and pre-eminence, which she had hitherto exercis-

* Herod. l. vii. c. 114.

† Diod. l. xi. p. 53.

† A. M. 3526. Ant. J. C. 478. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 59—62. Diod. l. xi. p. 30, 31. Justin. l. ii. c. 15.

ed over the rest of Greece. They therefore sent an embassy to the Athenians, the purport of which was to represent to them, that the common interest and safety required, that there should be no fortified city out of the Peloponnesus, lest, in case of a second irruption, it should serve for a place of arms for the Persians, who would be sure to settle themselves in it, as they had done before at Thebes, and who from thence would be able to infest the whole country, and to make themselves masters of it very speedily. Themistocles, who since the battle of Salamin was greatly considered and respected at Athens, easily penetrated into the true design of the Lacedæmonians, though it was gilded over with the specious pretext of public good : but, as the latter were able, with the assistance of their allies, to hinder the Athenians by force from carrying on the work, in case they should positively and absolutely refuse to comply with their demands, he advised the senate to make use of cunning and dissimulation as well as they. The answer therefore they made their envoys was, that they would send an embassy to Sparta, to satisfy the commonwealth concerning their jealousies and apprehensions. Themistocles got himself to be nominated one of the ambassadors, and persuaded the senate not to let his colleagues set out along with him, but to send them one after another, in order to gain time for carrying on the work. The matter was executed pursuant to his advice ; and he accordingly went alone to Lacedæmon, where he let a great many days pass without waiting upon the magistrates, or applying to the senate. And, upon their pressing him to do it, and asking him the reason why he deferred it so long, he made answer, that he waited for the arrival of his colleagues, that they might all have their audience of the senate together, and seemed to be very much surprised that they were so long in coming. At length they arrived ; but all came singly, and at a good distance of time one from another. During all this while, the work was carried on at Athens with the utmost industry and vigour. The women, children, strangers, and slaves, were all employed in it : nor was it interrupted night or day. The Spartans were not ignorant of the matter, but made great complaints of it to Themistocles, who positively denied the fact, and pressed them to send other deputies to Athens, in order to inform themselves better of the fact ; desiring them not to give credit to loose and flying reports, without foundation. At the same time he secretly advised the Athenians to detain the Spartan envoys as so many hostages, until he and his colleagues were returned from their embassy, fearing, not without good reason,

that

that they themselves might be served in the same manner at Sparta. At last, when all his fellow-ambassadors were arrived, he desired an audience, and declared in full senate, that it was really true the Athenians had resolved to fortify their city with strong walls; that the work was almost completed; that they had judged it to be absolutely necessary for their own security, and for the public good of the allies; telling them at the same time, that, after the great experience they had had of the Athenian people's behaviour, they could not well suspect them of being wanting in their zeal for the common interest of their country; that, as the condition and privileges of all the allies ought to be equal, it was just the Athenians should provide for their own safety by all the methods they judged necessary, as well as the other confederates; that they had thought of this expedient, and were in a condition to defend their city against whomsoever should presume to attack it; and * that as for the Lacedæmonians, it was not much for their honour, that they should desire to establish their power and superiority rather upon the weak and defenceless condition of their allies, than upon their own strength and valour. The Lacedæmonians were extremely displeased with this discourse: but, either out of a sense of gratitude and esteem for their country, or out of a conviction that they were not able to oppose their enterprise, they dissimulated their resentment; and the ambassadors on both sides, having all suitable honours paid them, returned to their respective cities.

† Themistocles, who had always his thoughts fixed upon raising and augmenting the power and glory of the Athenian commonwealth, did not confine his views to the walls of the city. He went on with the same vigorous application to finish the building and fortifications of the Piræus: for, from the time he entered into office, he had begun that great work. Before his time they had no other port at Athens but that of Phalerus, which was neither very large nor commodious, and consequently not capable of answering the great designs of Themistocles. For this reason he had cast his eye upon the Piræus, which seemed to invite him by its advantageous situation, and by the conveniency of its three spacious havens, which were capable of containing above 400 vessels. This undertaking was prosecuted with so much diligence and vivacity,

*. Graviter castigat eos, quod non virtute, sed imbecillitate sociorum, potentiam quærerent. Justin. l. ii. c. 15.

† Thucyd. p. 62. 65. Diod. l. xi. p. 32, 33.

that the work was considerably advanced in a very little time. Themistocles likewise obtained a decree, that every year they should build 20 vessels for the augmentation of their fleet: and, in order to engage the greater number of workmen and sailors to resort to Athens, he caused particular privileges and immunities to be granted in their favour. His design was, as I have already observed, to make the whole force of Athens maritime; in which he followed a very different scheme of politics from what had been pursued by their ancient kings, who, endeavouring all they could to alienate the minds of the citizens from seafaring business and from war, and to make them apply themselves wholly to agriculture and to peaceable employments, published this fable: That Minerva disputing with Neptune, to know which of them should be declared patron of Attica, and give their name to the city newly built, she gained her cause by showing her judges the branch of an olive-tree, the happy symbol of peace and plenty, which she had planted; whereas Neptune had made a fiery horse, the symbol of war and confusion, rise out of the earth before them.

SECTION XIII.

THE BLACK DESIGN OF THEMISTOCLES REJECTED UNANIMOUSLY BY THE PEOPLE OF ATHENS.

THEMISTOCLES*, who conceived the design of supplanting the Lacedæmonians, and of taking the government of Greece out of their hands, in order to put it into those of the Athenians, kept his eye and his thoughts continually fixed upon that great object. And as he was not very nice or scrupulous in the choice of his measures, whatever tended towards the accomplishing of the end he had in view, he looked upon as just and lawful. On a certain day then he declared, in a full assembly of the people, that he had a very important design to propose, but that he could not communicate it to the people; because its success required it should be carried on with the greatest secrecy: he therefore desired they would appoint a person, to whom he might explain himself upon the matter in question. Aristides was unanimously pitched upon by the whole assembly, who referred themselves entirely to his opinion of the affair: so great a confidence had they both in his probity and prudence. Themistocles therefore having taken him aside, told

* Plut. in Themist. p. 121, 122. in Arist. p. 332.

him, that the design he had conceived was to burn the fleet belonging to the rest of the Grecian states, which then lay in a neighbouring port, and that by this means Athens would certainly become mistress of all Greece. Aristides hereupon returned to the assembly, and only declared to them, that indeed nothing could be more advantageous to the commonwealth than Themistocles's project, but that at the same time nothing in the world could be more unjust. All the people unanimously ordained, that Themistocles should entirely desist from his project. We see in this instance, that the title of Just was not given to Aristides, even in his life-time, without some foundation: a title, says Plutarch, infinitely superior to all those which conquerors pursue with so much ardour, and which, in some measure, approaches a man to the divinity.

I do not know whether all history can afford us a fact more worthy of admiration than this. It is not a company of philosophers (to whom it costs nothing to establish fine maxims and sublime notions of morality in the schools) who determine on this occasion, that the consideration of profit and advantage ought never to prevail in preference to what is honest and just. It is an entire people, who are highly interested in the proposal made to them, who are convinced that it is of the greatest importance to the welfare of the state, and who however reject it with unanimous consent and without a moment's hesitation, and that for this only reason, that it is contrary to justice. How black and perfidious, on the other hand, was the design which Themistocles proposed to them, of burning the fleet of their Grecian confederates, at a time of entire peace, solely to aggrandize the power of the Athenians! Had he an hundred times the merit ascribed to him, this single action would be sufficient to fully all his glory. For it is the heart, that is to say, integrity and probity, that constitutes and distinguishes true merit.

I am sorry that Plutarch, who generally judges of things with great justness, does not seem, on this occasion, to condemn Themistocles. After having spoken of the works he had effected in the Piræus, he goes on to the fact in question, of which he says: “* Themistocles projected something *still greater* for the augmentation of their maritime power.”

† The Lacedæmonians having proposed in the council of the Amphictyons, that all the cities which had not taken arms against Xerxes, should be excluded from that assembly, Themis-

* Μεζόν τι διενόησεν.

† Plut. in Themist. p. 122.

toles, who apprehended, that if the Theſſalians, the Argives, and the Thebans, were excluded that council, the Spartans would by that means become maſters of the ſuffrages, and conſequently determine all affairs according to their pleaſure; Themiſtocles, I ſay, made a ſpeech in behalf of the cities they were for excluding, and brought the deputies that compoſed the aſſembly over to his ſentiments. He repreſented to them, that the greateſt part of the cities that had entered into the confederacy, which were but 31 in the whole, were very ſmall and inconfiderable; that it would therefore be a very ſtrange, as well as a very dangerous proceeding, to deprive all the other cities of Greece of their votes and places in the grand aſſembly of the nation, and by that means ſuffer the auguſt council of the Amphictyons to fall under the direction and influence of two or three of the moſt powerful cities, which for the future would give law to all the reſt, and would ſubvert and aboliſh that equality of power, which was juſtly regarded as the baſis and ſoul of all republics. Themiſtocles, by this plain and open declaration of his opinion, drew upon himſelf the hatred of the Lacedæmonians, who from that time became his profeſſed enemies. He had alſo incurred the diſpleaſure of the reſt of the allies, by his having exacted contributions from them in too rigorous and rapacious a manner.

* When the city of Athens was entirely rebuilt, the people, finding themſelves in a ſtate of peace and tranquillity, endeavoured by all ſorts of methods to get the government into their hands, and to make the Athenian ſtate entirely popular. This deſign of theirs, though kept as ſecret as poſſible, did not eſcape the vigilance and penetration of Ariſtides, who ſaw all the conſequences with which ſuch an innovation would be attended. But, as he conſidered on one hand, that the people were entitled to ſome regard, on account of the valour they had ſhown in all the late battles they had gained; and, on the other, that it would be no eaſy matter to curb and reſtrain a people who ſtill in a manner had their arms in their hands, and who were grown more insolent than ever from their victories; on theſe conſiderations, I ſay, he thought it proper to obſerve meaſures with them, and to find out ſome medium to ſatisfy and appeaſe them. He therefore paſſed a decree, by which it was ordained that the government ſhould be common to all the citizens, and that the Archons, who were the chief magiſtrates

of the commonwealth, and who used to be chosen only out of the richest of its members, *viz.* from among those only who received at least 500 medimnis of grain out of the product of their lands, should, for the future, be elected indifferently out of all the Athenians without distinction. By thus giving up something to the people, he prevented all dissensions and commotions, which might have proved fatal, not only to the Athenian state, but to all Greece.

SECTION XIV.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS LOSE THE CHIEF COMMAND
THROUGH THE PRIDE AND ARROGANCE
OF PAUSANIAS.

THE Grecians*, encouraged by the happy success which had every-where attended their victorious arms, determined to send a fleet to sea, in order to deliver such of their allies as were still under the yoke of the Persians, out of their hands. Pausanias was the commander of the fleet for the Lacedæmonians; and Aristides, and Cimon the son of Miltiades, commanded for the Athenians. They first directed their course to the isle of Cyprus, where they restored all the cities to their liberty: then steering towards the Hellespont, they attacked the city of Byzantium, of which they made themselves masters, and took a vast number of prisoners, a great part of whom were of the richest and most considerable families of Persia.

Pausanias, who from this time conceived thoughts of betraying his country, judged it proper to make use of this opportunity to gain the favour of Xerxes. To this end he caused a report to be spread among his troops, that the Persian noblemen, whom he had committed to the guard and care of one of his officers, had made their escape by night, and were fled: whereas he had set them at liberty himself, and sent a letter by them to Xerxes, wherein he offered to deliver the city of Sparta and all Greece into his hands, on condition he would give him his daughter in marriage. The king did not fail to give him a favourable answer, and to send him very large sums of money also, in order to win over as many of the Grecians, as he should find disposed to enter into his designs. The person he appointed to manage this intrigue with him, was Artabazus; and to the end that he might have it in his power to

* A. M. 3528. Ant. J. C. 476. Thucyd. l. i. p. 63. 84—86.

transact the matter with the greater ease and security, he made him governor of all the sea-coasts of Asia Minor.

* Pausanias, who was already dazzled with the prospect of his future greatness, began from this moment to change his whole conduct and behaviour. The poor, modest, and frugal way of living at Sparta; their subjection to rigid and austere laws, which neither spared nor respected any man's person, but were altogether as inexorable and inflexible to the greatest, as to those of the meanest condition; all this, I say, became insupportable to Pausanias. He could not bear the thoughts of going back to Sparta, after his having been possessed of such high commands and employments, to return to a state of equality, that confounded him with the meanest of the citizens; and this was the cause of his entering into a treaty with the barbarians. Having done this, he entirely laid aside the manners and behaviour of his country; assumed both the dress and state of the Persians, and imitated them in all their expensive luxury and magnificence. He treated the allies with an insufferable rudeness and insolence; never spoke to the officers but with menaces and arrogance; required extraordinary and unusual honours to be paid to him; and by his whole behaviour rendered the Spartan dominion odious to all the confederates. On the other hand, the courteous, affable, and obliging deportment of Aristides and Cimon; an infinite remoteness from all imperious and haughty airs, which only tend to alienate people and multiply enemies; a gentle, kind, and beneficent disposition, which showed itself in all their actions, and which served to temper the authority of their commands, and to render it both easy and amiable; the justice and humanity conspicuous in every thing they did; the great care they took to offend no person whatsoever, and to do kind offices and services to all about them: all this, I say, hurt Pausanias exceedingly, by the contrast of their opposite characters, and exceedingly increased the general discontent. At last this dissatisfaction publicly broke out; and all the allies deserted him, and put themselves under the command and protection of the Athenians. Thus did Aristides, says Plutarch, by the prevalence of that humanity and gentleness, which he opposed to the arrogance and roughness of Pausanias, and by inspiring Cimon his colleague with the same sentiments, insensibly draw off the minds of the allies from the Lacedæmonians, without their perceiving it, and at length deprived them of the com-

* Plut. in Arist p. 332, 333.

mand; not by open force, or by sending out armies and fleets against them, and still less by making use of any arts or perfidious practices; but by the wisdom and moderation of his conduct, and by rendering the government of the Athenians amiable.

It must be confessed at the same time, that the Spartan people on this occasion showed a greatness of soul and a spirit of moderation, that can never be sufficiently admired. For when they were convinced, that their commanders grew haughty and insolent from their too great authority, they willingly renounced the superiority, which they had hitherto exercised over the rest of the Grecians, and forebore sending any more of their generals to command the Grecian armies; chusing rather, adds the historian, to have their citizens wise, modest, and submissive to the discipline and laws of the commonwealth, than to maintain their pre-eminence and superiority over all the Grecian states.

SECTION XV.

PAUSANIAS'S SECRET CONSPIRACY WITH THE PERSIANS. HIS DEATH.

UPON * the repeated complaints the Spartan commonwealth received on all hands against Pausanias, they recalled him home to give an account of his conduct. But not having sufficient evidence to convict him of his having carried on a correspondence with Xerxes, they were obliged to acquit him on this first trial; after which he returned, of his own private authority, and without the consent and approbation of the republic, to the city of Byzantium, from whence he continued to carry on his secret practices with Artabazus. But, as he was still guilty of many violent and unjust proceedings, whilst he resided there, the Athenians obliged him to leave the place; from whence he retired to Colonæ, a small city of Troas. There he received an order from the Ephori to return to Sparta, on pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, a public enemy and traitor to his country. He complied with the summons and went home, hoping he should still be able to bring himself off by dint of money. On his arrival he was committed to prison, and was soon afterwards brought again upon his trial before the judges. The charge brought against him was supported by many suspi-

* A. M. 3529. Ant. J. C. 475. Thucyd. l. i. p. 86. & 89. Diod. l. ix. p. 3—36. Cor. Nep. in Pausan.

cious circumstances and strong presumptions. Several of his own slaves confessed that he had promised to give them their liberty, in case they would enter into his designs, and serve him with fidelity and zeal in the execution of his projects. But, as it was the custom of the Ephori never to pronounce sentence of death against a Spartan, without a full and direct proof of the crime laid to his charge, they looked upon the evidence against him as insufficient; and the more so, as he was of the royal family, and was actually invested with the administration of the regal office; for Pausanias exercised the function of king, as being the guardian and nearest relation to Plistarchus, the son of Leonidas, who was then in his minority. He was therefore acquitted a second time, and set at liberty.

Whilst the Ephori were thus perplexed for want of clear and plain evidence against the offender, a certain slave, who was called the Argilian, came to them, and brought them a letter, written by Pausanias himself to the king of Persia, which the slave was to have carried and delivered to Artabazus. It must be observed by the way, that this Persian governor and Pausanias had agreed together, immediately to put to death all the couriers they mutually sent to one another, as soon as their packets or messages were delivered, that there might be no possibility left of tracing out or discovering their correspondence. The Argilian, who saw none of his fellow-servants that were sent expresses, return back again, had some suspicion; and when it came to his turn to go, he opened the letter he was intrusted with, in which Artabazus was really desired to kill him pursuant to their agreement. This was the letter the slave put into the hands of the Ephori; who still thought even this proof insufficient in the eye of the law, and therefore endeavoured to corroborate it, by the testimony of Pausanias himself. The slave, in concert with them, withdrew to the temple of Neptune in Tenaros, as to a secure asylum. Two small closets were purposely made there, in which the Ephori and some Spartans hid themselves. The instant Pausanias was informed that the Argilian had fled to this temple, he hastened thither, to inquire the reason. The slave confessed that he had opened the letter; and that finding by the contents of it he was to be put to death, he had fled to that temple to save his life. As Pausanias could not deny the fact, he made the best excuse he could; promised the slave a great reward; obliged him to promise not to mention what had passed between them to any person whatsoever. Pausanias then left him.

Pausanias's guilt was now but too evident. The moment he
was

was returned to the city, the Ephori were resolved to seize him. From the aspect of one of these magistrates, he plainly perceived that some evil design was hatching against him, and therefore he ran with the utmost speed to the temple of Pallas called Chalciæcos, near that place, and got into it before the pursuers could overtake him. The entrance was immediately stopped up with great stones; and history informs us, that the criminal's mother set the first example on that occasion. They now tore off the roof of the chapel: but as the Ephori did not dare to take him out of it by force, because this would have been a violation of that sacred asylum, they resolved to leave him exposed to the inclemencies of the weather, and accordingly he was starved to death. His corpse was buried not far from that place: but the oracle of the Delphos, whom they consulted soon after, declared, that, to appease the anger of the goddess, who was justly offended on account of the violation of her temple, two statues must be set up there in honour of Pausanias, which was done accordingly.

Such was the end of Pausanias, whose wild and inconsiderate ambition had stifled in him all sentiments of probity, honour, love of his country, zeal for liberty, and of hatred and aversion for the barbarians: sentiments which, in some measure, were inherent in all the Greeks, and particularly in the Lacedæmonians.

SECTION XVI.

THEMISTOCLES FLIES FOR SHELTER TO KING ADMETUS.

THEMISTOCLES* was also charged with being an accomplice of Pausanias. He was then in exile. A passionate thirst of glory, and a strong desire to command arbitrarily over the citizens, had made him very odious to them. He had built, very near his house, a temple in honour of Diana, under this title, "To Diana, goddess of good counsel;" as hinting to the Athenians, that he had given good counsel to their city, and to all Greece; and he also had placed his statue in it, which was standing in Plutarch's time. It appeared, says he, from this statue, that his physiognomy was as heroic as his valour. Finding that men listened with pleasure to all the calumnies his enemies spread against him, to silence them, he was for ever expatiating, in all public assemblies, on the services he had done

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 89, 90. Plut. in Themist. c. cxxiii. cxxiv. Corn. Nep. in Themist. c. viii.

his country. As they were at last tired with hearing him repeat this so often, "How!" says he to them, "are you weary of having good offices frequently done you by the same persons?" He did not consider, that putting them so often in mind * of his services, was in a manner reproaching them with their having forgot them, which was not very obliging; and he seemed not to know, that the surest way to acquire applause, is to leave the bestowing of it to others, and to resolve to do such things only as are praise-worthy; and that a frequent repetition of one's own virtue and exalted actions, is so far from appeasing envy, that it only inflames it.

† Themistocles, after having been banished from Athens by the ostracism, withdrew to Argos. He was there when Pausanias was prosecuted as a traitor, who had conspired against his country. He had at first concealed his machinations from Themistocles, though he was one of his best friends; but as soon as he was expelled his country, and highly resented that injury, he disclosed his projects to him, and pressed him to join in them. To induce his compliance, he showed him the letters which the king of Persia wrote to him; and endeavoured to animate him against the Athenians, by painting their injustice and ingratitude in the strongest colours. However, Themistocles rejected with indignation the proposals of Pausanias, and refused peremptorily to engage in any manner in his schemes: but then he concealed what had passed between them, and did not discover the enterprise he had formed; whether it was that he imagined Pausanias would renounce it of himself, or was persuaded that it would be discovered some other way; it not being possible for so dangerous and ill-concerted an enterprise to take effect.

After Pausanias's death, several letters and other things were found among his papers, which raised a violent suspicion of Themistocles. The Lacedæmonians sent deputies to Athens, to accuse and have sentence of death passed upon him; and such of the citizens who envied him, joined these accusers. Aristides had now a fair opportunity of revenging himself on his rival, for the injurious treatment he had received from him, had his soul been capable of so cruel a satisfaction. But he refused absolutely to join in so horrid a combination; as little inclined to delight in the misfortunes of his adversary, as he

* Hoc molestum est. Nam est hæc commemoratio quasi exprobatio est immemoris beneficii. Terent. in Andr.

† Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

had before been to regret his successes. Themistocles answered by letters all the calumnies with which he was charged; and represented to the Athenians, that as he had ever been fond of ruling, and his temper being such as would not suffer him to be lorded over by others, it was highly improbable that he should have a design to deliver up himself, and all Greece, to enemies and barbarians.

In the mean time the people, too strongly wrought upon by his accusers, sent some persons to seize him, that he might be tried by the council of Greece. Themistocles, having timely notice of it, went into the island of Coreyra, to whose inhabitants he formerly had done some service; however, not thinking himself safe there, he fled to Epirus; and finding himself still pursued by the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, out of despair he made a very dangerous choice, which was, to fly to Admetus, king of Molossus, for refuge. This prince, having formerly desired the aid of the Athenians, and being refused with ignominy by Themistocles, who at that time presided in the government, had retained the deepest resentment on that account, and declared, that he would take the first opportunity to revenge himself. But Themistocles, imagining that in the unhappy situation of his affairs, the recent envy of his fellow-citizens was more to be feared than the ancient grudge of that king, was resolved to run the hazard of it. Being come into the palace of that monarch, upon being informed that he was absent, he addressed himself to the queen, who received him very graciously, and instructed him in the manner it was proper to make his request. Admetus being returned, Themistocles takes the king's son in his arms, seats himself on his hearth amidst his household gods, and there telling him who he was, and the cause why he fled to him for refuge, he implores his clemency, owns that his life is in his hand, intreats him to forget the past, and represents to him that no action can be more worthy a great king than to exercise clemency. Admetus, surprised and moved with compassion in seeing at his feet, in so humble a posture, the greatest man of all Greece, and the conqueror of all Asia, raised him immediately from the ground, and promised to protect him against all his enemies. Accordingly, when the Athenians and Lacedæmonians came to demand him, he refused absolutely to deliver up a person who had made his palace his asylum, in the firm persuasion that it would be sacred and inviolable.

Whilst he was at the court of this prince, one of his friends found an opportunity to carry off his wife and children from

Athens, and to send them to him; for which that person was some time after seized and condemned to die. With regard to Themistocles's effects, his friends secured the greatest part of them for him, which they afterwards found opportunity to remit him; but all that could be discovered, which amounted to 100 * talents, was carried to the public treasury. When he entered upon the administration, he was not worth three talents. I shall leave this illustrious exile for some time in the court of king Admetus, to resume the sequel of this history.

SECTION XVII.

ARISTIDES'S DISINTERESTED ADMINISTRATION OF THE PUBLIC TREASURE.—HIS DEATH. AND EULOGIUM.

I have before observed †, that the command of Greece had passed from Sparta to the Athenians. Hitherto the cities and nations of Greece had indeed contributed some sums of money towards carrying on the expence of the war against the barbarians; but this repartition or division had always occasioned great feuds, because it was not made in a just or equal proportion. It was thought proper, under this new government, to lodge in the island of Delos, the common treasure of Greece; to fix new regulations with regard to the public monies; and to lay such a tax as might be regulated according to the revenue of each city and state: in order that the expences being equally borne by the several individuals who composed the body of the allies, no one might have reason to murmur. The business was, to find a person of so honest and incorrupt a mind, as to discharge faithfully an employment of so delicate and dangerous a kind, the due administration of which so nearly concerned the public welfare. All the allies cast their eyes upon Aristides; accordingly they invested him with full powers, and appointed him to levy a tax on each of them, relying entirely on his wisdom and justice.

The citizens had no cause to repent their choice. ‡ He presided over the treasury with the fidelity and disinterestedness of a man who looks upon it as a capital crime to embezzle the

* 100,000 crowns French, about L. 22,500 Sterling.

† Plut. in Arist. p. 333, 334. Diod. l. xi. p. 36.

‡ Tu quidem orbis terrarum rationes administras; tam abstinenter quam alienas, tam diligenter quam tuas, tam religiose quam publicas. In officio amorem consequeris, in quo odium vitare difficile est. Senec. lib. de brev. vit. cap. xviii.

smallest portion of another's possessions ; with the care and activity of a father of a family, in the management of his own estate ; and with the caution and integrity of a person who considers the public monies as sacred. In fine, he succeeded in what is equally difficult and extraordinary, viz. to acquire the love of all in an office, in which he that escapes the public odium gains a great point. Such is the glorious character which Seneca gives of a person charged with an employment of almost the same kind, and the noblest eulogium that can be given such as administer public revenues. It is the exact picture of Aristides. He discovered so much probity and wisdom in the exercise of this office, that no man complained ; and those times were considered ever after as the golden age, that is, the period in which Greece had attained its highest pitch of virtue and happiness. And, indeed, the tax which he had fixed, in the whole, to 460 talents, was raised by Pericles to 600, and soon after to 1300 talents : it was not that the expences of the war were increased, but the treasure was employed to very useless purposes, in manual distributions to the Athenians, in solemnizing of games and festivals, in building of temples and public edifices ; not to mention, that the hands of those who superintended the treasury were not always clean and incorrupt as those of Aristides. This wise and equitable conduct secured him, to latest posterity, the glorious surname of "the Just."

Nevertheless, Plutarch relates an action of Aristides, which shows that the Greeks (the same may be said of the Romans) had a very narrow and imperfect idea of justice. They confined the exercise of it to the interior, as it were, of civil society ; and acknowledged that the individuals were bound to observe strictly its several maxims : but with regard to their country, to the republic (their great idol to which they reduced every thing), they thought in a quite different manner ; and imagined themselves essentially obliged to sacrifice to it, not only their lives and possessions, but even their religion and the most sacred engagements, in opposition to, and contempt of the most solemn oaths. This will appear evidently in what follows.

* After the regulation had been made in respect to the tributes of which I have just spoken, Aristides, having settled the several articles of the alliance, made the confederates take an oath to observe them punctually, and he himself swore in the

* Plut. in vit. Arist. p. 333, 334.

name of the Athenians; and in denouncing the curses which always accompanied the oaths, he threw into the sea, pursuant to the usual custom, large bars of red hot iron. But the ill state of the Athenian affairs forcing them afterwards to infringe some of those articles, and to govern a little more arbitrarily, he intreated them to vent those curses on him, and discharge themselves thereby of the punishment due to such as had forsworn themselves, and who had been reduced to it by the unhappy situation of their affairs. Theophrastus tells us, that in general (these words are borrowed from Plutarch) Aristides, who executed all matters relating to himself or the public with the most impartial and rigorous justice, used to act, in his administration, several things, according as the exigency of affairs and the welfare of his country might require; it being his opinion, that a government, in order to support itself, is on some occasions obliged to have recourse to injustice, of which he gives the following example. One day, as the Athenians were debating in their council, about bringing to their city, in opposition to the articles of the treaty, the common treasures of Greece, which were deposited in Delos: the Samians having opened the debate; when it was Aristides's turn to speak, he said, that the dislodging of the treasure was an unjust action, but useful, and made this opinion take place. This incident shows, that the pretended wisdom of the heathens was overspread with great obscurity and error.

It was scarce possible to have a greater contempt for riches than Aristides had. Themistocles, who was not pleased with the encomiums bestowed on other men, hearing Aristides applauded for the noble disinterestedness with which he administered the public treasures, did but laugh at it; and said, that the praises bestowed upon him for it, showed no greater merit or virtue than that of a strong chest, which faithfully preserves all the monies that are shut up in it, without retaining any. This low sneer was by way of revenge for a stroke of raillery that had stung him to the quick. Themistocles saying, that, in his opinion, the greatest talent a general could possess, was, to be able to foresee the designs of an enemy: "This talent," replied Aristides, "is necessary; but there is another no less noble and worthy a general, that is, to have clean hands, and a soul superior to venality and views of interest." Aristides might very justly answer Themistocles in this manner, since he was really very poor, though he had possessed the highest employments in the state. He seemed to have an innate love
for

for poverty ; and, so far from being ashamed of it, he thought it reflected as much glory on him as all the trophies and victories he had won. History gives us a shining instance of this.

Callias, who was a near relation of Aristides, and the most wealthy citizen in Athens, was cited to appear before the judges. The accuser, laying very little stress on the cause itself, reproached him especially with permitting Aristides, his wife and children, to live in poverty, at a time when he himself wallowed in riches. Callias perceiving that these reproaches made a strong impression on the judges, he summoned Aristides to declare before them, whether he had not often pressed him to accept of large sums of money ; and whether he had not obstinately refused to accept of his offer, with saying, That he had more reason to boast of his poverty, than Callias of his riches : that many persons were to be found who had made a good use of their wealth, but that there were few who bore their poverty with magnanimity, and even joy ; and that none had cause to blush at their abject condition, but such as had reduced themselves to it by their idleness, their intemperance, their profusion, or dissolute conduct. * Aristides declared, that his kinsman had told nothing but the truth ; and added, that a man whose frame of mind is such, as to suppress a desire of superfluous things, and who confines the wants of life within the narrowest limits ; besides its freeing him from a thousand importunate cares, and leaving him so much master of his time, as to devote it entirely to the public ; it also approaches him, in some measure, to the Deity, who is wholly void of cares or wants. There was no man in the assembly, but, at his leaving it, would have chosen to be Aristides, though so poor, rather than Callias with all his riches.

Plutarch gives us, in few words, Plato's glorious testimony of Aristides's virtue, for which he looks upon him as infinitely superior to all the illustrious men his cotemporaries. Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles, says he, filled, indeed, their city with splendid edifices, with porticos, statues, rich ornaments, and other vain superfluities of that kind ; but Aristides did all that lay in his power to enrich every part of it with virtue : now to raise a city to true happiness, it must be made virtuous, not rich.

Plutarch takes notice of another circumstance in Aristides's life, which, though of the simplest kind, reflects the greatest

* Plut. in compar. Arist. et Cat. p. 355.

honour on him, and may serve as an excellent lesson. It is in the beautiful * treatise, in which he inquires, whether it is proper for old men to concern themselves with affairs of government; and where he points out admirably well, the various services they may do the state, even in an advanced age. We are not to fancy, says he, that all public services require great motion and hurry, such as, to harangue the people, to preside in the government, or to head armies: an old man, whose mind is informed with wisdom, may, without going abroad, exercise a kind of magistracy in it, which, though secret and obscure, is not therefore the less important; and that is, in training up youth by good counsel, teaching them the various springs of policy, and how to act in public affairs. Aristides, adds Plutarch, was not always in office, but was always useful to it. His house was a public school of virtue, wisdom, and policy. It was open to all young Athenians, who were lovers of virtue, and these used to consult him as an oracle. He gave them the kindest reception, heard them with patience, instructed them with familiarity; and endeavoured, above all things, to animate their courage, and inspire them with confidence. It is observed particularly that Cimon, afterwards so famous, was obliged to him for this important service.

Plutarch † divided the life of statesmen into three ages. In the first, he would have them learn the principles of government; in the second, reduce them to practice; and in the third, instruct others.

‡ History does not mention the exact time when, nor place where, Aristides died; but then it pays a glorious testimony to his memory, when it assures us, that this great man, who had possessed the highest employments in the republic, and had the absolute disposal of its treasures, died poor, and did not leave money enough to defray the expences of his funeral; so that the government was obliged to bear the charge of it, and to maintain his family. His daughters were married, and Lysimachus his son was subsisted, at the expence of the Prytaneum; which also gave the daughter of the latter, after his death, the pension with which those were honoured who had

* Plut. in compar. Arist. et Cat. pag. 795—797.

† He applies on this occasion the custom used in Rome, where the Vestals spent the first 10 years in learning their office, and this was a kind of noviciate; the next 10 years they employed in the exercise of their functions, and the last 10 in instructing the young novices in them.

‡ Plut. in Arist. p. 334, 335.

been victorious at the Olympic games. * Plutarch relates on this occasion, the liberality of the Athenians in favour of the posterity of Aristogiton their deliverer, who were fallen to decay; and he adds, that even in his time, almost 600 years after, the same goodness and liberality still subsisted. It was glorious for a city, to have preserved, for so many centuries, its generosity and gratitude; and a strong motive to animate individuals, who were assured that their children would enjoy the rewards which death might prevent them from receiving! It was delightful to see the remote posterity of the defenders and deliverers of the commonwealth, who had inherited nothing from their ancestors but the glory of their actions, maintained for so many ages at the expence of the public, in consideration of the services their families had rendered. They lived in this manner with much more honour, and called up the remembrance of their ancestors with much greater splendor, than a multitude of citizens, whose fathers had been studious only of leaving them great estates, which generally do not long survive those who raised them, and often leave their posterity nothing but the odious remembrance of the injustice and oppression by which they were acquired.

The greatest honour which the ancients have done Aristides, is in bestowing on him the glorious title of "the Just." He gained it, not by one particular action, but by the whole tenor of his conduct and actions. Plutarch makes a reflection on this occasion, which, being very remarkable, I think it incumbent on me not to omit.

† Among the several virtues of Aristides, says this judicious author, that for which he was most renowned, was his justice; because this virtue is of most general use; its benefits extending to a greater number of persons; as it is the foundation, and in a manner the soul of every public office and employment. Hence it was that Aristides, though in low circumstances, and of mean extraction, merited the title of Just; a title, says Plutarch, truly royal, or rather truly divine; but one of which princes are seldom ambitious, because generally ignorant of its beauty and excellency. They chuse rather to be called ‡ the Conquerors of cities, and the Thunderbolts of war; and sometimes even eagles and lions; preferring the vain honour of pompous titles, which convey no other idea but violence and slaughter, to the solid glory of those expressive of

* Vid. Book V. Art. viii. † Plut. in vit. Arist. p. 321, 322.

‡ Poliorcetes, Cerauni Nicanores.

goodness and virtue. They do not know, continues Plutarch, that of the three chief attributes of the Deity, of whom kings boast themselves the image, I mean, immortality, power, and justice; that of these three attributes, I say, the first of which excites our admiration and desire, the second fills us with dread and terror, and the third inspires us with love and respect; this last only is truly and personally communicated to man, and is the only one that can conduct him to the other two; it being impossible for man to become truly immortal and powerful, but by being just.

* Before I resume the sequel of this history, it may not be improper to observe, that it was about this period the fame of the Greeks, still more renowned for the wisdom of their polity than the glory of their victories, induced the Romans to have recourse to their lights and knowledge. Rome, formed under kings, was in want of such laws, as were necessary for the good government of a commonwealth. † For this purpose the Romans sent deputies to copy the laws of the cities of Greece, and particularly of Athens, which were still better adapted to the popular government that had been established after the expulsion of the kings. On this model, the ten magistrates, called Decemviri, and who were invested with absolute authority, were created: these digested the laws of the twelve tables, which are the basis of the Roman law.

SECTION XVIII.

DEATH OF XERXES, KILLED BY ARTABANUS.—HIS CHARACTER.

THE ill success of Xerxes in his expedition against the Greeks‡, and which continued afterwards, at length discouraged him. Renouncing all thoughts of war and conquest, he abandoned himself entirely to luxury and ease, and was studious of nothing but his pleasures. § Artabanus, a native of Hyrcania, captain of his guards, and who had been long one

* A. M. 3532. A. Rom. 302.

† *Missi legati Athenas, jussuque inclytas leges Solonis describere, et aliarum Græciæ civitatum instituta, mores, juraque noscere. Decem tabularum leges perlatae sunt (quibus adjectæ postea duæ), qui nunc quoque in hoc immenso aliarum super alias privatarum legum cumulo, fons omnia publici privatique est juris.* Liv. l. iii. n. 31. et 34.

‡ A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473. Ctes. c. ii. Diod. l. xi. p. 52. Justin. l. iii. c. 1.

§ This was not the Artabanus uncle to Xerxes.

of his chief favourites, found that this dissolute conduct had drawn upon him the contempt of his subjects. He therefore imagined that this would be a favourable opportunity to conspire against his sovereign; and his ambition was so vast, that he flattered himself with the hopes of succeeding him in the throne*. It is very likely, that he was excited to the commission of this crime, from another motive. Xerxes had commanded him to murder Darius, his eldest son, but for what cause history is silent. As this order had been given at a banquet, and when the company was heated with wine, he did not doubt but that Xerxes would forget it, and therefore was not in haste to obey it: however he was mistaken, for the king complained upon that account, which made Artabanus dread his resentment, and therefore he resolved to prevent him. Accordingly he prevailed upon Mithridates, one of the eunuchs of the palace, and great chamberlain, to engage in his conspiracy; and by his means entered the chamber where the king lay, and murdered him in his sleep. He then went immediately to Artaxerxes, the third son of Xerxes. He informed him of the murder, charging Darius his eldest brother with it; as if impatience to ascend the throne had prompted him to that execrable deed. He added, that to secure the crown to himself, he was resolved to murder him also, for which reason it would be absolutely necessary for him to keep upon his guard. These words having made such an impression on Artaxerxes (a youth) as Artabanus desired, he went immediately into his brother's apartment, where, being assisted by Artabanus and his guards, he murdered him. Hytaspes, Xerxes's second son, was next heir to the crown after Darius; but as he was then in Bactriana, of which he was governor, Artabanus seated Artaxerxes on the throne, but did not design to suffer him to enjoy it longer than he had formed a faction strong enough to drive him from it, and ascend it himself. His great authority had gained him a multitude of creatures; besides this, he had seven sons, who were of a very tall stature, handsome, strong, courageous, and raised to the highest employments in the empire. The aid he hoped to receive from them, was the chief motive of his raising his views so high. But, whilst he was attempting to complete his design, Artaxerxes being informed of this plot by Megabyzus, who had married one of his sisters, he endeavoured to anticipate him, and killed him before he had an opportunity

* Arist. Polit. l. v. c. x. p. 404.

of putting his treason in execution. His death established this prince in the possession of the kingdom.

Thus we have seen the end of Xerxes, who was one of the most powerful princes that ever lived. It would be needless for me to anticipate the reader, with respect to the judgment he ought to form of him. We see him surrounded with whatever is greatest and most august in the opinion of mankind: the most extensive empire at that time in the world; immense treasures, and an incredible number of land as well as sea-forces. But all these things are round him, not in him, and add no lustre to his natural qualities: for, by a blindness too common to princes and great men, born in the midst of all terrestrial blessings, heir to boundless power, and a lustre that had cost him nothing, he had accustomed himself to judge of his own talents and personal merit, from the exterior of his exalted station and rank. He disregards the wise counsels of Artabanus his uncle, and of Demaratus, who alone had courage enough to speak truth to him; and he abandoned himself to courtiers, the adorers of his fortune, whose whole study it was to soothe his passions. He proportions, and pretends to regulate the success of his enterprises, by the extent of his power. The slavish submission of so many nations no longer soothes his ambition; and, little affected with too easy an obedience, he takes pleasure in exercising his power over the elements, in cutting his way through mountains, and making them navigable; in chastising the sea for having broken down the bridge, and in foolishly attempting to shackle the waves, by throwing chains into them. Big-sworn with a childish vanity and a ridiculous pride, he looks upon himself as the arbiter of nature: he imagines, that not a nation in the world will dare to wait his arrival; and fondly and presumptuously relies on the millions of men and ships which he drags after him. But when, after the battle of Salamin, he beholds the sad ruins, the shameful remains of his numberless troops scattered over all Greece*, he then is sensible of the wide difference between an army and a crowd of men. In a word, to form a right judgment of Xerxes, we need but contrast him with a citizen of Athens, a Miltiades, Themistocles, or Aristides. In the latter we find all the good sense, prudence, ability in war, valour, and greatness of soul; in the former we see nothing but vanity, pride, obstinacy; the meanest and most grovelling sentiments, and sometimes the most horrid barbarity.

* *Stratusque per totam passim Græciam Xerxes intellexit, quantum ab exercitu turba distaret.* Senec. de Benef. l. vi. c. 32.

BOOK SEVENTH.

THE HISTORY -OF THE PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

PLAN.

THE first and third chapters of this book include the history of the Persians and Greeks, during 48 years and some months, which contain the reign of Artaxerxes Longimanus; the last six years of which answer to the six first of the Peloponnesian war. This space of time begins at the year of the world 3531, and ends at 3579.

THE second chapter comprehends the other transactions of the Greeks, which happened both in Sicily and Italy, during the interval above-mentioned.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter includes the history of the Persians and Greeks, from the beginning of Artaxerxes's reign to the Peloponnesian war, which began in the 42d year of that king's reign.

SECTION I.

ARTAXERXES RUINS THE FACTION OF ARTABANUS, &c.

THE Greek historians give this prince the surname of Longimanus. Strabo * says, it was because his hands were so long, that when he stood upright he could touch his knees with them; but, according to Plutarch†, it was because his right hand was longer than his left. Had it not been for this blemish, he would have been the most graceful man of his age. He was still more remarkable for his goodness and generosity. He reigned about 49 years.

* Lib. xv. p. 735. A. M. 3531. Ant. J. C. 473.

† In Artax. p. 1014.

* Although Artaxerxes, by the death of Artabanus, was delivered from a dangerous competitor, there still were two obstacles in his way, before he could establish himself in the quiet possession of his throne; one of which was, his brother Hytaspes, governor of Bactriana; and the other, the faction of Artabanus. He began by the latter.

Artabanus had left seven sons, and a great number of partisans, who assembled to revenge his death. These, and the adherents of Artaxerxes, fought a bloody battle, in which a great number of Persian nobles lost their lives. Artaxerxes having at last entirely defeated his enemies, put to death all who had engaged in this conspiracy. He took an exemplary vengeance of those who were concerned in his father's murder, and particularly of Mithridates the eunuch, who had betrayed him, and who was executed in the following manner. He† was laid on his back in a kind of horse-trough, and strongly fastened to the four corners of it. Every part of him, except his head, his hands, and feet, which came out at holes made for that purpose, was covered with another trough. In this horrid situation victuals were given him from time to time; and in case of his refusal to eat it, they were forced down his throat: honey mixed with milk was given him to drink, and all his face was smeared with it, which by that means attracted a numberless multitude of flies, especially as he was perpetually exposed to the scorching rays of the sun. The worms which bred in his excrements preyed upon his bowels. The criminal lived 15 or 20 days in inexpressible torments.

Artaxerxes‡ having crushed the faction of Artabanus, was powerful enough to send an army into Bactriana, which had declared in favour of his brother; but he was not successful on this occasion. The two armies engaging, Hytaspes stood his ground so well, that, if he did not gain the victory, he at least sustained no loss; so that both armies separated with equal success; and each retired to prepare for a second battle. Artaxerxes having raised a greater army than his brother, not to mention that the whole empire declared in his favour, defeated him in a second engagement, and entirely ruined his party. By this victory he secured to himself the quiet possession of the empire.

To § maintain himself in the throne, he removed all such governors of cities and provinces from their employments, as he

* Ctes. c. 30.

† Plat. in Artax. p. 1019.

‡ Ctes. c. 31.

§ Diod. l. xi. p. 54.

suspected to hold a correspondence with either of the factions he had overcome, and subsisted others on whom he could rely. He afterwards applied himself to the reforming the abuses and disorders which had crept into the government. By his wise conduct and zeal for the public good, he soon acquired great reputation and authority, with the love of his subjects, the strongest support of sovereign power.

SECTION II.

THEMISTOCLES FLIES TO ARTAXERXES.

ACCORDING to Thucydides*, Themistocles fled to this prince in the beginning of his reign; but other authors, as Strabo, Plutarch, Diodorus, fix this incident under Xerxes his predecessor. Dr. Prideaux is of the latter opinion; he likewise thinks, that the Artaxerxes in question, is the same with him who is called Ahasuerus in scripture, and who married Esther: but we suppose, with the learned Archbishop Usher, that it was Darius the son of Hystaspes who espoused this illustrious Jewess. I have already declared more than once, that I would not engage in controversies of this kind; and therefore, with regard to this flight of Themistocles into Persia, and the history of Esther, I shall follow the opinion of the learned Usher, my usual guide on these occasions.

We † have seen that Themistocles had fled to Admetus king of the Molossi, and had met with a gracious reception from him; but the Athenians and Lacedæmonians would not suffer him to live in peace, and required that prince to deliver him up; threatening, in case of refusal, to carry their arms into his country. Admetus, who was unwilling to draw such formidable enemies upon himself, and much more to deliver up the man who had fled to him for refuge, informed him of the great danger to which he was exposed, and favoured his flight. Themistocles went as far by land as Pydna, a city of Macedonia, and there embarked on board a merchant ship, which was sailing to Ionia. None of the passengers knew him. A storm having carried this vessel near the island of Naxos, then besieged by the Athenians, the imminent danger to which Themistocles was exposed obliged him to discover himself to the pilot and master of the ship; after which, by intreaties and menaces, he forced them to sail towards Asia.

* A. M. 3531.

† Thucyd. l. i. p. 90, 91. Plut. in Themist. p. 125—127. Diod. l. xi. p. 42—44. Cor. Nep. in Themist. c. 8—10.

* Themistocles might on this occasion call to mind the advice which his father had given him when an infant, viz. to lay very little stress on the favour of the common people. They were then walking together in the harbour. His father, pointing to some rotten galleys that lay neglected on the strand, "Behold there," says he, "son," pointing to them, "thus do the people treat their governors, when they can do them no further service."

He was now arrived in Cumæ, a city of *Æolia*, in *Asia Minor*. The king of Persia had set a price upon his head, and promised 200 † talents to any man who should deliver him up. The whole coast was covered with people, who were watching for him. He fled to *Ægæ*, a little city of *Æolia*, where no one knew him except *Nicogenes*, at whose house he lodged. He was the most wealthy man in that country, and very intimate with all the lords of the Persian court. Themistocles was concealed some days in his house, till *Nicogenes* sent him under a strong guard to *Susa*, in one of those covered chariots in which the Persians, who were extremely jealous, use to carry their wives; those who carried him telling every body, that they were carrying a young Greek lady to a courtier of great distinction.

Being come to the Persian court, he waited upon the captain of the guards, and told him, that he was a Grecian by birth, and begged the king would admit him to audience, having matters of great importance to communicate to him. The officer informed him of a ceremony, which he knew was insupportable to some Greeks, but without which none were allowed to speak to the king; and this was, to fall prostrate before him. "Our laws," says he, "command us to honour the king in that manner, and to worship him as the living image of the immortal God, who maintains and preserves all things." Themistocles promised to comply. Being admitted to audience, he fell on his face before the king, after the Persian manner; and afterwards rising up, "Great king ‡," says he by an interpreter, "I am Themistocles the Athenian, who having been banished by the Greeks, am come to your court in hopes of finding an asylum in it. I have indeed brought many calamities on the Persians; but, on the other side, I have done them no

* Plut. in Themist. p. 112.

† 200,000 crowns, or about £.45,000 Sterling.

‡ Thucydides makes him say very near the same words; but informs us, that Themistocles did not speak them to the king, but sent them by way of letter before he was introduced to him.

“less services, by the salutary advices I have given them more than once; and I now am able to do them more important services than ever. My life is in your hands. You may now exert your clemency; or display your vengeance: by the former you will preserve your suppliant; by the latter you will destroy the greatest enemy of Greece.”

The king made him no answer at this audience, though he was struck with admiration at his great sense and boldness; but history informs us, he told his friends, that he considered Themistocles's arrival as a very great happiness; that he implored his god Arimanius always to inspire his enemies with such thoughts, and to prompt them to banish and make away with their most illustrious personages. It is added, that when this king was asleep, he started up three times in excess of joy, and cried thrice, “I have got Themistocles the Athenian!”

The next morning, at day-break, he sent for the greatest lords of his court, and commanded Themistocles to be brought before him, who expected nothing but destruction; especially after what one of his guards, upon hearing his name, had said to him the night before, even in the presence-chamber, just as he had left the king, “Thou serpent of Greece, thou compound of fraud and malice, the good genius of our prince brings thee hither!” However, the serenity which appeared in the king's face seemed to promise him a favourable reception. Themistocles was not mistaken; for the king began by making him a present of 200 * talents, which sum he had promised to any one who should deliver him up, which consequently was his due, as Themistocles had brought him his head, by surrendering himself to him. He afterwards desired him to give an account of the affairs of Greece. But as Themistocles could not express his thoughts to the king without the assistance of an interpreter, he desired time might be allowed him to learn the Persian tongue; hoping he then should be able to explain those things he was desirous of communicating to him, better than he could by the aid of a third person. It is the same, says he, with the speech of a man, as with a piece of tapestry, which must be spread out and unfolded, to show the figures and other beauties wrought in it. Themistocles, having studied the Persian tongue 12 months, made so great a progress; that he spoke it with greater elegance than the Persians themselves, and consequently could converse with the king without the help of an interpreter. This prince treated him with uncommon marks

* 200,000 French crowns; or, about £. 45,000 Sterling.

of friendship and esteem: he made him marry a lady descended from one of the noblest families in Persia; gave him a palace and an equipage suitable to it, and settled a noble pension on him. He used to carry him abroad on his parties of hunting, and every banquet and entertainment; and sometimes conversed privately with him, so that the lords of the court grew jealous and uneasy upon that account. He even presented him to the princesses, who honoured him with their esteem, and received his visits. It is observed, as a proof of the peculiar favour showed him, that by the king's special order, Themistocles was admitted to hear the lectures and discourses of the Magi, and was instructed by them in all the secrets of their philosophy.

Another proof of his great credit is related. Demaratus of Sparta, who was then at court, being commanded by the king to ask any thing of him, he desired that he might be suffered to make his entry on horseback, into the city of Sardis, with the royal tiara on his head: a ridiculous vanity! equally unworthy of the Grecian grandeur, and the simplicity of a Lacedæmonian! The king, exasperated at the insolence of his demand, expressed his disgust in the strongest terms, and seemed resolved not to pardon him; but Themistocles having interceded, the king restored him to favour.

In fine, Themistocles was in such great credit, that under the succeeding reigns, in which the affairs of Persia were still more mixed with those of Greece, whenever the kings were desirous of drawing over any Greek to their interest, they used to declare expressly in their letters, that he should be in greater favour with them, than Themistocles had been with king Artaxerxes.

It is said also that Themistocles, when in his most flourishing condition in Persia, he was honoured and esteemed by all the world, who were emulous in making their court to him, said one day, when his table was covered magnificently: "Children, we should have been ruined, if we had not been ruined."

But at last, as it was judged necessary for the king's interest that Themistocles should reside in some city of Asia Minor, that he might be ready on any occasion which should present itself; accordingly he was sent to Magnesia, situated on the Meander; and for his subsistence, besides the whole revenues of that city, which amounted to 50* talents every year, had

* Fifty thousand crowns; or, about L. 11,250 Sterling.

those of Myunte and Lampfacus assigned him. One of the cities was to furnish him with bread, another with wine, and a third with other provisions. Some authors add two more, viz. for his furniture and clothes. Such was the custom of the ancient kings of the east: instead of settling pensions on persons they rewarded, they gave them cities, and sometimes even provinces; which, under the name of bread, wine, &c. were to furnish them abundantly with all things necessary for supporting, in a magnificent manner, their family and equipage. Themistocles lived for some years at Magnesia in the utmost splendour; till he came to his end in the manner which will be related hereafter.

SECTION III.

CIMON BEGINS TO MAKE A FIGURE AT ATHENS.

THE Athenians * having lost one of their most distinguished citizens, as well as ablest generals, by the banishment of Themistocles, endeavoured to retrieve that loss, by bestowing the command of the armies on Cimon, who was not inferior to him in merit.

He spent his youth in such excesses as did him no honour, and prefigured no good with regard to his future conduct. † The example of this illustrious Athenian, who passed his juvenile years in so dissolute a manner, and afterwards rose to so exalted a pitch of glory, shows, that parents must not always despair of the happiness of a son, when wild and irregular in his youth; especially when nature has endued him with genius, goodness of heart, generous inclinations, and an esteem for persons of merit. Such was the character of Cimon. The ill reputation he had drawn upon himself, having prejudiced the people against him, he at first was very ill received by them; when being discouraged by this repulse, he resolved to lay aside all thoughts of concerning himself with the affairs of the public. But Aristides perceiving that his dissolute turn of mind was united with many fine qualities, he consoled him, inspired him with hope, pointed out the paths he should take, instilled good principles into him, and did not a little contribute, by the excellent instructions he gave him, and the affection he expressed for him on all occasions, to make him the man he afterwards appeared. What more important service could he have done his country?

* A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Diod. l. xi. p. 45. Plut. in Cim. p. 482, 483.

† Plut. in Cim. p. 482.

* Plutarch observes, that after Cimon had laid aside his juvenile extravagancies, his conduct was in all things great and noble; and that he was not inferior to Miltiades either in courage or intrepidity, nor to Themistocles in prudence and sense; but that he was more just and virtuous than either of them; and that without being at all inferior to them in military virtues, he surpassed them far in the practice of the moral ones.

It would be of great advantage to a state, if those, who excel in professions of every kind, would take pleasure, and make it their duty to fashion and instruct such youths as are remarkable for the pregnancy of their parts and goodness of disposition. They would thereby have an opportunity of serving their country even after their death, and of perpetuating in it, in the person of their pupils, a taste and inclination for true merit, and the practice of the wisest maxims.

The Athenians, a little after Themistocles had left his country, having put to sea a fleet under the command of Cimon, the son of Miltiades, took Eion, on the banks of the Strymon, Amphipolis, and other places of Thrace; and as this was a very fruitful country, Cimon planted a colony in it, and sent 10,000 Athenians thither for that purpose.

† The fate of Eion is of too singular a kind to be omitted here. Boges † was governor of it under the king of Persia, and acted with such a zeal and fidelity for his sovereign, as have few examples. When besieged by Cimon and the Athenians, it was in his power to have capitulated upon honourable terms, and he might have retired to Asia with his family and all his effects. However, being persuaded he could not do this with honour, he resolved to die rather than surrender. The city was assaulted with the utmost fury, and he defended it with incredible bravery. Being at last in the utmost want of provisions, he threw from the walls into the river Strymon all the gold and silver in the place; and causing fire to be set to a pile, and having killed his wife, his children, and his whole family, he threw them into the midst of the flames, and afterwards rushed into them himself. Xerxes could not but admire, and at the same time bewail, so surprising an example of generosity. The heathens, indeed, might give this name to what is rather savage ferocity and barbarity.

* Plut. in Cim. p. 481.

† Herod. l. vii. c. 107. Plut p. 482.

† Plutarch calls him Butis. Herodotus seems to place this history under Xerxes; but it is more probable, that it happened under Artaxerxes his successor.

Cimon made himself master also of the island of Scyros, where he found the bones of Theseus, the son of Ægeus, who had fled from Athens to that city, and there ended his days. An oracle had commanded that search should be made after his bones. Cimon put them on board his galley, adorned them magnificently, and carried them to his native country, near 800 years after Theseus had left it. The people received them with the highest expressions of joy; and to perpetuate the remembrance of this event, they founded a disputation, or prize, for tragic writers, which became very famous, and contributed exceedingly to the improvement of the drama, by the wonderful emulation it excited among the tragic poets, whose pieces were represented in it. For Sophocles having, in his youth, brought his first play on the stage, the Archon, or chief magistrate who presided at these games, observing there was a strong faction among the spectators, prevailed with Cimon, and the rest of the generals his colleagues, who were ten in number, and chosen out of each tribe, to sit as judges. The prize was adjudged to Sophocles, which so deeply afflicted Æschylus, who till then had been considered as the greatest dramatic poet, that Athens became insupportable to him, and he withdrew to Sicily, where he died.

* The confederates had taken a great number of barbarian prisoners in Sestus and Byzantium; and as a proof of the high regard they had for Cimon, intreated him to distribute the booty. Accordingly Cimon placed all the captives, stark naked, on one side, and on the other all their riches and spoils. The allies complained of this partition as too unequal; but Cimon giving them the choice, they immediately took the riches which had belonged to the Persians, and left the prisoners for the Athenians. Cimon therefore set out with his portion, and was thought a person no ways qualified to settle the distribution of prizes, for the allies carried off a great number of chains, necklaces, and bracelets of gold; a large quantity of rich habits, and fine purple cloaks; whilst the Athenians had only for their share, a multitude of human creatures, quite naked, and unfit for labour. However, the relations and friends of these captives came soon after from Phrygia and Lydia, and purchased them all at a very high price; so that, with the monies arising from the ransom of them, Cimon had enough to maintain his fleet four months; besides a great sum of money which was put into the exchequer, not to mention what

* Plut. in. Cim. p. 484.

he himself had for his own share. He afterwards used to take exceeding pleasure in relating this adventure to his friends.

* He made the best use of his riches, as Gorgias the rhetor has happily expressed in few, but strong and elegant words : “ † Cimon,” says he, “ amassed riches only to use them ; and “ he employed them to no other use, but to acquire esteem “ and honour.” We may here perceive, by the way, what was the scope and aim of the most exalted actions of the heathens ; and with what justice Tertullian defined a pagan, how perfect soever he might appear, a vain-glorious animal, *animal gloria*. The gardens and orchards of Cimon were always open, by his order, to the citizens in-general ; who were allowed to gather whatever fruits they pleased. His table was daily covered in a frugal but polite manner. It was entirely different from those delicate and sumptuous tables, to which only a few persons of great distinction are admitted, and which are covered merely to display a vain magnificence or elegance of taste. Now that of Cimon was plain, but abundant ; and all the citizens were received at it without distinction. In thus banishing from his entertainments, whatever had the least air of ostentation and luxury, he reserved to himself an inexhaustible fund, not only for the expences of his house, but for the wants of his friends, his domestics, and a very great number of citizens ; demonstrating, by this conduct, that he knew much better than most rich men, the true use and value of riches.

He was always followed by some servants, who were ordered to slip privately some piece of money into the hands of such poor as they met, and to give clothes to those who were in want of them. He often buried such persons as had not left money enough behind them to defray the expences of their funeral : and what is admirable, and which Plutarch does not fail to observe, he did not act in this manner to gain credit among the people, nor to purchase their voices ; since we find him, on all occasions, declaring for the contrary faction, that is, in favour of such citizens as were most considerable for their wealth or authority.

‡ Although he saw all the rest of the governors of his time enrich themselves by the plunder and oppression of the public, he was always incorruptible, and his hands were never

* Plut. in Cim. 484. Cornel. Nep. in Cim. c. iv. Athen. l. xii p. 533.

† Φησὶ τὸν Κίμωνα τὰ χρήματα κληῖσθαι μὲν ὡς χρεῶτο, χρησθαι δὲ ὡς τιμῶτο.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 485.

stained with extortion, or the smallest present; and he continued, during his whole life, not only to speak, but to act spontaneously, and without the least view of interest, whatever he thought might be of advantage to the commonwealth.

Besides a great number of other excellent qualities, Cimon had the finest sense, extraordinary prudence, and a profound knowledge of the genius and characters of men. The allies, besides the sums of money in which each of them was taxed, were to furnish a certain number of men and ships. Several among them, who, from the retreat of Xerxes, were studious of nothing but their ease, and applied themselves entirely to tilling and cultivating their lands, to free themselves from the toils and dangers of war, chose to furnish their quota in money rather than in men, and left the Athenians the care of manning with foldiers and rowers the ships they were obliged to furnish. The other generals, who had no forecast and penetration for the future, gave such people some uneasiness at first, and were for obliging them to observe the treaty literally. But Cimon, when in power, acted in a quite different manner, and suffered them to enjoy the tranquillity they chose; plainly perceiving that the allies, from being warlike in the field, would insensibly lose their martial spirit, and be fit for nothing but husbandry and trade; whilst the Athenians, by exercising the oar perpetually, would be more and more inured to hardships, and daily increase in power. What Cimon had foreseen happened; this very people purchased themselves masters at their own expence; so that they who before had been companions and allies, became in some measure the subjects and tributaries of the Athenians.

* No Grecian general ever gave so great a blow to the pride and haughtiness of the Persian monarch as Cimon. After the barbarians had been driven out of Greece, he did not give them time to take breath; but sailed immediately after them with a fleet of upwards of 200 ships, took their strongest cities, and brought over all their allies; so that the king of Persia had not one soldier left in Asia, from Ionia to Pamphylia. Still pursuing his point, he bravely attacked the enemy's fleet, though much stronger than his own. It lay near the mouth of the river Eurymedon, and consisted of 350 sail of ships, supported by the land-army on the coast. It was soon put to flight; and 200 sail were taken, besides those that were sunk. A great

* A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. p. 485—487. Thucyd. i. p. 66. Diod. l. xi. p. 45—47.

number of the Persians had left their ships, and leaped into the sea, in order to join their land army, which lay on the shore. It was very hazardous to attempt a descent in the sight of the enemy, and to lead on troops, which were already fatigued by their late battle, against fresh forces much superior in number. However, Cimon, finding that the whole army was eager to engage the barbarians, thought proper to take advantage of the ardour of the soldiers, who were greatly animated with their first success. Accordingly he landed*, and marched them directly against the barbarians, who waited resolutely for their coming up, and sustained the first onset with prodigious valour; however, being at last obliged to give way, they broke and fled. A great slaughter ensued, and an infinite number of prisoners and immensely rich spoils were taken. Cimon having, in one day, gained two victories which almost equalled those of Salamin and Platæa, to crown all, sailed out to meet a reinforcement of 14 Phœnician ships, which were come from Cyprus, to join the Persian fleet, and knew nothing of what had passed. They were all either taken or sunk, and most of the soldiers were killed or drowned.

Cimon having atchieved such glorious exploits, returned in triumph to Athens; and employed part of the spoils in fortifying the harbour, and in beautifying the city. The riches which a general amasses in the field, are applied to the noblest uses when they are disposed of in this manner; and must reflect infinitely greater honour upon him, than if he expended them in building magnificent palaces for himself, which must one time or other devolve to strangers; whereas works, built for public use, are his property in some measure for ever, and transmit his name to the latest posterity. † It is well known that such embellishments in a city give infinite pleasure to the people, who are always struck with works of this kind; and this, as Plutarch observes in the life of Cimon, is one of the surest, and, at the same time, the most lawful method of acquiring their friendship and esteem.

‡ The year following, this general sailed towards the Hellespont; and having driven the Persians out of the Thracian Chersonesus, of which they had possessed themselves, he conquered it in the name of the Athenians, though he himself had

* We do not find the ancients made use of long boats in making descents; the reason of which perhaps was, that, as their galleys were flat-bottomed, they were brought to shore without any difficulty.

† Plut. de gerend. rep. p. 218.

‡ Plut. in Chin. p. 487. Thucyd. l. i. p. 66, 67. Died. l. xi. p. 53.

more right to it, as Miltiades his father had been its sovereign. He afterwards attacked the people of the island of Thasus, who had revolted from the Athenians, and defeated their fleet. These maintained their revolt with an almost unparalleled obstinacy and fury. * As if they had been in arms against the worst of evils to fear, they made a law, that the first man who should only mention the concluding a treaty with the Athenians, should be put to death. The siege was carried on three years, during which the inhabitants suffered all the calamities of war with the same obstinacy. † The women were no less inflexible than the men; for the besieged wanting ropes for the military engines, all the women cut off their hair in a seeming transport; and when the city was in the utmost distress by famine, which swept away a great number of the inhabitants, Hegetorides the Thasian, deeply afflicted with seeing such multitudes of his fellow-citizens perish, resolutely determined to sacrifice his life for the preservation of his country. Accordingly he put a halter round his neck, and presenting himself to the assembly, "Countrymen," says he, "do with me as you please, and do not spare me if you judge proper; but let my death save the rest of the people, and prevail with you to abolish the cruel law you have enacted, so contrary to your welfare." The Thasians, struck with these words, abolished the law, but would not suffer it to cost so generous a citizen his life; for they surrendered themselves to the Athenians, who spared their lives, and only dismantled their city.

After Cimon had landed his troops on the shore opposite to Thrace, he seized on all the gold mines of those coasts, and subdued every part of that country as far as Macedonia. He might have attempted the conquest of that kingdom; and, in all probability, could have easily possessed himself of part of it, had he improved the occasion. And indeed, for his neglect in this point, at his return to Athens, he was prosecuted, as having been bribed by the money of the Macedonians, and of Alexander their king. But Cimon had a soul superior to all temptations of that kind, and proved his innocence in the clearest light.

‡ The conquests of Cimon, and the power of the Athenians, which increased every day, gave Artaxerxes great uneasi-

* Polyæn. Str. l. ii.

† Polyæn. l. viii.

‡ A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 466. Thucyd. l. i. p. 92. Plut. in Themist. p. 127.

ness. To prevent the consequences of it, he resolved to send Themistocles into Attica with a great army, and accordingly proposed it to him.

Themistocles was in great perplexity on this occasion. On one side, the remembrance of the favours the king had heaped upon him; the positive assurances he had given that monarch, to serve him with the utmost zeal on all occasions; the instances of the king, who claimed his promise; all these considerations would not permit him to refuse the commission. On the other side, the love of his country, which the injustice and ill-treatment of his fellow-citizens could not banish from his mind; his strong reluctance to fully the glory of his former laurels and mighty achievements by so ignominious a step; perhaps too, the fear of being unsuccessful in a war, in which he should be opposed by excellent generals, and particularly Cimon, who seemed to be as successful as valiant; these different reflections would not suffer him to declare against his country, in an enterprise, which, whether successful or not, would reflect shame on himself.

To rid himself at once of all these inward struggles, he resolved to put an end to his life*, as the only method for him not to be wanting in the duty he owed his country, nor to the promises he had made that prince. He therefore prepared a solemn sacrifice, to which he invited all his friends; when, after embracing them all, and taking a last farewell of them, he drank bull's blood, or, according to others, swallowed a dose of poison, and died in this manner at Magnesia, aged 65 years, the greatest part of which he had spent either in the government of the republic, or the command of the armies.

† When the king was told the cause and manner of his death, he esteemed and admired him still more, and continued his favour to his friends and domestics. But the unexpected death of Themistocles proved an obstacle to the design he meditated of attacking the Greeks. The Magnesians erected a splendid monument to the memory of that general in the public square, and granted peculiar privileges and honours to his descendants. They continued to enjoy them in Plutarch's time, that is, near 600 years after, and his tomb was still standing.

‡ Atticus, in the beautiful dialogue of Cicero, entitled Brutus, refutes, in an agreeable and ingenious manner, the tragi-

* The wisest Heathens did not think that a man was allowed to lay violent hands on himself.

† Cic. de Senec. n. 72.

‡ Brut. n. 42, 43.

cal end which some writers ascribe to Themistocles, as related above ; pretending that the whole is a fiction, invented by rhetoricians, who, on the bare rumour that this great man had poisoned himself, had added all the other particulars to embellish the story, which otherwise would have been very dry and uninteresting. He appeals for this to Thucydides, that judicious historian, who was an Athenian, and almost contemporary with Themistocles. This author indeed owns, that a report had prevailed, that this general had poisoned himself ; however, his opinion was, that he died a natural death, and that his friends conveyed his bones secretly to Athens, where, in * Pausanias's time, his mausoleum was standing near the great harbour. This account seems much more probable than the other.

Themistocles was certainly one of the greatest men that Greece ever produced. He had a great soul, and invincible courage, which danger even enflamed ; was fired with an incredible thirst for glory, which sometimes his country's love would temper and allay, but which sometimes carried him too far ; † his presence of mind was such, that it immediately suggested whatever it was most necessary to act : in fine, he had a sagacity and penetration with regard to futurity, that revealed to him, in the clearest light, the most secret designs of his enemies ; pointing out to him at a distance, the several measures he should take to disconcert them, and inspiring him with great, noble, bold, extensive views with regard to the honour of his country. The most essential qualities of the mind were, however, wanting in him, I mean sincerity, integrity, and fidelity : nor was he altogether free from suspicions of avarice, which is a great blemish in such as are charged with public affairs.

‡ Nevertheless, a noble sentiment as well as action is related of him, which speaks a great and disinterested soul. § His daughter being asked of him in marriage, he preferred an honest poor man, to a rich one of a different character ; and gave for his reason, " That in the choice of a son-in law, he would " much rather have merit without riches, than riches without " merit."

* Lib. i. p. i.

† De instantibus, ut ait Thucydides, verissime judicabat, et de futuris calamissime conjiciebat. Cor. Nep. in Themist. c. i.

‡ Plut. in Themist. p. 121.

§ Themistocles, cum consuleretur utrum bono viro pauperi, an minus probato, diviti filiam collocaret : *Ego vero, inquit, malo virum qui pecunia careat, quam pecuniam que viro.* Cic. de Offic. l. ii. c. 71.

SECTION XIV.

THE EGYPTIANS RISE AGAINST PERSIA, SUPPORTED BY
THE ATHENIANS.

ABOUT this time the Egyptians*, to free themselves from a foreign yoke, which was insupportable to them, revolted from Artaxerxes, and made Inarus, prince of the Lybians, their king. They demanded aid of the Athenians, who, having at that time a fleet of 200 ships at the island of Cyprus, accepted the invitation with pleasure, and immediately set sail for Egypt; judging this a very favourable opportunity to weaken the power of the Persians, by driving them out of so great a kingdom.

† Advice being brought Artaxerxes of this revolt, he raised an army of 300,000 men, and resolved to march in person against the rebels. But his friends advising him not to venture himself in that expedition, he gave the command of it to Achæmenes, one of his brothers. The latter being arrived in Egypt, encamped his great army on the banks of the Nile. During this interval, the Athenians having defeated the Persian fleet, and either destroyed or taken fifty of their ships, they went again up that river, landed their forces under the command of Charitimis, their general; and having joined Inarus and his Egyptians, they charged Achæmenes, and defeated him in a great battle, in which that Persian general and 100,000 of his soldiers were slain. Those who escaped fled to Memphis, whither the conquerors pursued them, and immediately made themselves masters of two quarters of the city: but the Persians having fortified themselves in the third, called the White Wall, which was the largest and strongest of the three, they were besieged in it near three years, during which they made a most vigorous defence, till they were at last delivered by the forces sent to their aid.

Artaxerxes‡ hearing of the defeat of his army, and how much the Athenians had contributed to it; to make a diversion of their forces, and oblige them to turn their arms another way, he sent ambassadors to the Lacedæmonians, with a large sum of money, to engage them to proclaim war against the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians having rejected the offer, their refusal did not abate his ardour, and accordingly § he

* A. M. 3538. Ant. J. C. 466. Thucyd. l. i. p. 68, et 71, 72. Ctes. c. 32—35. Diod. l. xi. p. 54—59.

† A. M. 3545. Ant. J. C. 459.

‡ A. M. 3546. Ant. J. C. 458.

§ A. M. 3547. Ant. J. C. 457.

gave Megabyfus and Artabazus the command of the forces designed againſt Egypt. Theſe generals immediately raiſed an army of 300,000 men in Cilicia and Phœnicia. They were obliged to wait till the fleet was equipped, which was not till the next year. * Artabazus then took upon him the command of it, and ſailed towards the Nile, whiſt Megabyfus, at the head of the land-army, marched towards Memphis. He raiſed the ſiege of that city, and afterwards fought Inarus. All the forces on both ſides engaged in this battle, in which Inarus was entirely defeated; but the Egyptians, who had rebelled, ſuffered moſt in this ſlaughter. After this defeat, Inarus, though wounded by Megabyfus, retreated with the Athenians, and ſuch Egyptians as were willing to follow him, and reached Biblos, a city in the iſland of Proſopitis, which is ſurrounded by two arms of the Nile, and both navigable. The Athenians ran their fleet into one of thoſe arms, where it was ſecured from the attacks of the enemy, and held out a ſiege of a year and a half in this iſland.

After the battle, all the reſt of Egypt ſubmitted to the conqueror, and was re-unioned to the empire of Artaxerxes, except Amyrteus, who had ſtill a ſmall party in the ſens, where he long ſupported himſelf, through the difficulty the Perſians found in penetrating far enough to reduce him.

The ſiege of Proſopitis was ſtill carrying on. † The Perſians finding that they made no advances in attacking it after the uſual methods, becauſe of the ſtratagems and intrepidity of the beſieged, they therefore had recourſe to an extraordinary expedient, which ſoon produced what force had not been able to effect. They turned the courſe, by different canals, of the arm of the Nile in which the Athenians lay, and by that means opened themſelves a paſſage for their whole army to enter the iſland. Inarus, ſeeing that all was loſt, compounded with Megabyfus for himſelf, for all his Egyptians, and about 50 Athenians, and ſurrendered upon condition that their lives ſhould be ſpared. The remainder of the auxiliary forces, which formed a body of 6000 men, reſolved to hold out longer; and for this purpoſe they ſet fire to their ſhips, and drawing up in order of battle, reſolved to die ſword in hand, and ſell their lives as dear as they could, in imitation of the Macedæmonians, who reſuſed to yield, and were all cut to pieces at Thermopylæ. The Perſians, hearing they had taken ſo deſperate a reſolution, did not think it adviſeable to attack them. A peace was there-

* A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 456. † A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454.

fore offered them, with a promise that they should all be permitted to leave Egypt, and have free passage to their native country either by sea or land. They accepted the conditions, put the conquerors in possession of Biblos and of the whole island, and went by sea to Cyrene, where they embarked for Greece: but most of the soldiers who had served in this expedition perished in it.

But this was not the only loss the Athenians sustained on this occasion. Another fleet of 50 ships, which they sent to the aid of their besieged countrymen, sailed up one of the arms of the Nile, just after the Athenians had surrendered, to disengage them, not knowing what had happened. But the instant they entered, the Persian fleet, which kept out at sea, followed them, and attacked their rear, whilst the army discharged showers of darts upon them from the banks of the river; thus only a few ships escaped, which opened themselves a way through the enemy's fleet, and all the rest were lost. Here ended the fatal war carried on by the Athenians for six years in Egypt, which kingdom was now united again to the Persian empire, and continued so during the rest of the reign of Artaxerxes, of which this is the twentieth year*. But the prisoners who were taken in this war met with the most unhappy fate.

SECTION V.

INARUS IS DELIVERED UP TO THE KING'S MOTHER.—

MEGABYSUS'S AFFLICTION AND REVOLT.

ARTAXERXES†, after refusing to gratify the request of his mother, who for five years together had been daily importuning him to put Inarus and his Athenians into her hands, in order that she might sacrifice them to the manes of Achæmenes her son, at last yielded to her solicitations. But how blind, how barbarously weak must this king have been, to break through the most solemn engagements merely through complaisance; who, deaf to remorse, violated the law of nations, solely to avoid offending a most unjust mother. ‡ This inhuman princess, without regard to the faith of solemn treaties, caused Inarus to be crucified, and beheaded all the rest. Megabyfus was in the deepest affliction on that account; for as he had promised that no injury should be done them, the affront re-

* A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454.

† A. M. 3556. Ant. J. C. 448. Ctes. c. xxxv—xl.

‡ Thucyd. l. i. p. 73.

flected principally on him. He therefore left the court, and withdrew to Syria, of which he was governor; and his discontent was so great, that he raised an army, and revolted openly.

* The king sent Osiris, who was one of the greatest lords of the court, against him with an army of 200,000 men. Megabyfus engaged Osiris, wounded him, took him prisoner, and put his army to flight. Artaxerxes sending to demand Osiris, Megabyfus generously dismissed him, as soon as his wounds were cured.

† The next year Artaxerxes sent another army against him, the command of which he gave to Menostanes, son to Artarius the king's brother, and governor of Babylon. This general was not more fortunate than the former. He also was defeated and put to flight, and Megabyfus gained as signal a victory as the former.

Artaxerxes finding he could not reduce him by force of arms, sent his brother Artarius and Amytis his sister, who was the wife of Megabyfus, with several other persons of the first quality, to persuade the latter to return to his allegiance. They succeeded in their negotiation; the king pardoned him, and he returned to court.

One day as they were hunting, a lion, raising himself on his hinder feet, was going to rush upon the king, when Megabyfus, seeing the danger he was in, and fired with zeal and affection for his sovereign, hurled a dart at the lion, which killed him. But Artaxerxes, upon pretence that he had affronted him, in darting at the lion first, commanded Megabyfus's head to be struck off. Amytis the king's sister, and Amestris, with the greatest difficulty prevailed upon the king to change this sentence into perpetual banishment. Megabyfus was therefore sent to Cyrtæ, a city on the Red sea, and condemned to end his days there: however, five years after, disguising himself like a leper, he made his escape, and returned to Susa, where, by the assistance of his wife and mother-in-law, he was restored to favour, and continued so till his death, which happened some years after, in the seventy-sixth year of his age. Megabyfus was extremely regretted by the king and the whole court. He was a man of the greatest abilities in the kingdom, and at the same time the best general. Artaxerxes owed ‡ both his

* A. M. 3557. Ant. J. C. 447. † A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446.

‡ Beneficia eo usque lata sunt, dum videntur exolveri posse; ubi multum antevertere, pro gratia odium redditur. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 18.

crown and life to him : but it is of dangerous consequence for a subject, when his sovereign is under too many obligations to him. This was the cause of all the misfortunes of Megabyfus.

It is surprising that so judicious a prince as Artaxerxes should have been so imprudent, as to be fired with jealousy against a nobleman of his court, merely because in a party of hunting he had wounded the beast they were pursuing before him. Could any thing be so weak ? and was this placing the point of honour in a manner worthy a king ? Nevertheless, history furnishes us with many instances of this kind. I am apt to believe, from some expressions of * Plutarch, that Artaxerxes was ashamed of the wild fury to which this false delicacy had raised him, and that he made some public kind of atonement for it : for, according to this author, he published a decree, importing, that any man who was hunting with the king, should be allowed to throw his javelin first at the beast, if opportunity should offer ; and he, according to Plutarch, was the first Persian monarch who granted such a permission.

SECTION VI.

ARTAXERXES SENDS ESDRAS, AND AFTERWARDS NEHEMIAH
TO JERUSALEM.

BEFORE I proceed in the history of the Persians and Greeks, I shall relate, in few words, the several things which happened to the people of God, during the first 20 years of Artaxerxes, which is an essential part of the history of that prince.

† In the seventh year of the reign of Artaxerxes, Esdras obtained of the king and his seven counsellors an ample commission, empowering him to return to Jerusalem with all such Jews as would follow him thither, in order to settle the Jewish government and religion agreeably to their own laws. Esdras was descended from Saraia, who was high-priest of Jerusalem, when destroyed by Nabuchodonosor, and was put to death by his command. Esdras was a very learned and pious man, and was chiefly distinguished from the rest of the Jews, by his great knowledge in the scriptures ; it being said of him ‡, “ That he “ was very ready in the law of Moses that was given by the “ God of Israel.” He now set out from Babylon with the gifts and offerings which the king, his courtiers, and such Is-

* Plut. in Apophthegm. p. 173.

† A. M. 3537. Ant. J. C. 467. I Esdras vii. 7, &c.

‡ I Esdras viii. 3.

raelites as had staid at Babylon, had put into his hands for the service of the temple, and which he gave to the priests upon his arrival in Jerusalem. It appears by the commission which Artaxerxes gave him, that this prince had a high veneration for the God of Israel, as, in commanding his officers to furnish the Jews with all things necessary for their worship, he adds, “* Let all things be performed after the law of God diligently, unto the most high God, that wrath come not upon the kingdom of the king and his son.” This commission, as I observed, empowered him to settle the religion and government of the Jews, pursuant to the law of Moses; to appoint magistrates and judges, to punish evil doers, not only by imprisoning their persons, and confiscating their possessions, but also by sending them into banishment, and even sentencing them to death, according to the crimes they should commit. Such was the power with which Esdras was invested, and which he exercised faithfully during 13 years, till Nehemiah brought a new commission from the Persian court.

† Nehemiah was also a Jew of distinguished merit and piety, and one of the cupbearers to king Artaxerxes. This was a very considerable employment in the Persian court, because of the privilege annexed to it, *viz.* of being often near the king’s person, and of being allowed to speak to him in the most favourable moments. However, neither his exalted station, nor the settlement of his family in that land of captivity, could obliterate from his mind the country of his ancestors, nor their religion: neither his love for the one, nor his zeal for the other, were abated; and his heart was still in Sion. Some Jews who were come from Jerusalem, having informed him of the sad state of that city, that its walls lay in ruins, its gates were burned down, and the inhabitants thereby exposed to the insults of their enemies, and made the scorn of all their neighbours; the affliction of his brethren, and the dangers with which they were menaced, made such an impression on his mind, as might naturally be expected from one of his piety. One day, as he was waiting upon the king, the latter observing an unusual air of melancholy in Nehemiah’s countenance, asked him the cause of it; a proof that this monarch had a tenderness of heart rarely found in kings, and which is nevertheless much more valuable than the most shining qualities. Nehemiah took this opportunity to acquaint him with the calamitous state of his coun-

* 1 Esdras viii. 21.

† A. M. 3550. Ant. J. C. 454. Nehem. c. i. et ii.

try, owned that was the subject of his grief, and humbly intreated that leave might be given him to go to Jerusalem, in order to repair the fortifications of it. The kings of Persia, his predecessors, had permitted the Jews to rebuild the temple, but not the walls of Jerusalem. But Artaxerxes immediately decreed, that the walls and gates of Jerusalem should be rebuilt; and Nehemiah, as governor of Judea, was appointed to put this decree in execution. The king, to do him the greater honour, ordered a body of horse, commanded by a considerable officer, to escort him thither. He likewise wrote to all the governors of the provinces on this side the Euphrates, to give him all the assistance possible in forwarding the work for which he was sent. This pious Jew executed every part of his commission with incredible zeal and activity.

* It is from this decree, enacted by Artaxerxes in the 20th year of his reign, for the rebuilding of the walls of Jerusalem, that we date the beginning of the 70 weeks mentioned in the famous prophecy of Daniel, after which the Messiah was to appear and be put to death. I shall here insert the whole prophecy, but without giving the explication of it, as it may be found in other writers, and is not a part of this history.

“† Thou art greatly beloved, therefore understand the matter, and consider the vision. Seventy weeks are determined upon thy people, and upon thy holy city, to finish the transgression, and to make an end of sins, and to make reconciliation for iniquity, and to bring in everlasting righteousness, and to seal up the vision and prophecy, and to anoint the Most Holy. Know therefore and understand, *that from the going forth of the commandment to restore and to rebuild Jerusalem*, unto the Messiah the prince, shall be seven weeks, and threescore and two weeks; the street shall be built again, and the wall, even in troublous times. And after threescore and two weeks shall Messiah be cut off, but not for himself: and the people of the prince that shall come, shall destroy the city and the sanctuary, and the end thereof shall be with a flood; and unto the end of the war desolations are determined. And he shall confirm the covenant with many for one week; and in the midst of the week he shall cause the sacrifice and the oblation to cease, and for the overspreading of abomination, he shall make it desolate, even until the consummation, and that determined shall be poured upon the desolate.”

* Dan. ix. 23—27.

† Ibid.

* When Esdras was in power, as his chief view was to restore religion to its ancient purity, he disposed the books of scripture into their proper order, revised them all very carefully, and collected the incidents relating to the people of God in ancient times; in order to compose out of them the two books of Chronicles, to which he added the history of his own times, which was finished by Nehemiah. It is their books that end the long history which Moses had begun, and which the writers who came after them continued in a direct series, till the repairing of Jerusalem. The rest of the sacred history is not written in that uninterrupted order. Whilst Esdras and Nehemiah were compiling the latter part of that great work, Herodotus, whom profane authors call the Father of History, began to write. Thus we find that the latest authors of the books of scripture flourished about the same time with the first authors of the Grecian history; and when it began, that of God's people, to compute only from Abraham, included already 15 centuries. Herodotus made no mention of the Jews in his history; for the Greeks desired to be informed of such nations only, as were famous for their wars, their commerce, and grandeur; so that as Judea was then but just rising from its ruins, it did not excite the attention of that people.

SECTION VII.

CHARACTER OF PERICLES, &c.

I now return to Greece. From the banishment of Themistocles, and the death of Aristides, the exact time of which is not known, two citizens, Cimon and Pericles, divided all credit and authority in Athens. Pericles was much younger than Cimon, and of a quite different character. As he will make a very considerable figure in the following history, it is of importance to the reader to know who he was, in what manner he had been educated, and his scheme and method of government.

† Pericles was descended, by the mother's as well as father's side, from the greatest and most illustrious families of Athens. His father Xanthippus, who defeated at Mycale the king of Persia's lieutenants, married Agarista, niece to Clisthenes, who expelled the Pisistratides, descendants of Pisistratus the tyrant, and established a popular government in Athens. Pericles had

* Bishop of Meaux's Universal History.

† Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 153—156.

long prepared himself for the design he formed of engaging in state-affairs.

He was brought up under the most learned men of his age, and particularly Anaxagoras of Clazomene, surnamed the Intelligent, from his being the first; as we are told, who ascribed human events, as well as the formation and government of the universe, not to chance, as some philosophers, nor to a fatal necessity, but to a superior intelligence, who disposed and governed all things with wisdom. This tenet or opinion subsisted long before his time; but he perhaps set it in a stronger light than all others had done, and taught it methodically and from principles. Anaxagoras instructed his pupil perfectly in the part of philosophy that relates to nature, and which is therefore called *Physics**. This study gave him a strength and greatness of soul which raised him above an infinite number of vulgar prejudices and vain practices generally observed in his time; and which, in affairs of government and military enterprises, either disconcerted often the wisest and most necessary measures, or defeated them by scrupulous delays, authorized and covered with the specious veil of religion. These were sometimes dreams or auguries, at other times dreadful phenomena, as eclipses of the sun or moon, or else omens and presages; not to mention the wild chimeras of judiciary astrology. The knowledge of nature, free from the groveling and weak superstitions to which ignorance gives birth, inspired him, says Plutarch, with a well-grounded piety towards the gods, attended with a strength of mind that was immovable, and a calm hope of the blessings to be expected from them. Although he found infinite charms in this study, he did not however devote himself to it as a philosopher, but as a statesman; and he had so much power over himself (a very difficult thing) as to prescribe himself limits in the pursuit of knowledge.

But the talent he cultivated with the greatest care, because he looked upon it as the most necessary instrument to all who are desirous of conducting and governing the people, was eloquence. And indeed, those who possessed this talent, in a free state like that of Athens, were sure of reigning in the assemblies, engrossing suffrages, determining affairs, and exercising a kind of absolute power over the hearts and minds of the people. He therefore made this his chief object, and the

* The ancients under this name, comprehended what we call physics and metaphysics; that is, the knowledge of spiritual things, as God and spirits; and that of bodies.

mark to which all his other improvements, as well as the several sciences he had learned from Anaxagoras*, were directed; exalting (to borrow Plutarch's expression) the study of philosophy with the dye of rhetoric; the meaning of which is, that Pericles, to embellish and adorn his discourse, heightened the strength and solidity of reasoning with the colouring and graces of eloquence.

He had no cause to repent his having bestowed so much time in this study, for his success far exceeded his utmost hopes. The poets†, his contemporaries, used to say, that his eloquence was so powerful, that he lightened, thundered, and agitated all Greece. ‡ It had those piercing and lively strokes, that reach the inmost soul; and his discourse left always an irresistible incentive, a kind of spur, behind it in the minds of his auditors. He had the art of uniting beauty with strength; and Cicero observes, that at the very time he opposed, with the greatest tenaciousness, the inclinations and desires of the Athenians, he had the art to make even severity itself, and the kind of cruelty with which he spoke against the flatterers of the people, popular. There was no resisting the solidity of his arguments, or the sweetness of his words; whence it was said, that the goddess of persuasion, with all her graces, resided on his lips. And indeed, as Thucydides§, his rival and adversary, was one day asked, whether he or Pericles was the best wrestler: "Whenever," says he, "I have given him a fall, he affirms the contrary in such strong and forcible terms, that he persuades all the spectators that I did not throw him, though they themselves saw him on the ground." Nor was he less prudent and reserved, than strong and vehement in his speeches; and it is related, that he never spoke in public, till after he had besought the gods not to suffer any expression to drop from him, either incongruous to his subject, or offensive to the people. || Whenever he went into the assembly, before he came out of his house, he used to say to himself, "Remem-

* Βαφῇ τῇ ῥητορικῇ τὴν φυσιογνωμίαν ὑποχέμενος.

† Ab Aristophane poeta fulgurare, tonare, permiscere Greciam dictus est. Cic. in Orat. n. 29.

‡ Quid Pericles? De cujus dicendi copia sic accepimus, ut, cum contra voluntatem Atheniensium loqueretur pro salute patriæ, severius tamen id ipsum, quod ille contra populares homines diceret, popolare omnibus et jucundum videretur: cujus in labris veteres comici—leporem habitasse dixerunt: tantamque vim in eo fuisse, ut in eorum mentibus, qui audissent, quasi aculeos quosdam relinquerit. Cic. l. iii. de Orat. n. 138.

§ Not the historian.

|| Plut. in Symp. l. i. p. 610.

“ber, Pericles, that thou art going to speak to men born in
“the arms of liberty ; to Greeks, to Athenians.”

The uncommon endeavours which Pericles, according to historians, used, in order to improve his mind in knowledge, and to attain to a perfection in eloquence, are an excellent lesson to such persons as are one day to fill the important offices of state ; and a just censure of those *, who, disregarding whatever is called study and learning, bring into those employments, upon which they enter without knowledge or experience, nothing but a ridiculous self-sufficiency, and a rash boldness in deciding. † Plutarch, in a treatise where he shows that it is to statesmen that a philosopher ought chiefly to attach himself, preferably to any other class of men, because in instructing them, he, at the same time, teaches whole cities and republics, verifies his assertion from the example of the greatest men both of Greece and Italy, who derived this help from philosophy. Pericles, of whom we now write, was taught by Anaxagoras ; Dionysius of Syracuse by Plato ; many princes of Italy by Pythagoras ; Cato, the famous censor, travelled to the place where Athenodorus lived, for the same purpose ; and, lastly, the famous Scipio, the destroyer of Carthage, always kept Panetius the philosopher near his person.

One of the chief endeavours of Pericles also was, to study thoroughly the genius and disposition of the Athenians, that he might discover the secret springs which were to be employed in order to set them in motion ; and the manner it was proper to act for acquiring their confidence ; ‡ for it was principally in that the great men among the ancients used to make their skill in politics consist. He found by the reflections he had made on the several transactions of his time, that the predominant passions of this people were, a violent aversion to tyranny, and a strong love of liberty, which inspired them with sentiments of fear, jealousy, and suspicion, of all such citizens as were too conspicuous for their birth, their personal merit, their own credit and authority, or that of their friends. He not only was very like Pisistratus, with regard to the sweetness of his voice, and fluency of expression, but he also resembled

* Nunc contra plerique ad honores adipiscendos, et ad remp. gerendam, nudi veniunt et inermes, nulla cognitione rerum, nulla scientia ornati. Cic. l. iii. de Orat. n. 136.

† Plut. in Symp. lib. i. p. 777.

‡ Olim noscenda vulgi natura, et quibus modis temperanter haberetur ; senatusque et optimatum ingenia qui maxime perdidicerant, callidi temporum et sapientes habebantur. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 33.

him very much in the features of his face, and his whole air and manner; and he observed, that the most ancient Athenians who had seen the tyrant, were prodigiously struck at the resemblance. Besides, he was very rich, was descended from an illustrious family, and had very powerful friends. To prevent therefore his being obnoxious to the suspicion and jealousy of the people, he at first shunned all affairs of government, which require a constant attendance in the city; and was solely intent upon distinguishing himself in war and dangers.

Seeing Aristides dead, Themistocles banished, and Cimon engaged almost continually in foreign wars, and absent from Greece, he began to appear in public with greater confidence than before, and entirely devoted himself to the party of the people; but not out of inclination, for he was far from affecting popular power, but to remove all suspicions of his aspiring to the tyranny, and still more, to raise a strong bulwark against the credit and authority of Cimon, who had joined with the nobles.

At the same time, he quite changed his conduct and way of life; and assumed, in all things, the character of a statesman, wholly busied in affairs of government, and entirely devoted to the service of his country. He was never seen in the streets, except when he was going either to the assembly of the people, or to the council. He left off going to banquets, assemblies, and other diversions of that kind which he had used to frequent; and during the many years that he presided in the administration, he was never seen to go to supper with his friends, except once at the nuptials of a near relation.

* He knew that the people†; who are naturally fickle and inconstant, commonly increase their disregard for those who are always in their sight; and that too strong a desire to please them, grows at last tiresome and importunate: and it was observed that such a behaviour did Themistocles great prejudice. To avoid this error, he used to go very rarely to the assemblies; and never appeared before the people but at intervals, in order to make himself desired; and to preserve such an ascendant over their minds as might be always new, and not worn and in a manner withered by an over-great assiduity; wisely reserving himself for great and important occasions.

* Plut. de sui laude, p. 441.

† *Ista nostra assiduitas, Servi, nescis quantum interdum afferat hominibus fastidii, quantum satietatis.—Utrique nostram deciderium nihil obfuisse.* Cic. pro Mur. n. 21.

* Hence it was, said that he imitated Jupiter, who, in the government of the world, according to some philosophers, busied himself in great events only, and left the direction of those of less importance to subaltern deities. And, indeed, Pericles used to transact all petty affairs by his friends, and by certain orators that were entirely devoted to him, among whom was Ephialtes.

† Pericles employed his whole industry and application to gain the favour and esteem of the people, in order to counter-balance the fame and credit of Cimon. However, he could not equal the magnificence and liberality of his rival, whose immense riches gave him an opportunity of bestowing such largesses as appear to us almost incredible, so much they differ from our behaviour in that respect. Finding it impossible for him to rival Cimon in this particular, he had recourse to another expedient, in order to gain the love of the populace, no less effectual perhaps, but certainly not so lawful and honourable. He was the first who divided the conquered lands among the citizens; who distributed among them the public revenues for the expences of their games and shows, and annexed pensions to all public employments; so that certain sums were bestowed on them regularly, as well to gratify them at the games, as for their presence in the courts of justice, and the public assemblies. It is impossible to say, how fatal these unhappy politics were to the republic, and the many evils with which they were attended: for these new regulations, besides their draining the public treasury, gave the people a luxurious and dissolute turn of mind; whereas they before were sober and modest, and contented themselves with getting a livelihood by their sweat and labour.

By ‡ such arts as these, Pericles had gained so great an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he may be said to have attained a monarchical power under a republican form of government; moulding the citizens into what shape he pleased, and presiding with unlimited authority in all their assemblies. And, indeed, Valerius Maximus makes scarce any other difference between Pisistratus and Pericles, except that the one exercised a tyrannical power by force of arms, and the other by

* Plut. de ger. rep. p. 811.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 156.

‡ Pericles felicissimis naturæ incrementis, sub Anaxagora præceptore summo studio perpolitus et instructus, liberis Athenarum cervicibus jugum servitutis imposuit: egit enim ille urbem et versavit arbitrio suo.— Quid inter Pisistratum et Periclen interfuit, nisi quod ille armatus, hic sine armis, tyrannidem exercuit? Val. Max. l. viii. c. 9.

the strength of his eloquence, in which he had made a very great progress under Anaxagoras.

This credit and authority, however enormous, could not yet restrain the comic writers from lashing him very severely in the theatres; and it does not appear, that any of the poets who censured Pericles with so much boldness, were ever punished, or even called to account for it by the people. - Perhaps it was out of prudence and policy that he did not attempt to curb this licentiousness of the stage, nor to silence the poets; that he might amuse and content the people by this vain shadow of liberty, and prevent their discovering that they really were enslaved.

* But Pericles did not stop here. He boldly resolved, if possible, to weaken the authority of the tribunal of the Areopagus, of which he was not a member, because he had never been elected either † Archon, Thesmotheta, king of the sacrifices, nor Polemarch. These were different employments in the republic, which from time immemorial had been given by lot; and none but those who had behaved uprightly in them, were allowed a seat in the Areopagus. Pericles, taking advantage of Cimon's absence, set Ephialtes, who was his creature, at work clandestinely; and at last lessened the power of that illustrious body, in which the chief strength of the nobility consisted. The people, emboldened and supported by so powerful a faction, subverted all the fundamental laws and ancient customs; took from the senate of the Areopagus the cognizance of most causes that used to be brought before it, leaving it very few; and such only as were of little consequence, and made themselves absolute masters of all the tribunals.

Cimon, being returned to Athens, was afflicted to see the dignity of the senate trampled under foot, and therefore set every engine at work to restore it to its pristine authority, and to revive the Aristocracy, in the same form as it had been established under Clisthenes. But now his enemies began to exclaim, and excite the people against him; reproaching him, among many other things, with his strong attachment to the Lacedæmonians. Cimon had himself given some room for this reproach,

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 157. In Cim. p. 438.

† After some changes had been made in the form of the Athenian government, the supreme authority was at last vested in nine magistrates, called Archons, and lasted but one year. One was called Rex; another Polemarchus, a third Archon, and this magistrate was properly at the head of the rest, and gave his name to the year; and six Thesmothetæ, who presided immediately over the laws and decrees.

by his not paying sufficient regard to the Athenian delicacy: for, in speaking to them, he would for ever extol Lacedæmonia; and whenever he censured their conduct on any occasion, he used to cry, "The Spartans do not act in this manner." Such expressions as these drew upon him the envy and hatred of his fellow-citizens; but an event, in which he nevertheless had no share, made him the object of their utmost detestation.

SECTION VIII.

AN EARTHQUAKE IN SPARTA, &c.

IN the fourth year of the reign of Archidamus*, there happened the most dreadful earthquake in Sparta that had ever been known. In several places the country was entirely swallowed up; Taygetus and other mountains were shaken to their foundations; many of their summits, being torn away, came tumbling down; and the whole city was laid in ruins, five houses only excepted. To heighten the calamity, the helots, who were slaves to the Lacedæmonians, looking upon this as a favourable opportunity to recover their liberty, flew up and down every part of the city, to murder such as had escaped the earthquake: but finding them under arms, and drawn up in order of battle, by the prudent foresight of Archidamus, who had assembled them round him, they retired into the neighbouring cities, and commenced that very day open war, having entered into alliance with several of the neighbouring nations, and being strengthened by the Messenians, who at that time were engaged in a war with the Spartans.

The Lacedæmonians in this extremity sent to Athens to implore succours; but this was opposed by Ephialtes, who declared that it would be no way adviseable to assist them, nor to rebuild a city that was the rival of Athens, which, he said, ought to be left in its ruins, and the pride of Sparta thereby humbled for ever. But Cimon, being struck with horror at these politics, did not hesitate a moment to prefer the welfare of the Lacedæmonians to the aggrandizing of his country; declaring, in the strongest terms, that it was absolutely weak and inconsistent, "to leave Greece lame of one of its legs, and Athens without a counterpoise;" the people came into his opinion, and accordingly a succour was voted. Sparta and Athens might indeed be considered as the two limbs on which Greece stood; so that if one of them was destroyed, the rest

* A. M. 3534. Ant. J. C. 470. Plut. in Cim. p. 488, 489.

were inevitably crippled. It is also certain, that the Athenians were so elated with their grandeur, and were become so proud and enterprising, that they wanted a curb; for which none was so proper as Sparta, that state being the only one that was capable of being a counterpoise to the head-strong disposition of the Athenians. Cimon therefore marched to the aid of the Lacedæmonians with 4000 men.

We have here an example of the prodigious influence which a man of fine talents and abilities has in a state, when a great fund of merit unites in his person, with a well established reputation for probity, disinterestedness, and zeal for the good of his country. Cimon, with very little difficulty, prevails so far as to inspire the Athenians with noble and magnanimous sentiments, which in outward appearance interfered with their interest; and this in spite of the suggestions of a secret jealousy, which never fails to show itself in the most sensible manner on these occasions. By the ascendant and authority which his virtue gives him, he raises them above the groveling and unjust, though too common, political views, that prompt a people to consider the calamities of their neighbours as an advantage, which the interest of their own country permits, and even enjoins them to lay hold of. The counsels of Cimon were perfectly wise and equitable; but it is surprising, how he could prevail so far as to make a whole people approve them, since this is all that could be expected from an assembly of the wisest and gravest senators.

* Some time after, the Lacedæmonians again implored the aid of the Athenians against the Messenians and helots, who had seized upon Ithoma. But these forces being arrived under the command of Cimon, the Spartans began to dread their intrepidity, their power, and great fame; so that the city affronted them so far, as to send them back, upon the suspicion of their harbouring ill designs, and of intending to turn their arms against them.

The Athenians being returned full of anger and resentment, they declared themselves, from that very day, enemies to all who should favour the Lacedæmonian interest; for which reason they banished Cimon by the ostracism, the first opportunity that presented itself for that purpose. This is the first time that the misunderstanding between these two nations, which afterwards augmented through mutual discontent, displayed itself in so strong a manner. It was nevertheless suspended for

* Plut. in Cim. Thucyd. l. i. p. 67, 68.

some years, by truces and treaties, which prevented its consequences; but it at last broke out in the most violent manner, in the Peloponnesian war.

Those who had shut themselves up in Ithoma, after making a ten years defence in it, surrendered at last to the Lacedæmonians, who gave them their lives, upon condition that they should never return to Peloponnesus. The Athenians, to exasperate the Lacedæmonians, received them with their wives and children, and settled them at Naupactus, of which they had just before possessed themselves. * The inhabitants of Megara at the same time went over from the Spartans to the Athenians. In this manner several leagues were concluded on both sides, and many battles were fought, the most famous of which was that of Tanagra in Bœotia, which Diodorus equals with those of Marathon and Platæa, and in which Myronidus, the Athenian general, defeated the Spartans who came to the aid of the Thebans.

† It was on this occasion that Cimon, thinking himself dispensed from his proscription, repaired with some soldiers to his tribe to serve his country, and to fight in the Athenian country against the Lacedæmonians: but his enemies caused him to be ordered to retire. However, before he went away, he exhorted his companions, who were no less suspected than himself of favouring the Lacedæmonians, to exert themselves to the utmost, and fight with the greatest courage, to prove their innocence; and, if possible, to efface from the minds of the citizens a suspicion so injurious to them all. Accordingly those brave soldiers, who were 100 in number, fired by these words, demanded his whole armour of him, which they placed in the centre of their little battalion, in order to have him in a manner present, and before their eyes. They fought with so much valour and fury, that they were all cut to pieces, to the great regret of the Athenians, who deeply repented their having accused them so unjustly.

I omit several events of little importance.

SECTION IX.

CIMON IS RECALLED.—HIS DEATH.

THE Athenians perceiving the great occasion they had for Cimon‡, recalled him from banishment, in which he had spent

* A. M. 3548. Ant. J. C. 456. Thucyd. l. i. p. 69—71. Diod. l. xi. p. 59—65.

† Plut. in Cim. p. 489.

‡ Ibid. p. 496.

five years. It was Pericles himself who proposed and drew up that decree; so moderate in those times, says Plutarch, were feuds and animosities, and so easy to be appeased, when the welfare of their country required it; and so happily did ambition, which is one of the strongest and most lively passions, yield to the necessity of the times, and comply with the occasions of the public.

* The instant Cimon returned, he stifled the sparks of war which were going to break out among the Greeks, reconciled the two cities, and prevailed with them to conclude a truce for five years. And to prevent the Athenians, who were grown haughty, in effect of the many victories they had gained, from having an opportunity, or harbouring a design to attack their neighbours and allies, he thought it adviseable to lead them at a great distance from home against the common enemy; thus endeavouring, in an honourable way, to inure the citizens to war, and enrich them at the same time. Accordingly he put to sea with a fleet of 200 sail. He sent 60 of these into Egypt, to the aid of Amyrteus, and himself sailed with the rest against the island of Cyprus. Artabazus was at that time in those seas, with a fleet of 300 sail; and Megabyfus, the other general of Artaxerxes, with an army of 300,000 men, on the coast of Cilicia. As soon as the squadron which Cimon sent into Egypt had joined his fleet, he sailed and attacked Artabazus, and took 100 of his ships. He sunk many of them, and chased the rest as far as the coast of Phœnicia. But, as if this victory had been only a prelude to a second, he made a descent on Cilicia in his return, attacked Megabyfus, defeated him, and cut to pieces a prodigious number of his troops. He afterwards returned to Cyprus with this double triumph, and laid siege to Citium, a strong city of very great importance. His design, after he had reduced that island, was, to sail for Egypt, and again embroil the affairs of the barbarians; for he had very extensive views, and meditated no less a prospect than that of the entire subversion of the mighty empire of Persia. The rumours which prevailed, that Themistocles was to command against him, added fresh fire to his courage; and, almost assured of success, he was infinitely pleased with the occasion of trying his abilities with those of that general. But we have already seen that Themistocles laid violent hands on himself about this time.

* A. M. 3554. Ant. J. C. 450. Plut. in Cim. p. 490. Diod. l. xii. p. 73, 74.

* Artaxerxes, tired with a war in which he had sustained such great losses, resolved, with the advice of his council, to put an end to it. Accordingly, he sent orders to his generals to conclude a peace with the Athenians, upon the most advantageous conditions they could. Megabyfus and Artabazus sent ambassadors to Athens to propose an accommodation. Plenipotentiaries were chosen on both sides, and Callias was at the head of those of Athens. The conditions of the treaty were as follow: 1. That all the Grecian cities of Asia should enjoy their liberty, with such laws and forms of government as they should think fit to chuse. 2. That no Persian ship of war should be allowed to enter the seas between the Cyanean and Chelidonian islands, that is, from the Euxine sea to the coasts of Pamphilia. 3. That no Persian general should march any troops within three days march of those seas. 4. That the Athenians should not invade any part of the dominions of the king of Persia. These articles being ratified by both parties, peace was proclaimed.

† Thus ended this war, which, from the burning of Sardis by the Athenians, had lasted 51 years complete, and in which infinite numbers of Persians, as well as Greeks, had perished.

‡ Whilst this treaty was negotiating, Cimon died, either of sickness, or of a wound he had received at the siege of Citium. When he was near his end, he commanded his officers to sail with the fleet immediately for Athens, and to conceal his death with the utmost care. Accordingly this was executed with so much secrecy, that neither the enemy nor the allies once suspected it; and they returned safe to Athens, still under the conduct and auspices of Cimon, though he had been dead above 30 days.

Cimon was universally regretted §, which is no wonder, since he was possessed of all those qualities which dignify the soul; the most tender son; a faithful friend; zealous for the good of his country; a great politician; an accomplished general; modest when raised to the highest employments and most distinguished honours; liberal and beneficent almost to profusion; simple and averse to ostentation of every kind, even in the midst of riches and abundance; in fine, so great a lover of the poor citizens, as to share his whole estate with them, without being ashamed of such companions of his fortune. History mentions no statues

* Diod. p. 74, 75.

† A. M. 3555. Ant. J. C. 449.

‡ Plut. in Cim. p. 491.

§ Sic se gerendo, minime est mirandum, si et vita ejus fuit secura, et non acerba. Cor. Nep. in Cim. c. 4.

or monuments erected to his memory, nor any magnificent obsequies celebrated after his death: but the greatest honour that could be paid him, was the sighs and tears of the people*. These were permanent and lasting statues, which are not obnoxious to the inclemencies of weather, or the injuries of time, and endear the memory of the good and virtuous to the remotest ages: for the more splendid mausoleums, the works of brass and marble, that are raised in honour of wicked great men, are despised by posterity, as sepulchres which inclose nothing but vile dust and putrefaction.

What followed proved more strongly the loss which Greece had sustained by his death; for Cimon was the last of all the Grecian generals who did any thing considerable or glorious against the barbarians. Excited by the orators, who gained the strongest ascendant over the minds of the people, and sowed the seeds of division in their public assemblies, they turned their animosity against each other, and at last proceeded to open war, the fatal consequences of which no one endeavoured to prevent; a circumstance that was of great advantage to the king of Persia, and the utmost prejudice to the affairs of Greece.

SECTION X.

THUCYDIDES IS OPPOSED TO PERICLES, &c.

THE nobles of Athens seeing Pericles raised to the highest degree of power*, and far above all the rest of the citizens, resolved to oppose him with a man, who, in some measure, might make head against him, and prevent his great authority from growing up to monarchy. Accordingly they opposed him with Thucydides, Cimon's brother-in-law, a man who had displayed his wisdom on numberless occasions. He, indeed, did not possess the military talents in so eminent a degree as Pericles; but then he had as great an influence over the people; shaping their opinions, and directing their assemblies as he pleased: and as he never stirred out of the city, but continually combated Pericles in all his designs, he soon restored things to an equilibrium. On the other side, Pericles was solicitous of pleasing the people on all occasions, and slackened the rein more than ever; entertaining them as often as possible with shows, festivals, games, and other diversions.

* *Hæ pulcherrimæ effigies et mansuræ. Nam, quæ saxo struantur, si judicium posterorum in odium vertit; pro sepulchris spernuntur.* Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 38.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 158—161.

He found means to maintain, during eight months in the year, a great number of poor citizens, by putting them on board a fleet, consisting of 60 ships, which he fitted out every year; and thereby did his country an important service, by training up a great number of seamen for its defence. He also planted several colonies in Chersonesus, in Naxos, in Andros, and among the Bisaltæ in Thrace. There was a very noble one in Italy, of which we shall soon have occasion to speak, and which built Thurium. Pericles had different views in settling these colonies, besides the particular design he might have of gaining the affections of the people by that means. His chief motives were, to clear the city of a great number of idle persons who were ever ready to disturb the government; to relieve the wants of the lowest class of people, who before were unable to subsist themselves; in fine, to awe the allies, by settling native Athenians among them as so many garrisons, which might prevent their engaging in any measures contrary to the interest of that people. The Romans acted in the same manner; and it may be said, that so wise a policy was one of the most effectual methods used by them to secure the tranquillity of the state.

But the circumstance which did Pericles the greatest honour in the sense of the people, was his adorning the city with magnificent edifices and other works, which raised the admiration and astonishment of all foreigners, and gave them a mighty idea of the power of the Athenians. It is surprising that, in so short a space, so many works of architecture, sculpture, engraving, and painting, should be performed, and at the same time be carried to the highest perfection: for it is generally found, that edifices, raised in haste, boast neither a solid and durable grace, nor the regularity required in works of an exquisitely beautiful kind. Commonly, nothing but length of time, joined to assiduous labour, can give them such a strength as may preserve, and make them triumph over ages; and this raises our wonder still more in regard to the works of Pericles, which were finished with so much rapidity, and however subsisted through so great a length of time. For each of those works, the very instant it was finished, had the beauty of an antique; and at this time, *i. e.* above 500 years after, says Plutarch, they retain a freshness and youth as if just come out of the artist's hand; so happily do they preserve the graces and charms of novelty, which will not suffer time to diminish their lustre; as if an ever-blooming spirit, and a soul exempt from age, were diffused into every part of those works.

But

But that circumstance, which excited the admiration of the whole world, raised the jealousy of the people against Pericles. His enemies were for ever crying aloud in the assemblies, that it was dishonourable to the Athenians, to appropriate to themselves the bank of all Greece, which he had sent for from Delos, where it had been deposited; that the allies must necessarily consider such an attempt as a manifest tyranny, when they found that the sums which had been extorted from them, upon pretence of their being employed in the war, were laid out by the Athenians in gilding and embellishing their city, in making magnificent statues, and raising temples that cost millions. They did not amplify on these occasions; for the temple of Minerva only, called the Parthenone, had cost 3,000,000 of livres*.

Pericles, on the contrary, remonstrated to the Athenians, that they were not obliged to give the allies an account of the monies they had received from them; that it was enough they defended them from, and repulsed the Barbarians, whilst the allies furnished neither soldiers, horses, nor ships; and were excused for some sums of money, which, from the instant they were paid in, were no longer the property of the donors, but of those who received them; provided they performed the conditions agreed upon, and in consideration of which they were received. He added, that as the Athenians were sufficiently provided with all things necessary for war, it was but just, that they should employ the rest of their riches in edifices and other works, which, when finished, would give immortal glory to their city; and the whole time they were carrying on, diffused a plenty of all things, and gave bread to an infinite number of citizens: that they themselves had all kinds of materials, as timber, stone, brass, ivory, gold, ebony, and cypress wood; and all sorts of artificers capable of working them, as carpenters, masons, smiths, stonecutters, dyers, goldsmiths, artificers in ebony, painters, embroiderers, and turners; men fit to conduct their naval affairs, as merchants, sailors, and experienced pilots; others for land-carriage, as cartwrights, waggoners, carters, ropemakers, pavers, &c. That it was for the advantage of the state to employ these different artificers and workmen, who, as so many separate bodies, formed, when united, a kind of peaceable and domestic army, whose different functions and employments diffused gain and increase throughout all sexes and ages: lastly, that whilst men

* About L. 145,000 Sterling.

of robust bodies, and of an age fit to bear arms, whether soldiers or mariners, and those who were in the different garrisons, were supported with the public monies; it was but just, that the rest of the people who lived in the city should also be maintained in their way; and that as all were members of the same republic, they all should reap the same advantages, by doing it services, which, though of a different kind, did however all contribute to its security or ornament.

One day, as the debates were growing warm, Pericles offered to defray the expence of all these things, provided it should be declared in the public inscriptions, that he only had been at the charge of them. At these words, the people, either admiring his magnanimity, or fired with emulation, and determined not to let him engross that glory, cried with one voice, that he might take out of the public treasury all the sums necessary for his purpose.

Phidias, the celebrated sculptor, presided over all these works, as director-general. It was he who particularly cast the gold * and ivory statue representing Pallas, which was so highly valued by all the judges of antiquity. There arose an incredible ardour and emulation among the several artificers, who all strove to excel each other, and immortalize their names by masterpieces of art.

The odeon, or music-theatre, which had a great number of seats and columns within it, and whose roof grew narrower by degrees, and terminated in a point, was built, as history informs us, after the model of king Xerxes's tent, according to the direction of Pericles. It was at that time he proposed, with great warmth, a decree, by which it was ordained, that musical games should be celebrated on the festival called Panathenæa; and having been chosen the judge and distributor of the prizes, he regulated the manner in which musicians should play on the flute and the lyre, as well as sing. From that time, the musical games were always exhibited in this theatre.

I have already taken notice that the more the beauty and splendor of these works were admired, the greater envy and clamour were raised against Pericles. The orators of the opposite faction were eternally exclaiming against him, and tearing his character to pieces; accusing him of squandering the public monies, and laying out very unseasonably the revenues

* Non Minervæ Athenis factæ amplitudine utimur, cum ea sit cubitorum xxvi. Ebore hoc et auro constat. Plin. l. xxxvi. c. 5. This statue was 26 cubits in height.

of the state in edifices, whose magnificence was of no use. At last, the rupture between him and Thucydides rose to such a height, that one or other of them must necessarily be banished by the ostracism. He got the better of Thucydides; prevailed to have him banished; crushed by that means the faction which opposed him, and obtained a despotic authority over the city and government of Athens. He now disposed at pleasure of the public monies, troops, and ships. The islands and sea were subject to him; and he reigned singly and alone in that wide domain, which extended, not only over the Greeks, but the barbarians also, and which was cemented and strengthened by the obedience and fidelity of the conquered nations, by the friendship of kings, and treaties concluded with various princes.

Historians expatiate greatly on the magnificent edifices and other works with which Pericles adorned Athens, and I have related faithfully their testimony; but I cannot say whether the complaints and murmurs raised against him were very ill grounded. And indeed, was it just in him to expend in superfluous buildings and vain decorations, the immense* sums intended for carrying on the war? and would it not have been better to have eased the allies of part of the contributions, which, in Pericles's administration, were raised to a third part more than before? According to Cicero†, such edifices and other works only are worthy of admiration, as are of use to the public, as aqueducts, city-walls, citadels, arsenals, sea-ports; and to these we must add, the work made by Pericles, to join Athens to the port of Piræus. But Cicero observes, at the same time, that Pericles was blamed for squandering away the public treasure, merely to embellish the city with superfluous ornaments. ‡ Plato, who formed a judgment of things, not from their outward splendor, but from truth, observes, after his master Socrates, that Pericles, with all his grand edifices and other works, had not improved the mind of one of the citizens in virtue, but rather corrupted the purity and simplicity of their ancient manners.

SECTION XI.

PERICLES CHANGES HIS CONDUCT WITH REGARD TO THE PEOPLE.

WHEN Pericles saw himself invested with the whole authority, he began to change his behaviour. § He now was not

* They amounted to upwards of 10,000,000 French Money.

† Offic. l. ii. n. 60.

‡ In Georg. p. 515. In Alcib. c. i. p. 119.

§ Plut. in Peric. p. 161.

so mild and tractable as before, nor did he submit or abandon himself any longer to the whims and caprice of the people, as so many winds; but drawing in, says Plutarch, the reins of this, too loose, popular government, in the same manner as we screw up the strings of an instrument when too slack, he changed it into an aristocracy, or rather a kind of monarchy, without departing, however, from the public good. Choos- ing always what was most expedient, and becoming irreproach- able in all things, he gained so mighty an ascendant over the minds of the people, that he turned and directed them at pleasure. Sometimes, by his bare counsel, and by persuasive methods, he would win them over gently to his will, and gain their assent spontaneously; at other times, when he found them obstinate, he would in a manner drag them forward against their will, to those things which were for their good; imitating on this occasion a skilful physician, who, in a tedious and stubborn disease, knows what times are proper for him to indulge his patient in innocent medicaments that are pleasing; in order after to administer those of a strong and violent nature, which indeed put him to pain, but are alone capable of restor- ing his health.

And indeed, it is manifest that the utmost skill and abilities were required to manage and govern a populace haughty from their power, and exceedingly capricious; and on this occasion Pericles succeeded wonderfully. He used to employ, accord- ing to the different situation of things, sometimes hope, and at other times fear, as a double helm, either to check the wild transports and starts of the people, or to raise them when deject- ed and desponding. By this conduct he showed, that elo- quence, as Plato observes, is only the art of directing the minds of people at will; and that the chief excellency of this art consists in moving, seasonably, the various passions, whether gentle or violent; which being to the soul what strings are to a musical instrument, need only be touched by an ingenious and skilful hand to produce their effect.

It must nevertheless be confessed, that the circumstance which gave Pericles this great authority, was, not only the force of his eloquence, but, as Thucydides observes, the re- putation of his life, and great probity.

* Plutarch points out in Pericles one quality which is very essential to statesmen; a quality well adapted to win the esteem and confidence of the public, and which supposes a great su-

* Plut. in præc. de rep. ger. p. 812.

periority of mind; and that is, for a man to be fully persuaded that he wants the counsels of others, and is not able to manage and direct all things alone; to associate with himself persons of merit in his labour, to employ each of these according to his talents; and to leave them the management of small matters, which only consume time, and deprive him of the liberty of mind, so necessary in the conduct of important affairs. Such a conduct, says Plutarch, is productive of two advantages. First, it extinguishes or at least breaks the force of envy and jealousy, by dividing, in some measure, a power, which is grating and offensive to us, when we see it united in one single person, as if all merit centred in him alone. Secondly, it advances and facilitates the execution of affairs, and makes their success more certain. Plutarch, the better to explain his thought, employs a very natural and beautiful comparison. The hand, says he, which, from its being divided into fingers, so far from being weaker, is the stronger, the more active, and better adapted to motion on that very account. It is the same of a statesman, who has the skill to divide his cares and functions in a proper manner, and who by that means makes his authority more active, more extensive and decisive: whereas the indiscreet fire of a narrow-minded man, who takes umbrage at, and is for engrossing all things, serves to no other purpose but to set his weakness and incapacity in a stronger light, and to disconcert his affairs. But Pericles, says Plutarch, did not act in this manner. Like a skilful pilot, who, though he stands almost motionless himself, however puts every thing in motion, and will sometimes seat subaltern officers at the helm; so Pericles was the soul of the government; and, seeming to do nothing of himself, he actuated and governed all things; employing the eloquence of one man, the credit and interest of another, the prudence of a third, the bravery and courage of a fourth, and so on.

* To what has been here related, we may add another quality which is no less rare and valuable, I mean, a noble and disinterested soul. Pericles had so great a disinclination to the receiving of gifts, so utter a contempt for riches, and was so far above all rapaciousness and avarice, that though he had raised Athens to the richest and most flourishing state; though his power had surpassed that of many tyrants and kings; though he had long disposed in an absolute manner of the treasures of Greece, he did not however add a single drachm

* Plut. in vit. Pericl. p. 161, 162.

to the estate he inherited from his father. This was the source, the true cause of the supreme authority of Pericles in the republic; the just and deserved fruit of his integrity and perfect disinterestedness.

It was not only for a few short moments, nor during the first heats of favour, which are generally short-lived, that he preserved his authority. He maintained it 40 years, notwithstanding the opposition of Cimon, of Tolmides, of Thucydides, and many others, who had all declared against him; and of these 40 years, he spent 15 without a rival, from the time of Thucydides's banishment, and disposed all affairs with absolute power. Nevertheless, in the midst of this supreme authority, which he had rendered perpetual and unlimited in his own person, his soul was always superior to the charms and allurements of wealth, though he never neglected improving his estate to the utmost of his power. For Pericles did not act like those rich men, who, notwithstanding their immense revenues, either through negligence or want of œconomy, or the expences of pride and folly, are always poor in the midst of their riches; unable and unwilling to do the least service to their virtuous friends, or their faithful and zealous domestics; and at last die in every one's debt, whence their name and memory are had in the utmost detestation by their unfortunate creditors. I shall not expatiate on another extreme, to which this negligence and want of œconomy generally lead, I mean rapine, a love of gifts and exactions; for here, as well as in the management of the public monies, the maxim of Tacitus takes place*, *viz.* that when a man has squandered away his estate, he then makes it his whole study to retrieve the loss of it by all sorts of methods, not excepting the most criminal.

Pericles knew much better the use a statesman ought to make of riches. He was sensible that he ought to expend them in the service of the public, such as the procuring of able men to assist him in the administration; the relieving good officers, who too often are in unhappy circumstances; the rewarding and encouraging merit of every kind, and a thousand such things; to which, doubtless, either on account of the exquisite joy they give, or the solid glory that results from them, no one will be so thoughtless as to compare the expences lavished away in entertainments, equipages, or gaming. In this view, Pericles managed his estate with the utmost œconomy;

* Si ambitione ærarium exhauserimus, per scelera supplendum erit.
Tacit. Annal. l. ii. c. 35.

having himself taught one of his old servants to take care of his domestic concerns; and he always had the account brought him, at stated times, of all things that had been received as well as expended; confining himself and his family to a decent subsistence, from which he banished severely all superfluities of a vain and ostentatious kind, suitable to his estate and condition. This way of life, indeed, did no way please his children when they were come to years of maturity, and much less his wife. They thought Pericles did not live at a sufficient expence for persons of their rank; and murmured at that low sordid œconomy, as they called it, which carried no air of the plenty which generally reigns in houses where riches and authority are united. However, Pericles had little regard to these complaints, and directed his views to things of much greater importance.

I believe it will not be improper to apply on this occasion, a very just remark of Plutarch, in his parallel of Aristides and Cato. After saying that political virtue, or the art of governing cities and kingdoms, is the greatest and most perfect that man can acquire, he adds, that œconomy is not one of the most inconsiderable branches of this virtue. And indeed, as riches are one of the means which may most contribute to the security or ruin of a state; the art that teaches to dispose of, and make a good use of them, and which is called œconomy, is certainly a branch of the art of policy; and not one of the most inconsiderable branches of it, since great wisdom is required, in order to the observing a just medium on these occasions, and to the banishing poverty and too great opulence from a country. It is this art, which avoiding industriously all trifling and needless expences, prevents a magistrate from being forced to overburden a people with taxes; and keeps always in reserve, in the public coffers, monies sufficient for the supporting a war that may break out, or for providing against any unforeseen accident. Now, what is said of a kingdom, or of a city, may be applied to particular persons. For a city, which is composed of an assemblage of houses, and which forms a whole of several parts united, is either powerful or weak when taken together, in proportion as all the members of which it consists, are powerful or weak. Pericles certainly acquitted himself well with regard to that part of this science which relates to the government of a family: but I do not know whether the same may be said of his administration of the public revenues.

SECTION XII.

JEALOUSY AND CONTESTS ARISE BETWEEN THE ATHE-
NIANS AND LACEDÆMONIANS.

SUCH was the conduct of Pericles with respect to his domestic concerns*; and he was no less famous for his administration of public affairs. The Lacedæmonians beginning to grow jealous of the prosperity of the Athenians, and to take umbrage at it, Pericles, to inspire his citizens with greater courage and magnanimity, published a decree, importing, that orders should be sent to all the Greeks, inhabiting either Europe or Asia, and to all the cities great or small, to send immediately their deputies or representatives to Athens, to examine and debate on ways and means to rebuild the temples that had been burnt by the barbarians; to perform the sacrifices, which they had engaged themselves to offer up, for the preservation and safety of Greece, when war was carrying on against them; as also, to consider on the necessary expedients for establishing such an order and discipline in their navy, that all ships might sail in safety, and the Greeks live in peace one with another.

Accordingly 20 persons were chosen for this embassy, each of whom was upwards of 50 years old. Five of these were sent to the Ionians and Dorians of Asia, and the inhabitants of the islands as far as Lesbos and Rhodes; five to the countries of the Hellespont and Thrace, as far as Byzantium. Five were ordered to go to Bœotia, to Phocis, and Peloponnesus; and from thence, by the country of the Locrians, to proceed to the several cities of the upper continent, as far as Acarnania and Ambracia. The last five were ordered to cross Eubœa, and to go to the people of mount Cæta, and those of the gulf of Malea, and to the inhabitants of Phthiotis, of Achaia, and of Thessaly; to induce the several nations to come to the assembly convened in Athens, and to assist at the debates which should be there carried on, concerning peace, and the general affairs of Greece. I judged it necessary to enter into this detail, as it shows how far the power of the Greeks extended, and the authority which the Athenians enjoyed among them.

But all these solicitations were in vain; the cities not sending their deputies, which, according to historians, was owing to the opposition made by the Lacedæmonians, a circumstance we are not to wonder at. They were sensible, that Pericles's design was, to have Athens acknowledged as mistress and so-

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

vereign of all the other Grecian cities; and Lacedæmon was far from allowing it that honour. A secret leaven of dissension had, for some years, begun to disturb the tranquillity of Greece; and we shall find by the sequel, that disguests augmented continually.

Pericles had acquired great fame for the wisdom with which he formed and conducted his enterprises. The troops reposed the highest confidence in him, and whenever they followed him, assured themselves of success. His chief maxim of war was, never to venture a battle unless he were almost certain of victory, and not to lavish the blood of the citizens. He used to say frequently, that were it in his power they should be immortal; that when trees were felled, they shoot to life again in a little time, but when once men die, they are lost for ever. A victory that was only the effect of a happy temerity, appeared to him as little worthy of praise, though it often was much admired.

His expedition into the Thracian Chersonesus did him great honour, and was of great advantage to all the Greeks of that country; for he not only strengthened the Grecian cities of that peninsula, by the colonies of Athenians which he carried thither, but also shut up the isthmus with a strong wall, with forts at proper distances from sea to sea; securing by that means the whole country from the perpetual incursions of the Thracians, who were very near neighbours to it.

He also sailed with 100 ships round Peloponnesus, spreading the terror of the Athenian arms wherever he came, the success of which was not once interrupted on this occasion.

He advanced as far as the kingdom of Pontus with a large, well-manned, and magnificent fleet; and granted the Grecian cities all they thought fit to ask of him. At the same time he displayed to the barbarian nations in that neighbourhood, to their kings and princes, the greatness of the power of the Athenians; and proved to them, by the security with which he sailed to all parts, that they possessed the empire of the seas without a rival.

* But so constant and shining a fortune began to dazzle the eyes of the Athenians. Intoxicated with the idea of their power and grandeur, they now revolved nothing but the boldest and most lofty projects. They were for ever talking of new attempts upon Egypt; of attacking the maritime provinces of the great king; of carrying their arms into Sicily, a fatal

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

and unhappy design, which at that time did not take effect, though it was revived soon after; and to extend their conquests towards Hetruria on one side, and Carthage on the other. Pericles was far from giving into such idle views, or supporting them with his credit and approbation. On the contrary, his whole study was to damp that restless ardour, and check an ambition which no longer knew either bounds or measure. It was his opinion that the Athenians ought to employ their forces for the future, only in securing and preserving their present acquisitions; and he thought he had gained a great point, in restraining the power of the Lacedæmonians, the reducing of which he always meditated; and this was particularly seen in the sacred war.

* This name was given to the war which was raised on account of Delphos. The Lacedæmonians, having entered armed into the country where that temple is situated, had dispossessed the people of Phocis of the superintendence of that temple, and bestowed it on the Delphians. As soon as they left it, Pericles went thither with an army, and restored the Phocenses.

The Eubœans having rebelled at the same time, Pericles was obliged to march thither with an army. He was no sooner arrived there, but news was brought that the inhabitants of Megara had taken up arms; and that the Lacedæmonians, headed by Plistonax their king, were on the frontiers of Attica. This obliged him to quit Eubœa, and to go with all possible expedition to defend his country. The Lacedæmonian army being retired, he returned against the rebels, and again subjected all the cities of Eubœa to the Athenians.

† After this expedition, a truce for 30 years was concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. This treaty restored things to a tranquillity for the present: but as it did not descend to the root of the evil, nor cure the jealousy and enmity of the two nations, this calm was not of long duration.

SECTION XIII.

NEW SUBJECTS OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS.

THE Athenians, six years after, took up arms against Sa-

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 164.

† A. M. 3558. Ant. J. C. 446. Thucyd. l. i. p. 75. Diod. p. 87.

anos in favour of Miletus*. These two cities were contesting for that of Priene, to which each claimed a right. It is pretended, that Pericles fomented this war to please a famous courtesan, of whom he was very fond; her name was Aspasia, a native of Miletus. After several events and battles, Pericles besieged the capital of the island of Samos. It is said, that this was the first time he used military engines, as battering-rams and tortoises, invented by Artemon the engineer, who was lame, and therefore was always carried in a chair to the batteries, whence he was surnamed Periphoretus. The use of these machines had been long known in the east. The Samians, after sustaining a nine months siege, surrendered: Pericles razed their walls, dispossessed them of their ships, and demanded immense sums to defray the expences of the war. Part of this sum they paid down; agreed to disburse the rest at a certain time, and gave hostages by way of security for the payment.

After the reduction of Samos, Pericles being returned to Athens, buried in a splendid manner all who had lost their lives in this war, and pronounced in person the funeral oration over their graves. This custom, which he first introduced, was afterwards regularly observed. The senate of the Areopagus always appointed the orator on these occasions. He was chosen, ten years after, for the like ceremony, in the beginning of the Peloponnesian war.

† Pericles, who foresaw that a rupture would soon ensue between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, advised the former to send aid to the people of Corcyra, whom the Corinthians had invaded; and to win over to their interest that island, which was so very formidable at sea; foretelling them, that they would be attacked by the Peloponnesians. The occasion of the quarrel between the people of Corcyra and Corinth, which gave rise to that of Peloponnesus, one of the most considerable events in the Grecian history, was as follows.

‡ Epidamnum, a maritime city of Macedonia among the Taulantii, was a colony of Corcyrans, founded by Phalius of Corinth. This city growing, in time, very large and populous, divisions arose in it, and the common people expelled the most wealthy inhabitants, who went over to the neighbouring

* A. M. 3564. Ant. J. C. 440. Thucyd. l. i. p. 75, 76. Diod. l. xii. p. 88, 89. Plut. in Pericl. p. 165—167.

† A. M. 3572. Ant. J. C. 432. Thucyd. l. i. p. 17—37. Diod. l. xii. p. 90—93. Plut. in Pericl. p. 167.

‡ This city was afterwards called Dyrrachium.

nations, and infested them greatly with their incursions. In this extremity they first had recourse to the Corcyrans, and being refused by them, they addressed the Corinthians, who took them under their protection, sent succours to, and settled other inhabitants in it. But they did not continue long unmolested there, the Corcyrans besieging it with a large fleet. The people of Corinth hastened to its aid, but having been defeated at sea, the city surrendered that very day, upon condition that the foreigners should be slaves, and the Corinthians prisoners, till further orders. The Corcyrans erected a trophy, murdered all their prisoners except the Corinthians, and laid waste the whole country.

The year after the battle, the Corinthians raised a greater army than the former, and fitted out a new fleet. The people of Corcyra, finding it would be impossible for them to make head alone against such powerful enemies, sent to the Athenians to desire their alliance. The treaty of peace, concluded between the states of Greece, left such Grecian cities as had not declared themselves the liberty of joining whom they pleased, or of standing neuter. This the Corcyrans had hitherto done; judging it their interest not to espouse any party, in consequence of which they had hitherto been without allies. They now sent for this purpose to Athens, which the Corinthians hearing, they also sent deputies thither. The affair was debated with great warmth in presence of the people, who heard the reasons on both sides, and it was twice put to the vote in the assembly. The Athenians declared the first time in favour of the Corinthians; but afterwards changing their opinion (doubtless on the remonstrances of Pericles), they received the Corcyrans into their alliance. However, they did not go so far as to conclude a league offensive and defensive with them, for they could not declare war against Corinth, without breaking at the same time with all Peloponnesus; but only agreed to succour each other mutually, in case they should be attacked, either personally, or in their allies. Their real design was to set those two states, very powerful by sea, at variance; and after each should have exhausted the other, by a tedious war, to triumph over the weakest: for at that time there were but three states in Greece, who possessed powerful fleets; and these were, Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra. They also had a design on Italy and Sicily, which their taking the island of Corcyra would very much promote.

On this plan they concluded an alliance with the Corcyrans, and accordingly sent them ten galleys, but with an order for
them

them not to engage the Corinthians, unless they should first invade the island of Corcyra, or some other place belonging to their allies. This precaution was used, in order that the articles of the truce might not be infringed.

But it was very difficult to obey these orders. A battle was fought between the Corcyrans and the Corinthians, near the island of Sibotis, opposite to Corcyra. It was one of the most considerable, with regard to the number of ships, that ever was fought between the Greeks. The advantage was almost equal on both sides. About the end of the battle, as night was drawing on, 20 Athenian galleys came up. The Corcyrans, with this reinforcement, sailed next day by day-break towards the port of Sibotis, whither the Corinthians had retired, to see if they would venture a second engagement. However, the latter contented themselves with sailing away in order of battle, without fighting. Both parties erected a trophy in the island of Sibotis, each ascribing the victory to himself.

* From this war arose another, which occasioned an open rupture between the Athenians and Corinthians, and afterwards the war of Peloponnesus. Potidæa, a city of Macedonia, was a colony belonging to the Corinthians, who sent magistrates thither annually; but it was dependent at that time on Athens, and paid tribute to it. The Athenians fearing this city would revolt, and prevail with the rest of the Thracian allies to join them, commanded the inhabitants to demolish their walls on the side next Pallene; to deliver hostages to them as sureties for their fidelity; and to send back the magistrates which Corinth had given them. Demands of so unjust a nature only fomented the revolt. † The Potidæans declared against the Athenians, and several neighbouring cities followed their example. Both Athens and Corinth armed and sent forces thither. The two armies engaged near Potidæa, and that of the Athenians had the advantage. Alcibiades, who was then very young, and Socrates his master, signalized themselves on this occasion. It is something very singular, to see a philosopher put on his coat of mail; as well as to consider his behaviour and conduct in a battle. There was not a soldier in the whole army who so resolutely supported all the toils and fatigues of the campaign as Socrates. Hunger, thirst, and cold, were enemies he had long accustomed himself to despise and subdue with ease. Thrace, the scene

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 37--42. Diod. l. xii. p. 93, 94.

† Plut. in Conviv. p. 219, 220. Plut. in Alcib. p. 194.

of this expedition, was a frozen region. Whilst the other soldiers, covered with thick clothes and warm furs, lay close in their tents, and scarce ever dared to stir out of them, Socrates used to come into the open air as thin-clad as usual, and bare-footed. His gaiety and wit were the life of all tables; and induced others to put the glass round cheerfully, though he himself never drank wine to excess. When the armies engaged, he performed his duty to a miracle. Alcibiades having been thrown down and wounded, Socrates placed himself before him, defended him valiantly, and, in sight of the whole army, prevented him and his arms from being taken by the enemy. The prize of valour was justly due to Socrates; but as the generals seemed inclined to decree it to Alcibiades, on account of his illustrious birth, Socrates, who only fought for opportunities to inflame him with desire of true glory, contributed more than any other person, by the noble eulogium he made on his courage, to cause the crown and complete suit of armour, which was the prize of valour, to be adjudged to Alcibiades.

Notwithstanding the loss which the Corinthians had sustained in the battle, the inhabitants of Potidæa did not change their conduct. The city was therefore besieged. * The Corinthians, fearing to lose a place of so much importance, addressed their allies in the strongest terms; who all in conjunction with them, sent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to complain of the Athenians, as having infringed the articles of peace. The Lacedæmonians admitted them to audience in one of their ordinary assemblies. The people of Ægina, though very much disgusted at the Athenians, did not send a deputation publicly thither, for fear of giving umbrage to a republic to which they were subject; but they acted in secret as strenuously as the rest. The Megarians complained vehemently against the Athenians, that, contrary to the law of nations, and in prejudice to the treaty concluded between the Greeks, they had prohibited them, by a public decree, access to their fairs and markets, and excluded them from all the ports dependent on them. † By that decree, according to Plutarch‡, the Athenians,

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 43—59.

† Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

‡ According to Plutarch, some persons pretended that Pericles had caused this decree to be enacted, to revenge the private injury done to Aspasia, from whose house the people of Megara had carried off two courtezans; and he cites some verses of Aristophanes, who, in a comedy intitled *The Acharnians*, reproaches Pericles with this action. But Thucydides,

Athenians declared an eternal and irreconcilable hatred against Megara; and ordained that all Megarians should be put to death, that set foot in Athens; and that all the Athenian generals, when they took the usual oath, should swear expressly, that they would send a body of soldiers twice a-year, to lay waste the territories of the Megarenses.

The chief complaints were made by the Corinthian ambassador, who spoke with the utmost force and freedom. He represented to the Lacedæmonians, that as they themselves never swerved from the most inviolable integrity, either in public or private transactions, they, for that very reason, were less suspicious of the probity of others; and that their own moderation prevented their discovering the ambition of their enemies: that instead of flying, with instant activity, to meet dangers and calamities, they never attempted to remedy them, till they were quite crushed by them: that by their indolence and supineness, they had given the Athenians an opportunity of attaining, by insensible degrees, their present height of grandeur and power: that it was quite different with regard to the Athenians: “that this active, vigilant, and indefatigable
“people were never at rest themselves, nor would suffer any
“other nation to be so. Employed,” says he, “wholly in their
“projects, they form only such as are of the greatest and most
“intrepid nature; their deliberations are speedy, and their
“executions the same. One enterprise serves only as a step
“to a second. Whether they are successful or unfortunate,
“they turn every thing to their advantage; and never stop
“in their career, or are discouraged. But you, who are oppressed by such formidable enemies, are lulled asleep in a
“fatal tranquillity; and do not reflect, that a man who desires to live calm and easy, must not only forbear injuring
“others, but also not let any ill be done to himself; and
“that justice consists, not only in forbearing to commit evil
“ourselves, but in avenging that done to us by others. Shall
“I be so free as to say it? Your integrity is of too antique a
“cast for the present state of affairs. It is necessary for men,
“in politics as well as in all other things, to conform always
“to the times. When a people are at peace, they may follow their ancient maxims; but when they are involved in a
“variety of difficulties, they must try new expedients, and

Thucydides, a contemporary author; and who was very well acquainted with all the transactions of Athens, does not say a word of this affair; and he is much more worthy of belief than a poet who was a professed slanderer and satirist.

“set every engine at work to extricate themselves. It was by
 “these arts that the Athenians have increased their power so
 “much. Had you imitated their activity, they would not
 “have dispossessed us of Corcyra, and would not now be lay-
 “ing siege to Potidæa. Follow, at least, their example on
 “this occasion, by succouring the Potidæans and the rest of
 “your allies, as your duty obliges you; and do not force
 “your friends and neighbours, by forsaking them, to have
 “recourse, out of despair, to other powers.”

The Athenian ambassador, who was come to Sparta upon other affairs, and was in the assembly, did not think it advisable to let this speech go unanswered: but put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the still recent services that the republic by which he was sent had done to all Greece, which, he said, merited some regard; and that therefore it ought not to be envied, much less should endeavours be used to lessen its power: that the Athenians could not be charged with having usurped an empire over Greece; since it was merely at the entreaty of their allies, and in some measure with the consent of Sparta, that they had been forced to take the abandoned helm: that those who murmured, did it without grounds; and only from the aversion which mankind in general have to dependence and subjection, though of the gentlest and most equitable kind: that he exhorted them to employ a sufficient time in deliberating, before they came to a resolution; and not involve themselves and all Greece in a war, which would necessarily be attended with the most fatal consequences: that gentle methods may be found for terminating the differences of the allies, without breaking at once into open violence: however, that the Athenians, in case of an invasion, were able to oppose force with force, and would prepare for a vigorous defence, after having invoked, against Sparta, the deities who take vengeance on those that forswear themselves, and who violate the faith of treaties.

The ambassadors being withdrawn, and the affair debated, the majority were for war. But before it passed into an act, Archidamus king of Sparta, setting himself above those prejudices which so strongly biased the rest, and directing his views to futurity, made a speech, in which he set forth the dreadful consequences of the war they were going to embark in; showed the strength of the Athenians; exhorted them first to try gentle methods, which they themselves had seemed to approve; but to make, in the mean time, the necessary preparations for carrying on so important an enterprise, and not to

be under any apprehensions, that their moderation and delays would be branded with the name of cowardice, since their past actions secured them from any suspicion of that kind.

But notwithstanding all these wise expostulations, a war was resolved. The people caused the allies to return into the assembly, and declared to them, that in their opinion the Athenians were the aggressors; but that it would be expedient first to assemble all who were in the alliance, in order that peace or war might be agreed upon unanimously. This decree of the Lacedæmonians was made the 14th year of the truce; and was not owing so much to the complaints of the allies, as to the jealousy of the Athenian power, which had already subjected a considerable part of Greece.

* Accordingly the allies were convened a second time. They all gave their votes, in their several turns, from the greatest city to the least, and war was resolved by a general consent. However, as they had not yet made any preparations, it was judged adviseable to begin them immediately; and while this was doing, in order to gain time, and observe the necessary formalities, to send ambassadors to Athens, to complain of the violation of the treaty.

The first who were sent thither, reviving an ancient complaint, required of the Athenians to expel out of their city the descendants of those who had profaned the temple of Minerva in the affair of † Cylon. As Pericles was of that family by the mother's side, the view of the Lacedæmonians, in their making this demand, was, either to procure his banishment, or lessen his authority. However, it was not complied with. The second ambassadors required, that the siege of Potidæa should be raised, and the liberty of Ægina restored, and above all, that the decree against the Megarians should be repealed; declaring that otherwise no accommodation could take place. In fine, a third ambassador came, who took no notice of any of these particulars, but only said, that the Lacedæmonians were for peace; but that this could never be, except the Athenians should cease to infringe the liberties of Greece.

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 77—84, et 93.

† This Cylon seized on the citadel of Athens above 100 years before. Those who followed him, being besieged in it, and reduced to extreme famine, fled for shelter to the temple of Minerva; where they afterwards were taken out by force, and cut to pieces. Those who advised this murder were declared guilty of impiety and sacrilege, and as such banished. However, they were recalled some time after.

SECTION XIV.

TROUBLES EXCITED AGAINST PERICLES, &c. &c.

PERICLES opposed all these demands with great * vigour, and especially that relating to the Megarians. He had great credit in Athens, and at the same time had many enemies. Not daring to attack him at first in person, they cited his most intimate friends, and those for whom he had the greatest esteem, as Phidias, Aspasia, and Anaxagoras, before the people, and their design in this was, to sound how the people stood affected towards Pericles himself.

Phidias was accused of having embezzled considerable sums in the casting the statue of Minerva, which was his masterpiece. The prosecution having been carried on with the usual forms, before the assembly of the people, not a single proof of Phidias's pretended embezzlement appeared: for the artist, from beginning that statue, had, by Pericles's advice, contrived the workmanship of the gold in such a manner, that all of it might be taken off and weighed; which accordingly Pericles bid the informers do in presence of all the spectators. But Phidias had witnesses against him, the truth of whose evidence he could neither dispute nor silence; these were the fame and beauty of his works, the ever-existing causes of the envy which attacked him. The circumstance which they could least forgive in him was, his having represented to the life, in the battle of the Amazons, engraved on the shield of the goddess, his own person, and that of Pericles†: and, by an imperceptible art, he had so blended and incorporated these figures with the whole work, that it was impossible to erase them, without disfiguring and taking to pieces the whole statue. Phidias was therefore dragged to prison, where he came to his end, either by the common course of nature, or by poison. Other authors say, that he was only banished, and that after his exile he made the famous statue of Jupiter at Olympia. It is not possible to excuse, in any manner, the ingratitude of the Athenians, in thus making a prison or death the reward of a masterpiece of art; nor their excessive rigour, in punishing, as a capital crime, an action that appears innocent in itself; or which, to make the worst of it, was a vanity very pardonable in so great an artist.

Aspasia, a native of Miletus in Asia, had settled in Athens, where she was become very famous, not so much for the charms

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 168, 169.

† Aristot. in tractat. de mund. p. 613.
of

of her person, as for her vivacity and solidity of wit, and her great knowledge. All the illustrious men in the city thought it an honour to frequent her house. * Socrates himself used to visit her constantly, and was not ashamed to pass for her pupil, and to own that he had learned rhetoric from her. Pericles declared also, that he was obliged to Aspasia for his eloquence, which so greatly distinguished him in Athens; and that it was from her conversation he had imbibed the principles of the art of policy, for she was exceedingly well versed in the maxims of government. Their intimacy was owing to still stronger motives. Pericles did not love his wife; he resigned her very freely to another man, and supplied her place with Aspasia, whom he loved passionately, though her reputation was more than suspicious. Aspasia was therefore accused of impiety and dissolute conduct; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Pericles saved her, by his intreaties, and by the compassion he had raised in the judges, by shedding abundance of tears whilst her cause was pleading, a behaviour little consistent with the dignity of his character, and the rank of supreme head of the most powerful state of Greece.

A decree had passed, by which informations were ordered to be taken out against all such † persons as denied what was ascribed to the ministry of the gods; or those philosophers and others who taught preternatural things, and the motions of the heavens, doctrines on this occasion considered injurious to the established religion. The scope and aim of this decree was, to make Pericles suspected with regard to these matters, because Anaxagoras had been his master. This philosopher taught, that one only intelligence had modified the chaos, and disposed the universe in the beautiful order in which we now see it; which tended directly to depreciate the gods of the pagan system. Pericles, thinking it would be impossible for him to save his life, sent him out of the city to a place of safety.

The enemies of Pericles seeing that the people approved and received with pleasure all these accusations, impeached that great man himself, and charged him with embezzling the public monies during his administration. A decree was made, by which Pericles was obliged to give in immediately his ac-

* Plut. in Menex. p. 235.

† *Τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας, ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρτίων διδάσκοντας.* Anaxagoras teaching, that the divine intelligence alone gave a regular motion to all the parts of nature, and presided in the government of the universe, destroyed, by that system, the plurality of gods, their powers, and all the peculiar functions which were ascribed to them.

counts; was to be tried for oppression and rapine; and the cause to be adjudged by 1500 judges. Pericles had no real cause of fear, because in the administration of the public affairs his conduct had always been irreproachable, especially on the side of interest: he could not however but be under some apprehensions from the ill-will of the people, when he considered their great levity and inconstancy. One day when Alcibiades, then very young, went to visit Pericles, he was told that he was not to be spoke with, because of some affairs of great consequence in which he was then engaged. Alcibiades inquiring what these mighty affairs were, was answered, that Pericles was preparing to give in his accounts. "He ought rather," says Alcibiades, "not give them in;" and indeed this was what Pericles at last resolved. To allay the storm, he made a resolution to oppose the inclination the people discovered for the Peloponnesian war no longer, preparations for which had been long carrying on, firmly persuaded that this would soon silence all complaints against him; that envy would yield to a more powerful motive; and that the citizens, when in such imminent danger, would not fail of throwing themselves into his arms, and submit implicitly to his conduct, from his great power and exalted reputation.

* This is what some historians have related; and the comic poets, in the life-time, and under the eye, as it were, of Pericles, spread such a report in public, to sully, if possible, his reputation and merit, which drew upon him the envy and enmity of many. Plutarch, on this occasion, makes a reflection which may be of great service, not only to those in the administration of public affairs, but to all sorts of persons, as well as of advantage in the ordinary commerce of life. He thinks it strange, when actions are good in themselves, and manifestly laudable in all respects, that men, purely to discredit illustrious personages, should pretend to dive into their hearts; and from a spirit of the vilest and most abject malice, should ascribe such views and intentions to them, as they possibly never so much as imagined. He, on the contrary, wishes, when the motive is obscure, and the same action may be considered in different lights, that men would always view it in the most favourable, and incline to judge candidly of it. He applies this maxim to the reports which had been spread concerning Pericles, as the fomentor of the Peloponnesian war, merely for private views of interest; whereas, the whole tenor of his past conduct ought

to have convinced every body, that it was wholly from reasons of state, and for the good of the public, that he at last acquiesced in an opinion, which he had hitherto thought it incumbent on him to oppose.

* Whilst this affair was carrying on at Athens, the Lacedæmonians sent several embassies thither, one after another, to make the various demands above mentioned. At last the affair was debated in the assembly of the people, and it was resolved they should first deliberate upon all the articles, before they gave a positive answer. Opinions, as is usual in these cases, were divided; and some were for abolishing the decree enacted against Megara, which seemed the chief obstacle to the peace.

Pericles spoke on this occasion with the utmost force of eloquence, which his view to the public welfare, and the honour of his country, rendered more vehement and triumphant than it had ever appeared before. He showed, in the first place, that the decree relating to Megara, on which the greatest stress was laid, was not of so little consequence as they imagined: that the demand made by the Lacedæmonians on that head, was merely to found the disposition of the Athenians, and to try whether it would be possible to frighten them out of their design; that should they recede on this occasion, it would betray fear and weakness: that the affair was of no less importance than the giving up to the Lacedæmonians the empire which the Athenians had possessed during so many years, by their courage and resolution: that should the Athenians submit on this occasion, the Lacedæmonians would immediately prescribe new laws to them, as to a people seized with dread; whereas, if they made a vigorous resistance, their opponents would be obliged to treat them, at least, on the foot of equals: that with regard to the present matters in dispute, arbiters might be chosen, in order to adjust them in an amicable way; but that it did not become the Lacedæmonians to command the Athenians, in a magisterial way, to quit Potidæa, to free Ægina, and to revoke the decree relating to Megara: that such imperious behaviour was directly contrary to the treaty, which declared in express terms, "that should any disputes arise among the allies, they should be decided by pacific methods, and without any party's being obliged to give up any part of what they possessed:" that the surest way to prevent a government from being eternally contesting about its

* Thucyd. l. i. p. 93—99. Diod. l. xii. p. 95—97.

possessions, is to take up arms, and dispute its rights sword in hand: that the Athenians had just reason to believe they would gain their cause this way; and to give them a stronger idea of this truth, he set before them in the most pompous light the present state of Athens, giving a very particular account of its treasures, revenues, fleets, land as well as sea-forces, and those of its allies; contrasting these several things with the poverty of the Lacedæmonians, who, he said, had no money, which is the sinew of war, not to mention the poor condition of their navy, on which they most depended. * And indeed it appeared by the treasury, that the Athenians had brought from Delos to their city 9600 talents, which amounted to about L.1,200,000 sterling. The annual contributions of the allies amounted to 460 talents, that is, to near 1,400,000 French livres. In cases of necessity, the Athenians would find infinite resources from the ornaments of the temples, since those of the statue of Minerva only amounted to 50 talents of gold, that is, 1,500,000 French livres, which might be taken from the statue without spoiling it in any manner, and be afterwards fixed on again in more auspicious times. With regard to the land-forces, they amounted to very near 30,000 men, and the fleet consisted of 300 galleys. Above all, he advised them not to venture a battle in their own country against the Peloponnesians, whose troops were superior in number to theirs; nor to regard the laying waste of their lands, as they might easily be restored to their former condition; but to consider the loss of their men as highly important, because irretrievable; to make their whole policy consist in defending their city, and preserving the empire of the sea, which would certainly one day give them the superiority over their enemies. He laid down the plan for carrying on the war, not for a single campaign, but during the whole time it might last; and enumerated the evils they had to fear, if they deviated from that system. Pericles, after adding other considerations, taken from the genius or character, and the internal government of the two republics; the one uncertain and fluctuating in its deliberations, and rendered still slower in the execution, from its being obliged to wait for the consent of its allies; the other speedy, determinate, independent, and mistress of its resolutions, which is no indifferent circumstance with regard to the success of enterprises; Pericles, I say, concluded his speech, and gave his opinion as follows: “We have
“no more to do but to dismiss the ambassadors, and to give

* Diod. l. xii. p. 96, 97.

“ them this answer, that we permit those of Megara to trade
 “ with Athens, upon condition that the Lacedæmonians do
 “ not prohibit either us, or our allies, to trade with them.
 “ With regard to the cities of Greece, we shall leave those free
 “ who were so at the time of our agreement, provided they
 “ shall do the same with regard to those dependent on them.
 “ We do not refuse to submit the decision of our differences
 “ to arbitration, and will not commit the first hostilities : how-
 “ ever, in case of being attacked, we shall make a vigorous de-
 “ fence.”

The ambassadors were answered as Pericles had dictated. They returned home, and never came again to Athens; soon after which the Peloponnesian war broke out.

CHAPTER II.

TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN SICILY AND ITALY

AS the Peloponnesian war is a great event of considerable duration, before I enter upon the history of it, it may be proper to relate, in few words, the most considerable transactions which had happened in Græcia Major, to the time we now speak of, whether in Sicily or Italy.

SECTION I.

THE CARTHAGINIANS DEFEATED IN SICILY.—OF GELON AND HIS TWO BROTHERS.

I. GELON.

WE have seen that Xerxes*, whose project tended to no less than the total extirpation of the Greeks, had prevailed with the Carthaginians to make war against the people of Sicily. They landed in it an army of above 300,000 men, and sent thither a fleet of 2000 ships, and upwards of 3000 small vessels for the baggage, &c. Hamilcar, the ablest of the Carthaginian generals at that time, was charged with this expedition. However, the success was not answerable to these mighty preparations; the Carthaginians were entirely defeated by Gelon, who at that time had the chief authority in Syracuse.

† This Gelon was born in a city of Sicily, situated on the

* A. M. 3520. Ant. J. C. 484. Diod. l. xi. p. 1, et 16—22.

† Her. l. vii. c. 153—167.

southern coast between Agrigentum and Camarina, called Gela, whence perhaps he received his name. He had signalized himself very much in the wars which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, carried on against the neighbouring powers, most of whom he subdued, and was very near taking Syracuse. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, upon pretence of defending the rights and possession of the tyrant's children, took up arms against his own citizens, and having overcome them in a battle, possessed himself of the government in his own name. Some time after, he made himself master also of Syracuse, by the assistance of some exiles, whom he had caused to return into it, and who had engaged the populace to open the gates of that city to him. He then gave Gela to Hiero his brother, and applied himself wholly in extending the limits of the territory of Syracuse, and soon rendered himself very powerful. We may form a judgment of this from the army which he offered the Grecian ambassadors*, who came to desire his aid against the king of Persia; and by his demand of being appointed generalissimo of all their forces, which however they refused. The fear he was in at that time of being soon invaded by the Carthaginians was the chief occasion of his not succouring the Greeks. He was extremely political in his conduct; and when news was brought him of Xerxes' having crossed the Hellespont, he sent a trusty person with rich presents, with orders for him to wait the issue of the first battle, and in case Xerxes should be victorious, to pay homage to him in his name, otherwise to bring back the money. I now return to the Carthaginians.

They were landed in Sicily at the earnest solicitation of Terillus, formerly tyrant of Himera, but dethroned by Theron, another tyrant, who reigned at Agrigentum. The family of the latter was one of the most illustrious of all Greece, being descended in a direct line from Cadmus. He married into the family which at that time ruled at Syracuse, and which consisted of four brothers, Gelon, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus. He married his daughter to the first, and himself married the daughter of the third.

Hamilcar having landed at Panormus, began by laying siege to Himera. Gelon hastened with a great army to the succour of his father-in-law; when uniting, they defeated the Carthaginians. This was perhaps the most complete victory every gained.

* He promised to furnish 200 ships and 30,000 men.

The battle was fought the same day with that of Thermopylæ*, the circumstances of which I have related in the history of the Carthaginians†. One remarkable circumstance in the conditions of the peace which Gelon prescribed the conquered, was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to the god Saturn; which shows, at the same time, the cruelty of the Carthaginians, and the piety of Gelon.

The spoils won on this occasion were of immense value. Gelon allotted the greatest part of them for the ornament of the temples in Syracuse. They also took an incredible number of prisoners. These he shared, with the utmost equity, with his allies, who employed them, after putting irons on their feet, in cultivating their lands, and in building magnificent edifices, as well for the ornament as the utility of the cities. Several of the citizens of Agrigentum had each 500 for his own share.

Gelon‡, after so glorious a victory, so far from growing more proud and haughty, behaved with greater affability and humanity than ever towards the citizens and his allies. Being returned from the campaign, he convened the assembly of the Syracusans, who were ordered to come armed into it. However, he himself came unarmed thither: declared to the assembly every step of his conduct; the uses to which he had applied the several sums with which he had been intrusted, and in what manner he had employed his authority; adding, that if they had any complaints to make against him, his person and life were at their disposal. All the people, struck with so unexpected a speech, and still more with the unusual confidence he reposed in them, answered by acclamations of joy, praise, and gratitude; and immediately, with one consent, invested him with the supreme authority, and the title of king. § And to preserve to latest posterity the remembrance of Gelon's memorable action, who had come into the assembly, and put his life into the hands of the Syracusans, they erected a statue in honour of him, wherein he was represented in the ordinary habit of a citizen, ungirded, and unarmed. This statue met af-

* Herodotus says, that this battle was fought on the same day with that of Salamin, which does not appear so probable. For the Greeks, informed of Gelon's successes, intreated him to succour them against Xerxes, which they would not have done after the battle of Salamin, that exalted their courage so much, that, after this battle, they imagined themselves strong enough to resist their enemies, and to put an end to the war, to their own advantage, without the assistance of any other power.

† Vol. I. Plut. in Apophth. p. 175. ‡ A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479.

§ Plut. in Timol. p. 247. Ælian. l. xiii. c. 37.

terwards with a very singular fate, and worthy of the motives which had occasioned its setting up. Timoleon, above 130 years after, having restored the Syracusans to their liberty, thought it adviseable, in order to erase from it all traces of tyrannical government, and at the same time to assist the wants of the people, to sell publicly all the statues of those princes and tyrants who had governed it till that time. But, first, he brought them to a trial, as so many criminals; hearing the depositions and witnesses upon each of them. They all were condemned unanimously, the statue of Gelon only excepted, which found an eloquent advocate and defender, in the warm and sincere gratitude which the citizens retained for that great man, whose virtue they revered as if he had been still alive.

The Syracusans had no cause to repent their having intrusted Gelon with unlimited power and authority. This did not add to his known zeal for their interests, but only enabled him to do them more important services: * for, by a change till then unheard of, and of which Tacitus † found no example, except in Vespasian, he was the first man whom the sovereignty made the better man. He made upwards of 10,000 foreigners, who had served under him, denizens. His views were, to people the capital, to increase the power of the state, to reward the services of his brave and faithful soldiers, and to attach them more strongly to Syracuse, from the sense of the advantageous settlement they had obtained in being incorporated with the citizens.

‡ He was particularly famous for his inviolable sincerity, truth, and fidelity to his engagements; a quality very essential to a prince, the only one capable of gaining him the love and confidence of his subjects and of foreigners, and which therefore ought to be considered as the basis of all just policy and good government. Having occasion for money to carry on an expedition he meditated (this, very probably, was before he had triumphed over the Carthaginians), he addressed the people, in order to obtain a contribution from them; but finding the Syracusans unwilling to be at that expence, he told them, that he asked nothing but a loan, and that he would engage to repay it as soon as the war should be over. The money was advanced, and repaid punctually at the promised time. How happy is that government where such justice and

* Diod. l. xi. p. 55.

† Solus omnium ante se principum in melius mutatus est. Hist. l. i. c. 50.

‡ Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

equity are exercised; and how mistaken are those ministers and princes who violate them in the least!

* One of the chief objects of his attention, and in which his successor imitated him, was to make the cultivation of the lands be considered as an honourable employment. It is well known how fruitful Sicily was in corn; and the immense revenues which might be produced from so rich a soil when industriously cultivated. He animated the husbandman by his presence, and delighted sometimes in appearing at their head, in the same manner as on other occasions he had marched at the head of armies. His intention, says Plutarch, was not merely to make the country rich and fruitful, but also to exercise his subjects, to accustom and inure them to toils, and by these means to preserve them from a thousand disorders, which inevitably follow a soft and indolent life. There are few maxims, in point of policy, on which the ancients have insisted more strongly, than on that relating to the cultivation of their lands; a manifest proof of their great wisdom, and the profound knowledge they had of what constitutes the strength and solid happiness of a state. † Xenophon, in a dialogue, the subject of which is government, entitled *Hiero*, shows the great advantage it would be to a state, were the king studious to reward those who should excel in husbandry, and whatever relates to the cultivation of lands. He says the same of war, of trade, and of all the arts; on which occasion, if honours were paid to all those who should distinguish themselves in them, it would give universal life and motion; would excite a noble and laudable emulation among the citizens, and give rise to a thousand inventions for the improvement of those arts.

It does not appear that Gelon had been educated in the same manner as the children of the rich among the Greeks, who were taught music and the art of playing on instruments very carefully. Possibly this was because of his mean birth, or rather was owing to the little value he set on those kind of exercises. ‡ One day at an entertainment, when, according to the usual custom, a lyre was presented to each of the guests; when it was Gelon's turn, instead of touching the instrument as they had done, he caused his horse to be brought, mounted him with wonderful agility and grace, and showed that he had learned a nobler exercise than playing on the lyre.

§ From the defeat of the Carthaginians in Sicily, the seve-

* Plut. in *Apophth.* p. 175.

† *Ibid.*

‡ Plut. in *Apophth.* p. 916, 917.

§ *Diod. l. xi. p. 29, 30.*

ral cities of it enjoyed a profound peace, and Syracuse was particularly happy in its tranquillity, under the auspicious government of Gelon. He was not born in Syracuse, and yet all the inhabitants of that city, though so extremely jealous of their liberty, had forced him in a manner to be their king. Though an alien, the supreme power went in search of him, not courted with any art or inducement but those of merit. Gelon was thoroughly acquainted with all the duties of the regal office, as well as its great weight; and he accepted it with no other view but the good of his people. He thought himself only king for the defence of the state, to preserve the good order of society, to protect innocence and justice, and to exhibit to all his subjects, in his simple, modest, active, and regular life, a pattern of every civil virtue. The whole of royalty that he assumed was the toils and cares of it, a zeal for the public welfare, and the sweet satisfaction which results from making millions happy by his cares: in a word, he considered the sovereignty as an obligation, and a mean to procure the felicity of a greater number of men. He banished from it pomp, ostentation, licentiousness, and impunity for crimes. He did not affect the appearance of reigning, but contented himself with making the laws reign. He never made his inferiors feel that he was their master, but only inculcated to them that both himself and they ought to submit to reason and justice. To induce their obedience, he employed no other methods but persuasion and a good example, which are the weapons of virtue, and alone produce a sincere and uninterrupted obedience.

A revered old age, a name highly dear to all his subjects, a reputation equally diffused within and without his kingdoms; these were the fruits of that wisdom which he retained on the throne to the last gasp. His reign was short, and only just showed him in a manner to Sicily, to exhibit in his person an example of a great, good, and true king. He left the world, after having reigned only seven years, to the infinite regret of all his subjects. Every family imagined itself deprived of its best friend, its protector, and father. The people erected, in the place where his wife Demarata had been buried, a splendid mausolæum, surrounded with nine towers of a surprising height and magnificence; and decreed those honours to him, which were then paid to the demi-gods or heroes. The Carthaginians afterwards demolished the mausolæum, and Agathocles the towers: but, says the historian, neither violence, envy, nor time, which destroys all grosser things, could destroy the glory of

of his name, or abolish the memory of his exalted virtues and noble actions, which love and gratitude had engraved in the hearts of the Sicilians.

II. HIERO. After Gelon's death, the sceptre continued near 12 years in his family *: he was succeeded by Hiero, his eldest brother.

It will be necessary for us, in order to reconcile the authors who have writ on this prince, some of whom declare him to have been a good king, and others a detestable tyrant; it will be necessary, I say, to distinguish the periods. It is very probable, that Hiero, dazzled, in the beginning of his reign, by the glitter of sovereign power, and corrupted by the flattery of his courtiers, studiously endeavoured to deviate from that path which his predecessor had pointed out to him, and in which he had found himself so happy. † This young prince was avaricious, headstrong, unjust, and studious of nothing but the gratification of his passions, without ever endeavouring to acquire the esteem and affection of the people; who, on the other side, had the utmost aversion for a prince, whom they looked upon as a tyrant over them, rather than as a king; and nothing but the veneration they had for Gelon's memory, prevented from breaking out.

‡ Some time after he had ascended the throne, he had violent suspicions of Polyzelus his brother, whose great credit among the citizens made him fear that he had a design to depose him. However, in order to rid himself without noise of an enemy whom he fancied very dangerous, he resolved to put him at the head of some forces he was going to send to the succour of the Sibaritæ against the Crotonienfes, hoping that he would perish in the expedition. His brother's refusal to accept this command made him the more violent against him. Theron, who had married Polyzelus's daughter, joined with his father-in-law. This gave rise to great differences of long duration between the kings of Syracuse and Agrigentum; however, they at last were reconciled by the wise mediation of Simonides § the poet; and to make their reconciliation lasting, they cemented it by a new alliance, Hiero marrying Theron's sister; after which the two kings always lived in good intelligence with each other.

|| At first, an infirm state of health, which was increased by repeated illnesses, gave Hiero an opportunity of thinking seri-

* A. M. 3532. Ant. J. C. 472.

† Diod. l. xxi. p. 51.

§ Schol. in Pind.

‡ Ibid. l. xi. p. 36.

|| Ælian. l. iv. c. 15.

ously; after which he resolved to send for men of learning, who might converse agreeably with him, and furnish him with useful instructions. The most famous poets of the age came to his court, as Simonides, Pindar, Bacchylides, and Epicharmus; and it is affirmed that their delightful conversation did not a little contribute to soften the cruel and savage disposition of Hiero.

* Plutarch relates a noble saying of his, which shows an excellent disposition in a prince. He declared, that his palace and his ears should be always open to every man who would tell him the truth, and that without disguise or reserve.

The poets above mentioned excelled, not only in poetry, but were also possessed of a great fund of learning, and considered and consulted as the sages of their times. This is what Cicero † says particularly of Simonides. He had a great ascendant over the king; and the only use he made of it was, to incline him to virtue.

‡ They often used to converse on philosophical subjects. I observed on another occasion, that Hiero, in one of these conversations, asked Simonides his opinion with regard to the nature and attributes of the Deity. The latter desired one day's time to consider of it; the next day he asked two, and went on increasing in the same proportion. The prince pressing him to give his reasons for these delays, he confessed, that the subject was above his comprehension, and that the more he reflected, the more obscure it appeared to him.

Xenophon has left us an excellent treatise on the art of governing well, entitled Hiero, and wrote by way of dialogue between this prince and Simonides. Hiero undertakes to prove to the poet, that tyrants and kings are not so happy as is generally imagined. Among the great number of proofs alleged by him, he insists chiefly on their vast unhappiness in being deprived of the greatest comfort and blessing in this life, *viz.* the enjoyment of a true friend, to whose bosom they may safely confide their secrets and afflictions; who may share with them in their joy and sorrow; in a word, a second self, who may form but one heart, one soul with them. Simonides, on the other side, lays down admirable maxims with respect to the well-governing of a kingdom. He represents to him that a king is not so for himself, but for others: that his grandeur

* Plut. in. Apophth. p. 175.

† Simonides, non poeta solum suavis, verum etiam ceteroqui doctus, sapiensque traditur. Lib. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 60.

‡ Cic. l. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 60.

consists, not in building magnificent palaces for his own residence, but in erecting temples, and fortifying and embellishing cities: that it is his glory, not that his people should fear, but be afraid for him: that a truly royal care is, not to enter the lists with the first comer at the Olympic games (for the princes of that age were passionately fond of them, and especially * Hiero), but to contend with the neighbouring kings, who should succeed best in diffusing wealth and abundance throughout his dominions, and in endeavouring to form the felicity of his people.

Nevertheless, another poet, Pindar, praises Hiero for the victory he had won in the horse-race. "This prince," says he, in his ode, "who governs with equity the inhabitants of opulent Sicily, has gathered the fairest flower in the garden of virtue. He takes a noble delight in the most exquisite performances of poetry and music. He loves melodious airs, such as it is customary for us to play at the banquets given us by our dearest friends. Rouse then thyself, take thy lyre, and raise it to the Doric pitch. If thou feelest thyself animated by a glorious fire in favour of † Písa and Phœrenice; if they have waked the sweetest transports in thy breast, when that generous courser, without being quickened by the spur, flew along the banks of the Alpheus, and carried his royal rider to glorious victory: O sing the king of Syracuse, the ornament of the Olympic course!"

The whole ode, translated by the late Mr. Massieu, is in the sixth volume of the *Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions of Belles Lettres*, from which I have made the small extract above. I was very glad to give the reader some idea of Pindar, by this little specimen.

The next ode to this was composed in honour of Theron king of Agrigentum, victorious in the chariot-race. The diction of it is so sublime, the thoughts so noble, and the moral so pure, that many look upon it as Pindar's masterpiece.

I cannot say how far we may depend on the rest of the praises which Pindar gives Hiero, for poets are not always very sincere in the eulogiums they bestow on princes: however, it

* It is said that Themistocles, seeing him arrive at the Olympic games with a splendid equipage, would have had him forbid them, because he had not succoured the Greeks against the common enemy, any more than Gelon his brother; which motion did honour to the Athenian general. *Ælian*, l. ix. c. 5.

† Písa was the city near to which the Olympic games were solemnized; and Phœrenice the name of Hiero's courser, signifying the victor.

is certain that Hiero had made his court the resort to all persons of wit and sense; and that he had invited them to it by his affability and engaging behaviour, and much more by his liberality, which is a great merit in a king.

We cannot bestow on Hiero's court the eulogium which Horace* gives the house of Mæcenas, in which a character prevailed rarely found among scholars, and nevertheless worth all their erudition. This amiable house, says Horace, was an utter stranger to the mean and grovelling sentiments of envy and jealousy; and men saw, in those who shared in the master's favour, a superior merit or credit, without taking the least umbrage at it. † But it was far otherwise in the court of Hiero, or of Theron. It is said that Simonides, and Bacchylides his nephew, employed all kinds of criticism, to lessen the esteem which those princes had for Pindar's works. The latter, by way of reprisal, ridicules them very strongly in his ode to Theron, in comparing "them to ravens, who croak in "vain against the divine bird of Jove." But modesty was not the virtue which distinguished Pindar.

‡ Hiero, having drove the ancient inhabitants of Catana and Naxos from their country, settled a colony of 10,000 men there, half of whom were Syracusans, and the rest Peloponnesians. This prompted the inhabitants of those two cities to appoint, after his death, the same solemnities in his honour, as were bestowed on heroes or demi-gods, because they considered him as their founder.

§ He showed great favour to the children of Anaxilaus, formerly tyrant of Zancle, and a great friend to Gelon his brother. As they were arrived at years of maturity, he exhorted them to take the government into their own hands; after Micythus, their tutor, should have informed them of the perfect state of it, and how he himself had behaved in the administration. The latter, having assembled the nearest relations and most intimate friends of the young princes, gave, in their presence, so good an account of his guardianship, that the whole assembly, in perfect admiration, bestowed the highest encomiums on his prudence, integrity, and justice. Matters were carried so far, that the young princes were extremely urgent with

* ——— Non isto vivimus illic,

Quo tu rere, modo: domus hac nec purior ulla est,
Nec Magis his aliena malis. nil mi officit unquam,
Ditior hic, aut est quia doctior: est locus uni-
Cuique suus.

Hor. lib. i. sat. 9.

† Scholiast. Pind.

‡ Diod. l. xi. p. 37.

§ Ibid. p. 50.

him to preside in the administration, as he had hitherto done. However, the wise tutor preferring the sweets of ease to the splendor of authority, and persuaded, at the same time, that it would be for the interest of the state, if the young princes took the government into their own hands, resolved to retire from business. Hiero died, after having reigned eleven years.

III. THRASYBULUS. *He was succeeded by Thrasybulus his brother, who, by his evil conduct, contributed very much to the making him be regretted. Swelled with pride and a brutal haughtiness, he considered men as mere worms; vainly fancying that they were created for him to trample upon, and that he was of a quite different nature from them. He abandoned himself implicitly to the flattering counsels of the giddy young courtiers who surrounded him. He treated all his subjects with the utmost severity; banishing some, confiscating the possessions of others, and putting great numbers to death. So severe a slavery grew soon insupportable to the Syracusans, and therefore they implored the succour of the neighbouring cities, whose interest it was also to throw off the tyrant's yoke. Thrasybulus was besieged even in Syracuse, the sovereignty of part of which he had reserved to himself, viz. Acradina, and the island, which was very well fortified; but the third quarter of the city, called Tyche, was possessed by the enemy. After making a feeble resistance, and demanding to capitulate, he left the city, and withdrew into banishment among the Locrians. He had reigned but a year. In this manner the Syracusans recovered their liberty. They also delivered the rest of the cities of Sicily from tyrants; established a popular government in all places, and maintained that form themselves during 60 years, till the reign of Dionysius the tyrant, who again enslaved them.

† After Sicily had been delivered from the government of tyrants, and all the cities of it were restored to their liberty; as the country was extremely fruitful in itself, and the peace which all places enjoyed gave the inhabitants of this island an opportunity of cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks; the people grew very powerful, and amassed great riches. To perpetuate to latest posterity the remembrance of the happy day in which they had thrown off the yoke of slavery, by the banishment of Thrasybulus, it was decreed in the general

* Diod. l. xi. p. 51, 52.

† A. M. 3544. Ant. J. C. 460. Diod. l. xi. p. 55, &c.

assembly of the nation, that a colossal statue should be set up to Jupiter the Deliverer; that on the anniversary of this day, a festival should be solemnized, by way of thanksgiving, for the restoration of their liberty; and that there should be sacrificed in honour of the gods, 450 bulls, with which the people should be entertained as a common feast.

There nevertheless lay concealed in the minds of many, I know not what secret leaven of tyranny, which frequently disturbed the harmony of this peace, and occasioned several tumults and commotions in Sicily, the particulars of which I shall omit. *To prevent the evil consequences of them, the Syracusans established the Petalism, which differed very little from the Athenian Ostracism, and was so called from the Greek *πέταλον*, signifying a leaf, because the votes were then given on an olive leaf. This judgment was pronounced against such citizens whose great power made the people apprehensive that they aspired at the tyranny, and it banished them for ten years; however, it did not long continue in force, and was soon abolished; because the dread of falling under its censure, having prompted the most virtuous men to retire, and renounce the government, the chief employments were now filled by such citizens only as had the least merit.

DEUCETIUS†, according to Diodorus, was chief over the people who were properly called Sicilians. Having united them all, the inhabitants of Hybla excepted, into one body, he became very powerful, and formed several great enterprises. It was he who built the city Palica, near the temple of the gods called Palici. This city was very famous on account of some wonders which are related of it; and still more from the sacred nature of the oaths which were then taken, the violation whereof was said to be always followed by a sudden and exemplary punishment. This was a secure asylum for all persons who were oppressed by superior power; and especially for slaves who were unjustly abused, or too cruelly treated by their masters. They continued in safety in this temple, till certain arbiters and mediators had made their peace; and there was not a single instance of a master's having ever forfeited the promise he had made to pardon his slave; so famous were the gods who presided over this temple, for the severe vengeance they took on those who violated their oaths.

This Deucetius, after having been successful on a great many occasions, and gained several victories, particularly over the

* Diod. l. xi. p. 65.

† Ibid. p. 67—70.

Syracusans, saw his fortune change on a sudden by the loss of a battle, and was abandoned by the greatest part of his forces. In the consternation and dispondency into which so general and sudden a desertion threw him, he formed such a resolution as despair only could suggest. He withdrew in the night to Syracuse, advanced as far as the great square of the city, and there, falling prostrate at the foot of the altar, he abandoned his life and dominions to the mercy of the Syracusans, that is, to his professed enemies. The singularity of this spectacle drew great numbers of people to it. The magistrates immediately convened the people, and debated on the affair. They first heard the orators, whose business was generally to address the people by their speeches; and these animated them prodigiously against Deucetius, as a public enemy whom providence seemed to throw into their way, to revenge and punish, by his death, all the injuries he had done the republic. A speech, in this cast, struck all the virtuous part of the assembly with horror. The most ancient and wisest of the senators represented, "That they were not to consider what punishment Deucetius deserved, but how it behoved the Syracusans to behave on that occasion; that they ought not to look upon him any longer as an enemy, but as a suppliant, a character by which his person was become sacred and inviolable. That there was a goddess, Nemesis, who took vengeance of crimes, especially of cruelty and impiety, and who doubtless would not suffer that to go unpunished: That besides the baseness and inhumanity there is in insulting the unfortunate, and in crushing those who are already under one's foot; it was worthy the grandeur and goodness natural to the Syracusans, to exert their clemency even to those who least deserved it." All the people came into this opinion, and, with one consent, spared Deucetius's life. He was ordered to reside in Corinth, the metropolis and foundress of Syracuse; and the Syracusans engaged to furnish Deucetius with all things necessary for his subsisting honourably there. What reader, who compares these two different opinions, does not perceive which of them was the noblest and most generous?

SECTION II.

FAMOUS PERSONS AND CITIES IN GRÆCIA MAJOR, &c.

I. PYTHAGORAS.

IN treating of what relates to Græcia Major in Italy, I must not omit Pythagoras, who was the glory of it. He was
born

born in Samos*. After having travelled into a great many regions, and enriched his mind with the most excellent learning of every kind, he returned to his native country, but did not make a long stay in it, because of the tyrannical government Polycrates had established in it, who however had the highest regard for him, and showed him all the esteem due to his rare merit. But the study of the sciences, and particularly of philosophy, is scarce compatible with slavery, though of the mildest and most honourable kind. He therefore went into Italy, and resided usually either at Croton, Metapontum, Heraclea, or Tarentum. Servius Tullius†, or Tarquinius Superbus, reigned in Rome at that time; which absolutely refutes the opinion of those who imagined that Numa Pompilius, the second king of the Romans, who lived upwards of 100 years before, had been Pythagoras's disciple; an opinion that very probably was grounded on the resemblance of their manners, disposition, and principles.

‡ The whole country soon felt very happy effects from the presence of this excellent philosopher. An inclination for study, and a love of wisdom, diffused themselves almost universally in a very short time. Multitudes flocked from all the neighbouring cities to get a sight of Pythagoras, to hear him, and to improve by his salutary counsels. The several princes of the country took a pleasure in inviting him to their courts, which they thought honoured by his presence; and all were delighted with his conversation, and glad to learn from him the art of governing nations with wisdom. His school became the most famous that had ever been till that age. He had no less than 4 or 500 disciples. Before he admitted them in that quality, they were probationers five years, during which time he obliged them to keep the strictest silence, thinking it proper for them to be instructed, before they should attempt to speak. I shall take notice of his tenets and sentiments, when I come to speak of the various sects of philosophers; it was well known, that the transmigration of souls was one of the chief of them. His disciples had the greatest reverence for every word he uttered; and, if he did but barely aver a thing, he was immediately believed without its being once examined; and to affirm the truth of any thing, they used to express

* A. M. 3480. Ant. J. C. 524. Diog. Laert. in vit. Pythag.

† Liv. l. i. n. 18.

‡ Pythagoras, cum in Italiam venisset, exornavit eam Græciam, quæ magna dicta est, et privatim et publicè, præstantissimis et institutis, et artibus. Cic. Tuscul. Quæst. l. v. n. 10.

themselves in this manner, “* The master said it.” However, the disciples carried their deference and docility too far, in thus waving all inquiry, and in sacrificing implicitly their reason and understanding; a sacrifice that ought to be made only to the divine authority, which is infinitely superior to our reason and all our knowledge; and which, consequently, is authorized to prescribe laws to us, and dictate absolute obedience.

The school of Pythagoras bred a great number of illustrious disciples, who did infinite honour to their master, as wise legislators, great politicians, persons skilled in all the sciences, and capable of governing states, and being the ministers of the greatest princes †. A long time after his death, that part of Italy which he had cultivated and improved by his instructions, was still considered as the nursery and seat of men skilled in all kinds of literature, and maintained that glorious character for several ages. ‡ The Romans certainly entertained a high opinion of Pythagoras’s virtue and merit, since the oracle of Delphos having commanded that people, during the war of the Samnites, to erect two statues in the most conspicuous part of Rome, the one to the wisest, and the other to the most valiant among the Greeks, they accordingly set up two in the “Comitium,” representing Pythagoras and Themistocles. Historians are not exact with respect to the time and place of Pythagoras’s death.

II. CROTON. SYBARIS. THURIUM. § Croton was founded by Myscellus, chief of the Achaïans, the third year of the 17th Olympiad. This Myscellus being come to Delphos to consult the oracle of Apollo, about the spot on which he should build his city, met Archias the Corinthian there, who was arrived upon the same account. The god gave him a favourable audience; and, after having determined them with regard to the place that would best suit their new settlements, he proposed different advantages to them; and left them, among other particulars, the choice of riches or health. The offer of riches struck Archias, but Myscellus desired health; and, if history is to be credited, Apollo performed his promise faithfully to both. Archias founded Syracuse, which soon became the most opulent city of Greece. || Myscellus laid the

* Αὐτὸς ἔφα.

† Pythagoras tenuit magnam illam Græciam cum honore, et disciplina, tum etiam auctoritate, multaue secula postea sic viguit Pythagoreorum nomen, ut nulli alii docti viderentur. Tusc. Quæst. l. i. n. 38.

‡ Plin. l. xxiv. c. 6.

§ A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strab. l. vi. p. 262, et 269. Dionys. Halicarn. Antiq. Rom. l. ii. p. 121.

|| Κρότωνος υγιέσεσθαι.

foundation of Croton, which became so famous for the long life and innate strength of its inhabitants, that its name was used proverbially, to signify a very healthy spot, whose air was extremely pure. The people of it signalized themselves in a great number of victories in the Grecian games; and Strabo relates, that in the same Olympiad seven Crotonians were crowned in the Olympic games, and carried off all the prizes of the stadium.

* Sybaris was ten leagues (200 stadia) from Croton, and had also been founded by the Achæians, but before the other. This city became afterwards very powerful. Four neighbouring states, and 25 cities, were subject to it; so that it was, alone, able to arise an army of 300,000 men. The opulence of Sybaris was soon followed by luxury, and such a dissoluteness as is scarcely credible. The citizens employed themselves in nothing but banquets, games, shows, parties of pleasure and carousals. Public rewards and marks of distinction were bestowed on those who gave the most magnificent entertainments; and even to such cooks as were best skilled in the important art of making new discoveries in the dressing dishes, and inventing new refinements to tickle the palate. The Sybarites carried their delicacy and effeminacy to such a height, that they carefully removed from their city all such artificers whose work was noisy; and would not suffer any cocks in it, lest their shrill piercing crow should disturb their balmy slumbers.

† All these evils were heightened by dissension and discord, which at last proved their ruin. Five hundred of the wealthiest in the city, having been expelled by the faction of one Telys, fled to Croton. Telys demanded to have them surrendered to him; and, on the refusal of the Crotonians to deliver them up, prompted to this generous resolution by Pythagoras who then lived among them, war was declared. The Sybarites marched 300,000 men into the field, and the Crotonians only 100,000; but then they were headed by Milo, the famous champion, of whom we shall soon have occasion to speak, over whose shoulders a lion's skin was thrown, and himself armed with a club, like another Hercules. The latter gained a complete victory, and made a dreadful havoc of those who fled, so that very few escaped, and their city was depopulated. About threescore years after, some Thessalians came and settled in it; however, they did not long enjoy peace, being driven out by

* Strab. l. vi. p. 263. Athen. l. xii. p. 518—520.

† A. M. 3474. Ant. J. C. 530. Diocl. l. xii. p. 76—85.

the Crotonians. Being thus reduced to the most fatal extremity, they implored the succour of the Lacedæmonians and Athenians. The latter, moved to compassion at their deplorable condition, after causing proclamation to be made in Peloponnesus, that all who were willing to assist that colony were at liberty to do it, sent the Sybarites a fleet of ten ships, under the command of Lampon and Xenocrates.

* They built a city near the ancient Sybaris, and called it Thurium. Two men, greatly renowned for their learning, the one an orator, and the other an historian, settled in this colony. The first was Lysias, at that time but 15 years of age. He lived in Thurium till the ill fate which befel the Athenians in Sicily, and then went to Athens. The second was Herodotus. Though he was born in Halicarnassus, a city of Caria, he was, however, considered as a native of Thurium, because he settled there with that colony. I shall speak more largely of him hereafter.

Divisions soon broke out in the city, on occasion of the new inhabitants, whom the rest would exclude from all public employments and privileges. But as these were much more numerous, they repulsed all the ancient Sybarites, and got the sole possession of the city. Being supported by the alliance they made with the people of Croton, they soon grew vastly powerful; and having settled a popular form of government in their city, they divided the citizens into ten tribes, which they called by the names of the different nations whence they sprung.

III. CHARONDAS, the legislator. They now bent their whole thoughts to the strengthening of their government by wholesome laws, for which purpose they made choice of Charondas, who had been educated in Pythagoras's school, to digest and draw them up. I shall quote some of them in this place.

1. He excluded from the senate, and all public employments, all such as should marry a second wife, in case any children by their first wife were living; being persuaded, that any man who was so regardless of his children's interest, would be equally so of his country's, and be as worthless a magistrate as he had been a father.

2. He sentenced all false accusers to be carried through every part of the city, crowned with heath or broom, as the vilest of men; an ignominy which most of them were not able to sur-

* A M. 3560. Ant. J. C. 444. Dionys. Halicarn. in vit. Lys. p. 82. Strab. l. xiv. p. 656.

vive. The city thus delivered from those pests of society, was restored to its former tranquillity. And indeed, * from calumniators generally arise all feuds and contests, whether of a public or private nature; and yet, according to Tacitus's observation, they are too much tolerated in most governments.

3. He enacted a new kind of law against another species of pests, which in a state generally first occasions depravity of manners; by suffering all those to be prosecuted who should form a correspondence, or contract a friendship with wicked men, and by laying a heavy fine upon them.

4. He required all the children of the citizens to be educated in the Belles Lettres; the effect of which is to polish and civilize the minds of men, inspiring them with gentleness of manners, and inclining them to virtue; all which constitute the felicity of a state, and are equally necessary to citizens of all conditions. In this view he appointed salaries (paid by the state) for masters and preceptors; in order that learning, by being communicated *gratis*, might be acquired by all. He considered ignorance as the greatest of evils, and the source whence all vices flowed.

5. He made a law with respect to orphans, which appears sufficiently judicious, by intrusting the care of their education to their relations by the mother's side, as their lives would not be in danger from them; and the management of their estates to their paternal relations, it being the interest of these to make the greatest advantage of them, since they would inherit them, in case of the demise of their wards.

6. Instead of putting deserters to death, and those who quitted their ranks and fled in battle, he only sentenced them to make their appearance during three days, in the city, dressed in the habit of women, imagining, that the dread of so ignominious a punishment would produce the same effect as putting to death; and being, at the same time, desirous of giving such cowardly citizens an opportunity of atoning for their fault.

7. To prevent his laws from being too rashly or easily abrogated, he imposed a very severe and hazardous condition on all persons who should propose to alter or amend them in any manner. These were sentenced to appear in the public assembly with a halter about their necks; and, in case the alteration proposed did not pass, they were to be immediately strangled.

* Delatores, genus hominum publico exitio repertum, et pœnus quidem nunquam satis coercitum. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 30.

There were but three amendments ever proposed, and all of them admitted.

Charondas did not long survive his own laws. Returning one day from pursuing some thieves, and finding a tumult in the city, he came armed into the assembly, though he himself had prohibited this by an express law. A certain person objected to him in severe terms, that he violated his own laws; "I do not violate them," says he, "but thus seal them with my blood;" saying which, he plunged his sword into his bosom, and expired.

IV. ZALEUCUS, another lawgiver. * At the same time, there arose among the Locrians another famous legislator, Zaleucus by name, who, as well as Charondas, had been Pythagoras's disciple. There is now scarce any thing extant of his, except a kind of preamble to his laws, which gives a most advantageous idea of them. He requires, above all things, of the citizens, to believe and be firmly persuaded, that there are gods; and adds, that the bare casting up our eyes to the heavens, and contemplating their order and beauty, are sufficient to convince us, that it is impossible so wonderful a fabric could have been formed by mere chance or human power. As the natural consequence of this belief, he exhorts men to honour and revere the gods, as the authors of whatever is good and just among mortals; and to honour them, not merely by sacrifices and splendid gifts, but by a sage conduct, and by purity and innocence of manners; these being infinitely more grateful to the immortals, than all the sacrifices that can be offered.

After this religious exordium, in which he describes the Supreme Being, as the source whence all laws flow, as the chief authority which commands obedience to them, as the most powerful motive for our faithful observance of them, and as the perfect model to which mankind ought to conform; he descends to the particulars of those duties which men owe to one another; and lays down a precept which is very well adapted to preserve peace and unity in society, by enjoining the individuals of it not to make their hatred and dissensions perpetual, which would argue an unfociable and savage disposition, but to treat their enemies as men who would soon be their friends. This is carrying morality to as great a perfection as could be expected from heathens.

With regard to the duty of judges and magistrates, after re-

* Diod. l. xii. p. 79—85.

presenting to them, that, in pronouncing sentence, they ought never to suffer themselves to be biased by friendship, hatred, or any other passion; he only exhorts them not to behave with the least haughtiness or severity towards the parties engaged in law, since such are but too unhappy, in being obliged to undergo all the toils and fatigues inseparable from law-suits. The office indeed of judges, how laborious soever it may be, is far from giving them a right to use the contending parties with ill-nature; the very form and essence of their employment requiring them to behave with impartiality, and to do justice on all occasions; and when they distribute this even with mildness and humanity, it is only a debt they pay, and not a favour they grant.

To banish luxury from his republic, which he looked upon as the certain destruction of a government, he did not follow the practice established in some nations, where it is thought sufficient, for the restraining it, to punish, by pecuniary mulcts, such as infringe the laws made on that occasion, but he acted, says the historian, in a more artful and ingenious, and at the same time more effectual manner. He prohibited women from wearing rich and costly stuffs, embroidered robes, precious stones, ear-rings, necklaces, bracelets, gold rings, and such like ornaments; excepting none from this law but common prostitutes. He enacted a like law with regard to the men; excepting, in the same manner, from the observance of it, such only as were willing to pass for debauchees and infamous wretches. By these regulations he easily, and without violence, preserved the citizens from the least approaches to luxury and effeminacy*; for no person was so abandoned to all sense of honour, as to be willing to wear the badges of his shame, under the eye, as it were, of all the citizens; since this would make him the public laughing-stock, and reflect eternal infamy on his family.

V. MILO, the champion. We have seen him at the head of an army obtain a great victory. However, he was still more renowned for his athletic strength, than for his military bravery. He was surnamed Crotoniensis, from Croton the place of his birth. It was his daughter, whom, as was before related, Democedes the famous physician, and Milo's countryman, married, after he had fled from Darius's court to Greece, his native country.

* More inter veteres recepto, qui satis poenarum adversus impudicas in ipsa professione flagitii credebant. Tacit. *Annal.* l. ii. c. 85.

* Pausanias relates, that Milo, when but a child, was seven times victorious in one day at the Pythian games; that he won six victories, at wrestling, in the Olympic games; one of which was also gained in his childhood; and that challenging a seventh time, in Olympia, any person to wrestle with him, he could not engage for want of an opponent. He would hold a pomegranate in such a manner, that, without breaking it, he would grasp it so fast in his hand, that no force could possibly wrest it from him. He would stand so firm on a discus†, which had been oiled to make it the more slippery, that it was impossible to move him on these occasions. He would bind his head with a cord, after which holding his breath strongly, the veins of his head would swell so prodigiously as to break the rope. When Milo, fixing his elbow on his side, stretched forth his right hand quite open, with his fingers held close one to the other, his thumb excepted, which he raised, the utmost strength of man could not separate his little finger from the other three.

All this was only a vain and puerile ostentation of his strength. Chance, however, gave him an opportunity of making a much more laudable use of it‡. One day as he was attending the lectures of Pythagoras (for he was one of his most constant disciples), the pillar which supported the ceiling of the school in which the pupils were assembled, being shaken by some accident, Milo supported it by his single strength, gave the auditors time to get away, and afterwards escaped himself.

What is related of the voracious appetite of the *Athletæ* is almost incredible. § Milo's appetite was scarce satiated with twenty minæ (pounds) of meat, the same quantity of bread, and three "congiū ||" of wine every day. Athenæus relates, that this champion having run the whole length of the stadium, with a bull of four years old on his shoulders, he afterwards knocked him down with one stroke of his fist, and eat the whole beast that very day. I will take it for granted, that all the other particulars related of Milo are true; but is it probable, that one man could devour a whole ox in so short a time?

* We are told that Milo, when advanced to a very great age, seeing the rest of the champions wrestling, and gazing upon his own arms which once were so vigorous and robust, but

* Lib. vi. p. 369, 370.

† This discus was a kind of quoit, flat and round.

‡ Strab. l. vi. p. 263.

§ Athen. l. x. p. 412.

|| Thirty pounds, or fifteen quarts.

** Cic. de Senec. n. 27.

were then very much enfeebled by time, he burst into tears, and cried, "Alas! these are now dead."

* And yet he either forgot or concealed his weakness from himself; the strong persuasion he entertained of his own strength, and which he preserved to the last, proving fatal to him. Happening to meet, as he was travelling, an old oak, which had been opened by some wedges that were forced into it, he undertook to split it in two by his bare strength. But, after forcing out the wedges, his arms were caught in the trunk of the tree, by the violence with which it closed; so that being unable to disengage his hands, he was devoured by wolves.

† An author has judiciously observed, that this surprisingly robust champion, who prided himself so much in his bodily strength, was the weakest of men with regard to a passion, which often subdues and captivates the strongest; a courtesan having gained so great an ascendant over Milo, that she tyrannized over him in the most imperious manner, and made him obey whatever commands she laid upon him.

CHAPTER III.

THE WAR OF PELOPONNESUS.

THE Peloponnesian war†, which I am now entering upon, began about the end of the first year of the 87th Olympiad, and lasted 27 years. Thucydides has written the history of it to the 21st year inclusively. He gives us an accurate account of the several transactions of every year, which he divides into campaigns and winter-quarters. However, I shall not be so minute, and shall only extract such parts of it as appear most entertaining and instructive. Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus will also be of great assistance to me on this occasion.

SECTION I.

THE SIEGE OF PLATÆA BY THE THEBANS.—*Æc. Æc.*

THE FIRST YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE first act of hostility by which the war began§, was committed by the Thebans, who besieged Platæa, a city of

* Pausan. l. vi. p. 370.

† *Ælian.* l. ii. c. 24.

‡ A. M. 3573. Ant. J. C. 431.

§ Thucyd. l. ii. p. 98—122. Diod. l. xii. p. 97—100. Plut. in Pericli. p. 170.

Bœotia in alliance with Athens. They were introduced into it by treachery; but the citizens falling upon them in the night, killed them, about 200 excepted, who were taken prisoners, and who a little after were put to death. The Athenians, as soon as the news were brought of the action at Plataea, sent succours and provisions thither, and cleared the city of all persons who were incapable of bearing arms.

The truce being evidently broke, both sides prepared openly for war; and ambassadors were sent to all places to strengthen themselves by the alliance of the Greeks and barbarians. Every part of Greece was in motion, some few states and cities excepted, which continued neuter, till they should see the event of the war. The majority were for the Lacedæmonians, as being the deliverers of Greece, and espoused their interest very warmly, because the Athenians, forgetting that the moderation and gentleness with which they commanded over others, had procured them many allies, had afterwards alienated the greatest part of them by their pride and the severity of their government, and incurred the hatred, not only of those who were then subject to them, but of all such as were apprehensive of becoming their dependants. In this temper of mind were the Greeks at that time. The confederates of each of those states were as follow:

All Peloponnesus, Argos excepted, which stood neuter, had declared for Lacedæmonia. The Achæians, the inhabitants of Pellene excepted, had also joined them: but the latter also engaged insensibly in that war. Out of Peloponnesus were the people of Megara, Locris, Bœotia, Phocis, Ambracia, Leucadia, and Anactorium.

The confederates of the Athenians were, the people of Chios, Lesbos, Plataea, the Messenians of Naupactus; the greatest part of the Acarnanians, Corcyrans, Cephallenians, and Zacynthians; besides the several tributary countries, as maritime Caria, Doria which lies near it, Ionia, the Hellespont; and the cities of Thrace, Chalcis and Potidæa excepted; all the islands between Crete and Peloponnesus, eastward; and the Cyclades, Melos and Thera excepted.

Immediately after the attempt on Plataea, the Lacedæmonians had ordered forces to be levied both within and without Peloponnesus; and made all the preparations necessary for entering the enemy's country. All things being ready, two-thirds of the troops marched to the isthmus of Corinth, and the rest were left to guard the country. Archidamus, king of Lacedæmonia, who commanded the army, assembled the generals
and

and chief officers, and calling up the remembrance of the great actions performed by their ancestors, and those they themselves had done, or been eye-witnesses to, he exhorted them to support, with the utmost efforts of their valour, the pristine glory of their respective cities, as well as their own fame. He declared, that the eyes of all Greece were upon them; and that in expectation of the issue of a war which would determine its fate, they were incessantly addressing heaven in favour of a people, who were as dear to them as the Athenians were become odious: that, however, he could not deny, but that they were going to march against an enemy, who, though greatly inferior to them in numbers and in strength, were, nevertheless, very powerful, warlike, and daring; and whose courage would doubtless be still more enflamed by the sight of danger, and the laying waste of their territories*: that therefore they must exert themselves to the utmost, to spread an immediate terror in the country they were going to enter, and to inspire the allies with new vigour. The whole army answered in the loudest acclamations of joy, and assured their generals that they would do their duty.

The assembly breaking up, Archidamus, still zealous for the welfare of Greece, and meditating how he might best prevent a rupture, the dreadful consequences of which he foresaw, sent a Spartan to Athens, to endeavour, before they should come to hostilities, to prevail, if possible, with the Athenians to lay aside their designs; since otherwise an army would soon march into Attica. But the Athenians, so far from admitting him to audience, or hearing his reasons, would not so much as suffer him to come into their city: Pericles having prevailed with the people to make an order, that no herald or ambassador should be received from the Lacedæmonians, till they had first laid down their arms. In consequence of this, the Spartan was commanded to leave the country that very day; and an escort was sent to guard him to the frontiers, and to prevent his speaking to any person by the way. At his taking leave of the Athenians, he told them, that from that day great calamities would ensue to all Greece. Archidamus, seeing no hopes of a reconciliation, marched for Attica, at the head of 60,000 chosen forces.

Pericles, before the Lacedæmonians had entered this country, declared to the Athenians, that should Archidamus, when

* *Gnarus primis eventibus metum aut fiduciam gigni.* Tacit. Ann. l. xiii. c. 31.

he was laying waste their territories, spare his (Pericles's) lands, either on account of the right of hospitality which subsisted between them, or to furnish his enemies, and those who envied him, with a handle to slander him, as holding intelligence with him, he declared, that from that day he made over all his lands and houses to the city of Athens. He remonstrated to the Athenians, that it was their interest to consume the enemy's troops, by protracting the war; and that, for this purpose, they must immediately remove all their effects out of the country, retire to the city, and shut themselves up in it without ever hazarding a battle. The Athenians, indeed, had not forces enough to take the field and oppose the enemy. Their troops, exclusive of those in garrison, amounted but to 13,000 heavy-armed foldiers; and 16,000 inhabitants, including young and old, the citizens as well as others, who were appointed to defend Athens: and besides these, 1200 troopers, including the archers who rode on horseback, and 1600 foot archers. This was the whole army of the Athenians. But their chief strength consisted in a fleet of 300 galleys, part of which were ordered to lay waste the enemy's country, and the rest to awe the allies, on whom contributions were levied, without which the Athenians could not defray the expences of the war.

The Athenians, animated by the warm exhortations of Pericles, brought from the country their wives, their children, their moveables, and all their effects, after which they pulled down their houses, and even carried off the timber of them. With regard to the cattle of all kinds, they conveyed them into the island of Eubœa and the neighbouring isles. However, they were deeply afflicted at the sad and precipitate migration, and it even forced tears from their eyes. From the time the Persians left their country, that is, for near 50 years, they had enjoyed the sweets of peace, wholly employed in cultivating their lands, and feeding their flocks. But now, sad fate of war! they were obliged to abandon every thing. They took up their habitations in the city, as conveniently as they could, in the midst of such confusion; retiring either to their relations or friends; and some withdrew even to the temples and other public places.

In the mean time the Lacedæmonians, being set out upon their march, entered the country, and encamped at Ænœ, which is the first fortress towards Bœotia. They employed a long time in preparing the attack, and raising the batteries; for which reason complaints were made against Archidamus, as if he carried on the war indolently, because he had not approved

proved of it. He was accused of being too slow in his marches, and of encamping too long near Corinth. He was also charged with having been too dilatory in raising the army, and having desired to give the Athenians opportunity to carry off all their effects out of the country; whereas, they said, had he marched speedily into it, all they had might have been plundered and destroyed. His design, however, was to engage the Athenians, by these delays, to agree to an accommodation, and to prevent a rupture, the consequences of which he foresaw would be pernicious to all Greece. Finding, after making several assaults, that it would be impossible for him to take the city, he raised the siege, and entered Attica in the midst of the harvest. Having laid waste the whole country, he advanced as far as Acharnæ, one of the greatest towns near Athens, and but 1500 paces from the city. He there pitched his camp, in hopes that the Athenians, exasperated to see him advanced so near, would sally out to defend their country, and give him an opportunity of coming to a battle.

It indeed was a great mortification to the Athenians, haughty and imperious, to be braved and insulted in this manner by an enemy, whom they did not think superior to themselves in courage. They were eye-witnesses of the dreadful havoc made of their lands, and saw all their houses and farms in a blaze. This sad spectacle was now so shocking, that they could not bear it any longer, and therefore demanded fiercely to be led out against the Lacedæmonians, be the consequence what it would. Pericles saw plainly, that the Athenians would thereby hazard every thing, and expose their city to certain destruction, should they march out to engage, under the walls of their city, an army of 60,000 fighting men, composed of the choicest troops at that time in Bœotia and Peloponnesus. Besides, he had made it his chief maxim to spare the blood of the citizens, since that was an irreparable loss. Pursuing inflexibly therefore the plan he had laid down, and studious of nothing but how he might check the impatience and ardour of the Athenians, he was particularly careful not to assemble either the senate or the people; lest they should form some fatal resolution, in spite of all the opposition in his power. His friends used all the intreaties imaginable to make him change his conduct. His enemies, on the other side, endeavoured to stagger him by their menaces and slanderous discourses. They strove to rouse him by songs and satires, in which they aspersed him as a man of a cowardly, insensible cast of mind, who basely gave up his country to the sword of the enemy. But no man showed

showed so much rancour against Pericles, as Cleon*. He was the son of a currier, and also followed that trade. He had raised himself by faction, and probably by a species of merit which those must possess who would rise in popular governments. He had a thundering, and at the same time a specious voice; and besides he possessed, in a wonderful manner, the art of gaining the people, and bringing them over to his interest. It was he who enacted a law, that three oboli, not two as before, should be given to each of the 6000 judges. The characteristics which more immediately distinguished him were, an insupportably vain opinion of his own abilities, a ridiculous persuasion of his uncommon merit, and a boldness of speech, which he carried to so high a pitch of insolence as to spare no man. But none of these things could move Pericles. † His great strength of mind raised him above low, vulgar clamours. Like a good pilot in a raging storm, who after he has given out the proper orders, and taken all the precautions necessary, is studious of nothing but how to make the best use of his art, without suffering himself to be moved by the tears or entreaties of those whom fear has distracted; Pericles, in like manner, after having put the city in a good posture of defence, and posted guards in all places to prevent a surprise, followed those counsels which his prudence suggested, entirely regardless of the complaints, the taunts, and licentious discourses of the citizens; from a firm persuasion, that he knew much better than they in what manner they were to be governed. ‡ It then appeared evidently, says Plutarch, that Pericles was absolute master of the minds of the Athenians, since he prevailed so far, at such a juncture as this, as § to keep them from sallying out of the city, as if he had kept the keys of the city in his own possession, and fixed on their arms the seal of his authority, to forbid their making use of them. Things happened exactly as Pericles had foretold; for the enemy, finding the Athenians were determined not to stir out of their city, and having advice that the enemy's fleet carried fire and sword into their territories, they raised their camp, and, after making dreadful havoc in the whole country through

* It is he whom Aristophanes has inveighed so much against, in several of his comedies.

† *Spernendis rumoribus validus.* Tacit.

‡ Plut. An Seni ger. fit. resp: p. 784.

§ Διεκάλυψε, μονονὲ τὰ ὅπλα τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰς κλεῖς τῶν πυλῶνα ποσφοραγισάμενος.

which they marched, they returned to Peloponnesus, and retired to their several homes.

It might here be asked, why Pericles acted, on this occasion, in a quite different manner from what Themistocles had done about 50 years before, when, at Xerxes's approach, he made the Athenians march out of their city, and abandon it to the enemy. But a little reflection will show, that the circumstances differed widely. Themistocles, being invaded by all the forces of the East, justly concluded that it would be impossible for him to withstand, in a single city, those millions of barbarians, who would have poured upon it like a deluge, and deprived him of all hopes of being succoured by his allies. This is the reason given by Cicero. *Fluctum enim totius barbariæ ferre urbs una non poterat.* It was therefore prudent in him to retire for some time, and to let the confused multitude of barbarians consume and destroy one another. But Pericles was not engaged in so formidable and oppressive a war. The odds were not very great, and he foresaw it would allow him time to breathe. Thus, like a judicious man and an able politician, he kept close in Athens, and could not be moved either by the remonstrances or murmurs of the citizens. Cicero*, writing to his friend Atticus, condemns absolutely the resolution which Pompey formed and executed, to abandon Rome to Cæsar; whereas he ought, in imitation of Pericles, to have shut himself up in it with the senate, the magistrates, and the worthiest of the citizens who had declared in his favour.

After the Lacedæmonians were retired, the Athenians put troops into all the important posts both by sea and land, pursuant to the plan they intended to follow as long as the war continued. They also came to a resolution, to keep always 1000 talents in reserve, and 100 galleys; and never to use them, except the enemy should invade Attica by sea; at the same time making it death for any man to propose the employing them any other way.

The galleys which had been sent into Peloponnesus made dreadful havoc there, which consoled the Athenians, in some measure, for the losses they had sustained. One day as the forces were going on board, and Pericles was entering his own ship, a sudden and total eclipse of the sun ensued, and the earth was overspread with the deepest gloom. This phænomenon filled the minds of the Athenians with the utmost terror; superstition, and the ignorance of natural causes, making them consider

* Lib. vii. Epist. 11.

such events as fatal omens. Pericles seeing the pilot who was on board his ship astonished, and incapable of managing the helm, threw his cloak over his face, and asked him whether he saw: the pilot answering, that the cloak took away all objects from his sight, Pericles then gave him to understand, that a like cause, *viz.* the interposition of the vast body of the moon between his eyes and the sun, prevented his seeing its splendor.

* The first year of the war of Peloponnesus being now elapsed, the Athenians, during the winter, solemnized public funerals, according to ancient custom, a practice truly humane and expressive of a just gratitude, in honour of those who had lost their lives in that campaign, a ceremony they observed during the whole course of the war. For this purpose they set up, three days before, a tent, in which the bones of the deceased citizens were exposed, and every person strewed flowers, incense, perfumes, and things of the same kind upon those remains. They afterwards were put on a kind of chariots, in coffins made of cypress wood, every tribe having its particular coffin and chariot; but in one of the latter a large † empty coffin was carried, in honour of those whose bodies had not been found. The procession marched with a grave, majestic, and religious pomp; a great number of inhabitants, both citizens and foreigners, assisted at this mournful solemnity. The relations of the deceased officers and soldiers stood weeping at the sepulchre. These bones were carried to a public monument, in the finest suburb of the city, called the Ceramicus; where were buried in all ages, those who had lost their lives in the field, except the warriors of Marathon, who, to immortalize their rare valour, were interred in the field of battle. Earth was afterwards laid over them, and then one of the citizens of the greatest distinction pronounced their funeral oration. Pericles was now appointed to exercise this honourable office. When the ceremony was ended, he went from the sepulchre to the tribunal, in order to be the better heard, and spoke the oration, the whole of which Thucydides has transmitted to us. Whether it was really composed by Pericles, or by the historian, we may affirm that it is truly worthy the reputation of both these great men, as well for the noble simplicity of the style, as for the just beauty of the thoughts, and the greatness of the sentiments which shine in every part of it. ‡ After hav-

* Thucyd. l. ii. p. 122—130.

† These are called Cenotaphia.

‡ Thucyd. l. ii. p. 130.

ing paid, in so solemn a manner, this double tribute of tears and applauses, to the memory of those brave soldiers who had sacrificed their lives to defend the liberties of their country; the public, who did not confine their gratitude to empty ceremonies and tears, maintained their widows, and all their infant orphans. This was a powerful * incentive to animate the courage of the citizens; for great men are formed, where merit is best rewarded.

About the close of the same campaign, the Athenians concluded an alliance with Sitalces, king of the Odrysians in Thrace; and, in consequence of this treaty, his son was admitted a citizen of Athens. They also made an accommodation with Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, by restoring him the city of Thermæ; after which they joined their forces, in order to carry on the war in Chalcis.

SECTION II.

THE PLAGUE MAKES DREADFUL HAVOC IN ATTICA, &c. &c.

SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE WAR.

IN the beginning of the second campaign†, the enemy made an incursion into the country as before, and laid it waste. But the plague made a much greater devastation in Athens; the like having never been known. It is related, that it began in Ethiopia, whence it descended into Egypt, from thence spread over Lybia, and a great part of Persia; and at last broke at once like a flood, upon Athens. Thucydides, who himself was seized with that deadly disease, has described very minutely the several circumstances and symptoms of it, in order, says he, that a faithful and exact relation of this calamity may serve as an instruction to posterity, in case the like should ever happen. ‡ Hippocrates, who was employed to visit the sick, has also described it in a medical, and § Lucretius in a poetical way. This pestilence baffled the utmost efforts of art; the most robust constitutions were unable to withstand its attacks; and the greatest care and skill of the physicians were a feeble help to those who were infected. The instant a person was seized, he was struck with despair, which quite disabled

* *Ἀθλα γὰρ οἷς κεῖται ἀρετῆς μέγιστα, τοῖς δὲ καὶ ἄνδρες πολιτεύουσι.*

† A. M. 3574. Ant. J. C. 430. Thucyd. l. ii. p. 130—147. Diod. p. 101, 102. Plut. in Pericl. p. 171.

‡ Epidem. l. iii. §. 3.

§ Lib. ii. c. 47.

him from attempting a cure. The assistance that was given them was ineffectual, and proved mortal to all such of their relations as had the courage to approach them. The prodigious quantity of baggage, which had been removed out of the country into the city, proved very noxious. Most of the inhabitants, for want of lodging, lived in little cottages, in which they could scarce breathe, during the raging heat of the summer, so that they were seen either piled one upon the other, the dead as well as those who were dying, or else crawling through the streets; or lying along by the side of fountains, to which they had dragged themselves, to quench the raging thirst which consumed them. The very temples were filled with dead bodies, and every part of the city exhibited a dreadful image of death; without the least remedy for the present, or the least hopes with regard to futurity.

* The plague, before it spread into Attica, had made wild havoc in Persia. Artaxerxes, who had been informed of the mighty reputation of Hippocrates of Cos, the greatest physician of that or any other age, caused his governors to write to him, to invite him into his dominions, in order that he might prescribe to those who were infected. The king made him the most advantageous offers; setting no bounds to his rewards on the side of interest, and, with regard to honours, promising to make him equal with the most considerable persons in his court. The reader has already been told, the prodigious regard which was shown to the Grecian physicians in Persia; and, indeed, was it possible that so useful a man as Hippocrates could be too well rewarded? However, all the glitter of the Persian riches and dignities were not capable to corrupt him, nor stifle the hatred and aversion which was become natural to the Greeks for the Persians, ever since the latter had invaded them. This great physician therefore sent no other answer but this, that he was free from either wants or desires; that he owed all his cares to his fellow-citizens and countrymen; and was under no obligation to Barbarians, the declared enemies of Greece. Kings are not used to denials. Artaxerxes, therefore, in the highest transports of rage, sent to the city of Cos, the native place of Hippocrates, and where he was at that time; commanding them to deliver up to him that insolent wretch, in order that he might be brought to condign punishment; and threatening, in case they refused, to lay waste their city and island in such a manner, that not

* Hippocrat. in Epist.

the least footsteps of it should remain. However, the inhabitants of Cos were not under the least terror. They made answer, that the menaces of Darius and Xerxes had not been able to prevail with them to give them earth and water, or to obey their orders; that Artaxerxes's threats would be equally impotent; that, let what would be the consequence, they would never give up their fellow-citizen; and that they depended upon the protection of the gods.

Hippocrates had said in one of his letters, that he owed himself entirely to his country. And indeed, the instant he was sent for to Athens, he went thither, and did not once stir out of the city till the plague was quite ceased. He devoted himself entirely to the service of the sick; and to multiply himself, as it were, he sent several of his disciples into all parts of the country; after having instructed them in what manner to treat their patients. The Athenians were struck with the deepest sense of gratitude for this generous care of Hippocrates. They therefore ordained, by a public decree, that Hippocrates should be initiated in the most exalted mysteries, in the same manner as Hercules the son of Jupiter; that a crown of gold should be presented him, of the value of 1000 staters*, amounting to 500 pistoles French money; and that the decree by which it was granted him, should be read aloud by a herald in the public games, on the solemn festival of Panathenæa: that the freedom of the city should be given him, and himself be maintained, at the public charge, in the Prytaneum, all his lifetime, in case he thought proper: in fine, that the children of all the people of Cos, whose city had given birth to so great a man, might be maintained and brought up in Athens, in the same manner as if they had been born there.

In the mean time the enemy having marched into Attica, came down towards the coast, and advancing still forward, laid waste the whole country. Pericles still adhering to the maxim he had established, not to expose the safety of the state to the hazard of a battle, would not suffer his troops to sally out of the city: however, before the enemy left the plains, he sailed to Peloponnesus with 100 galleys, in order to hasten their retreat by his making so powerful a diversion; and after having made a dreadful havoc, as he had done the first year, he returned into the city. The plague was still there as well as

* The Attic Stater was a gold coin weighing two drachms. It is the original *χρυσων νομισματων*.

in the fleet, and it spread to those troops that were besieging Potidæa.

The campaign being thus ended, the Athenians, who saw their country depopulated by two great scourges, war and pestilence, began to despond, and to murmur against Pericles; considering him as the author of all their calamities, as he had involved them in that fatal war. They then sent a deputation to Lacedæmonia, to obtain, if possible, an accommodation by some means or other, firmly resolved to make whatever concessions should be demanded of them: however, the ambassadors returned back without being able to obtain any terms. Complaints and murmurs now broke out afresh; and the whole city was in such a trouble and confusion, as seemed to prognosticate the worst of evils. Pericles, in the midst of this universal consternation, could not forbear assembling the people; and endeavoured to soften, and at the same time to encourage them, by justifying himself. "The reasons," says he, "which determined you to undertake this war, and which you approved at that time, are still the same; and are not changed by the alteration of circumstances, which neither you nor myself could foresee. Had it been left to your option to make choice of peace or war, the former would certainly have been the more eligible: but as there was no other means for preserving your liberty, but by drawing the sword, was it possible for you to hesitate? If we are citizens who truly love our country, will our private misfortunes make us neglect the common welfare of the state? Every man feels the evil which afflicts him, because it is present; but no one is sensible of the good which will result from it, because it is not come. Have you forgot the strength and grandeur of your empire? Of the two parts which form this globe of ours, *viz.* the land and sea, you have absolute possession of the latter; and no king, or any other power, is able to oppose your fleets. It is now your duty to preserve this glory, and this empire, or to resign it for ever. Be not therefore grieved because you are deprived of a few country-houses and gardens, which ought to be considered no otherwise than as the frame of the picture, though you would seem to make them the picture itself. Consider, that if you do but preserve your liberty, you will easily recover them; but that should you suffer yourselves to be deprived of this blessing, you will lose every valuable possession with it. Do not show less generosity than your ancestors, who, for the sake of preserv-

"ing

“ing it, abandoned even their city; and who, though they
 “had not inherited such a glory from their ancestors, yet suf-
 “fered the worst of evils, and engaged in the most perilous
 “enterprises, to transmit it to you. I will confess that your
 “present calamities are exceedingly grievous, and I myself
 “am duly sensible and deeply afflicted for them. But is it
 “just in you to exclaim against your general, merely for an
 “accident that was not to be diverted by all the prudence of
 “man; and to make him responsible for an event, in which
 “he has not the least concern? We must submit patiently to
 “those evils which heaven inflicts upon us, and vigorously
 “oppose such as arise from our fellow-creatures. As to the
 “hatred and jealousy which attend on your prosperity, they
 “are the usual lot of all who believe themselves worthy of
 “commanding. However, hatred and envy are not long-
 “lived, but the glory that accompanies exalted actions is im-
 “mortal. Revolve therefore perpetually in your minds, how
 “shameful and ignominious it is for men to bow the neck to
 “their enemies, and how glorious it is to triumph over them;
 “and then, animated by this double reflection, march on to
 “danger with joy and intrepidity, and do not crouch so tame-
 “ly in vain to the Lacedæmonians; and call to mind, that
 “those who display the greatest bravery and resolution in dan-
 “gers, acquire the most esteem and applause.”

The motives of honour and fame, the remembrance of the
 great actions of their ancestors, the soothing title of sovereigns
 of Greece, and, above all, the jealousy of Sparta, the ancient
 and perpetual rival of Athens, were the usual motives which
 Pericles employed to influence and animate the Athenians,
 and had hitherto never failed of success. But on this occasion,
 the sense of the present evils prevailed over every other con-
 sideration, and stifled all other thoughts. The Athenians in-
 deed did not design to sue the Lacedæmonians any more for
 peace, but the sight and presence only of Pericles was insup-
 portable to them. They therefore deprived him of the com-
 mand of the army, and sentenced him to pay a fine, which,
 according to some historians, amounted to 15 talents*, and,
 according to others, 50.

However, this public disgrace of Pericles was not to be very
 lasting. The anger of the people was appeased by the first
 effort, and had spent itself in this injurious treatment of him,
 as the bee leaves its sting in the wound. But he was not now

* 15, or 50,000 French crowns.

so happy with regard to his domestic evils; for, besides his having lost a great number of his friends and relations by the pestilence, feuds and divisions had long reigned in his family. Xanthippus, his eldest son, who himself was extremely profuse, and had married a young wife no less extravagant, could not bear his father's exact œconomy, who allowed him but a very small sum for his pleasures. This made him borrow money in his father's name. When the lender demanded his debt of Pericles, he not only refused to pay, but even prosecuted him for it. Xanthippus was so enraged, that he inveighed in the most heinous terms against his father, exclaiming against him in all places, and ridiculing openly the assemblies he held at his house, and his conferences with the Sophists. He did not know that a son, though treated unjustly, which was far otherwise in his case, ought to submit patiently to the injustice of his father, as a citizen is obliged to suffer that of his country.

The plague carried off Xanthippus. At the same time Pericles lost his sister, with many of his relations and best friends, whose assistance he most wanted in the administration. But he did not sink under these losses; his strength of mind was not shaken by them; and he was not seen to weep or show the usual marks of sorrow at the grave of any of his relations, till the death of Paralus, the last of his legitimate children. That rude stroke quite amazed him, though he did his utmost to preserve his usual tranquillity, and not show any outward symptoms of sorrow. But when he was to put the crown of flowers upon the head of his dead son, he could not support the cruel spectacle, nor stifle the transports of his grief, which forced its way in cries, in sobs, and a flood of tears.

Pericles, misled by the principles of a false philosophy, imagined, that bewailing the death of his relations and children, would betray a weakness that no way suited the greatness of soul he had ever shown; and that on this occasion, the sensibility of the father would sully the glory of the conqueror. Exceeding error! childish illusion! which either makes heroism consist in wild and savage cruelty; or leaving the same grief and confusion in the mind, assumes a vain outside of constancy and resolution, merely to be admired. But does martial bravery extinguish nature? Is a man dead to all humane sentiments, because he makes a considerable figure in the state? Antoninus the emperor had a much juster way of thinking, when, on occasion of Marcus Aurelius's lamenting the death of the person who had brought him up, he said, "Suffer him
"to

“to be a man, for neither philosophy nor sovereignty renders
“us insensible*.”

Fickleness and inconstancy were the prevailing characters of the Athenians; and as these carried them on a sudden to the greatest excesses, they soon brought them back again within the bounds of moderation and gentleness. It was not long before they repented the injury they had done Pericles, and earnestly wished to see him again in their assemblies. By dint of suffering they began to bear patiently their domestic misfortunes, and to be fired more and more with a zeal for their country's glory; and in their ardor for reinstating its affairs, they did not know any person more capable than Pericles of the administration. Pericles, at that time, never stirred out of his house, and was in the utmost grief for the loss he had sustained. However, Alcibiades and the rest of his friends intreated him to go abroad, and show himself in public. The people asked him pardon for their ungrateful usage of him; and Pericles, moved with their intreaties, and persuaded that it did not become a good man to harbour the least resentment against his country, resumed the government.

About the end of the second campaign, some ambassadors had set out from Lacedæmon, in order to solicit the king of Persia's alliance, and engage him to furnish a sum of money for maintaining the fleet: this reflected great ignominy on the Lacedæmonians, who called themselves the deliverers of Greece, since they thereby retracted or sullied the glorious actions they had formerly achieved in her defence against Persia. They went by the way of Thrace, in order to disengage, if possible, Sitacles from the alliance of the Athenians, and prevail with him to succour Potidæa. But they here met with some Athenian ambassadors, who caused them to be arrested as disturbers of the public peace, and afterwards to be sent to Athens, where, without suffering them to be heard, they were put to death the same day, and their bodies thrown into the open fields, by way of reprisal on the Lacedæmonians, who treated all who were not of their party in the same inhuman manner. It is scarce possible to conceive how two cities, which, a little before, were so strongly united, and ought to have shown a mutual civility and forbearance for each other, could contract so inveterate an hatred, and break into such cruel acts of violence, as infringe all the laws of war, humanity, and nations; and

* Permitte illi ut homo sit: neque enim vel philosophia vel imperium tollit affectus. Jul. Capitol. in vit. Antonini Pii.

prompted them to exercise greater cruelties upon one another, than if they had been at war with barbarians.

Potidæa had now been besieged almost three years; when the inhabitants, reduced to extremities, and in such want of provisions that some fed on human flesh, and not expecting any succours from the Peloponnesians, whose attempts in Attica had all proved abortive, surrendered on conditions. The circumstances which made the Athenians treat them with lenity, were, the severity of the weather, which exceedingly annoyed the besiegers, and the prodigious expence of the siege, which had already cost * 2000 talents. They therefore came out of the city with their wives and children, as well citizens as foreigners, with each but one suit of clothes, and the women two, and only a little money to carry them home. The Athenians blamed their generals for granting this capitulation without their order; because otherwise, as the citizens were reduced to the utmost extremities, they would have surrendered at discretion. They sent a colony thither.

† The first thing that Pericles did, after his being re-elected generalissimo, was to propose the abrogating of that law, which he himself had caused to be enacted against bastards, when they were legitimate children. It declared, that such only should be considered as true and legitimate Athenians, whose fathers and mothers were both natives of Athens; and it had been executed just before with the utmost rigour. For the king ‡ of Egypt having sent to Athens a present of 40,000 measures of corn to be distributed among the people, the bastards, on account of this new law, were involved in a thousand difficulties, till then unpractised, and which had not been so much as thought of. Near 5000 of them were condemned and sold as slaves, whilst 14,040 citizens were confirmed in their privileges, and recognized as true Athenians. It was thought very strange, that the author and promoter of this law should himself desire to have it repealed. But the Athenians were moved to compassion at the domestic calamities of Pericles; so that

* The army which besieged Potidæa consisted of 3000 men, exclusive of the 1600 who had been sent under the command of Phormio. Every soldier received daily two drachms, or 20d. French, for master and man; and those of the galleys had the same pay. Thucyd. l. 3. p. 182.

† A. M. 3575. Aut. J. C. 429.

‡ Plutarch does not name this king. Perhaps it was Inarus, son to Psammetichus king of Libya, who had caused part of the Egyptians to take up arms against Artaxerxes, and to whom the Athenians, above 30 years before, had sent succours against the Persians. Thucyd. l. i. p. 68.

they permitted him to enter his bastard, in his own name, in the register of the citizens of his tribe.

A little after, he himself was infected with the pestilence. Being extremely ill, and ready to breathe his last, the principal citizens, and such of his friends as had not forsaken him, discoursing together in his bed-chamber about his rare merit, they ran over his exploits, and computed the number of his victories; for whilst he was generalissimo of the Athenians, he had erected for the glory of their city nine trophies, in memory of as many battles gained by him. They did not imagine that Pericles heard what they were saying, because he seemed to have lost his senses; but it was far otherwise, for not a single word of their discourse had escaped him; when, breaking suddenly from his silence; "I am surpris'd," says he, "that you should treasure up so well in your memories, and extol so highly a series of actions, in which fortune had so great a share, and which are common to me with so many other generals; and at the same time should forget the most glorious circumstance in my life; I mean, my never having caused a single citizen to put on mourning." Excellent words! which very few in high stations can declare with truth. The Athenians were deeply afflicted at his death.

The reader has doubtless observed, from what has been said of Pericles, that in him were united most qualities which constitute the great man; as those of the admiral, by his great skill in naval affairs; of the great captain, by his conquests and victories; of the high-treasurer, by the excellent order in which he put the finances; of the great politician, by the extent and justness of his views, by his eloquence in public deliberations, and by the extensity and address with which he transacted the affairs; of a minister of state, by the methods he employed to increase trade and promote the arts in general; in fine, of father of his country, by the happiness he procured to every individual, and which he always had in view, as the true scope and end of his administration.

But I must not omit another characteristic which was peculiar to him. He acted with so much wisdom, moderation, disinterestedness, and zeal for the public good; he discovered, in all things, so great a superiority of talents, and gave so exalted an idea of his experience, capacity, and integrity, that he acquired the confidence of all the Athenians; and fixed, in his own favour, during 40 years that he governed the Athenians, their natural fickleness and inconstancy. He suppressed that jealousy, which an extreme fondness for liberty had made them entertain

entertain against all citizens distinguished by their merit and great authority. But the most surprising circumstance is, he gained this great ascendant merely by persuasion, without employing force, mean artifices, or any of those arts which a mean politician excuses in himself, upon the specious pretence, that the necessity of the public affairs, and reasons of state, make them necessary.

Anaxagoras * died the same year as Pericles. Plutarch relates a circumstance concerning him, which happened some time before, which must not be omitted. He says, that this philosopher, who had voluntarily reduced himself to excessive poverty, in order that he might have the greater leisure to pursue his studies; finding himself neglected in his old age by Pericles, who, in the multiplicity of the public affairs, had not always time to think of him; wrapped his cloak about his head†, and threw himself on the ground, in the fixed resolution to starve himself. Pericles hearing of this accidentally, ran with the utmost haste to the philosopher's house in the deepest affliction. He conjured him, in the strongest and most moving terms, not to throw his life away; adding, that it was not Anaxagoras, but himself that was to be lamented, if he was so unfortunate as to lose so wise and faithful a friend; one who was so capable of giving him wholesome counsels, with regard to the pressing occasions of the state. Anaxagoras then, uncovering his head a little, spoke thus to him: "Pericles, those who use a lamp take care to feed it with oil." This was a gentle, and, at the same time, a strong and piercing reproach. Pericles ought to have supplied his wants unasked. Many lamps are extinguished in this manner in a country, by the criminal negligence of those who ought to supply them.

SECTION III.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS BESIEGE PLATÆA—FOURTH AND FIFTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

THE most memorable transaction of the following years‡, was the siege of Platæa by the Lacedæmonians. This was one of the most famous sieges in antiquity, on account of the vigo-

* Plut. in Pericl. p. 162.

† It was the custom for those to cover their heads with their cloaks, who were reduced to despair, and resolve to die.

‡ A. M. 3576. Ant. J. C. 426. Thucyd. l. ii. p. 147—151. Diod. l. xxii. p. 102—109.

rous efforts of both parties : but especially for the glorious resistance made by the besieged, and their bold and industrious stratagem, by which several of them got out of the city, and by that means escaped the fury of the enemy. The Lacedæmonians besieged this place in the beginning of the third campaign. As soon as they had pitched their camp round the city, in order to lay waste the places adjacent to it, the Platæans sent some deputies to Archidamus, who commanded on that occasion, to represent, that he could not attack them with the least shadow of justice, because that, after the famous battle of Platæa, Pausanias, the Grecian general, offering up a sacrifice in their city to Jupiter the Deliverer, in presence of all the allies, had given them their freedom to reward their valour and zeal ; and therefore, that they ought not to be disturbed in the enjoyment of their liberties, since it had been granted them by a Lacedæmonian. Archidamus answered, that their demand would be very reasonable, had they not joined with the Athenians, the professed enemies to the liberty of Greece ; but that, if they would disengage themselves from their present alliance, or at least remain neuter, they then should be left in the full enjoyment of their privileges. The deputies replied, that they could not possibly come to any agreement, without first sending to Athens, whither their wives and their children were retired. The Lacedæmonians permitted them to send thither ; when the Athenians promising solemnly to succour them to the utmost of their power, the Platæans resolved to suffer the last extremities rather than surrender ; and accordingly they informed the Lacedæmonians, from their walls, that they could not comply with what was desired.

Archidamus then, after calling upon the gods to witness, that he did not first infringe the alliance, and was not the cause of the calamities which might befall the Platæans, for having refused the just and reasonable conditions offered them, prepared for the siege. He surrounded the city with a circumvallation of trees, which were laid long-ways, very close together, with their boughs interwoven, and turned towards the city, to prevent any person from going out of it. He afterwards threw up a platform to set the batteries on ; in hopes that, as so many hands were employed, they should soon take the city. He therefore caused trees to be felled on mount Cithæron, and interwove them with fascines, in order to support the terra on all sides ; he then threw in wood, earth, and stones ; in a word, whatever could help to fill it up. The whole army worked night and day, without the least inter-

mission,

mission, during seventy days; one half of the soldiers reposing themselves, whilst the rest were at work.

The besieged observing that the work began to rise, they threw up a wooden wall upon the walls of the city opposite to the platform, in order that they might always out-top the besiegers, and filled the hollow of this wooden wall with the bricks they took from the rubbish of the neighbouring houses; so that the wall of timber served in a manner as a defence to keep the wall from falling as it was carrying up. It was covered, on the outside, with hides both raw and dry, in order to shelter the works and the workmen from the fires discharged against it. In proportion as it rose, the platform was raised also, which in this manner was carried to a great height. But the besieged made a hole in the opposite wall, in order to carry off the earth that sustained the platform; which the besiegers perceiving, they put large paniers filled with mortar in the place of the earth which had been removed, because these could not be so easily carried off. The besieged therefore, finding their first stratagem defeated, made a mine under ground as far as the platform, in order to shelter themselves, and to remove from it the earth and other materials of which it was composed, and which they gave from hand to hand, as far as the city. The besiegers were a considerable time without perceiving this, till at last they found that their work did not go forward, and that the more earth they laid on the weaker it grew. But the besieged judging that the superiority of numbers would at length prevail, without amusing themselves any longer at this work, or carrying the wall higher on the side towards the battery, they contented themselves with building another within, in the form of a half-moon, both ends of which joined to the wall; in order that the besieged might retire behind it when the first wall should be forced, and so oblige the enemy to make fresh works.

In the mean time the besiegers having set up their machines, doubtless after they had filled up the ditch, though Thucydides does not say this, shook the city-wall in a very terrible manner, which, though it alarmed the citizens very much, did not however discourage them. They employed every art that fortification could suggest against the enemy's batteries. They prevented the effect of the battering rams, by ropes *

* The end, downward, of these ropes formed a variety of slip knots, with which they caught the head of the battering-ram, which they raised up by the help of the machine.

which turned aside their strokes. They also employed another artifice; the two ends of a great beam were made fast by long iron chains to two large pieces of timber, supported at due distance upon the wall in the nature of a balance; so that whenever the enemy played their machine, the besieged lifted up this beam, and let it fall back on the head of the battering ram, which quite deadened its force, and consequently made it of no effect.

The besiegers finding the attack did not go on successfully, and that a new wall was raised against their platform, despaired of being able to storm the place, and therefore changed the siege into a blockade. However, they first endeavoured to set fire to it, imagining that the town might easily be burnt down, as it was so small, whenever a strong wind should rise; for they employed all the artifices imaginable, to make themselves masters of it as soon as possible, and with little expence. They therefore threw fascines into the intervals between the walls of the city and the intrenchment with which they had surrounded them; and filled these intervals in a very little time, because of the multitude of hands employed by them; in order to set fire, at the same time, to different parts of the city. They then lighted the fire with pitch and sulphur, which in a moment made such a prodigious blaze, that the like was never seen. This invention was very near carrying the city, which had baffled all others; for the besieged could not make head at once against the fire and the enemy in several parts of the town; and had the weather favoured the besiegers, as they flattered themselves it would, it had certainly been taken: but history informs us, that an exceeding heavy rain fell, which extinguished the fire.

This last effort of the besiegers having been defeated as successfully as all the rest, they now turned the siege into a blockade, and surrounded the city with a brick wall, strengthened on each side with a deep fosse. The whole army was engaged successively in this work, and when it was finished, they left a guard over half of it; the Bœotians offering to guard the rest, upon which the Lacedæmonians returned to Sparta about the month of October. There were now, in Platæa, but 400 inhabitants, and 80 Athenians, with 110 women to dress their victuals; and no other person, whether freeman or slave; all the rest having been sent to Athens before the siege.

During the campaign, some engagements were fought both by sea and land, which I omit, because of no importance.

The

* The next summer, which was the fourth year of the war, the people of Lesbos, the citizens of Methymne excepted, resolved to break their alliance with the Athenians. They had designed to rebel before the war was declared, but the Lacedæmonians would not receive them at that time. The citizens of Methymne sent advice of this to the Athenians, assuring them that if an immediate succour was not sent, the island would be inevitably lost. The affliction of the Athenians, who had sustained great losses by the war and the plague, was greatly increased, when news was brought of the revolt of so considerable an island, whose forces, which were quite fresh, would now join the enemy, and reinforce them on a sudden by the addition of a powerful fleet. The Athenians therefore sent 40 galleys designed for Peloponnesus, which accordingly sailed for Mitylene. The inhabitants, though in great consternation, because they were unprepared, yet put on an appearance of bravery, and sailed out of the port with their ships; however, being repulsed, they proposed an accommodation, which the Athenians listened to, from an apprehension that they were not strong enough to reduce the island to their allegiance. A suspension of arms was therefore agreed upon, during which the Mityleneans sent ambassadors to Athens. The fear of not obtaining their demands, made them send others to Lacedæmonia, to desire succours. This was not ill judged, the Athenians sending them an answer which they had no reason to interpret in their favour.

The ambassadors of Mitylene, after a dangerous voyage, being arrived in Lacedæmonia, the Spartans deferred giving them audience, till the solemnization of the Olympic games, in order that the allies might hear the complaints they had to make. I shall repeat their whole speech on that occasion, as it may serve at once, to give a just idea of Thucydides's style, and of the disposition of the several states with regard to the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. "We are sensible," said the ambassadors, "that it is the custom to use deserters well at first, because of the service they do those whom they fly to; but to despise them afterwards, as traitors to their country and friends. This is far from being unjust, when they have no inducement to such a change; when the same union subsists, and the same aids are reciprocally granted. But it is far otherwise between us and the Athenians; and we entreat you not to be prejudiced against us, because, after having been treated mildly

* Thucyd. l. iii. p. 174—207.—Diod. l. xii. p. 108, 109.

“ by the Athenians during the peace, we now renounce their
“ alliance when they are unfortunate. For being come hither
“ to demand admittance into the number of your friends and
“ allies, we ought to begin our own justification, by showing
“ the justice and necessity of our procedure ; it being impossi-
“ ble for a true friendship to be established between individuals,
“ or a solid alliance between cities, unless both are founded on
“ virtue, and uniformity of principles and sentiments.

“ To come to the point: the treaty we concluded with the
“ Athenians, was not to enslave Greece, but to free it from
“ the yoke of the Barbarians ; and it was concluded after the
“ retreat of the Persians, when you renounced the command.
“ We adhered to it with pleasure, so long as the Athenians
“ continued to entertain just designs ; but, when we saw that
“ they discontinued the war they were carrying on against the
“ enemy, merely to oppress the allies, we could not but suspect
“ their conduct. And as it was extremely difficult, in so great
“ a diversity of interests and opinions, for all of them to con-
“ tinue in strict union ; and still harder to make head against
“ them, when alone and separated ; they have subjected, by
“ insensible degrees, all the allies, except the inhabitants of
“ Chios, and our people ; and used our own forces for this
“ end. For, at the same time that they left us seemingly at
“ our liberty, they obliged us to follow them ; though we
“ could no longer rely on their words, and had the strongest
“ reason to fear the like treatment. And indeed, what pro-
“ bability is there, after their enslaving all the other states, that
“ they should show a regard to us only, and admit us upon
“ the foot of equals, if they may become our masters when-
“ ever they please ; especially as their power increases daily,
“ in proportion as ours lessens ? A mutual fear between con-
“ federates, is a strong motive to make an alliance lasting, and
“ to prevent unjust and violent attempts, by its keeping all
“ things in an equilibrium. Their leaving us the enjoyment
“ of our liberties, was merely because they could not intrench
“ upon them by open force, but only by that equity and spe-
“ cious moderation they have shown us. First, they pretend-
“ ed to prove, from their moderate conduct in regard to us,
“ that as we are free, we should not have marched in con-
“ junction with them against the other allies, had they not
“ given them just grounds for complaint. Secondly, by at-
“ tacking the weakest first, and subduing them one after ano-
“ ther, they enabled themselves, by their ruin, to subject the
“ most powerful without difficulty, who at last would be left
“ alone

“ alone and without support : whereas, had they begun by
“ invading us, at the time that the allies were possessed of all
“ their troops, and were able to make some stand, they could
“ not so easily have completed their designs. Besides, as we
“ had a large fleet, which would strengthen considerably what-
“ ever party we should declare for, this was a check upon
“ them. Add to this, that the high regard we have always
“ shown for their republic, and the endeavours we have used
“ to gain the favour of those who commanded it, have sus-
“ pended our ruin. But we had been undone, had not this
“ war broke out ; which the fate of others leaves no room to
“ doubt.

“ What friendship then, what lasting alliance can be con-
“ cluded with those who never are friends and allies, but when
“ force is employed to make them continue such ? For, as they
“ were obliged to care for us during the war, to prevent our join-
“ ing with the enemy, we were constrained to treat them with
“ the same regard in time of peace, to prevent their falling
“ upon us. That which love produces in other places, was
“ with us the effect of fear. It was this circumstance that
“ made an alliance subsist some time, which both parties were
“ determined to break upon the very first favourable occasion :
“ Let therefore no one accuse us for the advantage we now
“ take. We had not always the same opportunity to save, as
“ they had to ruin us ; but were under a necessity of waiting
“ one, before we could venture to declare ourselves.

“ Such are the motives which now oblige us to solicit your
“ alliance ; the equity and justice of which appear very strong
“ to us, and consequently call upon us to provide for our safe-
“ ty : we should have claimed your protection before, had you
“ been sooner inclined to afford it us ; for we offered ourselves
“ to you, even before the war broke out : we are now come,
“ at the persuasion of the Bœotians your allies, to disengage
“ ourselves from the oppressors of Greece, and join our arms
“ with its defenders ; and to provide for the security of our
“ state, which is now in imminent danger. If any thing can
“ be objected to our conduct, it is, our declaring so precipitate-
“ ly, with more generosity than prudence, and without having
“ made the least preparations. But this also ought to engage
“ you to be more ready in succouring us ; that you may not
“ lose the opportunity of protecting the oppressed, and aveng-
“ ing yourselves on your enemies. There never was a more
“ favourable conjuncture than that which now offers itself ;
“ a conjuncture, when war and pestilence have consumed their
“ forces

“ forces, and exhausted their treasure: not to mention that
“ their fleet is divided, by which means they will not be in a
“ condition to resist you, should you invade them at the same
“ time by sea and land. For, they either will leave us to at-
“ tack you, and give us an opportunity of succouring you;
“ or they will oppose us altogether, and then you will have
“ but half their forces to deal with.

“ For the rest, let no one imagine that you will expose your-
“ selves to danger for a people incapable of doing you service.
“ Our country indeed lies at a considerable distance from you,
“ but our aid is near at hand. For the war will be carried on,
“ not in Attica, as is supposed, but in that country whose re-
“ venues are the support of Attica, and we are not far from
“ it. Consider, also, that in abandoning us, you will increase
“ the power of the Athenians by the addition of ours; and
“ that no state will then dare to take up arms against them.
“ But in succouring us, you will strengthen yourselves with a
“ fleet, which you so much want; you will induce many other
“ people, after our example, to join you; and you will take
“ off the reproach cast upon you, of abandoning those who
“ have recourse to your protection, which will be no inconsider-
“ able advantage to you during the course of the war.

“ We therefore implore you, in the name of Jupiter Olym-
“ pius, in whose temple we now are, not to frustrate the hopes
“ of the Greeks, nor reject suppliants, whose preservation may
“ be highly advantageous, and whose ruin may be infinitely
“ pernicious to you. Show yourselves such now, as the idea
“ entertained of your generosity, and the extreme danger to
“ which we are reduced, may demand; that is, the protec-
“ tors of the afflicted, and the deliverers of Greece.”

The allies, struck with these reasons, admitted them into the alliance of Peloponnesus. An incursion into the enemy's country was immediately resolved, and that the allies should rendezvous at Corinth with two-thirds of their forces. The Lacedemonians arrived first, and prepared engines for transporting the ships from the gulf of Corinth into the sea of Athens, in order to invade Attica both by sea and land. The Athenians were no less active on their side; but the allies, being employed in their harvest, and beginning to grow weary of the war, were a long time before they met.

During this interval, the Athenians, who perceived that all these preparations were made against them, from a supposition that they were very weak; to undeceive the world, and show that they alone were able to support a fleet without the aid of

Lesbos,

Lesbos, put to sea a fleet of 100 sail, which they manned with citizens as well as foreigners; not exempting a single citizen, except such only as were obliged to serve on horseback, or whose revenue amounted to 500 measures of corn. After having showed themselves before the isthmus of Corinth, the more to display their power, they made descents into whatever parts of Peloponnesus they pleased.

The world never saw a finer fleet. The Athenians guarded their own country, and the coasts of Eubœa and Salamis, with a fleet of 100 ships: they cruised round Peloponnesus with another fleet of the like number of vessels, without including their fleet before Lesbos and other places. The whole amounted to upwards of 250 galleys. The expences of this powerful armament entirely exhausted their treasure, which had been very much drained before, by that of the siege of Potidæa.

The Lacedæmonians, greatly surprised at so formidable a fleet, which they no ways expected, returned with the utmost expedition to their own country, and only ordered 40 galleys to be fitted out for the succour of Mitylene. The Athenians had sent a reinforcement thither, consisting of 1000 heavy-armed troops, by whose assistance they made a contravallation, with forts in the most commodious places; so that it was blocked up, both by sea and land, in the beginning of winter. The Athenians were in such great want of money for carrying on this siege, that they were reduced to assess themselves, which they had never done before, and by this means 200 talents were sent to it.

* The people of Mitylene being in want of all things, and having waited to no purpose for the succours which the Lacedæmonians had promised them, surrendered, upon condition that no person should be put to death or imprisoned, till the ambassadors, whom they should send to Athens, were returned; and that, in the mean time, the troops should be admitted into the city. As soon as the Athenians had got possession of the city, such of the factious Mityleneans as had fled to the altars for refuge, were conveyed to Tenedos, and afterwards to Athens. There the affair of the Mityleneans was debated. As their revolt had greatly exasperated the people, because not preceded by any ill treatment, and it seemed a mere effect of their hatred for the Athenians, in the first transports of their rage, they resolved to put all the citizens to death indiscriminately, and to make all the women and children slaves; and immediately they sent a galley to put the decree in execution.

But night gave them leisure to make different reflections. This severity was judged too cruel, and carried farther than consisted with justice. They imaged to themselves the fate of that unhappy city, entirely abandoned to slaughter, and repented their having involved the innocent with the guilty. This sudden change of the Athenians gave the Mitylenean ambassadors some little glimmerings of hope; and they prevailed so far with the magistrates, as to have the affair debated a second time. Cleon, who had suggested the first decree, a man of a fiery temper, and who had great authority over the people, maintained his opinion with great vehemence and heat. He represented, that it was unworthy a wise government to change with every wind, and to annul in the morning what they had decreed the night before; and that it was highly important to take an exemplary vengeance of the Mityleneans, in order to awe the rest of their allies, who were every-where ready to revolt.

Diodorus, who had contradicted Cleon in the first assembly, now opposed his reflections more strongly than before. After describing in a tender and pathetic manner, the deplorable condition of the Mityleneans, whose minds, he said, must necessarily be on the rack, whilst they were expecting a sentence that was to determine their fate; he represented to the Athenians, that the fame of their mildness and clemency had always reflected the highest honour on them, and distinguished them gloriously from all other nations: he observed, that the citizens of Mitylene had been drawn involuntarily into the rebellion; a proof of which was, their surrendering the city to them, the instant it was in their power to do it; they therefore, by this decree, would murder their benefactors, and consequently be both unjust and ungrateful, in punishing the innocent with the guilty. He observed farther, that supposing the Mityleneans in general were guilty, it would however be for the interest of the Athenians to dissemble, in order that the rigorous punishment they had decreed might not exasperate the rest of the allies; and that the best way to put a stop to the evil, would be, to leave room for repentance, and not plunge people into despair, by the absolute and irrevocable refusal of a pardon. His opinion therefore was, that they should examine very deliberately the cause of those factious Mityleneans who had been brought to Athens, and pardon all the rest.

The assembly was very much divided, so that Diodorus carried it only by a few votes. A second galley was therefore immediately fitted out. It was furnished with every thing
that

that might accelerate its course ; and the ambassadors of Mitylene promised a great reward to the crew, provided they arrived time enough. They therefore did not quit their oars, even when they took sustenance, but ate and drank as they rowed, and took their rest alternately ; and very happily for them, the wind was favourable. The first galley had got a day and night's sail before them ; but as those on board carried ill news, they did not make great haste. Its arrival before the city had spread the utmost consternation in every part of it : But it increased infinitely, when the decree, by which all the citizens were sentenced to die, was read in a full assembly. Nothing was now heard in all places but cries and loud laments. The moment that the sentence was going to be put in execution, advice came that a second galley was arrived. Immediately the cruel massacre was suspended. The assembly was again convened ; and the decree which granted a pardon, was listened to with such a silence and joy, as is much easier conceived than expressed.

All the factious Mityleneans, though upwards of 1000, were put to death. The city was afterwards dismantled, the ships delivered up, and the whole island, the city of Methymne excepted, was divided into 3000 parts or portions, 300 of which were consecrated to the service of the gods ; and the rest divided by lot, among such Athenians as were sent thither, to whom the natives of the country gave a revenue of two minæ for every portion ; on which condition they were permitted to keep possession of the island, but not as proprietors. The cities which belonged to the Mityleneans on the coast of Asia, were all subjected by the Athenians.

* During the winter of the preceding campaign, the inhabitants of Plataea, having lost all hopes of succour, and being in the utmost want of provisions, formed a resolution to cut their way through the enemy : but half of them, struck with the greatness of the danger, and the boldness of the enterprise, entirely lost courage when they came to the execution ; but the rest, who were about 220 soldiers, persisted in their resolution, and escaped in the following manner.

Before I begin the description of their escape, it will be proper to inform my readers, in what sense I use certain expressions I shall employ in it. In strictness of speech, the line or fortification which is made round a city when besieged, to prevent sallies, is called Contravallation ; and that which is made to prevent any succours from without, is named Circumvallation.

Both these fortifications were used in the siege; however, for brevity's sake, I shall use only the former term.

The contravallation consisted of two walls, at 16 feet distance one from the other. The space between the two walls being a kind of platform or terrace, seemed to be but one single building, and composed a range of caserns or barracks, where the soldiers had their lodgings. Lofty towers were built around it at proper distances, extending from one wall to the other, in order that they might be able to defend themselves at the same time against any attack from within and without. There was no going from one casern to another without crossing these towers; and on the top of the wall was a parapet on both sides, where a guard was commonly kept; but in rainy weather, the soldiers used to shelter themselves in the towers, which served in the nature of guard-houses. Such was the contravallation, on both sides of which was a ditch, the earth of which had been employed in making the bricks of the wall.

The besieged first took the height of the wall, by counting the rows of bricks which composed it; and this they did at different times, and employed several men for that purpose, in order that they might not mistake in the calculation. This was the easier, because as the wall stood but at a small distance, every part of it was very visible. They then made ladders of a proper length.

All things being now ready for executing the design, the besieged left the city one night when there was no moon, in the midst of a storm of wind and rain. After crossing the first ditch, they drew near to the wall undiscovered, through the darkness of the night; not to mention that the noise made by the rain and wind prevented their being heard. They marched at some distance from one another, to prevent the clashing of their arms, which were light, in order that those who carried them might be the more active; and one of their legs was naked, to keep them from sliding so easily in the mire. Those who carried the ladders laid them in the space between the towers, where they knew no guard was posted, because it rained. That instant 12 men mounted the ladders, armed with only a coat of mail, and a dagger, and marched directly to the towers, six on each side. They were followed by soldiers armed only with javelins, that they might mount the easier; and their shields were carried after them to be used in the charge.

When the most of these were got to the top of the wall, they were discovered by the falling of a tile, which one of their comrades, in taking hold of the parapet, had thrown down. The
alarm

alarm was immediately given from the towers, and the whole camp approached the wall without discovering the occasion of the outcry, from the gloom of the night, and the violence of the storm. Besides which, those who had staid behind in the city, beat an alarm at the same time in another quarter, to make a diversion; so that the enemy did not know which way to turn themselves, and were afraid to quit their posts. But a corps de reserve of 300 men, who were kept for any unforeseen accident that might happen, quitted the contravallation, and ran to that part where they heard the noise; and torches were held up towards Thebes, to shew that they must run that way. But those in the city, to render the signal of no use, made others at the same time in different quarters, having prepared them on the wall for that purpose.

In the mean time, those who had mounted first having possessed themselves of the two towers which flanked the interval where the ladders were set, and having killed those who guarded them, posted themselves there to defend the passage, and keep off the besiegers. Then setting ladders from the top of the wall against the two towers, they caused a good number of their comrades to mount, in order to keep off, by the discharge of their arrows, as well those who were advancing to the foot of the wall, as the others who were hastening from the neighbouring towers. Whilst this was doing, they had time to set up several ladders, and to throw down the parapet, that the rest might come up with greater ease. As fast as they came up, they went down on the other side, and drew up near the fosse on the outside, to shoot at those who appeared. After they were passed over, the men who were in the towers came down last, and made to the fosse to follow after the rest.

That instant the guard of 300, with torches, came up. However, as the Platæans saw their enemies by this light better than they were seen by them, they took a surer aim, by which means the last crossed the ditch, without being attacked in their passage: however, this was not done without difficulty, because the ditch was frozen over, and the ice would not bear, on account of the thaw and heavy rains. The violence of the storm was of great advantage to them.

After all were passed, they took the road towards Thebes, the better to conceal their retreat; because it was not likely that they had fled towards a city of the enemy's. Immediately they perceived the besiegers, with torches in their hands, pursuing them in the road that led to Athens. After keeping

that of Thebes about six or seven * stadia, they turned short toward the mountain, and resumed the route of Athens, whither 212 arrived, out of 220 who had quitted the place; the rest having returned back to it through fear, one archer excepted, who was taken on the side of the fosse of contravallation. The besiegers, after having pursued them to no purpose, returned to their camp.

In the mean time, the Platæans who remained in the city, supposing that all their companions had been killed, because those who were returned, to justify themselves, affirmed they were, sent a herald to demand the dead bodies; but being told the true state of the affair, he withdrew.

† About the end of the following campaign, which is that wherein Mitylene was taken, the Platæans, being in absolute want of provisions, and unable to make the least defence, surrendered, upon condition that they should not be punished till they had been tried and adjudged in form of justice. Five commissioners came for this purpose from Lacedæmon; and these, without charging them with any crime, barely asked them whether they had done any service to the Lacedæmonians and the allies in this war? The Platæans were much surprised, as well as puzzled at this question; and were sensible, that it had been suggested by the Thebans, their professed enemies, who had vowed their destruction. They therefore put the Lacedæmonians in mind of the services they had done to Greece in general, both at the battle of Artemisium, and that of Platæa; and particularly in Lacedæmonia, at the time of the earthquake, which was followed by the revolt of their slaves. The only reason, they declared, of their having joined the Athenians afterwards, was, to defend themselves from the hostilities of the Thebans, against whom they had implored the assistance of the Lacedæmonians to no purpose: that if that was imputed to them for a crime, which was only their misfortune, it ought not however entirely to obliterate the remembrance of their former services. “Cast your eyes,” said they, “on the monuments of your ancestors which you see here, to whom we annually pay all the honours which can be rendered to the manes of the dead. You thought fit to intrust their bodies with us, as we were eye-witnesses of their bravery: and yet you will now give up their ashes to their murderers, in abandoning us to the Thebans, who

* Upwards of a quarter of a league.

† Thucyd. l. i. p. 208—220. Diod. l. xii. p. 109.

“ fought against them at the battle of Platæa. Will you en-
 “ slave a province where Greece recovered its liberty? Will
 “ you destroy the temples of those gods, to whom you owe
 “ the victory? Will you abolish the memory of their founders,
 “ who contributed so greatly to your safety? On this occa-
 “ sion, we may venture to say, our interest is inseparable from
 “ your glory; and you cannot deliver up your ancient friends
 “ and benefactors to the unjust hatred of the Thebans, with-
 “ out eternal infamy to yourselves.”

One would conclude, that these just remonstrances should have made some impression on the Lacedæmonians; but they were biassed more by the answer the Thebans made, and which was expressed in the most haughty and bitter terms against the Platæans; and besides, they had brought their instructions from Lacedæmon. They stood therefore to their first ques- tion, “ Whether the Platæans had done them any service since
 “ the war?” and making them pass one after another, as they severally answered No, he was immediately butchered, and not one escaped. About 200 were killed in this manner; and 25 Athenians, who were among them, met with the same unhappy fate. Their wives, who had been taken prisoners, were made slaves. The Thebans afterwards peopled their city with exiles from Megara and Platæa; but the year after they demolished it entirely. It was in this manner the Lacedæmonians, in the hopes of reaping great advantages from the Thebans, sacrificed the Platæans to their animosity, 93 years after their first alliance with the Athenians.

* In the sixth year of the war of Peloponnesus, the plague broke out anew in Athens, and again swept away great numbers.

SECTION IV.

THE ATHENIANS POSSESS THEMSELVES OF PYLUS, &c.—
 SIXTH AND SEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I pass over several particular incidents of the succeeding campaigns, which differ very little from one another; the Lacedæmonians making regularly every year incursions into Attica, and the Athenians into Peloponnesus: I likewise omit some sieges in different places: † that of Pylus, a little city of Messenia, only 400 furlongs ‡ from Lacedæmon, was one of the most

* A. M. 3578. Ant. J. C. 426. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 232.

† A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 253—280. Diod. l. xii. p. 112—114.

‡ 20 French leagues.

considerable. The Athenians, headed by Demosthenes, had taken that city, and fortified themselves very strongly in it; this was the seventh year of the war. The Lacedæmonians left Attica immediately, in order to go and recover, if possible, that place, and accordingly they attacked it both by sea and land. Brasidas, one of their leaders, signalized himself here by the most extraordinary acts of bravery. Opposite to the city was a little island called Sphacteria, whence the besieged might be greatly annoyed, and the entrance of the harbour shut up. They therefore threw a chosen body of Lacedæmonians into it; making, in all, 420, exclusive of the helots. A battle was fought at sea, in which the Athenians were victorious, and accordingly erected a trophy. They surrounded the island; and set a guard in every part of it, to prevent any of the inhabitants from going out, or any provisions from being brought in to them.

The news of the defeat being come to Sparta, the magistrate thought the affair of the utmost importance, and therefore came himself upon the spot, in order that he might be better able to take proper measures; when concluding that it would be impossible for him to save those who were in the island; and that they at last must necessarily be starved out, or be taken by some other means, he proposed an accommodation. A suspension of arms was concluded, in order to give the Lacedæmonians time to send to Athens; but upon condition that in the mean time they should surrender up all their galleys, and not attack the place either by sea or land, till the return of the ambassadors: that if they complied with these conditions, the Athenians would permit them to carry provisions to those who were in the island, at the * rate of so much for the master, and half for the servant; and that the whole should be done publicly, and in sight of both armies: that, on the other side, the Athenians should be allowed to keep guard round the island, to prevent any thing from going in or out of it, but should not attack it in any manner: that in case this agreement should be infringed in the least, the truce should be broke; otherwise, that it should continue in full force till the return of the ambassadors, whom the Athenians obliged themselves, by the articles, to convey backwards and forwards; and that then the Lacedæmonians should have their ships re-

* For the masters, two Attic chœnices of flour, making about four pounds and a half, two cotyles, or half pints of wine, and a piece of meat; with half this quantity for the servants.

flored, in the same condition in which they had been delivered up. Such were the articles of the treaty. The Lacedæmonians began to put it in execution, by surrendering about 60 ships; after which they sent ambassadors to Athens.

Being admitted to audience before the people, they began by saying, that they were come to the Athenians to sue for that peace, which they themselves were, a little before, in a condition to grant: that they now might acquire the glory of having restored the tranquillity of all Greece, as the Lacedæmonians consented to their being arbitrators in this treaty: that the danger to which their citizens were exposed in the island, had determined them to take such a step as could not but be very grating to the Lacedæmonians: however, that their affairs were far from being desperate, and therefore, that now was the time to establish, between the two republics, a firm and solid friendship; because the affairs of both were still fluctuating, and fortune had not yet declared absolutely in favour of either: that the gods frequently abandoned those whom success makes proud, by shifting the scene, and rendering them as unfortunate as they before had been happy: that they ought to consider, that the fate of arms is very uncertain; and that the means to establish a lasting peace, is not to triumph over an enemy by oppressing him, but to agree to a reconciliation on just and reasonable terms: for then, conquered by generosity and not by violence, his future thoughts being all employed, not on revenge, but on gratitude, he is delighted, and thinks it his duty, to observe his engagements with inviolable fidelity.

The Athenians had now an happy opportunity for terminating the war, by a peace which would have been as glorious to them, as advantageous to all Greece. But Cleon, who had a great ascendant over the people, prevented its taking effect. They therefore answered, by his advice, that those who were in the island should first surrender at discretion; and afterwards be carried to Athens, on the condition of being sent back from it, as soon as the Lacedæmonians should have restored the cities, &c. which the Athenians had been forced to give up by the last treaty; and that these things being done, a firm and lasting peace should be concluded. The Lacedæmonians demanded that deputies should be appointed, and that the Athenians should engage to ratify what they should conclude. But Cleon exclaimed against this proposal, and said, it was plain they did not deal fairly, since they would not transact with the people, but with particular men, whom they might easily bribe; and

that, if they had any thing to offer, they should do it immediately. The Lacedæmonians, finding there was no possibility for them to treat with the people, without advising with their allies, and that if any thing had been granted by them to their prejudice, they must be responsible for it, went away without concluding any thing; fully persuaded that they must not expect equitable treatment from the Athenians, in the present state of their affairs and disposition from prosperity.

As soon as they were returned to Pylus, the suspension ceased; but when the Lacedæmonians came to demand back their ships, the Athenians refused to give them up, upon pretence that the treaty had been infringed in some particulars of little consequence. The Lacedæmonians inveighed strongly against this refusal, as being a manifest perfidy; and immediately prepared for war with greater vigour and animosity than before. A haughty carriage in success, and want of faith in the observation of treaties, never fail, at last, to involve a people in great calamities. This will appear by what follows.

The Athenians continued to keep a strict guard round the island, to prevent any provisions from being brought into it, and hoped they should soon be able to starve out the inhabitants. But the Lacedæmonians engaged the whole country in their interest by the views of gain, laying a heavy tax upon provisions, and giving such slaves their freedom as should run any into it. Provisions were therefore now brought, at the hazard of men's lives, from all parts of Peloponnesus. There were even divers who swam from the coast to the island, opposite to the harbour, and drew after them goat-skins filled with pounded linseed, and poppies mixed with honey.

Those who were besieged in Pylus were reduced to almost the like extremities, being in want both of water and provisions. When advice was brought to Athens, that their countrymen, so far from reducing the enemy by famine, were themselves almost starved; it was feared, that as it would not be possible for the fleet to subsist during the winter, on a desert coast which belonged to the enemy, nor to lie at anchor in so dangerous a road, the island must by that means be less securely guarded, which would give the prisoners an opportunity of escaping. But the circumstance they chiefly dreaded was, lest the Lacedæmonians, after their countrymen were once extricated from their danger, should refuse to hearken to any conditions of peace; so that they now repented their having refused it when offered them.

Cleon saw plainly that these complaints would terminate in him.

him. He therefore began by asserting, that it was all a false report concerning the extreme want of provisions, to which the Athenians, both within and without Pylus, were said to be reduced. He next exclaimed, in presence of the people, against the supineness and inactivity of the leaders who besieged the island, pretending, that were they to exert the least bravery, they might soon take the island; and that had he commanded, he would soon have taken it. Upon this he was immediately appointed to command the expedition; Nicias, who was before elected, resigning voluntarily that honour to him, either through weakness (for he was naturally timid), or out of a political view, in order that the ill success which it was generally believed Cleon would meet with in this enterprise, might lose him the favour of the people. But now Cleon was greatly surprised as well as embarrassed; for he did not expect that the Athenians would take him at his word, he being a finer talker than soldier, and much more able with his tongue than his sword. However, he desired leave to waive the honour they offered him, for which he alleged several excuses: but finding that the more he declined the command, the more they pressed him to accept it, he changed his note; and supplying his want of courage with rodomontade, he declared before the whole assembly, with a firm and resolute air, that he would bring, in 20 days, those of the island prisoners, or lose his life. The whole assembly, on hearing those words, set up a laugh, for they knew the man.

Cleon however, contrary to the expectation of every body, made good his words. He and Demosthenes (the other chief) landed in the island, attacked the enemy with great vigour, drove them from post to post, and gaining ground perpetually, at last forced them to the extremity of the island. The Lacedæmonians had stormed a fort that was thought inaccessible. There they drew up in battle-array, faced about to that side only where they could be attacked, and defended themselves like so many lions. As the engagement had held the greatest part of the day, and the soldiers were oppressed with heat and weariness, and parched with thirst, the general of the Messenians, directing himself to Cleon and Demosthenes, said, that all their efforts would be to no purpose, unless they charged their enemy's rear; and promised, if they would give him but some troops armed with missile weapons, that he would endeavour to find a passage. Accordingly, he and his followers climbed up certain steep and craggy places which were not guarded, when coming down unperceived into the fort, he
appeared

appeared on a sudden at the backs of the Lacedæmonians, which entirely damped their courage, and afterwards completed their overthrow. They now made but a very feeble resistance; and being oppressed with numbers, attacked on all sides, and dejected through fatigue and despair, they began to give way: but the Athenians seized on all the passes to cut off their retreat. Cleon and Demosthenes, finding that should the battle continue, not a man of them would escape, and being desirous of carrying them alive to Athens, they commanded their soldiers to desist, and caused proclamation to be made by a herald, for them to lay down their arms and surrender at discretion. At these words, the greatest part lowered their shields, and clapped their hands in token of approbation. A kind of suspension of arms was agreed upon; and their commander desired leave might be granted him to dispatch a messenger to the camp, to know the resolution of the generals. This was not allowed, but they called heralds from the coast; and after several messages, a Lacedæmonian advanced forward, and cried aloud, that they were permitted to treat with the enemy, provided they did not submit to dishonourable terms. Upon this they held a conference; after which they surrendered at discretion, and were kept till the next day. The Athenians then raising a trophy, and restoring the Lacedæmonians their dead, embarked for their own country, after distributing the prisoners among the several ships, and committing the guard of them to the captain of the galleys.

In this battle 128 Lacedæmonians fell, out of 420, which was their number at first; so that there survived not quite 300, 120 of whom were Spartans, that is, inhabitants of the city of Sparta. The siege of the island, to compute from the beginning of it, including the time employed in the truce, had lasted 72 days. They all now left Pylus; and Cleon's promise, though so vain and rash, was found literally true. But the most surprising circumstance was, the capitulation that had been made; for it was believed that the Lacedæmonians, so far from surrendering their arms, would die sword in hand.

Being come to Athens, they were ordered to remain prisoners till a peace should be concluded, provided the Lacedæmonians did not make any incursions into their country, for that then they should all be put to death. They left a garrison in Pylus. The Messenians of Naupactus, who had formerly possessed it, sent thither the flower of their youth, who very much infested the Lacedæmonians by their incursions; and as these

Messenians

Messenians spoke the language of the country, they prevailed with a great number of slaves to join them. The Lacedæmonians, dreading a greater evil, sent deputations to Athens, but to no purpose; the Athenians being too much elated with their prosperity, and especially their late success, to listen to any terms.

* In the seventh year of the Peloponnesian war, Artaxerxes sent to the Lacedæmonians an ambassador named Artaphernes, with a letter written in the Assyrian language, in which he said, that he had received many embassies from them, but the purport of them all differed so widely, that he could not comprehend in any manner what it was they requested: that in this uncertainty, he had thought proper to send a Persian, to acquaint them, that if they had any proposal to make, they should send a person in whom they could confide along with him, from whom he might be exactly informed in what they desired. This ambassador, arriving at Eion on the river Strymon in Thrace, was there taken prisoner, about the close of this year, by one of the admirals of the Athenian fleet, who sent him to Athens. He was treated with the utmost civility and respect; the Athenians being extremely desirous of recovering the favour of the king his master.

The year following, as soon as the season would permit the Athenians to put to sea, they sent the ambassador back in one of their ships at the public expence; and appointed some of their citizens to wait upon him at the court of Persia, in quality of ambassadors. Upon landing at Ephesus, they were informed that Artaxerxes was dead; whereupon the Athenian ambassadors, thinking it not adviseable to proceed farther after this news, took leave of Artaphernes, and returned to their own country.

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 285, 286.

BOOK EIGHTH.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE
PERSIANS AND GRECIANS,
CONTINUED DURING THE REIGNS OF
XERXES II. OF SOGDIANUS, AND OF DARIUS NÖTHUS.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains 13 years of the Peloponnesian war, to the 19th inclusively.

SECTION I.

THE VERY SHORT REIGNS OF XERXES II. AND SOGDIANUS, &c.

ARTAXERXES died about the beginning of the 49th year of his reign*. Xerxes, who succeeded him, was the only son which the queen his wife brought him: but he had 17 others by his concubines, among whom were Sogdianus (who is called Secondianus by Ctesias), Ochus, and Arsites. † Sogdianus, in concert with Pharnacias, one of Xerxes's eunuchs, came insidiously, one festival day, to the new king, who, after drinking too immoderately, was retired to his chamber, in order to give the fumes of the wine he had drank time to evaporate; where he killed him without any difficulty, after he had reigned but 45 days; and was declared king in his stead.

He was scarce on the throne, but he put to death Bagorazus, the most faithful of his father's eunuchs. It was he who

* A. M. 3579. Ant. J. C. 425. Ctes. c. xlvii—li. Diod. l. xii. p. 115.

† A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424.

had been appointed to superintend the interment of Artaxerxes, and of the queen, Xerxes's mother, who died the same day with her royal consort. After having deposited the two bodies in the mausolæum, where the kings of Persia were interred, he found, at his return, Sogdianus on the throne, who did not receive him favourably, upon account of some difference with him in the life-time of his father. But the new king did not stop here : not long after he took an opportunity to quarrel with him on some trifling circumstance relating to the obsequies of his father, and caused him to be stoned.

By these two murders, that of his brother Xerxes and of Bagorazus, he became the horror of the army and nobility, so that he did not think himself safe on a throne, to which he had forced his way by such horrid murders. He suspected that his brothers harboured the like design ; and Ochus, to whom his father had left the government of Hyrcania, was the chief object of his suspicion. Accordingly he sent for him, with the intention of getting him murdered as soon as he arrived. However Ochus, who saw through his design, delayed coming upon various pretences ; which he continued till he advanced at the head of a strong army, which he openly declared he would employ to revenge the death of his brother Xerxes. This declaration brought over to him a great number of the nobility, and several governors of the provinces, they being justly dissatisfied at Sogdianus's cruelty and ill conduct. They put the tiara on Ochus's head, and proclaimed him king. Sogdianus, seeing himself abandoned in this manner, was as mean and cowardly in the slight defence he made to maintain his crown, as he had before been unjust and barbarous in usurping it. Contrary to the advice of his best friends, and the wisest persons who still adhered to him, he concluded a treaty with his brother, who, getting him into his hands, caused him to be thrown into ashes, where he died a cruel death. * This was a kind of punishment peculiar to the Persians, and exercised only on great criminals. One of the largest towers was filled to a certain height with ashes. The criminal then was thrown headlong from the top of the tower into them ; after which the ashes were by a wheel turned perpetually round him till he was suffocated. Thus this wicked prince lost his life and empire, which he enjoyed six months and fifteen days.

Ochus, by the death of Sogdianus, now saw himself possess-

* Val. Max. l. ix. c. ii. 2 Maccab. c. xiii. l. iii.

fed of the empire. As foon as he was well fettled in it, he changed * his name from Ochus to that of Darius. To diftinguifh him, hiftorians add the epithet *Néce*, fignifying baf-tard. He reigned 19 years.

Arftes, feeing in what manner Sogdianus had fupplanted Xerxes, and had himfelf been dethroned by Ochus, meditated to ferve the latter in the fame manner. Though he was his brother by the father's as well as the mother's fide, he openly revolted againft him, and was affifted in it by Artyphius, fon of Megabyzus. Ochus, whom hereafter we fhall always call Darius, fent Artafyras, one of his generals, againft Artyphius; and himfelf, at the head of another army, marched againft Arftes. Artyphius, with the Grecian troops in his pay, defeated twice the general fent againft him. But, engaging a third time, the Greeks were corrupted, and he himfelf was beat, and forced to furrender, upon his being flattered with hopes that a pardon would be granted him. The king would have him put to death, but was diverted from that refolution by queen Paryfatis, Darius's fifter and queen. She alfo was the daughter of Artaxerxes, but not by the fame mother as Darius: She was an intriguing, artful woman, and the king her husband was governed by her on moft occafions. The counfel fhe now gave was perfidious to the laft degree. She advifed him to exerceife his clemency towards Artyphius, and fhew him kind ufage, in order that his brother might hope, when he heard of his treating a rebellious fervant with fo much generofity, that he himfelf fhould meet, at leaft, with as mild treatment, and thereby be prompted to lay down his arms. She added, that when once he fhould have feized that prince, he might difpofe of him and Artyphius as he pleafed. Darius followed her counfel, which proved fuccefsful. Arftes being informed of the gentle ufage which Artyphius met with, concluded, that as he was the king's brother, he fhould confequently meet with ftill more indulgent treatment; and with this hope he concluded a treaty, and furrendered himfelf. Darius was very much inclined to fave his life: but Paryfatis, by inculcating to him, that he ought to punifh this rebel to fecure himfelf, at laft prevailed with him to put his brother to death, and accordingly he was fuffocated in afhes with Artyphius. However, Darius had a violent ftruggle with himfelf, before he could give orders for this facrifice, having a very tender affection for his brother. He afterwards put fome

* A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 432.

other persons to death; which executions did not procure him the tranquillity he had expected from them; for his reign was afterwards disturbed with such violent commotions, that he enjoyed but little repose.

* One of the most dangerous commotions was occasioned by the rebellion of Pisuthnes, who, being governor of Lydia, wanted to throw off his allegiance to the Persian empire, and make himself king in his province. What flattered him with the hopes of succeeding in this attempt, was, his having raised a considerable body of Grecian troops, under the command of Lycon the Athenian. Darius sent Tissaphernes against this rebel, and gave him, with a considerable army, the commission of governor of Lydia, of which he was to dispossess Pisuthnes. Tissaphernes, who was an artful man, and capable of acting in all characters, found means of tampering with the Greeks under Pisuthnes; and by dint of presents and promises, brought over the troops with their general to his party. Pisuthnes, who, by this desertion, was unable to carry on his designs, surrendered, upon his being flattered with the hopes of obtaining his pardon; but the instant he was brought before the king, he was sentenced to be suffocated in ashes, and accordingly met with the same fate as the rest of the rebels. But his death did not put an end to all troubles; † for Amonges his son, with the remainder of his army, still opposed Tissaphernes; and for two years laid waste the maritime provinces of Asia Minor, till he at last was taken by the Greeks of Peloponnesus, in Iasus, a city of Ionia, and delivered up by the inhabitants to Tissaphernes, who put him to death.

‡ Darius was involved in fresh troubles by one of his eunuchs. This kind of officers had, for many years, engrossed all power in the court of Persia; and we shall find, by the sequel of this history, that they always governed absolutely in it. § We may know their character, and the danger to which they expose princes, by the picture which Dioclesian, after he had resigned the empire, and reduced himself to a private station of life, drew of freedmen, who had gained a like ascendancy over the Roman emperors. “Four or five persons,” says he, “who are closely united, and resolutely determined to impose on a prince, may do it very easily. They never show things to him but in such a light as they are sure will please. They

* A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414. Ctes. c. li.

† Thucyd. l. viii. p. 554—568.

§ Vopis. in vit. Aurelian. Imper.

‡ Ctes. c. li.

“conceal whatever would contribute to enlighten him: and
 “as they only besiege him continually, he cannot be inform-
 “ed of any thing but through their channel, and does nothing
 “but what they think fit to suggest to him. Hence it is,
 “that he bestows employments on those he ought to exclude
 “from them; and, on the other side, removes from offices
 “such persons as are most worthy of filling them. In a word,
 “the best prince is often sold by these men, though he be
 “ever so vigilant, and even suspicious of them. *Quid multa?*
 “*Ut Diocletianus ipse dicebat, bonus, cautus, optimus venditur*
 “*imperator.*

In this manner was Darius's court governed. Three eunuchs had usurped all power in it; * an infallible mark that a government is bad, and the prince of little merit. But one of those three eunuchs, whose name was Artoxares, presided over, and governed the rest. He had found Darius's weak side, by which he insinuated himself into his confidence. He had studied all his passions, to know how to indulge them, and govern his prince by their means. He plunged him continually in pleasures and amusements, to engross his whole authority to himself. In fine, under the name and protection of queen Parysatis, to whose will and pleasure he was the most devoted of slaves, he disposed of all the affairs of the empire, and nothing was transacted but by his orders. Intoxicated by the supreme authority which the favour of his sovereign gave him, he resolved to make himself king, instead of being prime minister; and accordingly formed a design to get Darius out of the way, and afterwards ascend the throne. However, his plot being discovered, he was seized and delivered up to Parysatis, who put him to a most ignominious and cruel death.

† But the greatest misfortune which happened in Darius's reign, was the revolt of the Egyptians. This terrible blow fell out the same year with Pisuthnes's rebellion. But Darius could not reduce Egypt as he had done that rebel. ‡ The Egyptians, weary of the Persian government, flocked from all parts to Amyrtæus of Sais, who at last was come out of the fens where he had defended himself, from the suppression of the revolt of Inarus. The Persians were drove out, and Amyrtæus proclaimed king of Egypt, where he reigned six years.

After having established himself securely on the throne, and

* Scis præcipuum esse indicium non magni principis, magnos libertos. Plin. ad Trajan.

† Euseb. in Chron.

‡ Thucyd. l. i. p. 72, 73.

entirely expelled the Persians out of Egypt, he prepared to pursue them as far as Phœnicia, and had already concerted measures with the Arabians, to attack them in that country. News of this being brought the king of Persia, he recalled the fleet which he had promised the Lacedæmonians, to employ it in the defence of his own dominions.

Whilst Darius was carrying on the war in Egypt and Arabia, the Medes rebelled; however, they were defeated, and reduced to their allegiance by force of arms. To punish them for this revolt, their yoke, till then easy enough, was made heavier: a fate that rebellious subjects always experience, when the government, which they endeavoured to throw off, gains the upper hand.

* Darius's arms seem to have had the like success against the Egyptians. Amyrtæus dying after he had reigned six years (he possibly was killed in a battle), Herodotus observes, it was by the assistance of the Persians that Pausiris his son succeeded him in the throne. To effect this, they must either have been masters of Egypt, or their party the strongest in that kingdom.

† After having crushed the rebels in Media, and restored the affairs of Egypt to their former situation, Darius gave Cyrus, the youngest of his sons, the supreme command of all the provinces of Asia Minor: an important commission, by which he commanded all the provincial governors in that part of the empire.

I thought it necessary to anticipate times, and draw together the facts which relate to the kings of Persia; to prevent my being often obliged to interrupt the history of the Greeks, to which I now return.

SECTION II.

THE ATHENIANS MAKE THEMSELVES MASTERS OF THE
ISLAND OF CYTHERA, &c. &c.

THE EIGHTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE three or four campaigns which followed the reduction of the small island of Sphacteria, were distinguished by very few considerable events.

‡ The Athenians under Nicias took the little island of Cy-

* Herod. l. iii. c. 15.

† A. M. 3597. Ant. J. C. 407.

‡ A. M. 3580. Ant. J. C. 424. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 286.

thera, situated on the coast of Lacedæmonia, near cape Malea, and from thence they infested the whole country.

* Brasidas, on the other side, marched towards Thrace. The Lacedæmonians were induced by more than one motive to undertake this expedition; imagining they should oblige the Athenians, who had fallen upon them in their country, to divide their forces. The inhabitants of it invited them thither, and offered to pay the army. In fine, they were extremely glad to embrace that opportunity, to rid themselves of the helots, whom they expected to rise in rebellion, from the taking of Pylus. They had already made away with 2000 of them in a most horrid manner. Upon the specious pretence of rewarding merit even in slaves, but, in reality, to get rid of a body of men whose courage they dreaded, they caused proclamation to be made, that such of the helots as had done the greatest service to the state in the last campaigns, should enter their names in the public registers, in order for their being made free. Accordingly 2000 gave in their names. They were carried in procession through the temples, with chaplets of flowers on their heads, as if they were really to be set at liberty. After this ceremony, they all disappeared, and were never heard of more. We have here an instance, in what manner an umbrageous policy and power, when filled with jealousy and distrust, excite men to the commission of the blackest crimes, without scrupling to make even religion itself, and the authority of the gods, subservient to their dark designs.

They therefore sent 700 helots with Brasidas, whom they had appointed to head this enterprize. This general brought over several cities, either by force or intelligence, and still more by his wisdom and moderation. The chief of these were Acanthus and Stagyra, which were two colonies from Andros. † He also marched afterwards towards Amphipolis, an Athenian colony, on the river Strymon. The inhabitants immediately dispatched a messenger to ‡ Thucydides the Athenian general, who was then in Thasus, a little island of the Ægæan sea, half a day's journey from Amphipolis. He instantly set sail with seven ships that were near him, to secure the place before Brasidas could seize it; or, at worst, to get into Eion, which lay near Amphipolis. Brasidas, who was afraid of Thucydides, from his great credit in all that country, where he

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 304—311. Diod. l. xii. p. 117, 118.

† Thucyd. l. iv. p. 320—324.

‡ The same who wrote the history of the Peloponnesian war.

was possessed of some gold mines, made all the dispatch imaginable to get thither before him; and offered such advantageous conditions to the besieged, who did not expect succours so soon, that they surrendered. Thucydides arrived the same evening at Eion; and had he failed to come that day, Brasidas would have taken possession of it the next morning by day-break. Although Thucydides had made all imaginable dispatch, the Athenians however charged him with being the cause of the taking of Amphipolis, and accordingly banished him.

The Athenians were greatly afflicted at the loss of that city, as well because they drew great revenues from it, and timber to build their ships, as because it was a kind of gate for entering Thrace. They were afraid that all their allies in that neighbourhood would revolt; especially as Brasidas discovered great moderation and justice, and continually gave out, that he came with no other view but to free the country. He declared to the several nations, that at his leaving Sparta he had taken an oath, in presence of the magistrates, to leave all those the enjoyment of their liberties, who would conclude an alliance with him; and that he ought to be considered as the most abandoned of men, should he employ oaths to ensnare their credulity. "For," according to Brasidas, "a fraud cloaked with a specious pretence, reflects infinitely greater dishonour on persons of high stations, than open violence; because the latter is the effect of the power which fortune has put into our hands; and the former is founded wholly on perfidy, which is the pest of society. Now I," said he, "should do a great disservice to my country, besides dishonouring it eternally, if, by procuring it some slight advantages, I should ruin the reputation it enjoys, of being just and faithful to its promises; which renders it much more powerful than all its forces united together, because it acquires it the esteem and confidence of other states." Upon such noble and equitable principles as these Brasidas always formed his conduct; believing, that the strongest bulwark of a nation is justice, moderation, integrity, and a firm persuasion which their neighbours and allies entertain, that they are not so base as to harbour a design to usurp their dominions, or deprive them of their liberty. By this conduct he brought over a great number of the enemy's allies.

* The Athenians, under the command of Demosthenes and

* Thucyd. l. iv. p. 311—319.

Hippocrates, had entered Bœotia, expecting that several cities would join them the moment they should appear. The Thebans marched out to meet them near Delium. A considerable engagement ensued, in which the Athenians were defeated and put to flight. * Socrates was in this battle; and Laches, who accompanied that great man in it, gives the following testimony of him in Plato; that had the rest of the army behaved as gallantly as Socrates, the Athenians would not have sustained so great a loss before Delium. He was borne away by the crowds who fled, and was on foot. Alcibiades, who was on horseback, when he saw him, rode up to him, and did not stir from him, but defended him with the utmost bravery from the enemy who were pursuing him.

After the battle, the victors besieged the city. Among other engines employed by them to batter it, they used one of a very extraordinary kind. This was a long piece of timber, cut into two parts, and afterwards made hollow and joined again, so that its shape resembled very much that of a flute. At one of the ends was fixed a long iron tube, to which a cauldron hung; so that by blowing a large pair of bellows at the other end of the piece of timber, the wind being carried from thence into the tube, lighted a great fire, with pitch and brimstone, that lay in the cauldron. This engine being carried on carts as far as the rampart to that part where it was lined with stakes and fascines, threw out so great a flame, that the rampart being immediately abandoned, and the pallisades burned, the city was easily taken.

SECTION III.

A TWELVEMONTH'S TRUCE IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN
THE TWO STATES, &c. &c.

NINTH, TENTH, AND ELEVENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

THE losses and advantages on both sides were pretty equal†; and the two nations began to grow weary of a war, which put them to great expence, and did not procure them any real advantage. A truce, for a year, was therefore concluded between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians. The former resolved on it, in order to check the progress of Brasidas's conquests; to

* Plut. in Lach. p. 181. In conviv. p. 221. Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

† A. M. 3581. Ant. J. C. 423. Thucyd. l. iv. p. 328—333. Diod. l. xii. p. 120.

secure their cities and fortresses; and afterwards to conclude a general peace, in case they judged it would be of advantage to them. The latter were induced to it, in order that by the sweets of repose, peace might become desirable to their enemy; and to get out of their hands such of their citizens as the Athenians had taken prisoners in the island of Sphacteria; and which they could never expect to do, if Brasidas extended his conquests farther. The news of this accommodation sensibly afflicted Brasidas, as it stopped him in the midst of his career, and disconcerted all his projects. He could not even prevail with himself to abandon the city of Scione, which he had taken two days before, but without knowing that a truce was concluded. He went still farther; and did not scruple to take Mende, a little city not far from Scione, that surrendered to him as the former had done, which was a direct violation of the treaty: but Brasidas pretended he had other infractions to object to the Athenians.

It will naturally be supposed, that they were far from being pleased with this conduct of Brasidas. Cleon, in all public assemblies, was for ever inflaming the minds of the Athenians, and blowing up the fire of war. * His great success in the expedition of Sphacteria had raised his credit infinitely with the people: he now was grown insupportably proud, and his audaciousness was not to be restrained. He had a vehement, impetuous, and furious kind of eloquence, which prevailed over the minds of his auditors, not so much by the strength of his arguments, as by the boldness and fire of his style and utterance. It was Cleon who first set the example of bawling in assemblies, where the greatest decorum and moderation had till then been observed; of throwing his robe behind him, to give him the more liberty to display his arms; of striking his thigh; and of running up and down the rostra whilst he was making his speech. In a word, he first introduced among the orators, and all those who were in public employments, an ungovernable licentiousness, and a contempt of decency; a licentiousness and contempt, which soon introduced terrible irregularities and confusion in public affairs.

† Thus two men, each on his own side, opposed the tranquillity of Greece, and raised, but in a very different way, an invincible obstacle to its peace. These were Cleon and Brasidas. The former, because the war screened his vices and misversations; and the latter, because it added a new lustre to

* Plut. in vit. Nicæ. p. 528.

† Ibid.

his virtues. And indeed, it gave Cleon an opportunity of committing enormous oppressions, and Brasidas of performing great and noble actions. But their death, which happened about the same time, made way for a new accommodation.

*The Athenians had appointed Cleon to command the troops which were to oppose Brasidas, and reduce those cities that had revolted from their allegiance. The Athenians were solicitous for none of them so much as Amphipolis; and Brasidas threw himself into that city, in order to defend it. Cleon had written to Perdiccas king of Macedonia, and to the king of the Odontantes, to furnish him with as many troops as possible, and with the utmost expedition. He waited for them, and had resolved not to march immediately towards the enemy: but finding his soldiers, who had followed him involuntarily and with regret, grow weary of continuing so long inactive, and begin to compare his cowardice and inexperience with the ability and valour of Brasidas, he could no longer bear their contempt and murmurs; and imagining himself a great captain by his taking Sphacteria, he now fancied the same good fortune would attend him at Amphipolis. He therefore approached it, as he said, to take a view of the place, and till such time as all his forces should be come up; not that he thought he wanted them for carrying that city, or that he doubted in any manner his success, for he was persuaded that no one would dare to oppose him, but only to enable him to invest the place on all sides, and afterwards to take it by storm. Accordingly he incamped before Amphipolis; when viewing very leisurely its situation, he fondly supposed that it would be in his power to retire whenever he pleased, without drawing the sword; for not a man came out or appeared on the walls, and all the gates of the city were kept shut; so that Cleon began to repent his not having brought the engines, imagining that he wanted only these to make himself master of the city. Brasidas, who was perfectly well acquainted with Cleon's disposition and character, studiously affected an air of fear and reserve, to increase his temerity, and the good opinion he had of himself: besides, he knew that Cleon had brought with him the flower of the Athenian forces, and the choicest troops of Lemnos and of Imbrus. Accordingly Cleon, despising an enemy who did not dare to appear before him, but shut himself up in a cowardly manner in the city, went boldly from place

* A. M. 3582. Ant. J. C. 422. Thucyd. l. iii. p. 342--351. Diod. l. xii. p. 121, 122.

to place, without precaution, or observing any discipline among his soldiers. Brasidas, whose intention was to attack him on a sudden before all his forces should be come up, thought this the critical juncture. He had concerted proper measures, and given the orders necessary. Accordingly he made a sudden sally on the Athenians, which surprised and disconcerted them exceedingly. Immediately the left wing drew off from the main body, and fled. Brasidas then turned the whole force of his arms against the right wing, which gave him a warm reception. Here he was wounded and disabled, upon which his soldiers carried him off, unperceived by the Athenians. As for Cleon, not having resolved to fight, he fled, and was killed by a soldier, who happened to meet him. The troops he commanded defended themselves for some time, and sustained two or three attacks without giving ground, but at last they were universally broke and routed. Brasidas was then carried into the city, where he survived his victory but a few moments.

The whole army being returned from the pursuit, stripped the dead, and set up a trophy; after which all the allies under arms solemnized the funeral obsequies of Brasidas in a public manner; and the inhabitants of Amphipolis celebrated funeral honours every year to his memory, as to a hero, with games, combats, and sacrifices. They considered him as their founder; and to secure this title the better to him, they demolished all the monuments of him * who had really been so; so that they might not appear to owe their establishment to an Athenian, and at the same time make their court to the Lacedæmonians, on whom they depended wholly for their security. The Athenians, after having carried off, with the consent of the victors, their dead, returned to Athens, during which the Lacedæmonians settled the affairs of Amphipolis.

† A saying is ascribed to the mother of Brasidas, which strongly intimates the Spartan character. As some persons were applauding, in her presence, the fine qualities and exalted actions of her son, and declared him superior to all other generals: “You are mistaken,” says she, “my son was a valiant man, but “Sparta has many citizens braver than him.” A mother’s generosity, in thus preferring the glory of the state to that of her son, was admired, and did not go unrewarded; for the Ephori paid her public honours.

‡ After this last engagement, in which the two persons who

* Agnon the Athenian.

† Diod. l. xii. p. 122.

‡ Thucyd. l. v. p. 351—354.

were the greatest obstacles to the peace lost their lives, both nations seemed more inclined to an accommodation, and the war was suspended on both sides. The Athenians from the loss of the battles of Delium and Amphipolis, which had very much brought down their haughtiness, were undeceived with regard to the opinion they had hitherto entertained of their own strength, which had made them refuse the advantageous offers of their enemies. Besides, they were afraid of the revolt of their allies, who, being discouraged by their losses, might thereby be induced to abandon them, as several had already done. These reflections made them strongly repent their not having concluded a treaty, after the advantages they had gained at Pylus. The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, no longer flattered themselves with the hopes of being able to ruin the Athenians by laying waste their country; and were besides dejected and terrified by their loss in the island, the greatest they had ever sustained. They also considered that their country was depopulated by the garrisons of Pylus and Cythera; that their slaves deserted; that they had reason to dread a more considerable revolt; and that as the truce they had concluded with the inhabitants of Argos was near expiring, they had reason to be apprehensive of being abandoned by some of their allies of Peloponnesus, as they accordingly were. These several motives, enforced by the desire they had of recovering the prisoners, the greatest part of whom were the most considerable citizens of Sparta, made them desire a peace.

Those who were most solicitous for having it concluded, and whose interest it was chiefly to wish it, were, the chiefs of the two states, *viz.* Plitonax king of Sparta, and Nicias general of the Athenians. The former was lately returned from banishment to which he had been sentenced, on account of his being suspected to have received a bribe, in order to draw off his troops from the Athenian territories; and to this precipitate retreat was ascribed several misfortunes which followed after it. He also was charged with having corrupted by gifts the priests of Delphos, who had commanded the Spartans in the name of the god to recall him from his exile. Plitonax was therefore desirous of peace, in order to put an end to the reproaches, which, on account of the perpetual calamities of the war, were daily revived. As for Nicias, the most fortunate general of his age, he was afraid lest some unhappy accident should eclipse his glory; and he wished to enjoy the fruits of peace in ease and tranquillity, and that his country might possess the same happiness.

Both

* Both states began by agreeing to a suspension of arms for 12 months, during which, being every day together, and tasting the sweets of security and repose, and the pleasure of corresponding with their friends and with foreigners, they grew passionately desirous of leading an easy, undisturbed life, remote from the alarms of war, and the horrors of blood and slaughter. They heard with the utmost demonstrations of joy the choruses of their tragedies sing, "May spiders henceforward weave their cobwebs on our lances and shields!" And they remembered with pleasure him who said, "Those who sleep in the arms of peace, do not start from it at the sound of the trumpet; and nothing interrupts their slumbers but the peaceful crowing of the cock."

† The whole winter was spent in conferences and interviews, in which each party proposed their rights and pretensions. ‡ At last, a peace was concluded and ratified for 50 years; one of the chief articles of which was, that they should reciprocally restore the prisoners on each side. This treaty was concluded ten years and some days from the first declaration of the war. The Bœotians and Corinthians were exceedingly disgusted at it, and for that reason used their utmost endeavours to excite fresh troubles. § But Nicias persuaded the Athenians and Lacedæmonians to give the last hand to this peace, by concluding an alliance offensive and defensive, which would render them more formidable to those who should desire to break with them, and more assured with regard to each other. The Athenians, in consequence of this treaty, at last restored the prisoners they had taken in the island of Sphacteria.

SECTION IV.

ALCIBIADES'S CHARACTER—BANISHMENT OF HYPERBOLUS.

Εα. Εα.

TWELFTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

ALCIBIADES|| began now to advance himself in the state, and appear in the public assemblies. Socrates had attached himself to him for many years, and adorned his mind with a great variety of the noblest erudition.

The strict intimacy between Alcibiades and Socrates is one of the most remarkable circumstances in his life. This philo-

* Thucyd. l. v. p. 354. Plut. in Nic. p. 528. 529.

† Diod. l. xiii. p. 122.

‡ A. M. 3583. Ant. J. C. 421.

§ Thucyd. l. v. p. 358, 359.

|| Plut. in Alcib. p. 192. 194.

sopher observing excellent natural qualities in him, which were greatly heightened by the beauty of his person, bestowed incredible pains in cultivating so valuable a plant, lest, being neglected, it should wither as it grew, and absolutely degenerate. And indeed Alcibiades was exposed to numberless dangers; the greatness of his extraction, his vast riches, the authority of his family, the credit of his guardians, his personal talents, his exquisite beauty, and, still more than these, the flattery and complaisance of all who approached him. One would have concluded, says Plutarch, that fortune had surrounded and invested him with all these pretended advantages, as with so many ramparts and bulwarks, to render him inaccessible and invulnerable to all the darts of philosophy; those salutary darts which strike to the very heart, and leave in it the strongest incitements to virtue and solid glory. But those very obstacles redoubled the zeal of Socrates.

Notwithstanding the strong endeavours that were used to divert this young Athenian from a correspondence which alone was capable of securing him from so many snares, he devoted himself entirely to it. As he had abundance of wit, he was fully sensible of Socrates's extraordinary merit; and could not resist the charms of his sweetly-insinuating eloquence, which at that time had a greater ascendant over him than the allurements of pleasure. He was so zealous a disciple of that great master, that he followed him wherever he went, took the utmost delight in his conversation, was extremely well pleased with his principles, received his instructions and even his reprimands with wonderful docility, and would be so moved with his discourses, as even to shed tears, and abhor himself; so weighty was the force of truth in the mouth of Socrates, and in so ugly and odious a light did he expose the vices to which Alcibiades abandoned himself.

Alcibiades, in those moments when he listened to Socrates, differed so much from himself, that he appeared quite another man. However, his head-strong fiery temper, and his natural fondness for pleasure, which was heightened and inflamed by the discourses and advice of young people, soon plunged him into his former irregularities, and tore him, as it were, from his master; who was obliged to run after him as after a slave who had escaped. This vicissitude of flights and returns, of virtuous resolutions and relapses into vice, continued a long time; but still Socrates was not disgusted by his levity, and always flattered himself with the hope of bringing him back to his duty. And hence certainly arose the strong mixture of good
good

good and evil, which always appeared in his conduct; the instructions which his master had given him, sometimes prevailing; and at other times, the fire of his passions hurrying him, in a manner against his own will, into things of a quite opposite nature.

This intimacy, which continued as long as they lived, did not pass uncensured. But some persons * of great learning pretend, that these censures and suspicions, when duly examined, quite disappear; and that they ought to be considered as the effect of the malice of the enemies of both. Plato, in one of his dialogues, gives us a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades, by which the genius and character of the latter may be known, who henceforward will have a very great share in the affairs of the republic of Athens. I shall make a very short extract from it in this place, which I hope will not displease my readers.

† In this dialogue, Socrates is introduced conversing with Alcibiades, who at that time was under the guardianship of Pericles. He was then very young, and had been educated like the rest of the Athenians; that is, he had been taught polite literature, and to play on instruments, and had practised wrestling and other bodily exercises. It does not appear that Pericles had hitherto taken much pains in Alcibiades's education, a fault too common in the greatest men, since he had put him under the tutorage of Zopyrus, a Thracian, a man far advanced in years, and who, of all Pericles's slaves, both from his turn of mind and age, was the least qualified to educate this young Athenian. And indeed Socrates told Alcibiades, that should he compare him with the youths of Lacedæmonia, who displayed a spirit of valour, a greatness of soul, a strong desire of glory, a love of labour, attended with gentleness, modesty, temperance, and a perfect obedience to the laws and discipline of Sparta, he would seem a mere child to them. Nevertheless, his high birth, his riches, the great families he was related to, and the authority of his guardian; all these things had conspired to make him exceedingly vain and haughty. He was full of esteem for himself, and of contempt for all others. He was preparing to enter upon the administration of the public affairs, and promised himself no less than to eclipse entirely the glory of Pericles, and to attack the king of Persia even

* Abbe Fraguier justifies Socrates in one of his dissertations. Mem. of the Academy of Belles Lettres, tom. iv. p. 372.

† Plut. in Alcib. I.

upon his throne. Socrates seeing him going to mount the rostra, in order to give the people some advice relating to the public affairs, demonstrates to him, by various questions, and by Alcibiades's answers, that he is quite ignorant of the affairs about which he is going to speak, as he had never studied them himself, nor been informed in them by others. After making Alcibiades confess this, he paints, in the strongest colours, the absurdity of his conduct, and makes him fully sensible of it. What, says Socrates, would Amestris, the mother of Artaxerxes, who then reigned in Persia, say, were she to hear, that there is a man now in Athens who is meditating war against her son, and even intends to dethrone him? She doubtless would suppose him to be some veteran general, a man of intrepid courage, of great wisdom, and the most consummate experience: that he is able to raise a mighty army, and march it wherever he pleases; and, at the same time, that he has long before taken the proper measures for putting so vast a design in execution. But were she to hear that there are none of these circumstances, and that the person in question is not 20 years old; that he is utterly ignorant of public affairs; has not the least knowledge of war, and no credit with the citizens or the allies; would it be possible for her to refrain from laughing at the folly and extravagance of such an enterprise? This nevertheless, says Socrates, directing himself to Alcibiades, is your picture; and unhappily resembles most of those who thrust themselves into the public employments. Socrates however excepts Pericles on this occasion; his solid merit and exalted reputation being acquired by his close study, during a long course of years, of every thing capable of forming his mind, and of qualifying him for public employments. Alcibiades could not deny that this was his case; he was ashamed of his conduct, and blushing to see himself so void of merit, he asks how he must act for the attainment of it. Socrates being unwilling to discourage his pupil, tells him, that as he is so young, these evils might be remedied; and afterwards continually gave him the wisest counsels. He had entire leisure to improve from them; as upwards of 20 years passed between this conversation, and his engaging in public affairs.

Alcibiades was of a convertible genius, that would take any impression which the difference of times and circumstances might require, still veering either to good or evil, with the same facility and ardour, and shifting almost in an instant from one extreme to its opposite, so that people applied to him who were absentees of the land of Egypt, "That it

“ produces a great number of very excellent medicinal drugs, “ and at the same time as many poisons.” * It might be said of Alcibiades, that he was not one single man, but, if so bold an expression might be used, a compound of several men ; either serious or gay ; austere or affable ; an imperious master, or a grovelling slave ; a friend to virtue and the virtuous, or abandoned to vice and vicious men ; capable of supporting the most painful fatigues and toils, or insatiably desirous of voluptuous delights.

† His irregularities and dissolute conduct were become the talk of the whole city ; and Alcibiades would very willingly have put a stop to these reports, but without changing his course of life, as appears from a saying of his. He had a very handsome dog, of a prodigious size, which had cost him 70 minæ ‡, or 3500 French livres. By this we find that a fondness for dogs was of great antiquity. Alcibiades caused his tail, which was the greatest beauty he had about him, to be cut off. His friends censured him very much on that account, and said, that the whole city blamed him very much for spoiling the beauty of so handsome a creature. “ This is the very “ thing I want,” replied Alcibiades with a smile, “ I would “ have the Athenians discourse about what I have done to my “ dog, that they may not entertain themselves with saying “ worse things of me.”

§ Among the various passions that were discovered in him, the strongest and most prevailing was a haughty turn of mind, which would force all things to submit to it, and could not bear a superior, or even an equal. Although his birth and uncommon talents smoothed the way to his attaining the highest employments in the republic, there was nothing however to which he was so fond of owing the credit and authority he wanted to gain over the people, as to the force of his eloquence, and the persuasive grace of his orations. To this his intimacy with Socrates might be of great service.

|| Alcibiades, with such a cast of mind as we have here described, was not born for repose, and had set every engine at work to traverse the treaty lately concluded between the two states ;

* *Quemvis hominem secum attulit ad nos.* Juvenal.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 195.

‡ About L. 160 sterling. The Attic mina was worth 100 drachms, and the drachm tenpence, French money.

§ *Τὸ φιλόνηκον, καὶ τὸ φιλόπρωτον.* Plut. in Alcib. p. 195, 196.

|| A. M. 3584. Ant. J. C. 420. Thucyd. i. v. p. 368—378. Plut. in Alcib. p. 197, 198.

but not succeeding in his attempt, he endeavoured to prevent its taking effect. He was disgusted at the Lacedæmonians, because they directed themselves only to Nicias, of whom they had a very high opinion; and, on the contrary, seemed to take no manner of notice of him, though his ancestors had enjoyed the rights of hospitality among them.

The first thing he did to infringe the peace was this; having been informed that the people of Argos only wanted an opportunity to break with the Spartans, whom they equally hated and feared, he flattered them secretly with the hopes that the Athenians would succour them, by suggesting to them that they were ready to break a peace which was no way advantageous to them.

And indeed the Lacedæmonians were not very careful to observe the several conditions of it religiously, having concluded an alliance with the Bœotians, in direct opposition to the design and tenor of the treaty; and having surrendered up the fort of Panæcton to the Athenians, not fortified and in the condition it was in at the concluding of the treaty, as they had stipulated to do, but quite dismantled. Alcibiades, observing the Athenians to be extremely exasperated at this breach of faith, did his utmost to widen the difference; and taking this opportunity to embarrass Nicias, he made him odious to the people, by causing them to entertain a suspicion of his being too strongly attached to the Lacedæmonians; and by charging him with crimes which were not altogether improbable, though they were absolutely false.

This new attack quite disconcerted Nicias; but happily for him there arrived, at that very instant, ambassadors from Lacedæmonia, who were invested with full powers to put an end to all the divisions. Being introduced into the council or senate, they set forth their complaints, and made their demands, which every one of the members thought very just and reasonable. The people were to give them audience the next day. Alcibiades, who was afraid they would succeed with them, used his utmost endeavours to engage the ambassadors in a conference with him. He represented to them, that the council always behaved with the utmost moderation and humanity towards those who addressed them; but that the people were haughty and extravagant in their pretensions; that should the ambassadors mention full powers, they, the people, would not fail to take advantage of this circumstance, and oblige them to agree to whatever they should take it into their heads to ask. He concluded with assuring them, that he would assist them
with

with all his credit, in order to get Pylus restored to them; to prevent the alliance with the people of Argos, and to get that with them renewed: and he confirmed all these promises with an oath. The ambassadors were extremely well pleased with this conference, and greatly admired the profound policy and vast abilities of Alcibiades, whom they looked upon as an extraordinary man; and, indeed, they were not mistaken in their conjecture.

On the morrow, the people being assembled, the ambassadors were introduced. Alcibiades asked them, in the mildest terms, the subject of their embassy, and the purport of the powers with which they were invested. They immediately answered, that they were come to propose an accommodation, but were not empowered to conclude any thing. These words were no sooner spoke, but Alcibiades exclaims against them; declares them to be treacherous knaves; calls upon the council as witness to the speech they had made the night before; and desires the people not to believe or hear men who so impudently advanced falsehoods, and spoke and prevaricated so unaccountably, as to say one thing one day, and the very reverse the next.

Words could never express the surprise and confusion with which the ambassadors were seized, who, gazing wildly on one another, could not believe either their eyes or ears. Nicias, who did not know the treacherous stratagem of Alcibiades, could not conceive the motive of this change, and tortured his brain to no purpose to find out the reason of it. The people were that moment going to send for the ambassadors of Argos, in order to conclude the league with them; when a great earthquake came to the assistance of Nicias, and broke up the assembly. It was with the utmost difficulty he prevailed so far, in that of next day, as to have a stop put to the proceedings, till such time as ambassadors should be sent to Lacedæmon. Nicias was appointed to head them; but they returned without having done the least good. The Athenians then repented very much their having delivered up; at his persuasion, the prisoners they had taken in the island, and who were related to the greatest families in Sparta. However, though the people were highly exasperated at Nicias, they did not proceed to any excesses against him, but only appointed Alcibiades their general; made a league with the inhabitants of Mantinea and Elis, who had quitted the party of the Lacedæmonians, in which the Argives were included, and sent troops to Pylus, to lay waste Laconia. In this manner they

again involved themselves in the war which they were so lately desirous of avoiding.

* Plutarch, after relating the intrigue of Alcibiades, adds :
 “ No one can approve the methods he employed to succeed in
 “ his design ; however, it was a master-stroke, to disunite
 “ and shake almost every part of Peloponnesus in this manner,
 “ and raise up, in one day, so many enemies against the La-
 “ cedæmonians.” In my opinion, this is too soft a censure
 of so knavish and perfidious an action, which, how successful
 soever it might have been, was notwithstanding horrid in it-
 self, and of a nature never to be sufficiently detested.

† There was in Athens, a citizen, Hyperbolus by name, a very wicked man, whom the comic poets generally made the object of their raillery and invectives. He was hardened in evil, and become insensible to infamy, by renouncing all sentiments of honour, which could only be the effect of a soul abandoned entirely to vice. Hyperbolus was not agreeable to any one ; and yet the people made use of him to humble those in high stations, and involve them in difficulties. Two citizens, Nicias and Alcibiades, engrossed at that time all the authority in Athens. The dissolute life of the latter shocked the Athenians, who besides dreaded his audacity and haughtiness. On the other side, Nicias, by always opposing, without the least reserve, their unjust desires, and by obliging them to take the most useful measures, was become very odious to them. One would have imagined, that as the people were thus alienated from both, they would not have failed to have put the ostracism in force against one of them. Of the two parties which prevailed at that time in the city, one, which consisted of the young men who were eager for war, the other of the old men, who were desirous for peace ; the former endeavoured to procure the banishment of Nicias, and the latter of Alcibiades. Hyperbolus, whose only merit was in impudence, in hopes of succeeding whichever of them should be removed, declared openly against them, and was eternally exasperating the people against both. However, the two factions being afterwards reconciled, he himself was banished by, and put an end to the ostracism, which seemed to have been demeaned, in being employed against a man of so base a character ; for hitherto there was a kind of honour and dignity annexed to this punishment. Hyperbolus was there-

* In Alcib. p. 198.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 196, 197. In Nic. p. 530, 531.

fore the last who was sentenced by the ostracism; as Hipparchus, a near relation of Pisistratus the tyrant, had been the first.

SECTION V.

ALCIBIADES ENGAGES THE ATHENIANS IN THE WAR OF SICILY.

SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH YEARS OF THE WAR.

I PASS over several inconsiderable events*, to hasten to the relation of that of the greatest importance, the expedition of the Athenians into Sicily, to which they were especially excited by Alcibiades. This is the 16th year of the Peloponnesian war.

† Alcibiades had gained a surprising ascendant over the minds of the people, though they were perfectly well acquainted with his character. For his great qualities were united with still greater vices, which he did not take the least pains to conceal. He passed his life in such an excess of luxury and voluptuousness, as was a scandal to that city. Nothing was seen in his house but festivals, rejoicings, and parties of pleasure and debauchery. He showed very little regard to the customs of his country, and less to religion and the gods. All persons of sense and judgment, besides the strong aversion they had for his irregularities, dreaded exceedingly the consequences of his audacity, profusion, and utter contempt of the laws, which they considered as so many steps by which Alcibiades would rise to tyrannical power.

Aristophanes, in one of his comedies‡, shows admirably well, in a single verse, the disposition of the people with regard to him: "They hate Alcibiades," says he, "and yet cannot do without him." And, indeed, the prodigious sums he squandered on the people; the pompous games and shows he exhibited to please them; the magnificent and almost incredible presents which he made the city; the grace and beauty of his whole person; his eloquence, his bodily strength, joined to his courage and experience: in a word, this assemblage of great qualities made the Athenians wink at his faults, and bear them patiently, always endeavouring to lessen and screen them under soft and favourable names; for they called them sports,

* A. M. 3588. Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 350—409.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 193—200. In Nic. p. 531.

‡ The Frogs, Act 5. Scene 4.

polite pastimes, and indications of his humanity and good-nature.

Timon the man-hater, morose and savage as he was, formed a better judgment of this conduct of Alcibiades. Meeting him one day as he was coming out of the assembly, vastly pleased at his having been gratified in all his demands, and to see the greatest honours paid him by the people in general, who were attending him in crowds to his house; so far from shunning him as he did all other men, on the contrary, he ran to meet him, and stretching out his hand to him in a friendly way; "Courage, my son," says he, "thou dost right in pushing thy fortune, for thy advancement will be the ruin of all these people." The war of Sicily will show that Timon was not mistaken.

The Athenians, from the time of Pericles, had meditated the conquest of Sicily. However, that wise guide had always endeavoured to check this ambitious and wild project. He used frequently to inculcate to them, that by living in peace, by supporting their fleet, by contenting themselves with the conquests they had already gained, and by not engaging in hazardous enterprises, they would raise their city to a flourishing condition, and be always superior to their enemies. The authority he had at that time over the people, though it kept them from invading Sicily, could not suppress the desire they had to conquer it, and their eyes were continually upon that island. * Some time after Pericles's death, the Leontines being invaded by the Syracusans, had sent a deputation to Athens, to demand aid. They were originally of Chalcis, an Athenian colony. The chief of the deputies was Gorgis, a famous rhetorician, who was reputed the most eloquent man of his time. His elegant and florid diction, heightened by shining figures which he first employed, charmed the Athenians, who were prodigiously affected with the beauties and graces of eloquence. Accordingly the alliance was concluded, and they sent ships to Rhegium to the aid of the Leontines. The year following they sent a greater number. Two years after, they sent a new fleet, something stronger than the former; but the Sicilians having put an end to all their divisions, by the advice of Hermocrates, the fleet was sent back; and the Athenians, not being able to prevail with themselves to pardon their generals for not conquering Sicily, sent two of them, Pythodorus and Sophocles, into banishment; and sentenced the third, Eurymedon, to pay

a heavy fine ; their prosperity having blinded them to so prodigious a degree that they were persuaded no power was able to resist them. They made several attempts afterwards ; and upon pretence of sending from time to time arms and soldiers to such cities as were unjustly treated or oppressed by the Syracusans, they by that means were preparing to invade them by a greater force.

But the person who most inflamed this ardour was Alcibiades, by his feeding the people with splendid hopes, with which he himself was ever filled, or rather intoxicated. He was every night, in his dreams, taking Carthage, subduing Africa, crossing from thence into Italy, and possessing himself of all Peloponnesus ; looking upon Sicily not as the scope and end of this war, but as the beginning and the first step of the exploits he revolved in his mind. All the citizens favoured his views, and without inquiring seriously into matters, were enchanted with the mighty hopes he gave them. This expedition was the only topic of all conversations. The young men, in the places where the public exercises were performed, and the old men in their shops and elsewhere, were employed in nothing but in drawing the plan of Sicily ; in discoursing on the nature and quality of the sea with which it is surrounded : on its good harbours, and flat shores towards Africa : for these people, infatuated by the speeches of Alcibiades, were, like him, persuaded that they should make Sicily only their place of arms and their arsenal, from whence they should set out for the conquest of Carthage, and make themselves masters of all Africa and the sea, as far as the pillars of Hercules.

* It is related, that neither Socrates, nor Methon the astronomer, believed that this enterprise would be successful ; the former, being inspired, as he insinuated, by his familiar spirit, who always warned him of the evils with which he was threatened ; and the other, directed by his reason and good sense, which, pointing out what he had to apprehend in respect to the future, induced him to act the madman on this occasion, and to demand, in consideration of the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, that the Athenians would not force away his son, and would dispense with his carrying arms.

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 199. In Nic. p. 532.

SECTION VI.

ACCOUNT OF THE SEVERAL PEOPLE WHO INHABITED
SICILY.

BEFORE I enter on the relation of the war of Sicily, it will not be improper to give a plan of the country, and of the nations who inhabited it : Thucydides begins in the same manner.

* It was first inhabited by the Leftrygonæ and the Cyclops, of whom we do not know any particulars, except what we are told by the poets. The most ancient, after these, were the Sicani, who called themselves the original inhabitants of this country, though they are thought to have come into it from the neighbourhood of a river in Spain, called Sicanus, whose name they gave to the island, which before was called Trinacria : these people were afterwards confined to the western part of the island. Some Trojans, after the burning of their city, came and settled near them, and built Erix and † Egesta, who all assumed the name of Elymæi, and were afterwards joined by some inhabitants of Phocis, at their return from the siege of Troy. Those who are properly called Sicilians came from Italy in very great numbers ; and having gained a considerable victory over the Sicani, confined them to a corner of their island, about 300 years before the arrival of the Greeks ; and in Thucydides's time, they still inhabited the middle part of the island and the northern coast. From them the island was called Sicily. The Phœnicians also spread themselves along the coast, and in the little islands which border upon it, for the convenience of trade : but after the Greeks began to settle there, they retired into the country of the Elymæi, in order to be nearer Carthage, and abandoned the rest. It was in this manner the barbarians first settled in Sicily.

‡ With regard to the Greeks, the first of them who crossed into Sicily were the Chalcidians of Eubœa, under Theocles, who founded Naxos. The year after, which, according to Dionysius Halicarnassus, was the third of the 17th Olympiad, Archias the Corinthian laid the foundation of Syracuse. Seven years after, the Chalcidians founded Leontium and Catana, after having drove out the inhabitants of the country, who were Sicilians. Other Greeks, who came from Megara, a city of Achaia, about the same time, founded Megara, called Hyblæa, or barely Hybla, from Hyblon a Sicilian King, by whose per-

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 410—413.

§ It is called Segesta by the Romans.

‡ A. M. 3294. Ant. J. C. 710.

mission they settled in his dominions. It is well known that the Hyblæan honey was very famous among the ancients. An hundred years after, the inhabitants of that city built Selinunta. Zancle, called afterwards Messana or Messene by Anaxilas tyrant of Rhegium, who was of Messene, a city of Peloponnesus, had several founders, and at different periods. The Zancleans built the city of Himera; the Syracusans built Acre, Cefmene, and Camarina. These are most of the nations, whether Greeks or barbarians, who settled in Sicily.

SECTION VII.

THE PEOPLE OF EGESTA IMPLORE AID OF THE ATHENIANS.

ATHENS* was in the disposition above related, when ambassadors were sent from the people of Egesta, who, in quality of their allies, came to implore their aid against the inhabitants of Selinunta, who were assisted by the Syracusans. It was the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war. They represented, among other things, that should they be abandoned, the Syracusans, after seizing their city, as they had done that of Leontium, would possess themselves of all Sicily, and not fail to aid the Peloponnesians, who were their founders; and, that they might put them to as little charge as possible, they offered to pay the troops that should be sent to succour them. The Athenians, who had long waited for an opportunity to declare themselves, sent deputies to Egesta to inquire into the state of affairs, and to see whether there was money enough in the treasury to defray the expence of so great a war. The inhabitants of that city had been so artful, as to borrow from the neighbouring nations a great number of gold and silver vases, worth an immense sum of money; and of these they made a show when the Athenians arrived. † The deputies returned with those of Egesta, who carried 60 talents in ingots, as a month's pay for the galleys which they demanded; and a promise of larger sums, which, they said, were ready both in the public treasury and in the temples. The people, struck with these fair appearances, the truth of which they did not give themselves the leisure to examine, and seduced by the advantageous reports which their deputies made, in the view of pleas-

* A. M. 3588 Ant. J. C. 416. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 413—415. Diod. l. xii. p. 129, 130. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200. In Nic. p. 331.

† A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415.

ing them, immediately granted the Egeftans their demand, and appointed Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus to command the fleet ; with full power, not only to fuccour Egefta, and reftore the inhabitants of Leontium to their city, but alfo to regulate the affairs of Sicily, in fuch a manner as might beft fuit the interefts of the republic.

Nicias was appointed one of the generals, to his very great regret ; for, befides other motives which made him dread that command, he fhunned it, becaufe Alcibiades was to be his colleague. But the Athenians promifed themfelves greater fuccefs from this war, fhould they not refign the whole conduct of it to Alcibiades, but temper his ardour and audacity with the coolnefs and wifdom of Nicias.

* Five days after, to haften the execution of the decree, and make the neceffary preparations, a fecond afsembly was held. Nicias, who had had time enough to reflect deliberately on the affair propofed, and was ftill better convinced of the difficulties and dangers which would enfue from it, thought himfelf obliged to fpeak with fome vehemence againft a project, the confequences of which he forefaw might be very fatal to the republic. He faid, “ That it was furprifing fo important an “ affair fhould have been determined, the moment almoft it “ was taken into deliberation : that, without once inquiring “ into matters, they had given credit to whatever was told “ them by foreigners, who were very lavish of their promifes ; “ and whose intereft it was to offer mighty things, in order to “ extricate themfelves from their imminent danger. After all, “ what advantage,” fays he, “ can accrue from thence to the “ republic ? Have we fo few enemies at our doors, that we need “ go in fearch of others at a diftance from us ? Will you act “ wifely, to hazard your prefent poffeffions, on the vain hopes “ of an uncertain advantage ? To meditate new conquelts, before you have fecured your ancient ones ? To ftudy nothing “ but the aggrandizing of your ftate, and quite neglect your “ own fafety ? Can you depend in any manner on a truce, “ which you yourfelves know is very precarious ; which you “ are fenfible has been infringed more than once ; and which “ the leaft defeat on our fide may fuddenly change into an “ open war ? You are not ignorant how the Lacedæmonians “ have always been, and ftill continue, difpofed with regard to “ us. They deteft our government as different from theirs ;

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 415—428.

" it is with grief and disdain they see us possessed of the em-
 " pire of Greece ; they consider our glory as their shame and
 " confusion ; and there is nothing they would not attempt, to
 " humble a power which excites their jealousy, and keeps
 " them perpetually in fear. These are our real enemies, and
 " it is they we ought to guard against. Will it be a proper
 " time to make these reflections, when (after having divided
 " our troops, and our arms will be employed elsewhere, and
 " unable to resist them) we shall be attacked at once by all
 " the forces of Peloponnesus ? We do but just begin to breathe,
 " after the calamities in which war and the plague had plun-
 " ged us ; and we are now going to plunge ourselves into
 " greater danger. If we are ambitious of carrying our arms
 " into distant countries, would it not be more expedient to
 " march and reduce the rebels of Thrace, and other nations
 " who are still wavering, and unfixed in their allegiance, than to
 " fly to the succour of the inhabitants of Egæta, about whose
 " welfare we ought to be very indifferent ? And will it suit our
 " interest, to attempt to revenge their injuries, at a time that
 " we do not discover the least resentment for those we ourselves
 " receive ? Let us leave the Sicilians to themselves, and not en-
 " gage in their quarrels, which it is their business to decide.
 " As the inhabitants of Egæta undertook the war without us,
 " let them extricate themselves from it as well as they can.
 " Should any of our generals advise you to this enterprise,
 " from an ambitious or self-interested view ; merely to make a
 " vain parade of his splendid equipages, or to raise money to
 " support his extravagance ; be not guilty of so much impru-
 " dence as to sacrifice the interest of the republic to his, or per-
 " mit him to involve it in the same ruin with himself. An en-
 " terprise of so much importance ought not to be committed
 " wholly to the conduct of a young man. Remember it is pru-
 " dence, not prejudice and passion, that gives success to affairs."

Nicias concluded with declaring it his opinion, that it would
 be proper to deliberate again on the affair, in order to prevent
 the fatal consequences with which their taking rash resolutions
 might be attended.

It was plain he had Alcibiades in view, and that his enor-
 mous luxury was the object of his censure. And indeed he
 carried it to an incredible height, and lavished prodigious
 sums of money on horses, equipages, and moveables ; not to
 mention the delicacy and sumptuousness of his table. He dis-
 puted the prize at the Olympic games with seven sets of cha-
 riot horses, which no private man had ever done before him ;

and he was crowned more than once on that occasion. Extraordinary resources were necessary for supporting such luxury; and as avarice often serves as a resource to ambition, there were some grounds to believe, that Alcibiades was no less solicitous for conquering Sicily and Carthage, which he pretended to possess afterwards as his own, to enrich his family, than to render it glorious. It is natural to suppose, that Alcibiades did not let this speech of Nicias go unanswered.

“ This,” says Alcibiades, “ is not the first time that merit
 “ has excited jealousy, and glory been made the object of envy.
 “ That very thing which is imputed to me for a crime, is, I
 “ will presume to say it, the honour of my country, and ought
 “ to gain me applause. The splendor in which I live; the
 “ great sums I expend, particularly in the public assemblies;
 “ besides their being just and lawful, at the same time give fo-
 “ reigners a greater idea of the glory of Athens; and show,
 “ that it is not in such want of money as our enemies imagine.
 “ But this is not our present business. Let the world form a
 “ judgment of me, not from passion and prejudice, but from
 “ my actions. Was it an inconsiderable service I did the re-
 “ public, in bringing over, in one day, to its alliance, the peo-
 “ ple of Elis, of Mantinea, and of Argos, that is, the chief
 “ strength of Peloponnesus? Make use, therefore, to aggran-
 “ dize your empire, of Alcibiades’s youth and folly, since his
 “ enemies give it that name, as well as of the wisdom and ex-
 “ perience of Nicias; and do not repent, from vain and idle
 “ fears, your engaging in an enterprise publicly resolved upon,
 “ and which may rebound infinitely both to your glory and
 “ advantage. The cities of Sicily, weary of the unjust and
 “ cruel government of their princes, and still more of the ty-
 “ rannical authority which Syracuse exercises over them, wait
 “ only for a favourable opportunity to declare themselves,
 “ and are ready to open their gates to whomsoever shall offer
 “ to take off the yoke under which they have so long groaned.
 “ Though the citizens of Eggesta, in quality of your allies,
 “ should not have a right to your protection, yet the glory of
 “ Athens ought to engage you to support them. Republics
 “ aggrandize themselves by succouring the oppressed, and not
 “ by living inactive. In the present state of your affairs, the
 “ only way to dispirit your enemies, and show that you are
 “ not afraid of them, will be, to harass one nation, to check
 “ the progress of another, to keep them all employed, and
 “ carry your arms into distant countries. Athens was not
 “ formed for ease; and it was not by inactivity that your an-
 “ cestors

“cestors raised it to the height in which we now see it. For
 “the rest, what hazards will you run by engaging in the enter-
 “prise in question? If it should be crowned with success, you
 “will then possess yourselves of all Greece; and should it not
 “answer your expectations, your fleet will give you an oppor-
 “tunity of retiring whenever you please. The Lacedæmo-
 “nians indeed may make an incursion into our country; but,
 “besides that it would not be in our power to prevent it,
 “though we should not invade Sicily, we still shall preserve
 “the empire of the sea, in spite of them; a circumstance
 “which makes our enemies entirely despair of ever being able
 “to conquer us. Be not therefore biassed by Nicias’s reasons.
 “The only tendency of them is to sow the seeds of discord be-
 “tween the young and the old men, who can do nothing with-
 “out one another; since it is wisdom and courage, counsel
 “and execution, that give success to all enterprises: and this
 “in which we are going to embark, cannot but turn to your
 “advantage.”

* The Athenians, flattered and pleased with Alcibiades’s speech, persisted in their first opinion. Nicias, on the other side, did not depart from his; but at the same time did not dare to oppose Alcibiades any farther. Nicias was naturally of a soft and timid disposition. He was not, like Pericles, master of that lively and vehement eloquence, which, like a torrent, bears down all things in its way. And indeed the latter, on several occasions and at several times, had never failed to check the wild starts of the populace, who, even then, meditated the expedition into Sicily; because he was always inflexible, and never slackened the reins of that authority and kind of sovereignty which he had acquired over the people; whereas † Nicias, both by acting and speaking in an easy, gentle manner, so far from winning over the people, suffered himself to be forcibly and involuntarily carried away: and accordingly he at last yielded to the people, and accepted the command in a war which he plainly foresaw would be attended with the most fatal consequences.

Plutarch makes this reflection in his excellent treatise, where, speaking of the qualities requisite in a statesman, he shows how very necessary eloquence and inflexible constancy and perseverance are to him.

* Plut. in præc. de ger. rep. p. 802.

† Καθαπὶς ἀμβλείῃ χαλινῶ τῇ λόγῳ πειράζομενος ἀποτρέφειν τὸν δῆμον, ἔκαστέχουν.

Nicias, not daring to oppose Alcibiades any longer openly, endeavoured to do it indirectly, by starting a great number of difficulties, drawn especially from the great expence of this expedition. He declared, that since they were resolved upon war, they ought to carry it on in such a manner as might suit the exalted reputation to which Athens had attained: that a fleet was not sufficient to oppose so formidable a power as that of the Syracusans and their allies: that they must raise an army, composed of good horse and foot, if they desired to act in a manner worthy of so grand a design: that besides their fleet, which was to make them masters at sea, they must have a great number of transports, to carry provisions perpetually to the army, which otherwise could not possibly subsist in an enemy's country: that they must carry vast sums of money with them, without waiting for that promised them by the citizens of Egesta, who perhaps were ready in words only, and very probably might break their promise: that they ought to weigh and examine the disparity there was between themselves and their enemies with regard to the conveniencies and wants of the army; the Syracusans being in their own country, in the midst of powerful allies, disposed by inclination, as well as engaged by interest, to assist them with men, arms, horses, and provisions; whereas the Athenians would carry on the war in a remote country, possessed by their enemies, where, in the winter, news could not be procured them in less than four months time; a country, where all things would oppose the Athenians, and nothing be procured but by force of arms: that it would reflect the greatest ignominy on the Athenians, should they be forced to abandon their enterprise, and thereby become the scorn and contempt of their enemies, by their neglecting to take all the precautions which so important a design required; that as for himself, he was determined not to go, unless he was provided with all things necessary for the expedition, because the safety of the whole army depended on that circumstance; and that he would not rely on the caprice, or the precarious engagements of the allies.

* Nicias had flattered himself, that this speech would cool the ardour of the people, whereas it only inflamed it the more. Immediately the generals had full powers given them to raise as many troops, and fit out as many galleys as they should judge necessary; and the levies were accordingly carried on in Athens, and other places, with inexpressible activity.

SECTION VIII.

THE ATHENIANS PREPARE TO SET SAIL—*Ἐ. Ἐ.*

WHEN all things were ready for their departure*, and they were preparing to sail, there happened several bad omens, which filled the minds of the people with trouble and disquietude. The † women were at that time celebrating the festival of Adonis, during which the whole city was in mourning, and full of images representing dead persons and funeral processions; and every part echoed with the cries and groans of the women, who followed those statues with lamentations of that kind. Whence it was feared, that this gay and magnificent armament would soon lose all its splendor, and ‡ wither away like a flower.

The general affliction was increased by another accident. The statues of Mercury, which stood at the entrance of private houses and temples, were all mutilated in one night, and particularly in the face; and although a great reward was promised to any person who should discover the authors of so audacious a crime, no one was accused. The citizens could not forbear considering this uncommon event, not only as an unlucky omen, but as a contrivance of some seditious men, who harboured very ill designs. Some young people had already been accused of committing much the like crime in the midst of their cups; and particularly of having wantonly mimicked the ceremonies and mysteries of Ceres and Proserpine, with Alcibiades, who represented the high-priest, at their head§. It highly concerns all those in exalted stations, to be extremely careful of every step they take, and not to give the least opportunity to the most inveterate malice to censure them. They ought to call to mind, says Plutarch, that the eyes of all men are upon their conduct, and that they are ever eagle-eyed on these occasions; that not only their outward actions pass the most severe scrutiny, but that they penetrate to their most private apartments.

* A. M. 3589. Ant. J. C. 415. Thucyd. l. vi. p. 428. Plut. in Alcib. p. 200, 201.

† This superstitious rite had extended even to God's people. "And behold, there sat women weeping for Tammuz," Ezek. viii. 14. N. B. The Latin version of the Bible, which Mr. Rollin follows, says, "weeping for Adonis;" which is the same as Tammuz, the Hebrews calling Adonis by that name.

‡ The historian alludes to the plants and flowers that were carried in that ceremony, and which went by the name of Adonis's gardens.

§ Plut. in præc. de rep. p. 800.

and there take the strictest notice of their discourses, their diversions, and the most secret things transacted by them. It was this dread of the piercing eye of the people, that kept Themistocles and Pericles perpetually on their guard, and obliged them to refrain from most of those pleasures in which others indulged themselves.

As for Alcibiades, he did not know what it was to lay himself under any restraints; and accordingly, as his character was so well known, people were persuaded he very probably had been concerned in what had happened. His luxury, libertinism, and irreligion, gave an air of probability to this charge, and the accuser was not afraid of telling his name. This attack staggered the constancy and resolution of Alcibiades; but hearing the soldiers and sailors declare that they were induced to engage in this expedition by no other motive but their affection for Alcibiades; and that, should the least injury be done him, they would all leave the service; he took heart, and appeared at his trial on the day appointed for that purpose. His enemies, upon pretence that it was necessary for the fleet to set sail, got the judgment superseded. It was to no purpose for Alcibiades to insist upon being tried, in case he was guilty, and not be ruined in his absence; and to represent, that it would be the most shocking and barbarous injustice to oblige him to embark for so important an expedition, without first making due inquiry into the accusations and horrid slanders which were cast upon him, the bare thoughts of which would keep him in perpetual fear and anxiety. However, none of these remonstrances proved effectual, and the fleet was ordered to set out.

* They accordingly prepared to set sail, after having appointed Coreyra the rendezvous for most of the allies, and such ships as were to carry the provisions, &c. All the citizens, as well as foreigners in Athens, flocked by day-break to the port of Pyræus. The former attended their children, relations, friends, or companions, with a joy overcast with a little sorrow, upon their bidding adieu to persons who were as dear to them as life, who were setting out on a far distant and very dangerous expedition, from which it was uncertain whether they ever would return, though they flattered themselves with the hopes that it would be successful. The foreigners came thither to feed their eyes with a sight which was highly worthy their curiosity; for no single city in the world

had ever fitted out so gallant a fleet. Those indeed which had been sent against Epidaurus and Potidæa, were as considerable with regard to the number of soldiers and ships; but then they were not equipped with so much magnificence, neither was their voyage so long, nor their enterprize so important. Here were seen a land and a naval army, provided with the utmost care, and at the expence of particular persons as well as of the public, with all things necessary, on account of the length of the voyage, and the duration of the war. The city furnished 100 empty galleys, that is, 60 light ones, and 40 to transport the soldiers heavily armed. Every mariner received daily a drachm, or ten pence, French, for his pay, exclusively of what the captains of ships gave the rowers * of the first bench. Add to this, the pomp and magnificence that was displayed universally; every one striving to eclipse the rest, and each captain endeavouring to make his ship the lightest, and at the same time the gayest in the whole fleet. I shall not take notice of the choice of the soldiers and seamen, who were the flower of the Athenians; nor of their emulation with regard to the beauty and neatness of their arms and equipage; any more than of their officers, who had laid out considerable sums purely to distinguish themselves, and to give foreigners an advantageous idea of their persons and circumstances; so that this sight had the air of a tournament, in which the utmost magnificence is displayed, rather than of a warlike expedition. But the boldness and greatness of the design still exceeded its expence and splendor.

When the ships were loaded, and the troops got on board, the trumpet sounded, and solemn prayers were offered up for the success of the expedition; gold and silver cups were filling every-where with wine, and the accustomed libations were poured out; the people who lined the shore shouting at the same time, and lifting up their hands to heaven, to wish their fellow-citizens a good voyage and success. And now, the hymn being sung, and the ceremonies ended, the ships sailed one after another out of the harbour; after which they strove to outfail one another, till the whole fleet met at Ægina. From thence it made for Corcyra, where the army of the allies was assembling with the rest of the fleet.

* They were called *Θεσπίται*. They had longer oars than the rest, and consequently more trouble in rowing.

SECTION IX.

SYRACUSE IS ALARMED. THE ATHENIAN FLEET
ARRIVES IN SICILY.

ADVICE * of this expedition coming to Syracuse from all quarters, it was thought so improbable, that at first nobody would believe it. But as it was more and more confirmed every day, the Syracusans began to think seriously of making the necessary preparations; and sent deputations to every part of the island, to ask assistance of some, and send succours to others. They garrisoned all the castles and forts in the country; reviewed all the soldiers and horses; examined the arms in the magazines; and settled and prepared all things, as if the enemy had been in their country.

In the mean time the fleet sailed in three squadrons, each under the command of its particular general. It consisted of 136 ships, 100 whereof belonged to Athens, and the rest to the allies. On board these ships were 5000 heavy-armed soldiers, 2,200 of whom were Athenian citizens, *viz.* 1500 of those who had estates, and 700 † who had none, but were equally citizens; the rest consisted of allies. With regard to the light infantry, there were 80 archers of Crete, and 400 of other countries; 700 Rhodian slingers, and 120 exiles of Megara. There was but one company of horse, consisting of 30 troopers, who had embarked on board a vessel proper for transporting cavalry. Both the fleet and the land-forces were afterwards increased considerably. Thirty vessels carried the provisions and cooks, with masons, carpenters, and their several tools; the whole followed by 100 small vessels for the service; exclusive of merchant-ships, of which there were great numbers. All this fleet had sailed together for Corcyra. Having met with but an indifferent reception from the people of Tarentum and Locris, they sailed with a favourable wind for Rhegium; where they made some stay. The Athenians were very urgent with the inhabitants of Rhegium to succour those of Leontium, who came originally from Chalcis as well as themselves; but these answered, that they were determined to stand neuter, and to undertake nothing but in concert with the rest of Italy. Here they debated on the manner in which it was necessary to carry on the war, and waited for the coming up of those

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 432—445. Diod. l. xiii. p. 135, 136.

† These were called *ἐχθροὶ*.

ships that had been sent out to make discoveries of a proper place for landing, and to inquire whether the citizens of Egesta had got their money ready. Upon their return, they brought advice that they had but 30 talents in the treasury. This Nicias had foreseen, but no regard had been paid to his salutary counsels.

* He did not fail, the instant this news was brought, to expatiate on the counsel he had given in Athens; to show the wrong step they had taken in engaging in this war; and to amplify the fatal consequences which might be expected from it: in all which he acted very imprudently. It was extremely judicious in Nicias to oppose it in the beginning, and to set every engine at work to crush, if possible, this ill-fated project. But as it was resolved, and he himself had accepted of the command, he ought not to be perpetually looking backward, nor to have repeated incessantly, that this war had been undertaken in opposition to all the maxims of prudence; and, by that means, to cool the ardour of his two colleagues in the command, to dispirit the soldiers, and blunt that edge of confidence and ardour, which assure the success of great enterprises. The Athenians, on the contrary, ought to have advanced boldly towards the enemy, should have attacked them with vigour, and have spread an universal terror, by a sudden and unexpected descent.

But Nicias acted in a quite different manner. His opinion, in the council of war, was, that they should sail for Selinunta, which had been the first occasion of this expedition; and then, if the citizens of Egesta performed their promise, and gave a month's pay to the army, to proceed forward; or otherwise, to oblige them to furnish provisions for the 60 galleys they had demanded, and continue in that road till they should have concluded a peace with the citizens of Selinunta, either by force of arms, or some other way. He said, that they afterwards should return to Athens, after having thus made a parade of their forces, and the assistance they gave their allies; unless they should have an opportunity of making some attempt in favour of the Leontines, or of bringing over some city into their alliance.

Alcibiades answered, that it would be inglorious, after their sailing out with so noble a fleet, to return without doing any thing; and that they should first endeavour to conclude an alliance with the Greeks and Barbarians, in order to divide

* Plut. in Nic. p. 532.

them from the Syracufans, and procure troops and provisions from them; and especially to send a deputation to Messina, which was a kind of key to Sicily, and its harbour capacious enough to hold all the fleet. He declared further, that after seeing who were their friends and who their enemies, and strengthening themselves by the addition of a new reinforcement, they then should attack either Selinunta or Syracuse; in case the one should refuse to conclude a peace with Egesta, and the other not permit the Leontines to return to their city.

Lamachus offered a third opinion, which perhaps was the most prudent; that was, to sail directly for Syracuse, before its citizens had time to recover from their surprise, or prepare for their defence. He observed, that the sudden arrival of an armed force always strikes the greatest terror; and that when enemies are allowed time to reflect and make preparations, it also revives their courage; whereas, when they are suddenly attacked, and still in confusion, they are generally overcome; that as they would be masters of the open country, they should not be in want of any thing, but, on the contrary, would oblige the Sicilians to declare for them: that at last they should settle in Megara, which was quite desert, and a near neighbour to Syracuse, and there lay up their fleet in safety. However, his counsel not being followed, he agreed to that of Alcibiades. Accordingly they sailed for Sicily, where Alcibiades took Catana by surprise.

SECTION X.

ALCIBIADES RECALLED, &c. &c.

THIS was the first and last exploit performed by Alcibiades in this expedition*, he being immediately recalled by the Athenians, in order to be tried upon the accusation against him. For, from the departure of the fleet, his enemies, who had no regard to the welfare of their country; and who, upon the specious pretence of religion, which is often made a cloak to cover the darkest designs, meditated nothing but satiating their hatred and revenge; his enemies, I say, taking advantage of his absence, had proceeded in the affair with greater vigour than ever. All those against whom informations were lodged, were thrown into prison, without so much as being suffered to be heard, and that too on the evidence of the most profligate and abandoned citizens; as if, says Thucydides, it was not as

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 446—450. Plut. in Alcib. p. 202.

great a crime to punish the innocent, as to suffer the guilty to escape. One of the informers was proved to be perjured by his own words: having declared that he saw and knew one of the accused by moonlight; whereas it appeared, that there was no moon at that time. But notwithstanding this manifest perjury, the populace were as furious as ever. The remembrance of the tyranny of the Pisistratides made them apprehensive of the like fate; and strongly possessed with this fear, they would not give ear to any thing.

At last they sent out the * ship of Salamin, ordering the captain not to carry off Alcibiades by force, for fear of raising a tumult in the army, but only to order him to return to Athens, to pacify the people by his presence. Alcibiades obeyed the order, and went immediately on board his galley; but the instant he was arrived at Thurium, and had got on shore, he disappeared, and eluded the pursuit of those who sought after him. Being asked, whether he would not rely on his country, with regard to the judgment it might pass on him: "I would not," says he, "rely on my mother, for fear least she should inadvertently mistake a † black bean for a white one." The galley of Salamin returned back without the commander, who was ashamed of his having suffered his prey to escape him in that manner. Alcibiades was sentenced to die for his contumacy. His whole estate was confiscated, and all priests and priestesses were commanded to curse him. Among the latter was one Theano, who alone had the courage to oppose this decree, saying, ‡ "That she had been appointed priestess, not to curse, but to bless." Some time after, news being brought him that the Athenians had condemned him to die, "I shall make them sensible," says he, "that I am alive."

§ Much about this time Diagoras of Melia was prosecuted at Athens. He had settled himself in the latter city, where he taught atheism, and was brought to a trial for his doctrine. || Diagoras escaped the punishment which would have been inflicted on him, by flying from the city; but he could not wipe off the ignominy of the sentence which condemned him to death. The Athenians had so great an abhorrence for the impious principles inculcated by him, that they even set a price upon his head, and promised the reward of a talent to any man who should bring him dead or alive.

* This was a sacred vessel, appointed to fetch criminals.

† The judges made use of beans in giving their suffrages, and the black bean denoted condemnation.

‡ Φάσκεα ἐυχῶν ὅτι καταρῶν ἱέρειαν γεγενῆσιν.

§ Joseph. contr. App.

|| Diod. l. xiii. p. 137.

* About 20 years before, a like affair had happened to Protagoras, for having only treated the same question by way of problem. He had said in the beginning of one of his books: "Whether the gods do or do not exist, is a question which I know not whether I ought to affirm or deny: for our understandings are too much clouded, and the life of man is too short, for the solution of so nice and difficult a point." But the Athenians could not bear to have a subject of this nature made a doubt; and for this reason, they ordered proclamation to be made by the public cryer, for all persons who had any copies of this book, to bring them to the magistrates: After which they were burnt as infamous pieces, and the author was banished, for ever, from all the territories of the Athenians.

Diagoras and Protagoras had been the disciples of Democritus, who first invented the philosophy of atoms. I shall speak of him in another place.

† From the departure of Alcibiades, Nicias had possessed the whole authority: for Lamachus his colleague, though a man of bravery and experience, was however in no credit, because of his extreme poverty, for which he was despised by the soldiers. But the Athenians were not always in this way of thinking; for we have seen that Aristides, poor as he was, was not less esteemed and respected on that account: but in this last expedition, the people in general had imbibed a passion for luxury and magnificence: the natural consequence of which is a love of riches. As Nicias, therefore, governed all affairs solely, all his actions were of the same cast with his disposition, that is, of a slow and fearful kind: he suffered every thing to languish, sometimes by only sailing along the coast, or losing time in consulting and deliberating; all which soon suppressed, on one side, the ardour and confidence the troops expressed at first; and on the other, the fear and terror with which the enemy had been seized, at the sight of so terrible an armament. He besieged Hybla; and though it was but a small city, he was however obliged to raise the siege some days after, which brought him into the highest contempt. He retired at last to Catana, after having performed but one exploit, viz. the ruining of Hyccara, a small town inhabited by barbarians; from which place, it is said, that Lais the courtesan, at that time

* Diog. Laert. in Protag. Joseph. contr. App. Cic. l. i. de Nat. Deor. n. 62.

† Thucyd. p. 452, 453. Plut. in Nic. p. 533.

very young, was sold with the rest of the captives, and carried to Peloponnesus.

* In the mean time, Alcibiades having left Thurium, was arrived at Argos; and as he quite despaired of ever being recalled home, he sent a messenger to the Spartans, desiring leave to reside among them, under their guard and protection. He promised in the most solemn manner, that if they would consider him as their friend, he would perform greater service for their state, than he before had done injuries to it. The Spartans received him with open arms; and soon after his arrival in their city, he gained the love and esteem of all its inhabitants. He charmed, and even enchanted them, by his conforming himself so easily to their way of living. Such people as saw Alcibiades shave himself to the skin, bathe in cold water, eat of the coarse heavy cakes, which were their usual food, and be so well satisfied with their black broth; could not persuade themselves that a man who submitted so cheerfully to this kind of life, had ever kept cooks in his palace, had used essences and perfumes, had wore the rich stuffs of Miletus; in a word, that he had hitherto lived in the midst of voluptuousness and profusion of all things. But flexibility was the characteristic that chiefly distinguished Alcibiades. Cameleon-like, he could assume all shapes and colours, to win the favour of those among whom he resided. He immediately assumed their manners, and adapted himself to their taste, as if they had been natural to him; and though he inwardly had an aversion to them, he could however cover his disgust with an easy, simple, and unconstrained air. With some he had all the graces and vivacity of the gayest youth, and with others all the gravity of old age. In Sparta, he was laborious, frugal, and austere; in Ionia, enjoyment, idleness, and pleasure, made up his whole life: in Thrace, he was always on horseback, or carousing; and when he resided with Tissaphernes the satrap, he exceeded all the magnificence of the Persians in luxury and profusion.

But he was not barely satisfied with gaining the esteem of the Lacedæmonians. He insinuated himself so far into the affection of Timea, the wife of king Agis, that he had a son by her, who, in public, went by the name of Leotychides; though his mother, in private, and among her women and female friends, did not blush to call him Alcibiades; so violent was her passion for that Athenian. Agis was informed of this intrigue, and therefore refused to own Leotychides for his son; for which reason he was afterwards excluded the throne.

* Plut. in Alcib. p. 230.

SECTION XI.

DESCRIPTION OF SYRACUSE.

As the siege of Syracuse is one of the most considerable in the Grecian history, the particular circumstances of which I thought proper to relate for that reason, in order to give my readers an idea of the manner of besieging by the ancients; I judge it necessary, before I enter into that detail, to give the reader a description and plan of the city of Syracuse; in which he will also find the different fortifications, both of the Athenians and Syracusans, mentioned in this siege.

* Syracuse stood on the eastern coast of Sicily. Its vast extent, its advantageous situation, the conveniency of its double harbour, its fortifications built with the utmost care and labour, and the multitude and wealth of its inhabitants, made it one of the greatest, the most beautiful, and most powerful among the Grecian cities. † We are told its air was so pure and serene, that there was no day in the year, how cloudy soever it might be, in which the sun did not display its beams.

‡ It was built by Archias the Corinthian, a year after Naxos and Megara had been founded on the same coast.

When the Athenians besieged this city, it was divided into three parts, *viz.* the Island, Achradina, and Tyche. Thucydides mentions only these three divisions. Two more, *viz.* Neapolis and Epipolæ, were afterwards added.

The Island, situated to the south, was called Νῆσος, Nafos, signifying, in Greek, an island, but pronounced according to the Doric dialect; and Ortygia. It was joined to the continent by a bridge. § It was in this island that the Syracusans afterwards built the citadel, and the palace of their kings. This quarter or division of the city was of very great importance, because it might render those who possessed it master of the two ports which surround it. It was for this reason the Romans, when they took Syracuse, would not suffer any Syracusans to inhabit the island.

|| There was in this island a very famous spring, called Are-

* Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117—119.

† Urbem Syracusus elegerat, cujus hic situs atque hæc natura esse loci cœlique dicitur, ut nullus unquam dies tam magna turbulentaque tempestate fuerit, quin aliquo tempore solem ejus diei homines viderent. Cic. Verr. 7. n. 26.

‡ A. M. 3295. Ant. J. C. 709. Strab. l. 6. p. 269.

§ Cic. Verr. 7. n. 97.

§ Strab. l. vi. 270. Senec. Nat. Quæst. l. iii. c. 26.

thusa. The ancients, or rather the poets, from reasons which have not the least shadow of probability, supposed that Alpheus, a river of Elis in Peloponnesus, rolled its waters either through or under the waves of the sea, without ever mixing with them, as far as the spring or fountain of Arethusa. It was this fiction gave occasion to the following lines of Virgil:

Extremum hunc, Arethusa, mihi concede laborem.—
Sic tibi, cum fluctus subterlabere Sicanos,
Doris amara suam non internisecat undam.

VIRG. Eclog. 10.

Thy sacred succour, Arethusa, bring,
To crown my labour: 'Tis the last I sing.—
So may thy silver streams beneath the tide,
Unmix'd with briny seas, securely glide.

DRYDEN.

Achradina, situated entirely on the sea-side towards the east, was the most spacious, the most beautiful, and best fortified quarter of the city.

Tyche, so called from the temple of fortune, *τύχη*, which embellished that part of the city, extended along Achradina westward from the north towards the south, and was very well inhabited. It had a famous gate called Hexapylum, which led into the country, and was situated to the north of the city.

Epipolæ was a hill without the city, which it commanded. It was situated between Hexapylum and the point of Euryelus, towards the north and west. It was exceedingly steep in several places, and for that reason of very difficult access. At the time of the siege in question, it was not surrounded with walls; and the Syracusans defended it with a body of troops, against the attack of the enemy. Euryelus was the pass or entrance which led to Epipolæ. On the small hill of Epipolæ was a fort called Labdalon, or Labdalum.

It was not till long after, under Dionysius the tyrant, that Epipolæ was surrounded with walls, and inclosed within the city, of which it formed a fifth part, but was thinly inhabited. A fourth division had been added before, called Neapolis; that is, the new city, which covered Tyche.

* The river Anapis ran at almost half a league distance from the city. The space between them was a large and beautiful plain, terminated by two fens or moors, the one called Syraco, whence the city was named, and the other Lysimelia. This

* Plut. in Dionys. vit. p. 970.

river emptied itself into the great harbour. Near its mouth, southward, was a kind of castle called Olympia, from the temple of Jupiter Olympius standing there, and in which were great riches. It was 500 paces from the city.

Syracuse had two harbours, very near one another, and separated only by the isle, viz. the great harbour, and the small one, called otherwise Laccus. According to the * description which the Roman orator gives of them, both were surrounded with buildings as parts of the city.

The great harbour was a little above † 5000 paces, or two leagues in circumference. It had a gulf called Dascon. The entrance of this port was but 500 paces wide. It was formed, on one side, by the point of the island Ortygia; and the other, by the little island and cape of Plemmyrium, which was commanded by a fort or castle of the same name.

Above Achradina was a third port, called the harbour of Trogilus.

SECTION XII.

NICIAS, AFTER SOME ENGAGEMENTS, BESIEGES SYRACUSE—*Sc. Sc.*

EIGHTEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

AT the end of the summer ‡, news was brought Nicias that the Syracusans, having resumed courage, intended to march against him. Accordingly their cavalry advanced with an air of insolence to attack him even in his camp; and asked with a loud laugh, whether he was come into Sicily to settle in Catana. These severe reproaches roused him a little, so that he resolved to sail for Syracuse. The enterprise was bold and dangerous. Nicias could not, without running the utmost hazard, attempt to land in presence of an enemy who waited for him with the greatest resolution, and would not fail to charge him, the instant he should offer to make a descent. Nor was it safer for him to march his troops by land, because, as he had no cavalry, that of the Syracusans, which was very numerous, upon

* Portus habet prope in ædificatione aspectuque urbis inclusos. Cic. Verr. 6. n. 117.

† According to Strabo, it is 80 stadia in circumference, which is twice its real extent: a plain proof that this passage of Strabo is corrupt.—Cluver. p. 167.

‡ Thucyd. l. vi. p. 453—461. Plut. in Nic. 533, 534. Diod. l. cxxxvii. cxxxviii.

the first advice they should have of their march, would come to blows, and overpower him by the superiority of forces.

To extricate himself from this perplexity, and enable himself to seize without opposition upon an advantageous post which a Syracusan exile had discovered to him, Nicias had recourse to stratagem. He caused a false piece of news to be given to the enemy, *viz.* that by means of a conspiracy, which was to take effect on a certain day, they might seize on his camp, and possess themselves of all the arms and baggage. The Syracusans, on this promise, marched towards Catana, and pitched their camp near Leontium. The moment the Athenians had advice of this, they embarked with all their troops and ammunition; and in the evening steered for Syracuse. They arrived by day-break in the great harbour; landed near Olympia, in the place which had been pointed out to them, and there fortified themselves. The enemy finding themselves shamefully over-reached, returned immediately to Syracuse; and, in the greatest rage, drew up in battle-array, some days after, before the walls of the city. Nicias marched out of the trenches, and a battle was fought. Victory was a long time doubtful, but a very heavy shower of rain, accompanied with thunder and lightning, coming unexpectedly, the Syracusans, who were unexperienced, and the greatest part of them having never carried arms before, were frightened at the tempest, whilst their enemies laughed at it as the mere effect of the season, and regarded nothing but the enemy, who were much more to be dreaded than the storm. The Syracusans, after making a long and vigorous resistance, were forced to give way. The Athenians could not pursue them far, because their horse, which was still in a body and had not been defeated, covered their retreat. The Syracusans retreated in good order into the city, after having thrown a body of troops into the temple of Olympia to prevent its being plundered.

This temple stood pretty near the camp of the Athenians, who were very desirous of taking it, because it abounded with gold and silver offerings, which the piety of kings and nations had consecrated. Nicias having delayed sending troops to seize it, lost the opportunity, and gave the Syracusans time to throw into it, as was before observed, a detachment to defend it. It was thought he did this on purpose, and out of reverence to the gods; because, had the soldiers plundered this temple, the public would not have reaped any benefit by it, and himself only had been accused of the sacrilege.

After the battle, the Athenians, who were not yet in a con-

dition to attack Syracuse, retired with their fleet to Naxos and Catana to winter there, with design to return in the beginning of the next spring, and lay siege to the city. To do this, they wanted money, provisions, and particularly horse, of which they were absolutely destitute. The Athenians depended upon obtaining part of these succours from the people of Sicily, who they supposed would join them the instant they should hear of their victory; and at the same time they sent an express to Athens, to solicit the like aid. They also addressed the Carthaginians for their alliance; and sent deputies to some cities of Italy, situated on the coast of the Tuscan sea, which had promised to assist them.

The Syracusans were far from desponding. Hermocrates, who, of all their leaders, was most distinguished for his valour, his judgment, and experience, represented to them, in order to raise their hopes, that they had not been wanting in courage, but in conduct; that their enemies, though very brave, owed their victory to their good fortune rather than to their merit; that the having a multitude of leaders (they were 15 in number), from which confusion and disobedience are inseparable, had done them prejudice; that it would be absolutely necessary for them to chuse experienced generals, to keep the rest in their duty, and exercise their forces continually during the winter season. This advice being followed, Hermocrates and two more were elected generals; after which they sent deputies to Corinth and Lacedæmon, to renew the alliance, and at the same time to engage them to make a diversion, in order to oblige, if possible, the Athenians to recall their troops out of Sicily, or at least to prevent their sending a reinforcement thither. The fortifying of Syracuse was the chief object of their care. Accordingly they took into the city, by a wall, all the tract of land towards Epipolæ, from the northern extremity of Tyche, descending westward towards the quarter or division of the city called afterwards Neapolis, in order to remove the enemy to a greater distance, and to give them more trouble in making their contravallation, by obliging them to give a larger extent to it. This part, in all probability, had been neglected, because it seemed to be sufficiently defended by its rugged and steep situation. They also garrisoned Megara and Olympia, and drove stakes into all those parts of the sea-shore where the enemy might easily make a descent. Hearing afterwards that the Athenians were at Naxos, they went and burnt the camp of Catana, and retired, after laying waste the country adjacent to it.

The

* The ambassadors of Syracuse, being arrived among the Corinthians, asked succour of them, as having been their founders, which was immediately granted; and at the same time they sent an embassy to the Lacedæmonians, to invite them to declare in their favour. Alcibiades enforced their demand with all his credit and eloquence, which his resentment against Athens inflamed prodigiously. He advised and exhorted the Lacedæmonians to appoint Gylippus their general, and send him into Sicily; and at the same time to invade the Athenians, in order to make a powerful diversion. In the third place, he counselled them to fortify Decelia in Attica, which quite completed the ruin of the city of Athens, it not being able ever to recover that blow: for by this fort, the Lacedæmonians made themselves masters of the country, by which the Athenians were deprived of their silver mines of Laurium, and of the revenues of their lands; nor could they be succoured by their neighbours, Decelia becoming the asylum of all the malcontents and partisans of Sparta.

† Nicias had received some succours from Athens. It consisted of 250 horsemen, who the Athenians supposed would be furnished with horses in Sicily (the troops bringing only the furniture), and of 30 horse-archers, with 300 talents, that is, 300,000 French crowns†. Nicias now began to prepare for action. He was accused of often letting slip opportunities, by his losing time in deliberating, arguing, and concerting measures; however, when once he entered upon action, he was as bold and vigorous in executing, as he before had been slow and timorous in undertaking, as he showed on the present occasion.

The Syracusans hearing that the Athenians had a reinforcement of cavalry, and would soon march and lay siege to their city; and knowing they could not possibly approach it, or make a contravallation, unless they should possess themselves of the hill of Epipolæ which commanded Syracuse, they resolved to guard the avenue to it, which was the only pass by which the enemy could get up to it, every other part being rugged and inaccessible. Marching therefore down into the meadow or plain, bordered by the river Anapis, and reviewing their troops there, they appointed 700 foot, under the command of Diomilus, to guard that important post; and commanded them

* Thucyd. l. vi. p. 471—482. Plut. in Alcib. p. 203. In Nic. p. 534, 535. Diod. l. xii. p. 138.

† A. M. 3590. Ant. J. C. 414.

‡ About L. 67,000 sterling.

to repair to it, at the first signal which should be given for that purpose. But Nicias conducted his design with so much prudence, expedition, and secrecy, that they had not time to do this. He sailed from Catana with all his fleet, without the enemy's having the least suspicion of his design. Being arrived at the port of Trogilus near Leontium, which is but a quarter of a league (six or seven furlongs) from Epipolæ, he put his land-forces on shore, after which he retired with his fleet to Thapsus, a small peninsula of Syracuse, the entrance to which he shut up with a staccado.

The land-forces marched with the utmost expedition to seize on Epipolæ, by the pass of Euryelus, before the enemy, who were in the plains of Anapis at above a league's distance, had the least notice of their arrival. At the first news of this, the 700 soldiers, under the command of Diomilus, advanced forward in confusion, but were easily defeated, and 300 of them, with their leader, left dead in the field. The Athenians, after setting up a trophy, built a fort in Labdalon, on the summit of Epipolæ, in order to secure their baggage and most valuable effects in it, whenever they should be forced to fight, or work at the contravallation.

Soon after, the inhabitants of Egesta sent the Athenians 300 horse, to which some of their Sicilian allies added 100 more; that, with the 250 sent before by the Athenians, and who had furnished themselves with horses in Sicily, made a body of 650 horse.

The plan laid down by Nicias, in order for taking Syracuse, was, to surround all the city on the land-side with a strong contravallation, in order to cut off all communication with the place from without, in hopes no doubt that his fleet would afterwards enable him to prevent the Syracusans from receiving any succours or provisions by sea.

Having left a garrison in Labdalon, he came down from the hill, advanced towards the northern extremity of Tyche, and halting there, he employed the whole army in throwing up a line of contravallation, to shut up their city northward from Tyche as far as Trogilus, situated on the sea-side. This work was carried on with such a rapidity as terrified the Syracusans. They thought it absolutely necessary to prevent the carrying on of this work, and accordingly made some sallies and attacks, but always with disadvantage, and even their cavalry was routed. The day after the action, the contravallation, northward, was continued by part of the army, during which the rest carried stones and other materials towards Trogilus, in order to finish it.

The besieged, by the advice of Hermocrates, thought it advisable not to venture a second battle with the Athenians; and only endeavoured to put a stop to their works, at least to render them useless, by running a line to cut that carried on by the Athenians. They imagined, that in case they should be suffered to complete their wall, it would be impossible for the Athenians to make any further progress in their work: or that, should they endeavour to prevent it, it would suffice for the Syracusans to oppose them with a part of their forces, after having shut up such avenues as were most accessible, with strong palisades: and that the Athenians, on the contrary, would be obliged to send for all their forces, and entirely abandon their works.

Accordingly they came out of their city, and working with inexpressible ardour, they began to raise a wall; and, in order to carry it on with less molestation, they covered it with strong palisades, and flanked it with wooden towers, at proper distances, to defend it. The Athenians suffered the Syracusans to carry on their works undisturbed, because, had they marched only part of their troops against them, they would have been too weak; and if they had brought them all, they then must have been obliged to discontinue their works, which they were resolved not to do. The work being completed, the Syracusans left a body of troops to defend the palisade, and guard the wall, and then returned into the city.

In the mean time the Athenians cut off the canals by which water was conveyed into the city; and observing the Syracusan soldiers, who had been left to guard the wall, very negligent in their duty; some returning at noon either into the city or their tents, and the rest not keeping a proper guard; they detached 300 chosen soldiers, and some light infantry, to attack this post; during which the rest of the army marched towards the city, to prevent any succours from coming out of it. Accordingly, the 300 soldiers having forced the palisade, pursued those who guarded it as far as that part of the city wall which covered Temenos; where, pouring in indiscriminately with them, they were repulsed by the inhabitants with loss. The whole army afterwards demolished the wall, and pulled up the palisades of the intrenchment, and carried them off.

After this success, whereby the Athenians were masters of the northern parts, they began the very next day a still more important work, and which would quite finish their inclosure of the city; *viz.* to carry a wall from the hills of Epipolæ, westward, through the plain and the fens as far as the great harbour.

harbour. To prevent this, the besieged beginning the same kind of work as they had carried on on the other side, ran a trench, lined with palisades, from the city through the fens, to prevent the Athenians from carrying their contravallations as far as the sea. But the latter, after finishing the first part of the wall on the hills of Epipolæ, resolved to attack this new work. For this purpose, they ordered their fleet to sail from Thapfus to the great harbour of Syracuse, it having continued in that road hitherto; and the besieged had always the sea open to them, by which the besiegers were obliged to get their provisions from Thapfus by land. The Athenians came down therefore from Epipolæ into the plain, before day-break; when throwing planks and beams in that part where the fen was only slimy and more firm than in other places, they immediately carried the greatest part of the fosse lined with palisades, and then the rest, after having beaten the Syracusans, who gave way and retired; such as were on the right towards the city, and the rest towards the river. Three hundred chosen Athenians having attempted to cut off the passage of the latter, flew towards the bridge; but the enemy's cavalry, the greatest part of which were drawn up in battle, repulsed them; and afterwards charged the right wing of the Athenians, and put the first battalions into disorder. Lamachus perceiving this from the left wing, where he commanded, ran thither with the Argives and some archers; but having passed a trench, and being abandoned by his soldiers, he was killed with five or six who followed him. The enemy immediately passed the river, and seeing the rest of the army come up, they retired.

At the same time the right wing, which had returned towards the city, resumed courage from this success, and drew up in order of battle before the Athenians; after having detached some troops to attack the fort on the hills of Epipolæ, which served as a magazine to the enemy, and was thought to be unguarded. They forced an intrenchment that covered the fort, but Nicias saved it. He was sick in this fort, and at that time in his bed, with only his domestics about him. Animated by the danger, and the presence of the enemy, he struggles with his indisposition, rises up, and commands his servants to set fire immediately to all the timber lying between the intrenchment and the fort for the military engines, and to the engines themselves. This unexpected conflagration stopped the Syracusans, saved Nicias, the fort, and all the rich effects of the Athenians, who made haste to the relief of that general. At the same time, the fleet was seen sailing into the
great

great harbour, according to the orders given for that purpose. The Syracusans, having perceived this from the hill, and fearing they should be attacked from behind, and over-powered by the land-forces, they retired, and returned to the city with all their forces; now no longer expecting, after having lost their fosse lined with palisades, that it would be possible for them to prevent the enemy from carrying on their contravallation as far as the sea.

In the mean time the Athenians, who had contented themselves with building a single wall on the hills of Epipolæ, and through such places as were craggy and of difficult access, being come down into the plain, began to build, at the foot of the hills, a double wall, intending to carry it as far as the sea, *viz.* a wall of contravallation against the besieged, and another of circumvallation against those Syracusan troops which were out of the city, and such allies as might come to its aid.

From thenceforth Nicias, who was now sole general, conceived great hopes; for several cities of Sicily, which hitherto had not declared for either side, came and joined him; and there arrived from all quarters vessels laden with provisions for his army, all parties being eager to go over to him, because he had acquired the superiority, and been exceedingly successful in all his undertakings. The Syracusans, seeing themselves blocked up both by sea and land, and losing all hopes of being able to defend their city any longer, already proposed an accommodation. Gylippus, who was coming from Lacedæmon to their assistance, having heard, in his passage, the extremity to which they were reduced, and looking upon the whole island as lost, sailed forward nevertheless; not in the view of defending Sicily, but only to preserve to the nations of Italy such cities as were subject to them in that island, if it were not too late, and if this could be done. For some had declared, in all places, that the Athenians had already possessed themselves of the whole island; and were headed by a general, whose wisdom and good fortune rendered him invincible. Nicias himself, now, contrary to his natural disposition, confiding in his own strength, and elate from his success; persuaded also by the secret advices which were brought him daily from Syracuse, and the messengers who were sent to him, that the city would immediately capitulate; did not regard Gylippus's approach, and in consequence took no precautions to prevent his landing, especially when he heard that he brought but very few vessels; terming him a trifling pirate, not worthy, in any manner, his notice. But a general ought to be extremely careful not to abate his cares and vigilance

lance upon account of success, because the least negligence may ruin every thing. Had Nicias sent the smallest detachment to oppose Gylippus's landing, he would have taken Syracuse, and the whole affair had been ended.

SECTION XIII.

THE SYRACUSANS RESOLVE TO CAPITULATE, BUT GYLIPPUS'S ARRIVAL CHANGES THE FACE OF AFFAIRS—*Εῖς*.

NINETEENTH YEAR OF THE WAR.

THE fortifications of the Athenians were now almost completed*, and they had drawn a double wall, near half a league in length, along the plain and the fens towards the great port, and had almost reached it. There now remained, on the side towards Trogilus, only a small part of the wall to be finished. The Syracusans were therefore on the brink of ruin, and had no hopes left, as they were no longer able to defend themselves, and did not expect any succours. For this reason they resolved to surrender. Accordingly a council was held to settle articles of capitulation, in order to present them to Nicias; and several were of opinion, that it would be proper to capitulate soon, before the city should be entirely invested.

It was at that very instant, and at the most critical juncture, that an officer, Gongyles by name, arrived from Corinth on board a ship with three benches of oars. At his arrival, all the citizens flocked around him. He informed them, that Gylippus would be with them immediately, and was followed by a great many other galleys, which came to their aid. The Syracusans, astonished, or rather stupified, as it were, with this news, could scarce believe what they heard. Whilst they were thus fluctuating and in doubt, a courier arrived from Gylippus to inform them of his approach, and order them to march out all their troops to meet him. He himself, after having taken a fort (Jeges) in his way, marched in battle directly for Epipolæ; and ascending by Euryelus, as the Athenians had done, he prepared to attack them from without, whilst the Syracusans should charge them, on their side, with the forces of Syracuse and his. The Athenians, exceedingly surprised by his arrival, drew up hastily, and without order, under the walls. With regard to himself, laying down his arms when he approached, he sent word by a herald, that he

* A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. p. 485—489. Plut. in Nic. p. 535, 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 138, 139.

would allow the Athenians five days to leave Sicily. Nicias did not condescend to make the least answer to this proposal ; and some of his soldiers bursting out a-laughing, asked the herald, “ Whether the presence of a Lacedæmonian privateer, “ and a trifling wand, could make any change in the present “ state of the city ? ” Both sides therefore prepared for battle.

Gylippus stormed the fort of Labdalon, and cut to pieces all who were found in it. The same day an Athenian galley was taken, as it sailed into the harbour. The besieged afterwards drew a wall from the city, towards Epipolæ, in order to cut, about the extremity of it, the single wall of the Athenians ; and to deprive them of all communication with the troops posted in the intrenchments which surrounded the city on the north side towards Tyche and Trogilus. The Athenians, after having finished the wall, which extended as far as the sea towards the great harbour, were returned to the hills. Gylippus perceiving, in the single wall which the Athenians had built on the hills of Epipolæ, a part that was weaker and lower than the rest, marched thither in the night with his troops ; but being discovered by the Athenians, who were encamped without, he was forced to retire, upon seeing them advance directly towards him. They raised the wall higher, and themselves undertook the guard of it ; after having fixed their allies in the several posts of the remainder of the intrenchment.

Nicias, on the other side, thought proper to fortify the cape of Plemmyrium, which, by its running into the sea, straitened the mouth of the great harbour ; and his design thereby was, to procure provisions, and all other things he might want, the more easily ; because the Athenians, by possessing themselves of that post, drew near the little port, wherein lay the chief naval forces of the Syracusans, and were the better able to observe the various motions of it ; and that besides, by having the sea open, they would not be forced to have all their provisions from the bottom of the great harbour ; as they must have been, should the enemy, by seizing on the mouth of it, oblige them to keep close in the harbour, in the manner they then did. For Nicias, from the arrival of Gylippus, had no hopes left but from the side next the sea. Sending therefore his fleet and part of his troops thither, he built three forts, by which the ships were enabled to lie at anchor ; he also secured there a great part of the baggage and ammunition. It was then that the troops on board the fleet suffered very much ; for, as they were obliged to go a great way to fetch wood and water, they were surrounded by the enemy’s horse, the third part of which were

posted at Olympia, to prevent the garrison of Plemmyrium from falling, and were masters of the field. Advice being brought to Nicias, that the Corinthian fleet was advancing, he sent 20 galleys against it; ordering them to observe the enemy towards Locris, Rhegium, and the rest of the avenues of Sicily.

In the mean time Gylippus, employing those very stones which the Athenians had got together for their use, went on with the wall which the Syracusans had begun to carry through Epipolæ; and drew up daily in battle-array before it, as did the Athenians. When he saw it was a proper time for engaging, he began the battle in the spot lying between the two walls. The narrowness of it having rendered his cavalry and archers useless, he came off with loss, and the Athenians set up a trophy. Gylippus, to reanimate his soldiers, by doing them justice, had the courage to reproach himself for the ill success they had met with, and to declare publicly, that he, not they, had occasioned the late defeat, because he had made them fight in too narrow a spot of ground. However, he promised soon to give them an opportunity of recovering both their honour and his; and accordingly, the very next day, he led them against the enemy, after having exhorted them, in the strongest terms, to behave in a manner worthy of their ancient glory. Nicias perceiving, that though he should not desire to come to a battle, it would however be absolutely necessary for him to prevent the enemy from extending their line beyond the contravallation, to which they were already very near; because otherwise this would be granting them a certain victory; he therefore marched against the Syracusans. Gylippus brought up his troops beyond that place where the walls terminated on both sides, in order that he might leave the more room to extend his battle; when charging the enemy's left wing with his horse, he put it to flight, and soon after defeated the right. We have here an instance of what the experience and abilities of a great captain are capable of producing: for Gylippus, with the same men, the same arms, the same horses, and the same ground, by only changing his order of battle, defeated the Athenians, and beat them quite to their camp. The following night, the victors carried on their wall beyond the contravallation of the Athenians, and thereby deprived them of all hopes of being ever able to surround them.

* After this success, the Syracusans, to whose aid the Corinthian fleet was arrived, unperceived by that of the Athenians,

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 490—494. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 139.

refused courage, armed several galleys, and marching into the plains with their cavalry and other forces, took a great number of prisoners. They sent deputies to Lacedæmonia and Corinth, to desire a reinforcement; Gylippus went in person to all the cities in Sicily, to solicit them to join him, and brought over the greatest part of them, who accordingly sent him powerful succours. Nicias, finding his troops lessen, and those of the enemy increase daily, began to be discouraged, and not only sent expresses to the Athenians, to acquaint them with the situation of affairs, but likewise wrote to them in the strongest terms. I repeat his whole letter, both as it gives a clear and exact account of the state of things at that time in Syracuse, and may serve as a model for such kind of relations.

“ Athenians: I have already informed you, by several expresses, of what passed here: but it is necessary you should know the present situation of affairs, that you may resolve accordingly. After we had been victorious in several engagements, and almost completed our contravallation, Gylippus arrived in Syracuse with a body of Lacedæmonian and Corinthian troops; and, having been defeated the first time, he was victorious the second, by means of his cavalry and archers. We are in consequence shut up in our intrenchments, without daring to make any attempt, or complete our works, through the superiority of the enemy’s forces; for part of our soldiers are employed in guarding our forts, and consequently we have not an opportunity of employing all our soldiers in battle. Besides, as the Syracusans have cut our lines, by a wall, in that part where they were not complete, it will no longer be possible for us to invest the city, unless we should force their intrenchments; so that instead of besieging, we ourselves are besieged, and dare not stir out, for fear of their horse.

“ Not contented with these advantages, they are bringing new succours from Peloponnesus, and have sent Gylippus to force all the neutral cities of Sicily to declare for them, and the rest to furnish them with men and ships, to attack us both by sea and land. I say by sea, which, though very surprising, is however but too true. For our fleet, which before was considerable, from the good condition of the galleys and mariners, is now very deficient in those very circumstances, and prodigiously weakened.

“ Our galleys leak every-where; because we cannot draw them on shore to careen them, for fear, lest those of the enemy, which are more numerous, and in better condition

“ than ours, should attack us on a sudden, which they seem
“ to threaten every moment. Besides, we are under a necessity
“ of sending many backwards and forwards to guard the
“ convoys which we are forced to fetch from a great dis-
“ tance, and bring along in sight of the enemy; so that
“ should we be ever so little negligent in this point, our army
“ would be starved.

“ With regard to the ships’ crews, they decrease sensibly
“ every day; for as great numbers of them disperse to ma-
“ raud, or to fetch wood and water, they are often cut to
“ pieccs by the enemy’s horse. Our slaves, allured by the
“ neighbourhood of the enemy’s camp, desert very fast to it.
“ The foreigners which we forced into the service, diminish
“ daily; and such as have been raised with money, who came
“ for plunder rather than fighting, finding themselves balked,
“ go over to the enemy, who are so near us, or else hide them-
“ selves in Sicily, which they may easily do, in so large an
“ island. A great number of citizens, though long used to,
“ and well skilled in working of ships, by bribing the captains,
“ put others in their room, who are wholly unexperienced,
“ and incapable of serving, and by that means have quite sub-
“ verted all discipline. I am now writing to men perfectly
“ well versed in naval affairs, and who are very sensible, that,
“ when order is neglected, every thing grows worse and worse,
“ and a fleet must inevitably be ruined.

“ But the most unhappy circumstance is, that, though I am
“ generalissimo, I cannot put a stop to these disorders. For,
“ Athenians, you are very sensible, that such is your disposi-
“ tion, that you do not easily brook restraint; besides, I do
“ not know where to furnish myself with seamen, whilst the
“ enemy get numbers from all quarters. It is not in the power
“ of our Sicilian allies to aid us; and should the cities of Italy,
“ from whence we have our provisions, hearing the extremity
“ to which we are reduced, and your not taking the least care
“ to send us any succour, join the Syracusans, we are undone;
“ and the enemy will have no occasion to fight us.

“ I could write of things which would be more agreeable,
“ but of none that could be more advantageous to you, nor
“ which could give you a more just idea of the subjects on
“ which you are to deliberate. I am sensible that you love to
“ have such advices only sent you as are pleasing; but then
“ I know, on the other side, that when affairs turn out other-
“ wise than you expected and hoped for, you accuse those who
“ deceived you; which induced me to give you a sincere and
“ genuine

“genuine account of things, without concealing a single circumstance. By the way, I am to inform you, that no complaints can be justly made either against the officers or common soldiers, both having done their duty very well.

“But now that the Sicilians join all their forces against us, and expect a new army from Peloponnesus; you may lay this down as the foundation for your deliberations, that our present troops are not sufficient; and, therefore, we either must be recalled, or else a land and naval force, equal to the first, must be sent us, with money in proportion. You must also think of appointing a person to succeed me; it being impossible for me, through my nephritic disorder, to sustain any longer the weight of the command. I imagine that I deserve this favour at your hands, on account of the services I have done you, in the several commands conferred upon me, so long as my health would permit me to act.

“To conclude; whatever resolution you may come to, the request I have to make, is, that you would execute it speedily, and in the very beginning of the spring. The succours which our enemies meet with in Sicily are all ready; but those which they expect from Peloponnesus may be longer in coming. However, fix this in your minds, that if you do not exert yourselves, the Lacedæmonians will not fail, as they have already done, to be beforehand with you.”

The Athenians were strongly affected with this letter, which made as great an impression on them as Nicias expected. However, they did not think proper to appoint him a successor, and only nominated two officers who were under him, *viz.* Menander and Euthydemus, to assist him till other generals should be sent. Eurymedon and Demosthenes were chosen to succeed Lamachus and Alcibiades. The former set out immediately with ten galleys, and some money*, about the winter solstice, to assure Nicias that a speedy succour should be sent him; during which, the latter was raising troops and contributions, in order to set sail early in the spring.

†The Lacedæmonians, on the other side, being supported by the Corinthians, were very industrious in preparing reinforcements to send into Sicily, and to enter Attica, in order to keep the Athenian fleet from sailing to that island. Accordingly they entered Attica early, under the command of

* 120 talents.

† A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. vii. p. 494—496, et 502—504. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.

king Agis; and after having laid waste the country, they fortified Decelia; having divided the work among all the forces, to make the greater dispatch. This post is about 120 furlongs from Athens, that is, about six French leagues, and the same distance from Bœotia. Alcibiades was perpetually soliciting the Lacedæmonians, and could not be easy till he had prevailed with them to begin that work. This annoyed the Athenians most of all: for hitherto the enemy, retiring after they had laid waste the Athenian territories, the latter were unmolested all the rest of the year; but from the fortifying of Decelia, the garrison left in it was continually making incursions, and alarming the Athenians, Athens being now become a kind of frontier town; for, in the day-time, a guard was mounted at all the gates; and in the night, all the citizens were either on the walls, or under arms. Such vessels as brought provisions from the island of Eubœa, and which before had a much shorter passage by Decelia, were forced to go round about, in order to double the cape of Sunium: by which means provisions, as well as goods imported, grew much dearer. To heighten the calamity, upwards of 20,000 slaves, the greatest part of whom were artificers, went over to the enemy, to fly from the extreme misery with which the city was afflicted. The cattle of all kinds died. Most of the horses were lamed, being continually upon guard, or upon parties. Every thing being laid waste in this manner, and the Athenians enjoying no longer the revenues which arose from the produce of their lands, there was a prodigious scarcity of money; so that they were forced to take the twentieth part of all the imports, to supply their usual subsidies.

* In the mean time Gylippus, who had made the tour of Sicily, returned with as many men as he could raise in the whole island, and prevailed with the Syracusans to fit out the strongest fleet in their power, and to hazard a battle at sea, upon the presumption that the success would answer the greatness of the enterprize. This advice was strongly enforced by Hermocrates, who exhorted the Syracusans not to abandon to their enemies the empire of the sea. He observed, that the Athenians themselves had not received it from their ancestors, nor been always possessed of it: that the Persian war had in a manner forced them into the knowledge of naval affairs, notwithstanding two great obstacles, their disposition, and the situation of their city, which stood at a considerable distance

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 497—500. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140.
from

from the sea : that they had made themselves formidable to other nations, not so much by their real strength, as by their courage and intrepidity ; that they ought to copy them ; and since they had to do with enemies who were so enterprising, it was fit they should be equally daring.

This advice was approved, and accordingly a large fleet was equipped. Gylippus led out all his land-forces in the night-time, to attack the forts of Plemmyrium. Thirty-five galleys of Syracuse which were in the great harbour, and 45 in the lesser, where was an arsenal for ships, were ordered to advance towards Plemmyrium, to amaze the Athenians, who would see themselves attacked both by sea and land at the same time. The Athenians, at this news, went on board also ; and, with 25 ships, failed to fight the 35 Syracusan vessels which were sailing out against them from the great harbour ; and opposed 35 more to the 45 of the enemy, which were come out of the little port. A sharp engagement was fought at the mouth of the great harbour ; one party endeavouring to force their way into it, and the other to keep them out.

Those who defended the forts of Plemmyrium, having flocked to the shore to view the battle, Gylippus attacked the forts unexpectedly by day-break ; and having carried the greatest of them by storm, the soldiers who defended the other two were so terrified, that they abandoned them in a moment. After this advantage the Syracusans sustained a considerable loss ; for such of their vessels as fought at the entrance of the harbour, after having forced the Athenians, bulged furiously one against the other as they entered it in disorder ; and by this means shifted the victory to their enemies, who were not contented with pursuing them, but also gave chase to those who were victorious in the great harbour. Eleven Syracusan galleys were sunk, and great numbers of the sailors in them killed. Three were taken ; but the Athenians likewise lost three, and after towing off those of the enemy, they raised a trophy in a little island lying before Plemmyrium, and retired to the centre of their camp.

The Syracusans also raised three trophies for their taking of the three forts ; and after razing one of the smaller, they repaired the fortifications of the other two, and put garrisons into them. Several Athenians had been either killed or made prisoners there ; and great sums of money were taken, the property of the public, as well as of merchants and captains of galleys, besides a large quantity of ammunition ; this being a kind of magazine for the whole army. . They likewise lost the
stores

stores and rigging of 40 galleys, with three ships that lay in the dock. But a more considerable circumstance was, Gylippus thereby prevented Nicias from getting provisions and ammunition so easily; for, whilst the latter was possessed of Plemmyrium, they procured these securely and expeditiously; whereas, after their being dispossessed of it, it was equally difficult and hazardous, because they could not bring in any thing without fighting; the enemy lying at anchor just off their fort. Thus the Athenians could have no provisions but from the points of their swords; which dispirited the soldiers very much, and threw the whole army into a great consternation.

* There afterwards was a little skirmish in defending a staccado which the inhabitants had made in the sea, at the entrance of the old harbour, to secure the shipping. The Athenians having raised towers and parapets on a large ship, made it advance as near as possible to the staccado, in order that it might serve as a bulwark to some ships that carried military engines, with which they drew up stakes by the help of pulleys and ropes, exclusive of those which the divers sawed in two; the besieged defending themselves with their harbour, and the enemy with their tower. Such stakes as had been driven in, level with the surface of the water, in order to strand those vessels that should come near them, were the hardest to force away. The divers also bribed the enemy, and most of the stakes were torn up; but then others were immediately driven in their places. The utmost efforts were used on both sides, in the attack as well as the defence.

† One circumstance which the besieged considered of the greatest importance, was to attempt a second engagement both by sea and land, before the fleet, and other succours sent by the Athenians, should arrive. They had concerted fresh measures for a battle at sea, by improving from the errors they had committed in the last engagement. The change made in the galleys was, their prows were now shorter, and at the same time stronger and more solid than before. For this purpose, they fixed great pieces of timber, projecting forward on each side of the prows; and to these pieces they joined beams by way of props. These beams extended to the length of six cubits on each side of the vessel, both within and without. By this they hoped to gain the advantage over the galleys of the Athenians, which did not dare, because of the weakness of

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 500, 501.

† Ibid. p. 509—513. Plut. in Nic. p. 536. Diod. l. xiii. p. 140, 141.

their prows, to attack an enemy in front, but only in flank ; not to mention, that should the battle be fought in the harbour they would not have room to spread themselves, nor to pass between two galleys, in which lay their greatest art ; nor to tack about, after they should have been repulsed, in order to return to the charge ; whereas the Syracusans, by their being masters of the whole extent of the harbour, would have all these advantages, and might reciprocally assist one another. On these circumstances the latter founded their hopes of victory.

Gylippus therefore first drew all the infantry out of the camp, and advanced towards that part of the contravallation of the Athenians which faced the city ; whilst the troops of Olympia marched towards the other, and their galleys set sail.

Nicias did not care to venture a second battle, saying, that as he expected a fresh fleet every moment, and a great reinforcement under Demosthenes, it would betray the greatest want of judgment, should he, as his troops were inferior in number to those of the enemy, and already fatigued, hazard a battle without being forced to it. On the contrary, Menander and Euthydemus, who had just before been appointed to share the command with Nicias till the arrival of Demosthenes, fired with ambition, and jealous of those generals, were eager to perform some great exploit, to bereave the one of his glory, and, if possible, eclipse that of the other. The pretence they alleged on this occasion was, the fame and reputation of Athens ; and they asserted with so much vehemence, that it would be entirely destroyed, should they shun the battle, as the Syracusans offered it them, that they at last forced Nicias to a compliance. The Athenians had 75 galleys, and the Syracusans 80.

The first day the fleets continued in sight of each other, in the great harbour, without engaging ; and only a few skirmishes passed, after which both parties retired ; and it was just the same with the land-forces. The Syracusans did not make the least motion the second day. Nicias, taking advantage of this inactivity, caused the transports to draw up in a line, at some distance from one another, in order that his galleys might retire behind them with safety, in case he should be defeated. On the morrow, the Syracusans came up sooner than usual, when a great part of the day was spent in skirmishing, after which they retired. The Athenians did not suppose they would return, but imagined that fear had made them fly : but having refreshed themselves with great diligence, and returning on board their

their galleys, they attacked the Athenians, who were far from expecting them. The latter being now forced to return immediately on board their ships, they entered them in great disorder, so that they had not time to draw them up in a line of battle, and most of the sailors were fasting. Victory did not long continue in suspense. The Athenians, after making a short and slight resistance, retired behind their line of transport ships. The enemy pursued them thither, and were stopped by the sail-yards of those ships, to which were fixed* dolphins of lead, which, being very heavy, had they fallen on the enemy's galleys, would have sunk them at once. The Athenians lost seven galleys in this engagement, and a great number of soldiers were either killed or taken prisoners.

† This loss threw Nicias into the utmost consternation. All the misfortunes he had met with, ever since the time he had first enjoyed the supreme command, came into his mind: and he now is involved in a greater than any of them by his complying with the advice of his colleagues. Whilst he was revolving these gloomy ideas, Demosthenes's fleet was seen coming forward in great pomp, and with such an air as should fill the enemy with dread: it was now the day after the battle. This fleet consisted of 73 galleys, on board of which were 5000 fighting men, and about 3000 archers, slingers, and bowmen. All these galleys were richly trimmed; their prows being adorned with shining streamers, manned with stout rowers, commanded by good officers, and echoing with the sound of clarions and trumpets; Demosthenes having affected an air of pomp and triumph, purposely to strike terror into the enemy.

This gallant sight alarmed them indeed beyond expression. They did not see any end, or even the least suspension of their calamities: all they had hitherto done or suffered was as nothing, and their work was to begin again. What hopes could they entertain of being able to weary out the patience of the Athenians, since, though they had a camp intrenched in the middle of Attica, they were however able to send a second army into Sicily, as considerable as the former; and that their power, as well as their courage, seemed, notwithstanding all their losses, instead of diminishing to increase daily?

Demosthenes having made an exact enquiry into the state of things, imagined that it would not be proper for him to lose

* This engine, so violent was its motion, broke through a galley from the deck to the hold.

† Thucyd. l. vii. p. 513—518. Plut. in Nic. p. 537. Diod. l. xiii. p. 141, 142.

time as Nicias had done, who, having spread an universal terror at his first arrival, became afterwards the object of contempt, for his having wintered in Catana, instead of going directly to Syracuse, and had afterwards given Gylippus an opportunity of throwing troops into it. He flattered himself with the hopes, that he should be able to carry the city at the first attack, by taking advantage of the alarm which the news of his arrival would spread in every part of it, and by that means should immediately put an end to the war: otherwise he intended to raise the siege, and no longer harass and lessen the troops by fighting battles never decisive, nor quite exhaust the city of Athens, by employing its treasures in needless expences.

Nicias, terrified by this bold and precipitate resolution of Demosthenes, conjured him not to be so hasty, but to take time to weigh things deliberately, that he might have no cause to repent of what he should do. He observed to him, that the enemy would be ruined by delays: that their provisions as well as money were entirely exhausted; that their allies were going to abandon them; that they must soon be reduced to such extremity, for want of provisions, as would force them to surrender, as they had before resolved: for there were certain persons in Syracuse who held a secret correspondence with Nicias, and exhorted him not to be impatient, because the Syracusans were tired with the war and with Gylippus; and that should the necessity to which they were reduced be ever so little increased, they would surrender at discretion.

As Nicias did not explain himself clearly, and would not declare in express terms, that sure and certain advices were sent him of whatever was transacted in the city, his remonstrances were considered as an effect of the timidity and slowness with which he had always been reproached. "Such," said they, "are his usual protraction, delays, distrusts, and fearful precaution, whereby he has deadened all the vivacity, and extinguished all the ardour of the troops, in not marching them immediately against the enemy; but on the contrary, by deferring to attack them, till his own forces were weakened and despised." This made the rest of the generals and all the officers come over to Demosthenes's opinion, and Nicias himself was at last forced to acquiesce with it.

Demosthenes, after having attacked to no purpose the wall which cut the contravallation of the besiegers, confined himself to the attack of Epipolæ, from a supposition that should he once be master of it, the wall would be quite undefended.

He

He therefore took provisions for five days, with workmen, implements, and every thing necessary for him to defend that post after he should possess himself of it. As there was no going up to it in the day-time undiscovered, he marched thither in the night with all his forces, followed by Eurymedon and Menander: Nicias staying behind to guard the camp. They went up by the way of Euryelus, as before, unperceived by the centinels; attack the first intrenchment, and storm it, after killing part of those who defended it. Demosthenes, not satisfied with this advantage, to prevent the ardour of his soldiers from cooling, and not delay the execution of his design, marches forward. During this interval, the forces of the city, sustained by Gylippus, march under arms out of the intrenchments. Being seized with astonishment, which the darkness of the night increased, they were immediately repulsed and put to flight. But as the Athenians advanced in disorder, to force whatever might resist their arms, lest the enemy might rally again, should time be allowed them to breathe and recover from their surprise, they are stopt on a sudden by the Bœotians, who make a vigorous stand, and marching against the Athenians with their pikes presented, they repulse them with great shouts, and make a dreadful slaughter. This spreads an universal terror through the rest of the army. Those who fled either force along such as were advancing to their assistance, or else mistaking them for enemies, turn their arms against them. They now were all mixed indiscriminately, it being impossible to discover objects in the horrors of a night, which was not so gloomy as entirely to make objects imperceptible, nor yet light enough to distinguish those which were seen. The Athenians fought for one another to no purpose; and from their often asking the *word*, by which only they were able to know one another, a strange confusion of sounds was heard, which occasioned no little disorder; not to mention that they, by this means, divulged the word to the enemy, and could not learn theirs; because by their being together and in a body, they had no occasion to repeat it. In the mean time, those who were pursued, threw themselves from the top of the rocks, and many were dashed to pieces by the fall; and as most of those who escaped, straggled from one another up and down the fields and woods, they were cut to pieces the next day by the enemy's horse, who pursued them. Two thousand Athenians were slain in this engagement, and a great number were taken; those who fled having thrown them away, that they might be the better able to escape over the precipices.

SECT.

SECTION XIV.

THE ATHENIANS AGAIN HAZARD A SEA FIGHT, AND ARE DEFEATED.—NICIAS AND DEMOSTHENES SENTENCED TO DIE, AND EXECUTED.

THE Athenian generals*, after sustaining so great a loss, were in a prodigious dilemma, and did not know how to act in the present discouragement and despair of the troops, who died daily, either by the diseases of the autumn, or by the bad air of the fens near which they were encamped. Demosthenes was of opinion that it would be proper for them to leave the country immediately, since they had been unsuccessful in so important an enterprise; especially as the season was not too far advanced for sailing, and that they had ships enough to force a passage, in case the enemy should dispute it with them. He declared, that it would be of much greater advantage to oblige the enemy to raise their blockade of Athens, than for them to continue that of Syracuse, by which they exhausted themselves to no purpose; that he was certain they would not be reinforced by a new army; and that they could not hope to overcome the enemy with the weak one under their command.

Nicias was sensible, that the arguments his colleague used were very just, and he himself was of his opinion: but at the same time he was afraid, lest so public a confession of the weak condition to which they were reduced, and their resolution to leave Sicily, the report of which would certainly reach the enemy, should complete the ruin of their affairs; and perhaps make them unable to execute their resolution when they should attempt it. Besides, they had some little hopes left that the besieged, being themselves reduced to great extremity by their absolute want of provisions and money, would at last be inclined to surrender upon honourable terms. Thus, although he was in reality uncertain and wavering, he insinuated, that he did not care to quit Sicily, till the Athenians should have first sent orders for that purpose; and that otherwise they would be highly displeased: that as those who were to judge them, had not been eye-witnesses of the state of things, they would be of a different opinion; and, at the instigation of some orator, certainly condemn them: that most of those men, who

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 511—520. Plut. in Nic. p. 538—542. Diod. l. xiii. p. 142.

now exclaimed with the greatest vehemence against the difficulties they laboured under, would then change their note, and accuse them of having been bribed to raise the siege: That knowing so well, as he did, the disposition and character of the Athenians, he chose to die gloriously by the enemy's sword, rather than be ignominiously condemned by his fellow-citizens.

These reasons, though they appeared very strong, were yet not able to convince Demosthenes; and it was still his opinion, that the only good choice they could make, would be to retire. However, as he had been unsuccessful in his former opinion; he was afraid of insisting upon this; and he was the more inclined to come into that of Nicias, from imagining, with many others, that this general might have some secret resource, as he was so firmly resolved to stay.

* Gylippus, after having made the tour of Sicily, had brought a great body of troops with him. This new reinforcement terrified the Athenians exceedingly, whose army diminished daily by sickness; and they now began to repent their not having raised the siege, especially as the besieged were preparing to attack them both by sea and land. Besides, Nicias no longer opposed this resolution, and only desired to have it kept secret. Orders were therefore given, as privately as possible, for the fleet to prepare for setting sail with the utmost expedition.

When all things were ready, the moment they were going to set sail, wholly unsuspected by the enemy, who were far from surmising they would leave Sicily so soon, the moon was suddenly eclipsed in the middle of the night, and lost all its splendor; which terrified Nicias and the whole army, who, from ignorance and superstition, were astonished at so sudden a change, the causes of which they did not know, and therefore dreaded the consequences of it. They then consulted the soothsayers; and, who being equally unacquainted with the reasons of this phenomenon, only augmented their consternation. It was the custom, after such accidents had happened, to suspend their enterprise but for three days. The soothsayers pronounced, that he must not set sail till three times nine days were past (these are Thucydides's words), which doubtless was a mysterious number in the opinion of the people. Nicias, scrupulous to a fault, and full of a mistaken veneration

* Thucyd. l. vii. p. 421—548. Plut. in Nic. p. 538. Died. l. xiii. p. 242—261.

for these blind interpreters of the will of the gods, declared that he would wait a whole revolution of the moon, and not return till the same day of the next month; as if he had not seen the planet very clearly, the instant it had emerged from that part which was darkened by the interposition of the earth's body.

But he was not allowed time for this. The news of the intended departure of the Athenians being soon spread over the city, a resolution was taken to attack the besiegers both by sea and land. The Syracusans began the first day by attacking the intrenchments, and gained a slight advantage over the enemy. On the morrow they made a second attack; and at the same time sailed with 76 galleys, against 86 of the Athenians. Eurymedon, who commanded the right of the Athenian fleet, having spread along the shore to surround them, this movement proved fatal to him: for, as he was detached from the body of the fleet, the Syracusans, after forcing the main battle, which was in the centre, attacked him; drove him vigorously into the gulf called Dascon, and there defeated him entirely. Eurymedon lost his life in the engagement. They afterwards gave chase to the rest of the galleys, and run them against the shore. Gylippus, who commanded the land-army, seeing the Athenian galleys were forced aground, and not able to return into their staccado, landed with part of his troops, in order to charge the soldiers, in case they should be forced to run ashore; and to give his friends the more room to tow such galleys as they should have taken. However, he was repulsed by the Tyrrhenians, who were posted on that side, and obliged by the Athenians, who flew to sustain them, to retire with some loss as far as the moor called Lysimelia, which lay near it. The latter saved most of their ships, 18 excepted, which were taken by the Syracusans, and their crews cut to pieces by them. After this, resolving to burn the rest, they filled an old vessel with combustible materials; and having set fire to it, they drove it by the help of the wind against the Athenians, who nevertheless extinguished the fire, and drove off that ship.

Each side erected trophies; the Syracusans for the defeat of Eurymedon, and the advantage they had gained the day before; and the Athenians, for their having drove part of the enemy into the moor, and put the other part to flight. But the minds of the two nations were very differently disposed. The Syracusans, who had been thrown into the utmost consternation at the arrival of Demosthenes with his fleet, seeing

themselves victorious in a naval engagement, resumed fresh hope, and assured themselves of a complete victory over their enemies. The Athenians, on the contrary, frustrated of their only resource, and overcome by sea so contrary to their expectations, entirely lost courage, and had no thoughts but of retiring.

The enemy, to deprive them of all resource, and prevent their escaping, shut the mouth of the great harbour, which was about 500 paces wide, with galleys placed cross-ways, and other vessels fixed with anchors and iron chains; and at the same time made the requisite preparations for the battle, in case they should have the courage to engage again. When the Athenians saw themselves thus hemmed in, the generals and principal officers assembled, in order to deliberate on the present state of affairs. They were in absolute want of provisions, which was owing to their having forbid the people of Catana to bring any, from the hopes they entertained of their being able to retire; and they could not procure any from other places, unless they were masters of the sea. This made them resolve to venture a sea-fight. In this view, they were determined to leave their old camp, and their walls, which extended to the temple of Hercules; and to entrench themselves on the shore, near their ships, in the smallest compass possible. Their design was, to leave some forces in that place to guard their baggage and the sick; and to fight with the rest on board all the ships they should have saved. They intended to retire into Catana, in case they should be victorious; otherwise, to set fire to their ships, and to march by land to the nearest city belonging to their allies.

This resolution being taken, Nicias immediately filled 110 galleys, the others having lost their oars, with the flower of his infantry; and drew up the rest of the forces, particularly the bowmen, in order of battle on the shore. As the Athenians dreaded very much the beaks of the Syracusan galleys, Nicias had provided harping-irons to grapple them, in order to break the force of the blow, and to come immediately to close fight as on the shore. But the enemy perceiving this, covered the prows and upper part of their galleys with leather, to prevent their being so easily laid hold of. The commanders on both sides had employed all their rhetoric to animate their men; and none could ever have been prompted from stronger motives; for the battle which was going to be fought, was to determine, not only their lives and liberties, but also the fate of their country.

The battle was very obstinate and bloody. The Athenians, being arrived at the mouth of the port, easily took those ships which defended the entrance of it; but when they attempted to break the chain of the rest, to widen the passage, the enemy came up from all quarters. As near 200 galleys, came rushing on each side, in the narrow place, there must necessarily be a very great confusion; and the vessels could not easily advance forward or retire, nor turn about to renew the attack. The beaks of the galleys, for this reason, did very little execution; but there were very furious and frequent discharges. The Athenians were overwhelmed with a shower of stones, which always did execution from what place soever they were thrown; whereas they defended themselves only by shooting darts and arrows, which, by the motion of the ships, from the agitation of the sea, did not carry true, and by that means the greatest part of them did little execution. Ariston the pilot had given the Syracusans this counsel. These discharges being over, the soldiers, heavily armed, attempted to enter the enemy's ships, in order to fight hand to hand: And it often happened, that whilst they were climbing up one side, their own ships were entered on the other; and two or three ships would be grappled to one, which occasioned a great perplexity and confusion. Further, the noise of the ships, that dashed one against the other, the different cries of the victors and vanquished, prevented the orders of the officers from being heard. The Athenians wanted to force a passage, whatever might be the consequence, to secure their return into their own country; and this the enemy employed their utmost efforts to prevent, in order that they might gain a more complete and more glorious victory. The two land-armies, which were drawn up on the highest part of the shore, and the inhabitants of the city who were there, ran to the walls; whilst the rest, kneeling in the temples, were imploring heaven to give success to their citizens; and these saw clearly, because of their little distance from the fleets, every thing that passed, and contemplated the battle as from an amphitheatre, but not without great anxiety and terror. Attentive to, and shuddering at every movement and the several changes which happened; they discovered the concern they had in the battle, their fears, their hopes, their grief, their joy, by different cries and different gestures; stretching out their hands, sometimes towards the combatants to animate them, and at other times towards heaven, to implore the succour and protection of the gods. At last, the Athenian fleet, after sustaining a long battle and a vigorous resistance, was put

to flight, and driven against the shore. The Syracusans, who were spectators of this victory, conveyed to the whole city, by an universal shout, the news of this victory. The victors, now masters of the sea, and sailing with a favourable wind towards Syracuse, erected a trophy; whilst the Athenians, who were quite dejected and overpowered, did not so much as request that their dead soldiers might be delivered to them, in order to pay the last sad duty to their remains.

There now remained but two methods for them to choose; either to attempt the passage a second time, for which they had ships and soldiers sufficient, or to abandon their fleet to the enemy, and retire by land. Demosthenes proposed the former; but the sailors, in the deepest affliction, refused to obey, fully persuaded that it would be impossible for them to sustain a second engagement. The second method was therefore resolved upon, and accordingly they prepared to set out in the night, to conceal the march of their army from the enemy.

But Hermocrates, who suspected their design, was very sensible that it was of the utmost importance not to suffer so great a body of forces to escape; since they otherwise might fortify themselves in some corner of the island, and renew the war. The Syracusans were at that time in the midst of their festivity and rejoicings, and meditating nothing but how they might best divert themselves, after the toils they had sustained in fight. They were then solemnizing the festival of Hercules. To desire the Syracusans to take up arms again, in order to pursue the enemy, and to attempt to draw them from their diversions either by force or persuasion, would have been to no purpose; for which reason another expedient was employed. Hermocrates sent out a few horsemen, who were to pass for friends of the Athenians, and ordered them to cry aloud: "Tell Nicias not to retire till day-light; for the Syracusans lie in ambush for him, and have seized on the passes." This false advice stopt Nicias at once; and he did not even set out the next day, in order that the soldiers might have more time to prepare for their departure, and carry off whatever might be necessary for their subsistence, and abandon the rest.

The enemy had time enough for seizing the avenues. The next morning early they possessed themselves of the most difficult passes, fortified those places where the rivers were fordable, broke down the bridges, and spread detachments of horse up and down the plain; so that there was not one place through
which

which the Athenians could pass without fighting. They set out upon their march the third day after the battle, with design to retire to Catana. The whole army was in an inexpresible consternation, to see such great numbers of men, either dead or dying, some of whom were left exposed to wild beasts, and the rest to the cruelty of the enemy. Those who were sick and wounded conjured them with tears, to take them along with the army, and held by their clothes when they were going; or else, dragging themselves after them, followed them as far as their strength would permit; and, when this failed, they had recourse to tears, sighs, imprecations; and sending up towards heaven plaintive and dying groans, they called upon the gods as well as men to avenge their cruelty, whilst every place echoed with lamentations.

The whole army was in as deplorable a condition. All men were seized with the deepest melancholy. They were inwardly tortured with rage and anguish, when they represented to themselves the greatness from which they were fallen, the extreme misery to which they were reduced, and the still greater evils from which they foresaw it would be impossible for them to escape. They could not bear the comparison for ever present in their thoughts, of the triumphant state in which they had left Athens, in the midst of the good wishes and acclamations of the people; with the ignominy of their retreat, aggravated by the cries and imprecations of their relations and fellow-citizens.

But the most melancholy part of the spectacle, and that which most deserved compassion, was Nicias. Dejected and worn out by a tedious illness, deprived of the most necessary things, at a time when his age and infirmities required them most; pierced, not only with his private grief, but with that of others, all which preyed upon his heart; this great man, superior to all his evils, thought of nothing but how he might best comfort his soldiers, and revive their courage. He ran up and down in all places, crying aloud, that matters were not yet desperate, and that other armies had escaped from greater dangers; that they ought not to accuse themselves, or grieve too immoderately, for misfortunes which they had not occasioned; that if they had offended some god, his vengeance must be satiated by this time; that fortune, after having so long favoured the enemy, would at last be tired of persecuting them; that their bravery and numbers made them still formidable, being still near 40,000 strong; that no city in Sicily would be able to withstand them, nor prevent their settling wherever they

they might think proper; that they had no more to do, but to take care severally of themselves, and march in good order; that by a prudent and courageous retreat, which was now become their only resource, they would not only save themselves, but also their country, and enable it to recover its former grandeur.

The army marched in two bodies, both drawn up in the form of a phalanx; the first being commanded by Nicias, and the second by Demosthenes, with the baggage in the centre. Being come to the river Anapis, they forced the passage, and afterwards were charged by all the enemy's cavalry, as well as archers, who discharged perpetually upon them. They were annoyed in this manner during several days march; every one of the passes being guarded, and the Athenians being obliged to dispute every inch of their way. The enemy did not care to hazard a battle against an army, which despair alone might render invincible; and, the instant the Athenians presented the Syracusans battle, the latter retired: but whenever the former would proceed in their march, they advanced, and charged them in their retreat.

Demosthenes and Nicias, seeing the miserable condition to which the troops were reduced, being in extreme want of provisions, and great numbers of them wounded, judged it advisable to retire towards the sea, by a quite contrary way from that in which they then marched, and to make directly for Camarina and Gela, instead of proceeding to Catana, as they first intended. They set out in the night, after lighting a great number of fires. The retreat was made in great confusion and disorder, as generally happens to great armies in the gloomy horrors of the night, especially when the enemy is not far off. However, the van-guard, commanded by Nicias, came forward in good order; but above half the rear-guard, with Demosthenes at their head, separated from the main body, and lost their way. On the next day the Syracusans, who, on the report of their retreat, had marched with the utmost diligence, came up with him about noon; and having surrounded him with their horse, they drove him into a narrow place inclosed with a wall, where his soldiers fought like lions. Perceiving, at the close of the day, that they were oppressed with fatigue, and covered with wounds, they gave the islanders leave to retire, which some of them accepted; and afterwards spared the lives of the rest, who surrendered at discretion with Demosthenes, after having stipulated, that they should not be put to death, nor sentenced to perpetual imprisonment. About 6000 soldiers surrendered on these conditions.

Nicias arrived the same evening at the river Erineus, and, passing it, encamped on a mountain, where the enemy came up with him the next day, and summoned him to surrender at discretion, as Demosthenes had done. Nicias could not persuade himself at first, that what they told him concerning that general was true, and therefore desired leave to send some horse for information. Upon their returning with the news that Demosthenes had really surrendered in that manner, Nicias offered to pay the expences of the war, upon condition that they would permit him to leave the country with his forces, and to give as many Athenians for hostages, as they should be obliged to pay talents. But the enemy rejected this proposal with disdain and insolence, and renewed the attack. Nicias, though in absolute want of all things, however sustained the charge the whole night, and marched towards the river Asinarus. When they were got to the banks of it, the Syracusans advancing up to them, threw most of them into the stream; the rest having already plunged voluntarily into it to quench their thirst. Here the greatest and most bloody havoc was made, the poor wretches being butchered without the least pity as they were drinking. Nicias, finding all lost, and unable to bear this dismal spectacle, surrendered at discretion, upon condition that Gylippis should discontinue the fight, and spare the rest of his army. A great number were killed, and more taken prisoners, so that all Sicily was filled with them. * The Athenians seemed to have been displeased with their general, for surrendering in this manner at discretion; and, for this reason, his name was omitted in a public monument, on which were engraved the names of those commanders who had lost their lives in fighting for their country.

The victors adorned with the arms taken from the prisoners the finest and largest trees they could find on the banks of the rivers, and made a kind of trophies of these trees; when crowning themselves with chaplets of flowers, dressing their horses in the richest caparisons, and cropping those of their enemies, they entered triumphantly into Syracuse, after having happily terminated the most considerable war in which they had ever been engaged with the Greeks; and won, by their strength and valour, a most signal and most complete victory. The next day a council was held, to deliberate on what was to be done with the prisoners. Diocles, one of the leaders of the greatest authority among the people, proposed, that all the

* Pausan. l. i. p. 56.

Athenians who were born of free parents, and all such Sicilians as had joined with them, should be imprisoned, and only two measures of flour, and one of water, given them daily; that the slaves and all the allies should be publicly sold; and that the two Athenian generals should be first scourged with rods, and afterwards put to death.

* This last article was exceedingly disliked by all wise and compassionate Syracusans. Hermocrates, who was very famous for his probity and justice, attempted to make some remonstrances to the people, but they would not hear him; and the shouts which echoed on all sides, prevented him from continuing his speech. At that instant † an ancient man, venerable for his great age and gravity, who, in this war, had lost two sons, the only heirs to his name and estate, made his servants carry him to the tribunal for harangues; and the instant he appeared, a profound silence was made. “You here behold,” says he, “an unfortunate father, who has felt more than any other Syracusan, the fatal effects of this war by the death of two sons, who formed all the consolation, and were the only supports of my old age. I cannot indeed forbear admiring their courage and felicity, in sacrificing, to their country’s welfare, a life of which they would one day have been deprived by the common course of nature: but then I cannot but be strongly affected with the cruel wound which their death has made in my heart; nor forbear hating and detesting the Athenians, the authors of this unhappy war, as the murderers of my children. But, however, I cannot conceal one circumstance, which is, that I am less sensible to my private affliction, than to the honour of my country: and I see it exposed to eternal infamy, by the barbarous advice which is now given you. The Athenians indeed merit the worst treatment, and every kind of punishment that could be inflicted on them, for so unjustly declaring war against us; but have not the gods, the just avengers of crimes, punished them and revenged us sufficiently? When their generals laid down their arms, and surrendered, did they not do this in the hopes of having their lives spared? And, if we put them to death, will it be possible for us to avoid the just reproach of our having violated the law of nations, and dishonoured our victory by an unheard-of cruelty? How! Will you suffer your glory to be thus sullied in the face of the whole world; and have it said, that a nation, who first dedicated a temple

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 149—161.

† Nicolaus.

“ in their city to clemency, had not found any in your’s ?
“ Surely victories and triumphs do not give immortal glory to
“ a city ; but the exercising mercy towards a vanquished ene-
“ my, the using moderation in the greatest prosperity, and fear-
“ ing to offend the gods by a haughty and insolent pride. You
“ doubtless have not forgot that this Nicias, whose fate you are
“ going to pronounce, was the very man who pleaded your
“ cause in the assembly of the Athenians, and employed all
“ his credit, and the whole power of his eloquence, to dissuade
“ his country from embarking in this war. Should you there-
“ fore pronounce sentence of death on this worthy general,
“ would it be a just reward for the zeal he showed for your in-
“ terest ? With regard to myself, death would be less grievous
“ to me, than the sight of so horrid an injustice, committed by
“ my countrymen and fellow-citizens.”

The people seemed moved to compassion at this speech, especially as, when this venerable old man first ascended, they expected to hear him cry aloud for vengeance on those who had brought all his calamities upon him, instead of suing for their pardon. But the enemies of the Athenians having expatiated with vehemence on the unheard-of cruelties which their republic had exercised on several cities belonging to their enemies, and even to their ancient allies ; the inveteracy which their commanders had shown against Syracuse, and the evils they would have made it suffer had they been victorious ; the afflictions and groans of infinite numbers of Syracusans, who bewailed the death of their children and near relations, whose manes could be appeased no other way than by the blood of their murderers ; on these representations, the people returned to their sanguinary resolution, and followed Diocles’s advice in every respect. Gylippus used his utmost endeavours, but in vain, to have Nicias and Demosthenes given up to him, especially as he had taken them, in order for him to carry them to Lacedæmon. But his demand was rejected with a haughty scorn, and the two generals were put to death.

All wise and compassionate men could not forbear shedding tears, for the tragical fate of two such illustrious personages ; and particularly for Nicias, who, of all men of his time, seemed least to merit so ignominious and untimely an end. When people recollected the speeches and remonstrances he had made to prevent this war ; and on the other side, when they considered how high a regard he had always retained for things relating to religion ; the greatest part of them were tempted to exclaim against providence, in seeing that a man, who had ever shown the

the highest reverence for the gods, and had always exerted himself to the utmost for their honour and worship, should be so ill rewarded by them, and meet with no better fate than the most abandoned wretches. But it is no wonder that the calamities of good men should inspire the heathens with such thoughts, and make them murmur and despond; since they did not know the holiness of the Divine Being, nor the corruption of human nature.

The prisoners were shut up in the mines, “prisons of Syracuse,” where, crowded one upon the other, they suffered incredible torments for eight months. Here they were for ever exposed to the inclemencies of the weather; scorched, in the day-time, by the burning rays of the sun, or frozen, in the night, by the colds of autumn; poisoned by the stench of their own excrements, by the carcases of those who died of their wounds and of sickness; in fine, worn out by hunger and thirst, for the daily allowance to each was but a small measure of water, and two of meal. Those who were taken out of this place two months after, in order to be sold as slaves (many of them were citizens who had concealed their condition), found a less rigorous fate. Their wisdom, their patience, and a certain air of probity and modesty, were of great advantage to them; for they were soon restored to their liberty, or met with the kindest and most generous treatment from their masters. Several of them even owed the good usage they met with to Euripides, the finest scenes of whose tragedies they repeated to the Sicilians, who were extremely fond of them; so that when they returned to their own country, they went and saluted that poet as their deliverer, and informed him of the admirable effects wrought in their favour by his verses.

* The news of this defeat being carried to Athens, the citizens would not believe it at first; and were so far from giving credit to it, that they sentenced that man to death who had first published it. But when it was confirmed, all the Athenians were seized with the utmost consternation; and as if themselves had not decreed the war, they vented their rage and resentment against the orators who had promoted the enterprise, as well as against the soothsayers, who, by their oracles or supposed prodigies, had flattered them with the hopes of success. They had never been reduced to so deplorable a condition as now; having neither horse, foot, money, galleys, nor mariners; in a word, they were in the deepest despair, ex-

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 551—553. Plut. de Garrulit. p. 509.

pecting every moment that the enemy, elated with so great a victory, and strengthened by the revolt of the allies, would come and invade Athens, both by sea and land, with all the forces of Peloponnesus. Cicero had reason to observe*, speaking of the battles in the harbour of Syracuse, that it was there the troops of Athens, as well as their galleys, were ruined and sunk; and that, in this harbour, the power and glory of the Athenians were miserably shipwrecked.

The Athenians however did not suffer themselves to be wholly dejected, but resumed courage. They now resolved to raise money on all sides, and to import timber for building of ships, in order to awe the allies, and particularly the inhabitants of the island of Eubœa. They retrenched all superfluous expences, and established a new council of ancient men, who were to weigh and examine all affairs before they should be proposed to the people. In fine, they omitted nothing which might be of service in the present conjuncture; the alarm in which they were in, and their common danger, obliging every individual to be attentive to the necessities of the state, and docile to all advice that might promote its interests.

The defeat of the army under Nicias was followed by the taking of Athens, of which the ancient form of government was entirely changed by Lyfander.

CHAPTER II.

THIS chapter is the sequel of the preceding book, and contains the eight last years of the Peloponnesian war, during as many years of the reign of Darius Nothus.

SECTION I.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEFEAT OF THE ATHENIANS IN SICILY, &c. &c.

THE * defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse gave occasion for great movements throughout all Greece. The people, who had not yet joined either side, and waited to be determined

* Hic primum opes illius civitatis victæ, comminutæ, depressæque sunt; in hoc portu Atheniensium nobilitatis, imperii, gloriæ naufragium factum existimatur. Cic. Verr. 7. n. 97.

† A. M. 3591. Ant. J. C. 413. Thucyd. l. viii. p. 553.

by the event, resolved to declare against them. The allies of the Lacedæmonians believed, that the time was come to deliver them for ever from the expences of a war, which lay very heavy upon them, by the speedy and final ruin of Athens. Those of Athens, who followed them only out of constraint, seeing no appearance of any future resource for that republic, after the dreadful blow it had received, thought it best to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture, for throwing off the yoke of dependence, and resuming their liberty. Dispositions of this kind inspired the Lacedæmonians with great views, which were supported by the hopes they had conceived, that their Sicilian allies would join them in the spring with a naval army, augmented by the ruins of the Athenian fleet.

* In effect the people of Eubœa, Chio, and Lesbos, with several others, gave the Lacedæmonians to understand, that they were ready to quit the party of the Athenians, if they would take them under their protection. At the same time came deputies from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. The first was governor of Lydia and Ionia, the other of the Hellespont. These viceroys of Darius wanted neither application nor zeal for the interest of their master. Tissaphernes, promising the Lacedæmonians all the necessary expences for their troops, pressed them to arm directly, and to join him; because the Athenian fleet prevented him from levying the usual contributions in his province, and had put it out of his power to remit those of preceding years to the king. He hoped besides with that powerful aid to get into his hands with more ease a certain nobleman, who had revolted, and whom he had the king's orders to send to him dead or alive. This was Armorges the bastard of Pissuthna. Pharnabazus, at the same time demanded ships to reduce the cities of the Hellespont from their subjection to the Athenians, who also prevented him from levying the tributes of his government.

The Lacedæmonians thought it proper to begin by satisfying Tissaphernes; and the credit of Alcibiades contributed very much to the taking that resolution. He embarked with Calcidæus for Chio, which took arms upon their arrival, and declared for the Lacedæmonians. Upon the news of this revolt, the Athenians resolved to take the † 1000 talents out of the treasury, which had been deposited there from the beginning of the war, after having repealed the decree which prohibited it. Miletus also revolted soon after. Tissaphernes, having

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 555—558.

† 3,000,000 livres.

joined

joined his troops with those of Sparta, attacked and took the city of Iasus, in which * Amorges had shut himself up, who was taken alive and sent into Persia. That governor gave a month's pay to the whole army, at a drachm or tenpence a-day to each soldier, observing that he had orders to give them only half that sum for the future.

† Calcidæus then made a treaty with Tissaphernes, in the name of the Lacedæmonians, of which one of the principal articles was, that all the country which had been subject to the king or his predecessors, should remain in his hands. It was renewed some time after by Theramenes, another general of the Lacedæmonians, with some small alterations. But when this treaty came to be examined at Sparta, it was found, that too great concessions had been made to the king of Persia, in giving up all the places held by himself or his ancestors, which was to make him master of the greatest part of Greece, Thessaly, Locris, and the whole country as far as Bœotia, without mentioning the islands: from whence the Lacedæmonians would appear rather to have enslaved Greece, than re-established its liberty. It was therefore necessary to make farther alterations in it, with which Tissaphernes and the other governors made great difficulties to comply. A new treaty was however concluded, as we shall see in the sequel.

In the mean time, several cities of Ionia declared for Lacedæmon, to which Alcibiades contributed very much. ‡ Agis, who was already his enemy in effect of the injury he had done him, could not suffer the glory he acquired: for nothing was done without the advice of Alcibiades, and it was generally said, that the success of all enterprises was owing to him. The most powerful and ambitious of the Spartans, from the same sentiments of jealousy, looked upon him with an evil eye, and at length by their intrigues obliged the principal magistrates to send orders into Ionia for putting him to death. Alcibiades, being secretly apprised of this order, did not discontinue his services to the Lacedæmonians, but kept himself so well upon his guard, that he avoided all the snares which were laid for him.

§ For his better security, he threw himself into the protection of Tissaphernes, the great king's governor at Sardis, and was not long without seeing himself in the highest degree of

* Thucyd l. viii. p. 568.

† Idem. p. 561—571, 572—576.

‡ Ibid. p. 577—579. Plut. in Alcib. p. 164, 165.

§ A. M. 3593. Ant. J. C. 411.

credit and authority in the court of the barbarian. For the Persian, who was full of fraud and artifice, a great friend to knaves and bad men, and set no value upon simplicity and integrity, infinitely admired the smooth address of Alcibiades, the ease with which he assumed all kinds of manners and characters, and his great ability in the conduct of affairs: and indeed there was no heart so hard, or temper so untractable, as to hold out against the graces and charms of his conversation and intimacy. Even those, who feared and envied him most, enchanted in a manner by his affable air and engaging behaviour, could not dissemble the infinite satisfaction they felt in seeing and conversing with him.

Tissaphernes therefore, though otherwise very haughty and brutal, and who of all the Persians hated the Greeks most, was so much taken with the complacency and insinuation of Alcibiades, that he gave himself wholly up to him, and flattered him more than he was flattered by him: insomuch that he gave the name of Alcibiades to the finest and most delightful of his gardens, as well from the abundance of its fountains and canals, and the verdure of its groves, as the surprising beauty of its retreats and solitudes, which art and nature seemed to vie in embellishing, and wherein a more than royal magnificence was displayed.

Alcibiades, who found there was no longer any safety for him in the party of the Spartans, and who always apprehended the resentment of Agis, began to do them ill offices with Tissaphernes, to prevent his aiding them with all his forces, and ruining the Athenians entirely. He had no difficulty in bringing the Persian into his views, which were conformable to his master's interests, and to the orders he had received from him. For after the famous treaty concluded under Cimon, the kings of Persia, not daring to attack the Greeks with open force, took other measures to ruin them. They endeavoured underhand to excite divisions among them, and to foment troubles by considerable sums of money, which they found means to convey sometimes to Athens, and sometimes to Sparta. They applied themselves so successfully to keep up a balance of power between these two republics, that the one could never entirely reduce the other. They granted them only slight aids, that could effect nothing decisive, in order to undermine them insensibly, and exhaust both parties gradually, by weakening them upon one another.

It is in this kind of conduct that policy makes the ability of ministers consist; who, from the recess of their cabinets, without

without noise or emotion, without any great expences, or setting numerous armies on foot, effect the reduction of the states whose power gives them umbrage, either by sowing domestic divisions amongst them, or by promoting the jealousy of their neighbours, in order to set them at variance with each other.

We must confess, however, that this kind of policy gives us no very favourable idea of the kings of Persia. To reduce themselves, powerful as they were, to such mean, obscure, and indirect measures, was to confess their weakness, and how unable they believed themselves to attack their enemies with open force, and to reduce them by honourable means. Besides, does it consist with justice to employ such methods in regard to people, against whom there is no foundation of complaint, who live in peace under the faith of treaties, and whose sole crime is the apprehension of their being one day in a condition to do hurt? And is it lawful by secret corruptions to ensnare the fidelity of subjects, and to be the accomplice of their treasons, by putting arms into their hands against their native country?

What glory and renown would not the kings of Persia have acquired, if, content with the vast and rich dominions which providence had given them, they had applied their good offices, power, and even treasures, to conciliate the neighbouring people with each other; to remove their jealousies, to prevent injustice and oppression; and if, feared and honoured by them all, they had made themselves the mediators of their differences, the security of their peace, and the guarantee of their treaties? Can any conquest, however great, be compared with such glory?

Tissaphernes acted upon other principles, and had no thought but of preventing the Greeks from being in a condition to attack the Persians, their common enemy. He entered freely therefore into the views of Alcibiades, and at the same time that he declared himself openly for the Lacedæmonians, did not fail to assist the Athenians underhand, and by a thousand secret methods; deferring the payment of the Lacedæmonian fleet, and retarding the arrival of the Phœnician ships, of which he had long kept them in hopes. He omitted no occasion of giving Alcibiades new marks of his friendship and esteem, which rendered that general equally considerable to both parties. The Athenians, who had sadly experienced the effects of having drawn his anger upon them, were not now to repent their passing sentence of condemnation upon him. Alcibiades

biades also on his side, who was extremely sorry to see the Athenians in so mournful a situation, began to fear that, the city of Athens being entirely ruined, he might fall into the hands of the Spartans, who mortally hated him.

SECTION II.

ALCIBIADES RETURNS TO ATHENS.—TISSAPHERNES CONCLUDES A NEW TREATY WITH THE LACEDÆMONIANS.

THE Athenians were intent upon nothing so much as Samos*, where they had all their forces. From thence with their fleet they reduced all the cities that had abandoned them under their obedience, kept the rest in their duty†, and found themselves still in a condition to make head against their enemies, over whom they had obtained several advantages. But they were afraid of Tissaphernes, and the 150 Phœnician ships which he hourly expected, and rightly perceived, that if so powerful a fleet should join the enemy, there was no longer any safety for their city. Alcibiades, who was well informed of all that passed among the Athenians, sent secretly to the principal of them at Samos, to sound their sentiments, and to let them know, that he was not averse to returning to Athens, provided the administration of the republic were put into the hands of the great and powerful, and not left to the populace, who had expelled him. Some of the principal officers went from Samos, with design to concert with him the proper measures for the success of that undertaking. He promised to procure the Athenians not only the favour of Tissaphernes, but of the king himself, upon condition they would abolish the democracy or popular government; because the king would place more confidence in the engagements of the nobility, than upon those of the inconstant and capricious multitude.

The deputies lent a willing ear to these proposals, and conceived great hopes of discharging themselves from part of the public impositions, because, being the richest of the people, the burden lay heaviest upon them, and of making their country triumph after having possessed themselves of the government. At their return, they began by bringing over such as were most proper to share in their design: after which they caused a report to be spread amongst the troops, that the king was inclined to declare in favour of the Athenians, upon condition.

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 572—587.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 204. 206.

that Alcibiades were re-inflated, and the popular government abolished. That proposal surprised the soldiers, and was generally rejected at first; but the charm of gain, and the hope of a change to their advantage, soon softened what was harsh and shocking in it, and even made them ardently desire the recall of Alcibiades.

Phrynicius, one of their generals, rightly judging that Alcibiades affected an oligarchy no more than he did the democracy, and that in decrying the people's conduct, he had no other view than to acquire the favour and confidence of the nobility for his own re-establishment, had the boldness to oppose their resolutions, which were about to take place. He represented, that the change they meditated might very probably excite a civil war to the ruin of the state; that it was very unlikely that the king of Persia would prefer the alliance of the Athenians to that of the Spartans, so much more advantageous to him; that this change would not retain the allies in their duty, nor bring over those who had renounced it, who would persist in preferring their liberty; that the government of a small number of rich and powerful persons would not be more favourable to either the citizens or allies, than that of the people, because ambition was the great cause of all misfortunes in a republic, and the rich were the sole promoters of all troubles for the aggrandizing of themselves; that a state suffered more oppressions and violences under the rule of the nobility, than that of the people, whose authority kept the former within due bounds, and was the asylum of such as they desired to oppress; that the allies were too well acquainted with these truths from their own experience, to want any lessons upon the subject.

These remonstrances, as wise as they were, had no effect. Pisander was sent to Athens with some of the same faction, to propose the return of Alcibiades, the alliance of Tissaphernes, and the abolition of the democracy. They represented, that by changing the government, and recalling Alcibiades, Athens might obtain a powerful aid from the king of Persia, which would be a certain means to triumph over Sparta. Upon this proposal, great numbers exclaimed against it, and especially the enemies of Alcibiades. They alleged, amongst other reasons, the imprecations pronounced by the priests, and all the orders of religion, against him, and even against such as should propose to recall him. But Pisander, advancing into the midst of the assembly, demanded, whether they knew any other means to save the republic in the deplorable condition to which it was reduced: and as it was admitted there were none, he added,
that

that the preservation of the state was the question, and not the authority of the laws, which might be provided for in the sequel; but at present there was no other method for the attainment of the king's friendship and that of Tissaphernes. Though this change was very offensive to the people, they gave their consent to it at length, with the hope of re-establishing the democracy in time; as Pisander had promised; and they decreed that he should go with ten more deputies to treat with Alcibiades and Tissaphernes, and that in the mean time Phrynicius should be recalled, and another general appointed to command the fleet in his stead.

The deputies did not find Tissaphernes in so good a disposition as they had been made to hope. He was afraid of the Lacedæmonians, but did not care to render the Athenians too powerful. It was his policy, by the advice of Alcibiades, to leave the two parties always at war, in order to weaken and consume them by each other. He therefore made great difficulties. He demanded at first, that the Athenians should abandon all Ionia to him, and afterwards insisted upon their adding the neighbouring islands. Those demands being complied with, he further required, in a third interview, permission to fit out a fleet, and to cruise in the Grecian seas; which had been expressly provided against in the celebrated treaty concluded with Artaxerxes. The deputies thereupon broke up the conference with indignation, and perceived that Alcibiades had imposed upon them.

Tissaphernes, without loss of time, concluded a new treaty with the Lacedæmonians; in which, what had displeased in the two preceding treaties, was retrenched. The article which yielded to Persia the countries in general that had been in the actual possession of the reigning king Darius, or his predecessors, was limited to the provinces of Asia. The king engaged to defray all expences of the Lacedæmonian fleet, upon the foot, and in the condition it then was, till the arrival of that of Persia; after which they were to support it themselves; unless they should choose that the king should pay it, to be reimbursed after the conclusion of the war. It was further agreed, that they should unite their forces, and continue the war, or make peace, by common consent. Tissaphernes, to keep his promise, sent for the fleet of Phœnicia. This treaty was made in the 11th year of Darius, and the 20th of the Peloponnesian war.

SECTION III.

ALTERATION IN THE GOVERNMENT OF ATHENS—ALCIBIADES RECALLED, AND AFTERWARDS APPOINTED GENERALISSIMO.

PISANDER*, at his return into Athens, found the change he had proposed at his setting out much forwarded, to which he put the last hand soon after. To give a form to this new government, he caused ten commissaries with absolute power to be appointed, who were however at a certain fixed time to give the people an account of what they had done. At the expiration of that term, the general assembly was summoned, wherein their first resolution was, that every one should be admitted to make such proposals as he thought fit, without being liable to any accusation of infringing the law, or consequential penalty. It was afterwards decreed, that a new council should be formed, with full power to administer the public affairs, and to elect new magistrates. For this purpose five presidents were established, who nominated 100 persons, including themselves. Each of these chose and associated three more at his own pleasure, which made in all 400, in whom an absolute power was lodged. But to amuse the people, and to console them with a shadow of popular government, whilst they instituted a real oligarchy, it was said that the 400 should call a council of 5000 citizens, to assist them when they should judge it necessary. The council and assemblies of the people were held as usual; nothing was done however but by order of the 400. The people of Athens were deprived in this manner of their liberty, which they had enjoyed almost an hundred years, after having abolished the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

This decree being passed without opposition, after the separation of the assembly, the 400, armed with daggers, and attended by 120 young men, whom they made use of when any execution required it, entered the senate, and compelled the senators to retire, after having paid them the arrears due upon their appointments. They elected new magistrates out of their own body, observing the usual ceremonies upon such occasions. They did not think proper to recall those who were banished, lest they should authorize the return of Alcibiades, whose uncontrollable spirit they apprehended, and who would soon have made himself master of the people. Abusing their power in a

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 590—594. Plut. in Alcib. p. 105.

tyrannical

tyrannical manner, some they put to death, others they banished, confiscating their estates with impunity. All who ventured to oppose this change, or even to complain of it, were butchered upon false pretexts; and those would have met with a bad reception, who demanded justice of the murderers. The 400, soon after their establishment, sent ten deputies to Samos, for the army's concurrence to it.

* All that had passed at Athens was already known there, and the news had enraged the soldiers to the highest degree. They deposed immediately several of their chiefs, whom they suspected, and put others into their places, of whom Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus were the principal, and in the highest credit. Alcibiades was recalled, and chosen generalissimo by the whole army, which desired to sail directly for Piræus to attack the tyrants. But he opposed it, representing that it was necessary he should first have an interview with Tissaphernes, and that as they had chosen him general, they might rely upon him for the care of the war. He set out immediately for Miletus. His principal design was to show himself to that governor with all the power with which he had been invested, and to let him see that he was in a condition to do him much good or much harm. The consequence of which was, that as he had kept the Athenians in awe by Tissaphernes, he now awed Tissaphernes no less by the Athenians; and we shall see in the sequel that this interview was not unnecessary.

Alcibiades, upon his return to Samos, found the army more inflamed than at first. The deputies of the 400 arrived there during his absence, and had endeavoured in vain to justify the alteration made at Athens to the soldiery. Their discourses, which were often interrupted by tumultuous cries, served only to exasperate them more, and they earnestly demanded to be led against the tyrants directly. Alcibiades did not act on this occasion, as every body else would have done in consequence of having been raised to so high a dignity by the favour of the people: for he did not think himself obliged to an absolute and implicit compliance with them in every thing, though, from an exile and a fugitive, they had made him general of so great a fleet, and so numerous and formidable an army: but, as a statesman and great politician, he believed it his duty to oppose the blind fury that hurried them on into evident danger, and to prevent them from committing a fault, which must have

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 595—604. Plut. in Alcib. p. 205. Diod. l. xiii. p. 165.

been attended with their utter ruin. This wise steadiness preserved the city of Athens: for had they failed thither at first, the enemy had made themselves masters of Ionia, the Hellespont, and all the islands without resistance; whilst the Athenians, by carrying the war into their own city, would have exhausted their whole forces against one another. He prevented the deputies from being ill treated, and dismissed them; saying, that he did not object to the 5000 citizens having the supreme authority in the republic, but that it was necessary to depose the 400, and to re-establish the senate.

* Whilst this passed, the Phœnician fleet, which the Lacedæmonians impatiently expected, approached, and news came that it was arrived at † Aspendus. Tisaphernes went to meet it, nobody being able to divine the cause of that journey. He had sent for that fleet at first to flatter the Lacedæmonians with the hopes of a powerful aid, and to put a stop to their progress, by making them wait its arrival. It was believed that his journey had the same motive; to prevent their doing any thing in his absence, and that their foldiers and mariners might disband for want of pay. However it was, he did not bring the fleet with him, from the view, no doubt, of keeping the balance equal, which was the king of Persia's interest, and to exhaust both parties by the length of the war. For it had been very easy to have put an end to it by the assistance of this additional fleet, as the Lacedæmonians alone were already as strong at sea as the Athenians. His frivolous excuse, of its not being complete, for not bringing it with him, sufficiently shows that he had other reasons for his conduct.

‡ The return of the deputies without success, who had been sent to Samos, and the answer of Alcibiades, excited new troubles in the city, and gave a mortal wound to the authority of the 400. The tumult increased exceedingly, when news was brought, that the enemy, after having beat the fleet sent by the 400 to the aid of Eubœa, had made themselves masters of the island. Athens was in the highest terror and consternation upon this account: for neither the defeat of Sicily, nor any other preceding it, were so considerable as the loss of this island, from whence the city received considerable supplies, and almost all its provisions. If in the confusion, in which Athens was at that time between

* Thucyd. l. viii. p. 604—606.

† A city of Pamphylia.

‡ Ibid. p. 607—614. Plut. in Alcib. p. 206.—210. Diod. l. xiii. p. 171, 172, et 175—177, et 182—192.

two factions, the victorious fleet had fallen upon the port, as it might have done, the army of Samos would have been indispensably obliged to have flown to the defence of their country: and then the republic would have had only the city of Athens remaining of all its dominions. For the Hellespont, Ionia, and all the islands, seeing themselves abandoned, would have been reduced to take party, and go over to the Peloponnesians. But the enemy were not capable of such great designs; and this was not the first time the Lacedæmonians had been observed to have lost their advantages by the slowness and protraction natural to them.

Athens without delay deposed the 400, as authors of all the troubles and divisions under which they groaned. Alcibiades was recalled by unanimous consent, and earnestly solicited to make all possible haste to the assistance of the city. But judging, that if he returned immediately to Athens, he should owe his recall to the compassion and favour of the people, he resolved to render his return glorious and triumphant, and to deserve it by some considerable exploit. *For this purpose, leaving Samos with a small number of ships, he cruised about the islands of Cos and Cnidos; and having learned that Mindarus, the Spartan admiral, was sailed to the Hellespont with his whole fleet, and that the Athenians were in pursuit of him, he steered that way with the utmost diligence to support them, and arrived happily with his 18 vessels at the time the fleets were engaged near Abydos in a battle, which lasted till night, without any advantage on either side. His arrival gave the Spartans new courage at first, who believed him still their friend, and dispirited the Athenians. But Alcibiades, hanging out the Athenian flag in the admiral's galley, fell upon the Lacedæmonians, who were strongest and pursued the Athenians, put them to flight, drove them ashore; and animated by his success, sunk their vessels, and made a great slaughter of the soldiers, who had thrown themselves into the sea to save themselves by swimming; though Pharnabazus spared no pains to assist them, and had advanced at the head of his troops, to the coast, to favour their flight, and to save their ships. The Athenians, after having taken 30 of their galleys, and retaken those they had lost, erected a trophy.

Alcibiades, vain of his success, had the ambition to desire to appear before Tissaphernes in this triumphant equipage, and to make him rich presents, as well in his own, as in the name of

* A. M. 3595. Ant. J. C. 409.

the people of Athens. He went to him therefore with a magnificent retinue, worthy of the general of Athens. But he did not meet with the favourable reception he expected. For Tiffaphernes, who knew he was accused by the Lacedæmonians, and feared that the king would punish him at length for not having executed his orders, found Alcibiades's presenting himself very *opportune*, and caused him to be seized and sent prisoner to Sardis; to shelter himself by that injustice against the representations of the Lacedæmonians.

Thirty days after, Alcibiades, having found means to get a horse, escaped from his guards, and fled to Clazomene, where, to revenge himself on Tiffaphernes, he gave out, that he had set him at liberty. From Clazomene he repaired to the Athenian fleet, where he was joined by Theramenes with 20 ships from Macedonia, and by Thrasylbulus with 20 more from Thasos. He sailed from thence to Parium in the Propontis. All those ships, to the number of 86, being come thither, he left that place in the night, and arrived the next morning at Proconnesus, a small isle near Cyzicum. He heard there, that Mindarus was at Cyzicum with Pharnabafus and his land-army. He rested that whole day at Proconnesus. On the morrow he harangued his soldiers, and represented to them the necessity there was for attacking the enemy by sea and land, and for making themselves masters of Cyzicum; demonstrating, at the same time, that without a complete and absolute victory, they could have neither provisions nor money. He had taken great care that the enemy should not be apprised of his approach. By good fortune for him, a great storm of rain and thunder, followed by a thick gloom, helped him to conceal his enterprize so successfully, that not only the enemy were prevented from perceiving that he advanced, but the Athenians themselves, whom he had caused to embark with precipitation, did not know that he had weighed anchor and put to sea.

When the gloom was dispersed, the Lacedæmonian fleet appeared, exercising at some distance before the port. Alcibiades, who apprehended that the enemy, upon the sight of so great a number of ships, would make the harbour, ordered the captains to keep back a little, and to follow him at a good distance; and taking only 40 vessels, he advanced towards the enemy, to offer them battle. The enemy, deceived by this stratagem, and despising his small number, advanced against him, and began the fight. But when they saw the rest of the Athenian fleet come up, they immediately lost courage, and

fled. Alcibiades, with 20 of his best ships, pursued them to the shore, landed, and killed a great number of them in the flight. Mindarus and Pharnabazus opposed his efforts in vain; the first, who fought with astonishing valour, he killed, and put the other to flight.

The Athenians by this victory, which made them masters of the slain, the arms, spoils, and whole fleet of the enemy, besides the taking of Cyzicum, not only possessed themselves of the Hellespont, but drove the Spartans entirely out of that sea. Letters were intercepted, in which the latter, with a conciseness truly laconic, advised the Ephori of the blow they had received, in terms to this effect: "The flower of your
" army is cut off; Mindarus is dead; the rest of the troops
" are dying with hunger; and we neither know what to do,
" nor what will become of us."

The news of this victory occasioned no less joy to the Athenians than consternation to the Spartans. * They dispatched ambassadors immediately to demand, that an end should be put to a war equally destructive to both people, and that a peace should be concluded upon reasonable conditions, for the re-establishment of their ancient concord and amity, of which they had for many years experienced the salutary effects. The wisest and most judicious of the citizens of Athens were unanimously of opinion, that it was proper to take the advantage of so favourable a conjuncture for the concluding of a treaty, which might put an end to all jealousies, appease all animosities, and remove all distrusts. But those who found their advantage in the troubles of the state, prevented the good effects of that disposition. † Cleophon, amongst others, the most reputed orator at that time, animated the people from the tribunal of harangues, by a violent and seditious discourse, insinuating, that their interests were betrayed by a secret intelligence with the Lacedæmonians, which aimed at depriving them of all the advantages of the important victory they had gained, and at making them lose for ever the opportunity of being fully avenged for all the wrongs and misfortunes Sparta had caused them to suffer. This Cleophon was an inconsiderable fellow, a musical instrument-maker. It was reported also that he had been a slave, and got himself fraudulently inrolled in the register of the citizens. He carried his audacity and fury so far, as to threaten to plunge his dagger into the throat of any one who should talk of peace. The Athenians, puffed up with their pre-

* Diod. l. iii. p. 177—179.

† Æsch. in Orat. de fals. legat.

sent prosperity, forgetting their past misfortunes, and promising themselves all things from the valour and good fortune of Alcibiades, rejected all proposals of accommodation, without reflecting, that there is nothing so fluctuating and precarious as the success of war. The ambassadors retired without being able to effect any thing. Such infatuation and irrational pride are generally the fore-runners of some great misfortune.

Alcibiades knew well how to make use of the victory he had gained, and presently after besieged Chalcedonia, which had revolted from the Athenians, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison. During this siege, he took another town, called Selymbria. Pharnabazus, terrified by the rapidity of his conquests, made a treaty with the Athenians to this effect: "That Pharnabazus should pay them a certain sum of money; that the Chalcedonians should return to their obedience, depend upon the Athenians, and pay them tribute; that the Athenians should commit no hostilities in the province of Pharnabazus, who engaged for the safe conduct of their ambassadors to the great king." Byzantium and several other cities submitted to the Athenians.

* Alcibiades, who desired with the utmost passion to see his country again, or rather to be seen by his country, after so many victories over their enemies, set out for Athens. The sides of his ships were covered with bucklers and all sorts of spoils, in form of trophies; and causing a great number of vessels to be towed after him by way of triumph, he displayed also the ensigns and ornaments of those he had burned, which were more than the others; the whole amounting to about 200 ships. It is said, that reflecting on what had been done against him, upon approaching the port, he was struck with some terror, and was afraid to quit his vessel till he saw from the deck a great number of his friends and relations, who were come to the shore to receive him, and earnestly entreated him to land.

The people came out of the city in a body to meet him, and at his appearance set up incredible shouts of joy. In the midst of an infinite number of officers and soldiers, all eyes were fixed solely on him, whom they considered as victory itself, descended from the skies: all around him passionately caressing, blessing, and crowning him in emulation of each other. Those who could not approach him were never tired with contemplating him at a distance, whilst the old men showed

him to their children. They repeated with the highest praises all the great actions he had done for his country; nor could they refuse their admiration even to those he had done against it during his banishment, of which they imputed the fault to themselves alone. This public joy was mingled with tears and regret, from the remembrance of past misfortunes, which they could not avoid comparing with their present felicity. “We could not have failed,” said they, “of the conquests of Sicily; our other hopes could never have proved abortive, if we had referred all our affairs and forces to the disposal of Alcibiades alone. In what a condition was Athens when he took upon him our protection and defence! We had not only almost entirely lost our power at sea, but were scarce possessed of the suburbs of our city, and, to add to our misfortunes, were torn in pieces by a horrid civil war. He, notwithstanding, has raised the republic from its ruins; and, not content with having re-inflated it in the possession of the sovereignty of the sea, has rendered it universally victorious by land; as if the fate of Athens had been in his hands alone, either to ruin or preserve it, and victory was annexed to his person, and obeyed his orders.”

This favourable reception of Alcibiades did not prevent his demanding an assembly of the people, in order to his justification before them; well knowing how necessary it was for his safety to be absolved in form. He appeared therefore, and after having deplored his misfortunes, which he imputed very little to the people, and entirely ascribed it to his ill fortune, and some dæmon envious of his prosperity, he represented to them the designs of the enemy, and exhorted them not to conceive other than great hopes. The Athenians, transported with hearing him speak, decreed him crowns of gold, appointed him general by sea and land with unlimited power, restored him all his fortunes, and ordered the *Eumolpides and Ceryces to absolve him from the curses they had pronounced against him by the order of the people; doing their utmost to make him amends for the injury and shame of his banishment by the glory of his recall, and to efface the remembrance of the anathemas themselves had decreed, by the vows and prayers which they made in his favour. Whilst all

* The Eumolpides and Ceryces were two families at Athens, who had different functions in the mysteries of Ceres. They took their names from Eumolpus and Ceryx, the first who had exercised those offices. Perhaps the employment of the latter had some relation to that of heralds, *Κήρυκες*.

the Eumolpides and Ceryces were employed in revoking those imprecations, Theodorus, the principal of them, had the courage to say: "But for me, I have not cursed him, if "he has done no evil to his country;" insinuating by that bold expression, that the maledictions, being conditional, could not fall upon the head of the innocent, nor be averted from the guilty.

In the midst of this glory and shining prosperity of Alcibiades, the majority of the people could not help being concerned, when they considered the time of his return; for it happened precisely upon the day when the Athenians celebrated the feast in honour of Minerva, adored under the name of Agraulis. The priests took off all the ornaments from the goddess's statue to wash it, from whence that feast was called *Πλυντήρια*, and afterwards covered it; and that day was accounted one of the most ominous and unfortunate. It was the 25th of the month Thargelion, which answers to the 2d of July*. This circumstance displeased that superstitious people, because it seemed to imply, that the goddess, patroness, and protectress of Athens, did not receive Alcibiades agreeably, and with a benign aspect, since she covered and concealed herself, as if she would keep him off, and remove him from her.

† All things having however succeeded according to his wish, and the 100 ships he was to command being ready, he deferred his departure out of a laudable ambition to celebrate the great mysteries; for from the time the Lacedæmonians had fortified Decelia, and taken possession of all the ways from Athens to Eleusina, the feast had not been solemnized in all its pomp, and the procession had been obliged to go by sea. The particular ceremonies of this solemnity may be seen in book x. chap. iii.

Alcibiades believed it would be a most glorious action, and attract the blessings of the gods, and the praises of men, if he restored all its lustre and solemnity to this feast, in making the procession go by land under the convoy of his troops, to defend it against the attacks of the enemy. For either Agis would suffer it to pass quietly, notwithstanding the numerous troops he had at Decelia, which would considerably lessen the reputation of that king, and be a blot in his glory; or, if he should chuse to attack it, and oppose the march, he should then have the satisfaction to fight a sacred battle; a battle

* N. S.

† Plut. in Alcib. p. 210.

grateful to the gods, for the greatest and most venerable of all their mysteries, in the sight of his country and citizens, who would be witnesses of his valour, and regard for religion. It is very likely, that by this public and ostentatious act of piety, which struck the people's view in so sensible a manner, and was so extremely to his taste, Alcibiades's principal design was to efface entirely from their minds the suspicions of impiety, to which the mutilation of statues, and profanation of mysteries, had given birth.

Having taken that resolution, he gave notice to the Eumolpides and Ceryces to hold themselves in readiness, posted centinels upon the hills, sent out runners at the break of day, and taking with him the priests, the initiated, and the probationers, with those who initiated them, he covered them with his army, and disposed the whole procession with wonderful order and profound silence. Never was show, says Plutarch, more august, nor more worthy the majesty of the gods, than this warlike procession, and religious expedition; in which even those who envied the glory of Alcibiades were obliged to own, that he was no less happy in discharging the functions of an high-priest, than those of a general. No enemy dared to appear, to disturb that pompous march, and Alcibiades re-conducted the sacred troops to Athens with entire safety. This success gave him new courage, and raised the valour and boldness of his army to such a degree, that they looked upon themselves as invincible, whilst he commanded them.

He acquired the affection of the poor and the lower sort of people so much, that they most ardently desired to have him for their king. Many of them openly declared themselves to that effect; and there were some who addressed themselves to him, and exhorted him to set himself above envy, and not to trouble himself about laws, decrees, or suffrages; to put down those wordy impertinents that disturbed the state with their vain harangues, to make himself master of affairs, and to govern with entire authority, without fearing accusers. For him, what his thoughts of the tyranny and his designs were, are unknown; but the most powerful citizens, apprehending the breaking out of a fire, of which they already saw the sparks, pressed him to depart without delay; granting whatever he demanded, and giving him, for colleagues, the generals most agreeable to him. He set sail accordingly with 100 ships, and steered for the island of Andros, which had revolted. His high reputation, and the good fortune which had attended him in all his enterprises, made nothing but what was great and extraordinary to be expected from him.

SECTION IV.

THE LACEDÆMONIANS APPOINT LYSANDER ADMIRAL.—
HE BEATS THE ATHENIAN FLEET NEAR EPHEBUS.

LYSANDER IS SUCCEEDED IN THE COMMAND BY CALLICRATIDAS.

THE Lacedæmonians, justly alarmed at the return and success of Alcibiades*, conceived that such an enemy made it necessary to oppose him with an able general, capable of making head against him. For this reason they made choice of Lysander, and gave him the command of the fleet. When he arrived at Ephesus, he found the city very well disposed in his favour, and well affected to Sparta: but otherwise in a very unhappy situation: for it was in danger of becoming barbarous, by assuming the manners and customs of the Persians, who had great commerce with it, as well from the neighbourhood of Lydia, as because the king's generals commonly took up their winter-quarters there. An idle and voluptuous life, filled up with luxury and empty show, could not fail of disgusting infinitely a man like Lysander, who had been bred from his birth in the simplicity, poverty, and severe discipline of Sparta. Having brought his army to Ephesus, he gave orders for assembling ships of burden there from all parts, erected an arsenal for building of galleys, made the ports free for merchants, gave the public places to artificers, put all arts in motion, and held them in honour; and by these means filled the city with riches, and laid the foundation of that grandeur and magnificence to which it afterwards attained. So great a change can the application and ability of a single person occasion in a state!

Whilst he was making these dispositions, he received advice, that Cyrus, the king's youngest son, was arrived at Sardis. That prince could not be above 16 years old at that time, being born after his father's accession to the crown in the 17th year of his reign. Parysatis, his mother, loved him to idolatry, and had the entire ascendant of her husband. It was she that occasioned his having the supreme government of all the provinces of Asia Minor given him; a command that subjected all the provincial governors of the most important part of the empire to his authority. The view of Parysatis was, with-

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. xi. p. 440—442. Plut. in Lysand. p. 434, 435. Diod. l. xiii. p. 192—197.

out doubt, to put the younger prince into a condition to dispute the throne with his brother after the king's death; as we shall see he does to some effect. One of the principal instructions given him by his father, upon sending him to his government, was to give effectual aid to the Lacedæmonians against Athens, an order very contrary to the measures observed till then by Tissaphernes, and the other governors of those provinces. It had always been their maxim, sometimes to assist one party, sometimes the other, in order to hold their power in such a balance, that the one might never be able to crush the other entirely: from whence it followed, that both parties were kept weak by the war, and neither in condition to form any enterprizes against the Persian empire.

Upon Lyfander's being apprised therefore of the arrival of Cyrus at Sardis, he set out from Ephesus to make him a visit, and to complain of the delays and breach of faith of Tissaphernes, who, notwithstanding the orders he had received to support the Lacedæmonians, and to drive the Athenians out of the sea, had always covertly favoured the latter, out of regard for Alcibiades, whose measures he entirely gave into, and had been the sole cause of the loss of the fleet, by not supplying it with the necessary quantity of provisions. This discourse pleased Cyrus, who looked upon Tissaphernes as a very bad man, and his particuar enemy; and he answered, that the king had given him orders to support the Lacedæmonians powerfully, and that he had received 500 talents * for that purpose. Lyfander, contrary to the common character of the Spartans, was submissive and condescending, full of complacency for the grandees, always ready to pay his court to them, and supporting, for the good of the service, all the weight of their haughtiness and vanity with incredible patience; in which behaviour some people make the whole address and merit of a courtier consist.

He did not forget himself on this occasion, and setting at work all that the industry and art of a complete courtier could suggest of flattery and insinuation, he perfectly gained the young prince's favour and good opinion. After having praised his generosity, magnificence, and zeal for the Lacedæmonians, he desired him to give each soldier and mariner a † drachm per day; in order to debauch those of the enemy by that means, and thereby terminate the war the sooner. Cyrus very

* 500,000 crowns, about L. 112,500 Sterling.

† Tenpence.

much approved the project, but said, that he could make no change in the king's order, and that the treaty with them expressly settled only half a talent * to be paid monthly for each galley. The prince, however, at the end of a banquet, which he gave him before his departure, drinking to his health, and pressing him to ask something of him, Lyfander desired that an † obolus a-day might be added to the seamen's pay. This was granted; and he gave them four oboli, instead of three which they received before, and paid them all the arrears due to them, with a month's advance; giving Lyfander 10,000 ‡ darics for that purpose; that is, 100,000 livres, or about L.5000 sterling.

This largess filled the whole fleet with ardour and alacrity, and almost unmanned the enemy's galleys; the greatest part of the mariners deserting to the party where the pay was best. The Athenians, in despair upon receiving this news, endeavoured to conciliate Cyrus by the interposition of Tissaphernes; but he would not hearken to them, notwithstanding the satrap represented, that it was not for the king's interest to aggrandize the Lacedæmonians, but to balance the power of one side with that of the other, in order to perpetuate the war, and to ruin both by their own divisions.

Though Lyfander had considerably weakened the enemy by augmenting the mariners pay, and thereby very much hurt their naval power, he dared not however hazard a battle with them, particularly apprehending Alcibiades, who was a man of execution, had the greater number of ships, and had never been overthrown in any battle either by sea or land. But after Alcibiades had left Samos to go into Phocæa and Ionia, to raise money, of which he was in want for the payment of his troops, and had given the command of his fleet to Antiochus, with express order not to fight or attack the enemy in his absence; the new commander, to make show of his courage, and to brave Lyfander, entered the port of Ephesus with two galleys, and after having made a great noise, retired with loud laughter, and an air of contempt and insult. Lyfander, enraged at that affront, immediately detached some galleys, and went himself in pursuit of him. But as the Athenians advanced to support Antiochus, he ordered other galleys of his side to come on

* 1500 livres, about L.112 Sterling.

† The drachm was six oboli, or 10 pence French; each obolus being three halfpence; so that the four oboli were sixpence halfpenny a-day. instead of fivepence, or three oboli.

‡ A Daric is about a pistole.

till the whole fleet arrived by little and little, and the engagement became general on both sides. Lyfander gained the victory, and having taken 15 of the Athenian galleys, he erected a trophy. Alcibiades, on his return to Samos, sailed even into the port to offer him battle; but Lyfander was contented with his victory, and did not think proper to accept it; so that he retired without doing any thing.

* Thraſybulus at the ſame time, the moſt dangerous enemy he had in his army, left the camp, and went to Athens to accuſe him. To enſlave his enemies in the city the more, he told the people in a full aſſembly, that Alcibiades had entirely ruined their affairs, and the navy, by the licence he had introduced; that he had given himſelf up to the moſt † notorious debauchees and drunkards, who from common ſeamen were the only perſons in credit about him; that he abandoned his whole authority to them, to be at leiſure to enrich himſelf in the provinces, and to plunge himſelf there into intemperance and all other infamous exceſſes, to the diſgrace of Athens, whiſt his fleet was left neglected in the face of the enemy's.

Another article of accuſation againſt him was taken from the forts he had built near the city of Byzantium, for an aſylum and retreat for him; as neither being able nor willing to return any more to his country. The Athenians, a capricious inconstant people, gave credit to theſe impeachments. The loſs of the laſt battle, and his little ſucceſs ſince his departure from Athens, inſtead of the great and wonderful actions expected from him, entirely ſunk him in their opinions; and his own glory and reputation may be ſaid to have occaſioned his ruin. For he was ſuſpected of not deſiring to do what was not done, which they could not believe out of his power, becauſe they were fully perſuaded, that nothing he deſired to do was impoſſible to him. They made it a crime in Alcibiades that the rapidity of his conqueſts did not anſwer to that of their imaginations; not conſidering, that he made war without money upon a people who had the great king for their treaſurer, and that he was often obliged to quit his camp, to go in queſt of what was neceſſary for the payment and ſubſiſtence of his troops. However it was, Alcibiades was depoſed, and ten generals nominated in his ſtead; of which, when he received

* A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 415.

† Antiochus is pointed at in this place, a mean debauched man, who had acquired the favour of Alcibiades, by catching a quail for him, which he had let fly.

advice, he retired in his galley to some castles he had in the Thracian Chersonesus.

* About this time died Plístonax, one of the kings of Lacedæmonia, and was succeeded by Pausanias, who reigned 14 years. The latter made a fine answer to one who asked, why it was not permitted to change any thing in the ancient customs of Sparta; “† Because,” says he, “at Sparta the laws command men, and not men the laws.”

‡ Lyfander, who intended to establish the government of the nobility in all the cities in the dependence of Sparta, that the governors of his choosing might be always at his disposal, from his having rendered them independent of their people, he caused such persons of the principal cities to come to Ephesus as he knew to be the boldest, and most enterprising and ambitious. These he placed at the head of affairs, promoted to the greatest honours, and raised to the first employments of the army, thereby rendering himself, says Plutarch, the accomplice of all the crimes and oppressions they committed to advance and enrich themselves. For this reason they were always extremely attached to him, and regretted him infinitely, when Callicratidas came to succeed him, and took upon him the command of the fleet. He was not inferior to Lyfander either in valour or military knowledge, and was infinitely above him in point of moral virtue. Alike severe to himself and others, inaccessible to flattery and sloth, the declared enemy of luxury, he retained the modesty, temperance, and austerity of the ancient Spartans; virtues that began to distinguish him particularly, as they were not too common in his time. His probity and justice were proof against all things; his simplicity and integrity abhorred all falsehood and fraud, to which were joined a truly Spartan nobleness and grandeur of soul. The great and powerful could not hinder themselves from admiring his virtue; but they were better pleased with the facility and condescension of his predecessor, who was blind to the injustice and violence of their actions.

It was not without mortification and jealousy Lyfander saw him arrive at Ephesus to take upon him the command, and out of a criminal baseness and treachery, not uncommon with those who hearken more to their private ambition, than the good

* Diod. l. xiii. p. 196.

† “Οτι τὸς νόμος τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἢ τὸς ἀνδρας τῶν νόμων κυρίως εἶναι δεῖ. Plut. in Apoph. p. 230.

‡ Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 442—444. Plut. in Lyfand. p. 433—436. Diod. l. xiii. p. 197, 198.

of the public, he did him all the ill offices in his power. Of the 10,000 darics, which Cyrus had given him for the augmentation of the mariners pay, he returned the remainder to that prince; telling Callicratidas, that he might apply to the king for the money, and that it depended on him to find means for the subsistence of his army. This conduct gave him great trouble, and distressed him exceedingly; for he had brought no money with him from Sparta, and could not resolve to extort any from the citizens, as he found them sufficiently rifled already.

* In this urgent necessity a person having offered him 50 talents, that is to say, 50,000 crowns, to obtain a favour he could not grant with justice, he refused them. Upon which Cleander, one of his officers, said, "I would accept them, were I in your place." "And so would I," replied the general, "were I in yours."

He had no other resource therefore than to go, as Lyfander had done, to ask money at the gates of the king's general and lieutenants, for which he was the least proper of all mankind. Nurtured and educated in the love of liberty, full of great and noble sentiments, and infinitely remote from all flattery and baseness, he was convinced at heart, that it was less evil and dishonour for Greeks to be overcome by Greeks, than infamously to make their court, and beg at the gates of barbarians, whose only merit consisted in their gold and silver. The whole nation were indeed disgraced by so mean a prostitution.

Cicero, in his Offices, draws two very different characters of persons employed in the administration of government, and makes the application of them to the two generals of whom we speak. The one, says he, † zealous lovers of truth, and declared enemies of all fraud, pique themselves upon their simplicity and candour, and do not believe that it can ever consist with honour to lay snares, or use artifice. The others, prepared to do or suffer every thing, are not ashamed of the meanest actions and prostitutions, provided, from those unworthy means, they have reason to expect the success of their designs. Cicero places Callicratidas amongst the former, and Lyfander

* Plut. in Apoph. p. 222.

† Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti; qui nihil ex occulto, nihil ex insidiis agendum putant; veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici; itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuius deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedæmonium Lyfandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidem. Offic. l. i. n. 109.

amongst the latter, to whom he gives two epithets not much to his honour, and hardly consistent with the Spartan character, when he calls him "very artful and very patient," or rather "very complaisant."

Callicratidas, however, forced by necessity, went to Lydia, and repaired immediately to the palace of Cyrus, where he desired that prince might be told, that the admiral of the Grecian fleet was come to speak with him. He was answered, that Cyrus was then at table, engaged in a * party of pleasure; to which he replied with a modest tone and air, that he was in no haste, and would wait till the prince came forth. The guards set up a laugh, wondering at the honest stranger's simplicity, which had so little the air of the world in it; and he was obliged to retire. He came thither a second time, and was again denied admittance. Upon which he returned to Ephesus, loading those with curses and imprecations, who had first made their court to barbarians, and by their flattery and submissions had taught them to make their riches a title and pretence for insulting the rest of mankind. Addressing himself at the same time to those about him, he swore, that, as soon as he returned to Sparta, he would use his utmost endeavours to reconcile the Greeks amongst themselves, that for the future they might become formidable to the barbarians, and have no further occasion for their aid to invade and ruin each other. But that generous Spartan, whose thoughts were so noble, and so worthy the Lacedæmonian name, and whose justice, magnanimity, and valour, might rank him with all that Greece had ever produced of the most excellent and most consummate, had not the good fortune to return to his country, nor apply himself to a work so great, and so worthy of him.

SECTION V.

CALLICRATIDAS IS DEFEATED BY THE ATHENIANS—SENTENCE OF DEATH PASSED ON SOME ATHENIAN GENERALS—SOCRATES ALONE OPPOSES THIS SENTENCE.

CALLICRATIDAS†, after having gained several victories over the Athenians, had at last pursued Conon, one of their generals, into the port of Mitylene, where he kept him blocked up.

* The Greek says literally that he was drinking, *πίνει*. The Persians valued themselves upon drinking a great deal, as an instance of their merit, as we shall see in Cyrus's letter to the Lacedæmonians.

† Xenoph. Hellen. l. i. p. 444—452. Diod. l. xiii. p. 198, et 201. 217—222.

This was in the 26th year of the Peloponnesian war. Conon, seeing himself besieged by sea and land, without hope of aid, and in want of provisions, found means to apprize Athens of the extreme danger he was in. Extraordinary efforts were made to relieve him, and in less than a month's time a fleet of 110 sail were fitted out, on board of which were embarked all who were capable of bearing arms, as well slaves as freemen, with some horse. At Samos they were joined by the allies with 40 galleys, and steered for the Arginusæ, islands situated between Cuma and Mitylene. Callicratidas, being informed of their course, left Eteonicus to continue the siege with 50 ships, and put to sea with 120 sail, with design to face the enemy, and prevent their relieving Conon. The right wing of the Athenians was commanded by Protomachus and Thrasylus, who had each 15 galleys. They were supported by a second line with a like number of ships, commanded by Lysias and Aristogenes. The left wing, like the other, drawn up in two lines, was under Aristocrates and Diomedon, supported by Erasimidas and Pericles*. The main body, consisting of near 30 galleys, amongst which were the three Athenian admirals, was disposed in one line. They had strengthened each of their wings with a second line; because their galleys were neither so swift, nor so easy to manage, as those of the enemy; so that there was reason to fear their getting between two, and being charged on both sides at the same time. The Lacedæmonians and their allies, who perceived they were inferior in number to the enemy, contented themselves with drawing up in one line, in order to equal their front, and for the greater facility of running between the Athenian galleys, and turning nimbly round them. Callicratidas's pilot, daunted at the inequality, advised him not to hazard the battle, and to retire: but he replied, that he could not fly without shame, and that his death was of small importance to the republic. "Sparta," said he, "does not depend upon one man." He commanded the right wing, and Thrasondas, the Theban, the left.

It was terrible to behold the sea covered with 300 galleys ready to engage. Never had more numerous naval armies of the Greeks joined in battle before. The ability, experience, and valour of the generals who commanded, left nothing to desire; so that there was reason to believe this battle would decide the fate of both people, and put an end to a war that had endured so long. When the signals were given, the two armies

* He was son of the great Pericles.

raised great shouts, and began the fight. Callicratidas, who, from the answer of the augurs, expected to fall in the battle, did amazing actions of valour. He attacked the enemy with incredible courage and boldness, sunk some of their ships, disabled others, by breaking their oars, and piercing their sides with the prow or beak of his galley. At length he attacked that of Pericles, and made a thousand holes in it; but the latter having hooked him fast with a grappling iron, he found it impossible to disengage himself, and was surrounded in an instant by several of the Athenian vessels. His own was immediately filled with the enemy, and, after a dreadful slaughter, he fell dead, rather overwhelmed by their numbers than vanquished. The right wing, which he commanded, having lost its admiral, was put to flight. The left, composed of Bœotians and Eubœans, still made a long and vigorous resistance, from the important concern they were in, lest they should fall into the hands of the Athenians, against whom they had revolted; but they were at length obliged to give way, and retire in disorder. The Athenians erected a trophy in the Arginusæ. They lost 25 galleys in this battle, and the enemy more than 70, of which number were nine of the ten furnished by the Lacedæmonians.

* Plutarch equals Callicratidas, the Lacedæmonian general, for his justice, valour, and magnanimity, with all who had ever rendered themselves most worthy of admiration amongst the Greeks.

† He blames him however exceedingly for hazarding the battle at the Arginusæ, and observes, that to avoid the reproach of having retired out of fear, he had, through a mistaken sense of honour, failed in the essential duty of his function. For, says Plutarch, if, to use the comparison of ‡ Iphicrates, the light-armed infantry resemble the hands, the horse the feet, the main body the breast, and the general the head; the general, who abandons himself rashly to the impetuosity of his valour, does not so much neglect or expose his own life, as the lives of those whose safety depends upon his. Our Lacedæmonian chief was therefore in the wrong, continues Plutarch, to answer the pilot who advised him to retire, “Sparta does not depend upon one man;” for though it be true, that Callicratidas, fighting under the orders of another by sea or land, “was no more than one man;” yet, commanding an army, all who obeyed his orders were collected in his person;

* Plut. in Lyfand. p. 436.

† Plut. in Pelop. p. 278.

‡ He was a famous general of the Athenians.

and he, in whom so many thousands might be lost, “was no longer one man.” * Cicero had passed the same judgment upon him before Plutarch. After having said, that there were many persons to be found, who were ready to sacrifice their fortune, and even lives, for their country, but who out of false delicacy in point of glory would not hazard their reputation for it in the least; he cites the example of Callicratidas, who answered those who advised him to retreat from the Arginusæ, “That Sparta could fit out another fleet if this were lost; but for himself, he could not fly before the enemy without shame and infamy.”

I return to the sequel of the battle near the Arginusæ. The Athenian generals ordered Theramenes, Thrasybulus, and some other officers, to return with about 50 galleys to take up the wrecks and dead bodies, in order to their interment, whilst they rowed on with the rest against Eteonicus, who kept Conon besieged before Mitylene. But a rude tempest came on suddenly, and prevented the execution of this order. Eteonicus having received news of the defeat, and fearing it might occasion alarm and terror amongst the troops, sent back those who brought it, with orders to return with wreaths of flowers upon their heads, and to give out, that Callicratidas had gained the victory, and destroyed the whole Athenian fleet. Upon their return he offered sacrifices of thanksgiving, and having made his troops take some refreshment, he sent the galleys away directly, the wind being fair, and marched off the land-army to Methymna, after having burned the camp. Conon being delivered in this manner from the blockade, joined the victorious fleet, which returned forthwith to Samos. However, when it was known at Athens, that the dead bodies had been left without interment, the people were highly enraged, and laid the whole weight of their resentment upon those they believed guilty of that crime. The ancients held it a great one not to provide sepulture for the dead; and we may observe, that after all their battles, the first care of the conquered, notwithstanding the sense of their misfortune, and the great affliction for a bloody defeat, was to demand a suspension of

* *Inventi multi sunt, qui non modo pecuniam, sed vitam etiam, profindere pro patria parati essent, idem gloriæ jacturam ne minimam quidem facere vellent, ne republica quidem postulante: ut Callicratidas, qui cum Lacedæmoniorum dux fuisset Peloponnesiaco bello, multaque fecisset egregie, vertit ad extremum omnia, cum consilio non paruit eorum, qui classem ab Arginusis removendam, nec cum Atheniensibus dimicandum putabant. Quibus ille respondit, Lacedæmonios, classe illa amissa, aliam parare posse; se fugere sine suo dedecore non posse. Offic. l. i. n. 48.*

arms from the victor, in order to pay their last duties to those who had fallen in battle ; upon which they believed their happiness in another life depended. They had little or no idea of the resurrection of the body ; but however, the Pagans, in the soul's concern for the body after death, the religious regard paid to it, and the passion with which they rendered solemn honours to the dead, seem to argue, that they had some confused notions of a resurrection, which subsisted, amongst all nations, and descended from the most ancient tradition, though they could not distinguish clearly upon it.

Hence arose the fury of the people of Athens. They immediately nominated new generals, retaining only Conon of the old ones, to whom they gave Adimantes and Philocles for colleagues ; eight days after which, two of them withdrew themselves, and only six returned to Athens. Theramenes, the tenth general, who returned before the rest of the fleet, accused the other chiefs before the people, making them responsible for not bringing off the dead after the battle ; and, to clear himself, read the letter they had written to the senate and people, wherein they excused themselves, from the violence of the storm, without charging any body. That calumny was detestably vile, as done in abuse of their reserve in not mentioning him in their letter, and in not laying a fault to his charge, of which he might have appeared the most guilty. The generals, at their return, not being able to prevail for the time necessary for making their defence, contented themselves with representing in few words the state of the affair, and appealed for the truth of what they said to the pilots, and all present when it happened. The people seemed to receive their excuse favourably, and several persons offered themselves for their sureties ; but it was thought proper to adjourn the assembly, because of the night ; and it being the people's custom to give their suffrages by lifting up of hands, their resolution could not be known ; besides which, the council were first to give their opinion upon the question to be proposed to the people.

The feast of Apaturia unexpectedly coming on, in which it was the custom to assemble by families, the relations of Theramenes posted several persons in mourning habits, and shaved in proper places, who said, they were the kindred of those who had been slain in the battle, and obliged Callixenes to accuse the generals in the senate. It was decreed in consequence, that as the accusation and defence had been heard in the last assembly, the people by their respective tribes should give their

voices, and if the accused were found guilty, they should be punished with death, their estates confiscated, and the tenth part consecrated to the goddesses *. Some senators opposed this decree as unjust, and contrary to the laws: but as the people, at the instigation of Callixenes, threatened to include the opposers in the same cause and crime with the generals, they were so mean as to desist from their opposition, and to sacrifice the innocent generals to their own safety, by consenting to the decree. Socrates, the celebrated philosopher, was the only one of the senators who stood firm, and persisted obstinately in opposing a decree, so notoriously unjust, and so contrary to all laws. The orator, who mounted the tribunal in defence of the generals, showed, “ That they had failed in
 “ nothing of their duty, as they had given orders that the dead
 “ bodies should be taken up: That if any one were guilty, it
 “ was he, who, being charged with these orders, had neglected
 “ to put them in execution: but that he accused nobody; and
 “ that the tempest, which came on unexpectedly at the very in-
 “ stant, was an unanswerable apology, and entirely discharged the
 “ accused from all guilt. He demanded, that a whole day should
 “ be allowed them to make their defence, a favour not denied
 “ to the most criminal, and that they should be tried separately.
 “ He represented, that they were not in the least obliged to
 “ precipitate a sentence, wherein the lives of the most illustrious
 “ of the citizens were concerned; that it was in some measure
 “ attacking the gods to make † men responsible for the winds:
 “ and weather; that they could not, without the most flagrant
 “ ingratitude and injustice, put the conquerors to death, to
 “ whom they ought to decree crowns and honours, or give up
 “ the defenders of their country to the rage of those who en-
 “ vied them; that if they did so, their unjust judgment would
 “ be followed with a sudden, but vain, repentance, which
 “ would leave behind it the sharpest remorse, and cover them
 “ with eternal shame and infamy.” The people seemed at first to be moved with these reasons; but animated by the accusers, they pronounced sentence of death against eight of their generals; and six of them, who were present, were seized, in order to their being carried to execution. One of them, Diomedon, a person of great reputation for his valour and probity, demanded to be heard. “ Athenians,” said he, “ I wish the

* Minerva.

† Quem adeo iniquum, ut sceleri assignet, quod venti et fluctus deliquerint? Tacit. Annal. l. xiv. c. 3.

“ sentence you have passed upon us may not prove the misfortune of the republic ; but I have one favour to ask of you in behalf of my colleagues and myself, which is, to acquit us before the gods of the vows we made to them for you and ourselves, as we are not in a condition to discharge them ; for it is to their protection, invoked before the battle, we acknowledge that we are indebted for the victory gained by us over the enemy.” There was not one good citizen, that did not melt into tears at this discourse, so full of goodness and religion, and admire with surprise the moderation of a person, who, seeing himself unjustly condemned, did not however vent the least resentment, or even complaint, against his judges, but was solely intent in favour of an ungrateful country, which had doomed them to perish, upon what it owed the gods in common with them for the victory they had lately obtained.

The six generals were hardly executed, when the people opened their eyes, and perceived all the horror of that sentence ; but their repentance could not restore the dead to life. Callixenes, the orator, was put in prison, and refused to be heard. Having found means to make his escape, he fled to Decelia to the enemy, from whence he returned some time after to Athens, where he died of hunger, universally detested and abhorred by all the world, as all false accusers and slanderers ought to be. Diodorus remarks, that the people themselves were justly punished for their crime by the gods, who abandoned them soon after, not to a single master, but to 30 tyrants, who treated them with the utmost rigour and cruelty.

* The disposition of a people is very naturally imaged in this account ; and Plato, upon the same event, draws in few words their character with much spirit and resemblance. The commonalty†, says he, is an inconstant, ungrateful, cruel, suspicious animal, incapable of submitting to the government of reason ; which is no wonder, adds he, as it is commonly composed of the dregs of a city, and is a monstrous assemblage, without form or order, of all that is worst in it.

The same relation shows what effect fear can have upon the minds of men, even upon those who pass for the wisest ; and how few there are, who are capable of supporting inflexibly the view of present danger and disgrace. Though the justness of the generals’ cause was perfectly known in the senate, at least

* Plut. in Axioch. p. 368, 369.

† Δῆμος ἀψίκορον, ἀχάριστον, ὡμὸν, βάσκανον, ἀπειθεῖον.

by the major part of it, as soon as the people's rage was mentioned, and the terrible menaces they murmured, those grave senators, most of whom had commanded armies, and who all of them had frequently exposed themselves to the greatest dangers of war, instantly changed sides, and came over to the most notorious calumny, and crying injustice, that ever had being. An evident proof, that there is a courage, though very rare, which infinitely transcends the valour that induces so many thousands of men every day to confront the most terrible dangers in battle.

Among all the judges, only one, truly worthy of his reputation (the great Socrates), in this general treason and perfidy, stood firm and immoveable; and though he knew his suffrage and unaided voice would be of little or no consequence to the accused, he thought them a just homage to oppressed innocence, and that it was * unworthy an honest man to govern himself by the fury of a blind and frantic people. We see in this instance, how far the cause of justice may be abandoned. We may conclude it was not better defended before the people. Of more than 3000 citizens, who composed the assembly, two only took upon them the defence of their generals, Euripodemos and Axiochus. Plato has preserved their names, and given that of the latter to the dialogue, from whence part of these reflections are taken.

† The same year the battle of the Arginusæ was fought, Dionysius possessed himself of the tyranny in Sicily. I shall defer speaking of him till book xi. in which I shall treat the history of Syracuse at large.

SECTION VI.

LYSANDER COMMANDS THE LACEDÆMONIAN FLEET.—HIS CELEBRATED VICTORY OVER THE ATHENIANS.

AFTER the defeat at the Arginusæ ‡, the affairs of the Peloponnesians declining, the allies, supported by the credit of Cyrus, sent an embassy to Sparta, to demand that the command of the fleet should be again given to Lysander, with the promise of serving with more affection and courage if their request were granted. As it was contrary to the laws of Sparta

* 'Ου γὰρ ἐφαίνετό μοι σεμνὸν δῆμῳ μαινομένῃ συνεζάχειν.

† A. M. 3598. Ant. J. C. 406.

‡ A. M. 3599. Ant. J. C. 405. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 45. Plut. in Lys. l. ix. p. 436, 437. Diod. l. xiii. p. 223.

that the same person should be twice admiral, the Lacedæmonians, to satisfy the allies, gave the title of admiral to one Aracus, and sent Lyfander with him, whom in appearance they commissioned only as vice-admiral, though in effect with all the authority of the supreme command.

All those who had the greatest share in the government of the cities, and were of most authority in them, saw him arrive with extreme joy; promising themselves, from his influence, the final subversion of the democratic power. His character of complacency for his friends; and indulgence to all their faults, suited much better with their ambitious and injurious views, than the austere equity of Callicratidas. For Lyfander was a man of the most corrupt heart, and gloried in having no principles in point of virtue or the most sacred duties. He made no scruple to employ artifice and deceit upon all occasions, and esteemed justice only as far as it served his measures. When it did not promote them, he never failed to prefer the useful, which with him was alone laudable and excellent; from a persuasion that truth had in its own nature no advantage over falsehood, and that the value of both one and the other was to be determined by the convenience resulting from them. And for those who represented to him, that it was unworthy the descendants of Hercules to make use of fraud and treachery, he laughed at them: "For," said he, "where the lion's skin is not long enough, it is necessary to tack the fox's tail to it."

An expression ascribed to him, sufficiently denotes how small an account he made of perjury. He used to say, " *Children are amused with baubles, and men with oaths;" showing by so professed a want of religion, that the gods were more inconsiderable with him than his enemies; for he who deceives with a false oath, plainly declares in so doing, that he fears his enemies, but that he despises God.

† Here ends the 26th year of the Peloponnesian war. In this year it was, that young Cyrus, dazzled with the unusual splendor of supreme authority, and jealous of the least omission in point of ceremonial homage, discovered by a remarkable action the secret of his heart. Brought up from his infancy in the reigning house, nurtured under the shade of the throne,

* The Greek text admits of another sense, which is perhaps no less good: Children may use art, and cheat one another in their games, and men in their oaths: *Ἐκίλευε τὰς μὲν παῖδας ἀσραγάλοις, τὰς δ' ἀνδρας ὅρκις ἔκπαττον.*

† Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 454.

amidst the submissions and prostrations of the courtiers, entertained long by the discourses of an ambitious mother, who idolized him, in the desire and hope of empire, he began already to affect the rights of sovereignty, and to exact the honours paid to it with surprising haughtiness and rigour. Two Persians of the royal family, his cousins-german by their mother, his father Darius's sister, had omitted to cover their hands with their sleeves in his presence, according to a ceremonial observed only to the kings of Persia. Cyrus, resenting that neglect as a capital crime, condemned them both to die, and caused them to be executed at Sardis without mercy. Darius, at whose feet their relations threw themselves to demand justice, was very much affected with the tragical end of his two nephews, and looked upon this action of his son's as an attempt upon himself, to whom alone that honour was due. He resolved therefore to take his government from him, and ordered him to court upon the pretext of being sick, and having a desire to see him.

Cyrus before his departure sent for Lyfander to Sardis, and put into his hands great sums of money for the payment of his fleet, promising him still more for the future; and with the ostentation of a young man, to let him see how much he desired to oblige him, he assured him, that though the king his father should cease to afford him any supplies, he would furnish him the more willingly out of his own coffers; and that, rather than he should want the necessary provisions, he would even cause the throne of massy gold and silver, upon which he sat in judgment, to be melted down. At length, when he was upon the point of setting out, he empowered him to receive the tributes and revenues of the cities, confided the government of his provinces to him, and conjured him with embraces not to give battle in his absence, unless superior in force; because the king neither wanted the will nor the power to give him that superiority to the enemy; promising at the same time, with the strongest assurances of affection, to bring him a great number of ships from Phœnicia and Cilicia.

* After that prince's departure, Lyfander sailed towards the Hellespont, and laid siege to Lampfacus. Torax, having marched thither with his land-forces at the same time, assaulted the city on his side. † The place was carried by storm,

* Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 455—458.

† Plut. in. Lyf. p. 437, et 440. Idem. in Alcib. p. 212. Diod. l. xiii. p. 225, 226.

and abandoned by Lyfander to the mercy of the foldiers. The Athenians, who followed him clofe, came to an anchor in the port of Eleontum in the Chersonesus, with 180 galleys. But upon the news of the taking of Lampfacus, they immediately fteered for Sestos, and after having taken in provisions, they flood away from thence, failing along the coaft to a place called * *Ægospotamos*, where they halted over-againft the enemy, who were then at anchor before Lampfacus. The Hellespont is not above 2000 paces broad in that place. The two armies, feeing themfelves fo near each other, expected only to reft that day, and were in hopes of coming to a battle on the next.

But Lyfander had another design in view. He commanded the feamen and pilots to go on board their galleys, as if they were in reality to fight the next morning at break of day, to hold themfelves in readinefs, and to wait his orders with profound filence. He ordered the land-army in like manner to draw up in battle upon the coaft, and to wait the day without any noife. On the morrow, as foon as the fun was rifen, the Athenians began to row towards them with their whole fleet in one line, and to bid them defiance. Lyfander, though his fhips were ranged in order of battle, with their heads towards the enemy, lay ftill without making any movement. In the evening when the Athenians withdrew, he did not fuffer his foldiers to go afhore, till two or three galleys, which he had fent out to obferve them, were returned with advice that they had feen the enemy land. The next day paffed in the fame manner, as did the third and fourth. Such a conduct, which argued referve and apprehenfion, extremely augmented the fecurity and boldnefs of the Athenians, and infpired them with an extreme contempt for an army, which fear, in their fenfe, prevented from fhewing themfelves, and attempting any thing.

Whilft this paffed, Alcibiades, who was near the fleet, took horfe, and came to the Athenian generals; to whom he reprefented, that they kept upon a very difadvantageous coaft, where there were neither ports nor cities in the neighbourhood; that they were obliged to bring their provisions from Sestos with great danger and difficulty; and that they were very much in the wrong to fuffer the foldiers and mariners of the fleet, as foon as they were afhore, to ftaggle and difperfe themfelves at their own pleafure, whilft the enemy's fleet faced them in view, accuftomed to execute the orders of their

* The river of the Gægt.

general with instant obedience, and upon the slightest signal. He offered also to attack the enemy by land with a strong body of Thracian troops, and to force them to a battle. The generals, especially Tydeus and Menander, jealous of their command, did not content themselves with refusing his offers, from the opinion, that if the event proved unfortunate, the whole blame would fall on them, and if favourable, that Alcibiades would engross the honour of it, but rejected also with insult his wife and salutary counsel, as if a man in disgrace lost his sense and abilities with the favour of the commonwealth. Alcibiades withdrew.

The fifth day the Athenians presented themselves again, and offered him battle; retiring in the evening according to custom with more insulting airs than the days before. Lyfander, as usual, detached some galleys to observe them, with orders to return with the utmost diligence, when they saw the Athenians landed, and to put a brazen buckler at each ship's head as soon as they reached the middle of the channel. Himself in the mean time ran through the whole line in his galley, exhorting the pilots and officers to hold the seamen and soldiers in readiness to row and fight on the first signal.

As soon as the bucklers were put in the ships' heads, and the admiral's galley had given the signal by the sound of trumpet, the whole fleet set forwards in good order. The land-army at the same time made all possible haste to the top of the promontory to see the battle. The strait that separates the two continents in this place, is about 15 stadia*, or three quarters of a league in breadth, which space was presently cleared through the activity and diligence of the rowers. Conon, the Athenian general, was the first who perceived, from shore, the enemy's fleet advance in good order to attack him; upon which he immediately cried out for the troops to embark. In the height of sorrow and perplexity, some he called to by their names, some he conjured, and others he forced to go on board their galleys: but all his endeavours and emotion were ineffectual, the soldiers being dispersed on all sides. For they were no sooner come on shore, than some ran to the sutlers, some to walk in the country, some to sleep in their tents, and others had begun to dress their suppers. This proceeded from the want of vigilance and experience in their generals, who, not suspecting the least danger, indulged themselves in taking their repose, and gave their soldiers the same liberty.

* 1875 paces.

The enemy had already fallen on with loud cries and a great noise of their oars, when Conon, disengaging himself with nine galleys, of which number was the sacred ship called the Paralian, stood away for Cyprus, where he took refuge with Evagoras. The Peloponnesians, falling upon the rest of the fleet, took immediately the galleys which were empty, and disabled and destroyed such as began to fill with men. The soldiers, who ran without order or arms to their relief, were either killed in the endeavour to get on board, or flying on shore were cut to pieces by the enemy, who landed in pursuit of them. Lyfander took 3000 prisoners, with all the generals, and the whole fleet. After having plundered the camp, and fastened the enemy's galleys to the sterns of his own, he returned to Lampfacus, amidst the sound of flutes and songs of triumph. It was his glory to have atchieved one of the greatest military exploits recorded in history, with little or no loss, and to have terminated a war in the small space of an hour, which had already lasted 27 years, and which perhaps, without him, had been of much longer continuance. Lyfander immediately sent dispatches with this agreeable news to Sparta.

The 3000 prisoners, taken in this battle, having been condemned to die, Lyfander called upon Philocles, one of the Athenian generals, who had caused all the prisoners taken in two galleys, the one of Andros, the other of Corinth, to be thrown from the top of a precipice, and had formerly persuaded the people of Athens to make a decree for cutting off the thumb of the right hand of all the prisoners of war, in order to disable them for handling the pike, and that they might be fit only to serve at the oar. Lyfander therefore caused him to be brought forth, and asked him, what sentence he would pass upon himself, for having induced his city to pass that cruel decree. Philocles, without departing from his haughtiness in the least, notwithstanding the extreme danger he was in, made answer, "Accuse not people of crimes who have no judges, but, as you are victor, use your right, and do by us as we had done by you, if we had conquered." At the same instant he went into a bath, put on afterwards a magnificent robe, and marched foremost to the execution. All the prisoners were put to the sword, except Adamantus, who had opposed the decree.

After this expedition, Lyfander went with his fleet to all the maritime cities, and gave orders for all Athenians in them to withdraw as soon as possible to Athens, without permitting them to take any other route; declaring, that after a certain

time fixed, all such should be punished with death, as should be found out of Athens. This he did as an able politician, to reduce the city by famine the more easily, and to render it incapable of sustaining a long siege. He afterwards applied himself in subverting the democratic, and all other forms of government throughout the cities; leaving in each of them a Lacedæmonian governor, called Harmostes, and ten archons or magistrates, whom he chose out of the societies he had established in them. He thereby in some measure secured to himself universal authority, and a kind of sovereignty over all Greece; putting none into power but such as were entirely devoted to his service.

SECTION VII.

LYSANDER BESIEGES ATHENS.—FORM OF GOVERNMENT
CHANGED.—DEATH OF DARIUS NOTHUS.

WHEN the news of the entire defeat of the army came to Athens by a ship*, which arrived in the night at the Piræus, the city was in universal consternation. Nothing was heard but cries of sorrow and despair in every part of it. They imagined the enemy already at their gates. They represented to themselves the miseries of a long siege, a cruel famine, the ruin and burning of their city, the insolence of a proud victor, and the shameful slavery they were upon the point of experiencing, more afflicting and insupportable to them than the most severe punishments and death itself. The next day the assembly was summoned, wherein it was resolved to shut up all the ports, one only excepted; to repair the breaches in the walls; and mount guard to prepare against a siege.

In effect, Agis and Pausanias, the two kings of Sparta, advanced towards Athens with all their troops. Lysander soon after arrived at the Piræus with 150 sail, and prevented all ships from going in or coming out. The Athenians, besieged by sea and land, without provisions, ships, hope of relief, or any resource, re-inflated all persons attainted by any decree, without speaking the least word of a capitulation however, though many already died of famine. But when their corn was entirely consumed, they sent deputies to Agis, to propose a treaty with Sparta, upon condition of abandoning all their possessions, the city and port only excepted. He referred the

* A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Xenoph. Hellen. l. ii. p. 458—462. Plut. in Lysand. p. 440, 441.

deputies to Lacedæmon, as not being empowered to treat with them. When they arrived at Salafia, upon the frontier of Sparta, and had made known their commission to the Ephori, they were ordered to retire, and to come with other proposals if they expected peace. The Ephori had demanded, that 1200 paces of the wall on each side of the Piræus should be demolished: but an Athenian, for venturing to advise a compliance, was sent to prison, and prohibition made against proposing any thing of that kind for the future.

In this deplorable condition Theramenes declared in the assembly, that if he were sent to Lyfander, he would know, whether the proposal made by the Lacedæmonians for dismantling the city, was intended to facilitate its ruin, or to prevent a revolt. The Athenians having deputed him accordingly, he was more than three months absent; no doubt with the view of reducing them by famine to accept any conditions that should be offered. On his return he told them, that Lyfander had detained him all that time, and that at last he had been given to understand, that he might apply to the Ephori. He was therefore sent back with nine others to Sparta, with full powers to conclude a treaty. When they arrived there, the Ephori gave them audience in the general assembly, where the Corinthians and several other allies, especially the Thebans, insisted that it was absolutely necessary to destroy the city without hearkening any farther to a treaty. But the Lacedæmonians, preferring the glory and safety of Greece to their own grandeur, made answer, that they would never be reproached with having destroyed a city that had rendered such great services to all Greece; the remembrance of which ought to have much greater weight with the allies, than the resentment of private injuries received from it. The peace was therefore concluded under these conditions: "That the fortifications of the Piræus, with the long wall that joined that port to the city, should be demolished; that the Athenians should deliver up all their galleys, 12 only excepted; that they should abandon all the cities they had seized, and content themselves with their own lands and country; that they should recall their exiles, and make a league offensive and defensive with the Lacedæmonians, under whom they should march wherever they thought fit to lead them.

The deputies on their return were surrounded with an innumerable throng of people, who apprehended that nothing had been concluded, for they were not able to hold out any longer, such multitudes dying every day of famine. The next

day they reported the success of their negotiation; the treaty was ratified, notwithstanding the opposition of some persons; and Lyfander, followed by the exiles, entered the port. It was upon the very day the Athenians had formerly gained the famous naval battle of Salamin. He caused the walls to be demolished to the sound of flutes and trumpets, and with all the exterior marks of triumph and rejoicing, as if all Greece had that day regained its liberty. Thus ended the Peloponnesian war, after having continued during the space of 27 years.

Lyfander, without giving the Athenians time to look about them, changed the form of their government entirely, established 30 archons, or rather tyrants, over the city, put a good garrison into the citadel, and left the Spartan Callibius "harmostes", or governor. Agis dismissed his troops. Lyfander, before he disbanded his, advanced against Samos, which he pressed so warmly, that it was at last obliged to capitulate. After having established its ancient inhabitants in it, he proposed to return to Sparta with the Lacedæmonian galleys, those of the Piræus, and the beaks of those he had taken.

He had sent Gylippus, who had commanded the army in Sicily, before him, to carry the money and spoils, which were the fruit of his glorious campaigns, to Lacedæmon. The money, without reckoning the innumerable crowns of gold given him by the cities, amounted to 1500 talents, that is to say, 1,500,000 crowns*. Gylippus, who carried this considerable sum, could not resist the temptation of converting some part of it to his own use. The bags were sealed up carefully, and did not seem to leave any room for theft. He unsewed them at the bottom; and after having taken out of each of them what money he thought fit, to the amount of 300 talents, he sewed them up again very neatly, and thought himself perfectly safe. But when he arrived at Sparta, the accounts which had been put up in each bag, discovered him. To avoid punishment, he banished himself from his country, carrying along with him in all places the disgrace of having sullied, by so base and sordid an avarice, the glory of all his great actions.

From this unhappy example, the wisest and most distinguishing of the Spartans, apprehending the all-powerful effects of money, which enslaved not only the vulgar, but even the greatest of men, extremely blamed Lyfander for having acted so contradictorily to the fundamental laws of Sparta, and warmly re-

* About L.337,000 sterling.

presented to the Ephori, how incumbent it was upon them to banish * all that gold and silver from the republic, and to lay the heaviest of curses and imprecations upon it, as the fatal bane of all other states, introduced only to corrupt the wholesome constitution of the Spartan government, which had supported itself for so many ages with vigour and prosperity. The Ephori immediately passed a decree to proscribe that money, and ordained that none should be current, except the usual pieces of iron. But Lyfander's friends opposed this decree, and sparing no pains to retain the gold and silver in Sparta, the affair was referred for further deliberation. There naturally seemed only two methods to be considered; which were, either to make the gold and silver species current, or to cry them down and prohibit them absolutely. The men of address and policy found out a third expedient, which, in their sense, reconciled both the others with great success: this was wisely to chuse the mean betwixt the vicious extremes of too much rigour and too much neglect. It was therefore resolved, that the new coin of gold and silver should be solely employed by the public treasury; that it should only pass in the occasions and uses of the state; and that every private person, in whose possession it should be found, should be immediately put to death.

A strange expedient, says Plutarch! As if Lycurgus had feared the species of gold and silver, and not the avarice they occasion; and avarice, less to be extinguished by prohibiting to particulars the possession of it, than inflamed by permitting the state to amass and make use of it for the service of the public. For it was impossible, whilst that money was in honour, and esteem with the public, that it should be despised in private as useless, and that people should look upon that as of no value in their domestic affairs, which the city prized, and were so much concerned to have it for its occasions; bad usages, authorized by the practice and example of the public, being a thousand times more dangerous to particulars, than the vices of particulars to the public. The Lacedæmonians therefore, continues Plutarch, in punishing those with death who should make use of the new money in private, were so blind and imprudent as to imagine, that the placing of the law, and the terror of punishment as a guard at the door, was sufficient to prevent gold and silver from entering the house: they left the hearts of their citizens open to the desire and admiration of riches, and

* Ἀποδιδομένην δὲ πᾶν τὸ ἀργύριον, καὶ τὸ χρυσίον, ὥσπερ κῆρας ἐπαγωγυμῆς.

introduced themselves a violent passion for amassing treasure, in causing it to be deemed a great and honourable thing to become rich.

* It was about the end of the Peloponnesian war, that Darius Nothus king of Persia died, after a reign of 19 years. Cyrus had arrived at the court before his death, and Parysatis his mother, whose idol he was, not contented with having made his peace, notwithstanding the faults he had committed in his government, pressed the old king to declare him his successor also, after the example of Darius the first, who gave Xerxes the preference before all his brothers, because born, as Cyrus was, after his father's accession to the throne. But Darius did not carry his complaisance for her so far. He gave the crown to Arfaces, his eldest son by Parysatis also, whom Plutarch calls Articas, and bequeathed only to Cyrus the provinces he had already.

A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404.

BOOK NINTH.

THE
HISTORY
OF THE

PERSIANS AND GRECIANS.

CONTINUED DURING THE
FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE REIGN OF ARTAXERXES
MNEMON.

CHAPTER I.

THIS chapter contains the domestic troubles of the court of Persia: the death of Alcibiades: the re-establishment of the liberty of Athens: and Lyfander's secret designs to make himself king.

SECTION I.

CORONATION OF ARTAXERXES MNEMON.—CYRUS ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE HIS BROTHER.—REVENGE OF STATIRA.—DEATH AND CHARACTER OF ALCIBIADES.

ARSACES, upon ascending the throne, assumed the name of Artaxerxes, the same to whom the Greeks gave the surname of * MNEMON, from his prodigious memory. † Being near his father's bed when he was dying, he asked him a few moments before he expired, what had been the rule of his conduct during so long and happy a reign as his, that he might make it his example. "It has been," replied he, "to do always what justice and religion required of me"—Words of deep sense, and well worthy of being set up in letters of gold in the

* Which word signifies in the Greek, one of a good memory.

† A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Athen. l. xii. p. 458.

palaces of kings, to keep them perpetually in mind of what ought to be the guide and rule of all their actions. It is not uncommon for princes to give excellent instructions to their children on their death-beds, which would be more efficacious, if preceded by their own example and conduct; without which they are as weak and impotent as the sick man who gives them, and seldom survive him long.

* Soon after Darius's death, the new king set out from his capital for the city of † Pasargades, in order to his coronation, according to custom, by the priests of Persia. There was in that city a temple of the goddess who presided in war, in which the coronation was solemnized. It was attended with very singular ceremonies, which no doubt had some mysterious sense; though Plutarch does not explain it. The prince at his consecration took off his robe in the temple, and put on that worn by the ancient Cyrus, before he came to the throne, which was preserved in that place with great veneration. After that he ate a dry fig, chewed some leaves of the turpentine tree, and drank a draught composed of milk and vinegar. This might signify, that the sweets of sovereign power are mingled with the fours of care and disquiet, and that, if the throne be surrounded with pleasures and honours, it is also attended with pains and anxieties. It seems sufficiently evident, that the design in putting the robes of Cyrus upon the new king, was to make him understand, that he should also clothe his mind with the great qualities and exalted virtues of that prince.

Young Cyrus, whose soul was all ambition, was in despair upon being for ever prevented from ascending a throne his mother had given him, and on seeing the sceptre, which he thought his right, transferred into the hand of his brother. The blackest crimes cost the ambitious nothing. Cyrus resolved to assassinate Artaxerxes in the temple itself, and in the presence of the whole court, just when he took off his own, to put on the robe of Cyrus. Artaxerxes was apprised of this design by the priest himself, who had educated his brother, to whom he had imparted it. Cyrus was seized, and condemned to die, when his mother Parysatis, almost out of her senses, flew to the place, clasped him in her arms, tied herself to him with the tresses of her hair, fastened her neck to his, and by her shrieks, and tears, and prayers, prevailed so far as to obtain his pardon, and that he should be sent back to his govern-

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1012.

† A city of Persia built by Cyrus the Great,

ment of the maritime provinces. He carried thither with him an ambition no less ardent than before, was animated besides with resentment of the check he had received, and the warm desire of revenge, and armed with an almost unbounded power. Artaxerxes upon this occasion acted contrary to the most common rules of policy, which do not admit * the nourishing and enflaming, by extraordinary honours, the pride and haughtiness of a bold and enterprising young prince like Cyrus, who had carried his personal enmity to his brother so far, as to have resolved to assassinate him with his own hand, and whose ambition for empire was so great, as to employ the most criminal methods for the attainment of its end.

† Artaxerxes had espoused Statira. Scarce had her husband ascended the throne, when she employed the power her beauty gave her over him, to avenge the death of her brother Teriteuchmes. History has not a more tragical scene, nor a more monstrous complication of adultery, incest, and murder; which, after having occasioned great disorders in the royal family, terminated at length in the most fatal manner to all who had any share in it. But it is necessary, for the reader's knowledge of the fact, to trace it from the beginning.

Hidarnes, Statira's father, a Persian of very great quality, was governor of one of the principal provinces of the empire. Statira was a lady of extraordinary beauty, which induced Artaxerxes to marry her, who was then called Arfaces. At the same time Teriteuchmes, Statira's brother, married Hamestris, Arfaces's sister, one of the daughters of Darius and Parysatis; in favour of which marriage Teriteuchmes, upon his father's death, had his government given him. There was at the same time another sister in this family, no less beautiful than Statira, and who besides excelled in the arts of shooting with the bow, and throwing the dart. Teriteuchmes her brother conceived a criminal passion for her, and to gratify it resolved to set himself at liberty by killing Hamestris, whom she had espoused. Darius, having been informed of this project, by the force of presents and promises engaged Udiastes, Teriteuchmes's intimate friend and confidant, to prevent so black a design, by assassinating him. He obeyed, and had for his reward the government of him he had put to death with his own hands.

Amongst Teriteuchmes's guards was a son of Udiastes, called

* Ne quis mobiles adolescentium animos præmaturis honoribus ad superbiam extolleret. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 17.

† Ctes. c. li. lv.

Mithridates, very much attached to his master. The young gentleman, upon hearing that his father had committed this murder in person, uttered all manner of imprecations against him, and full of horror for so infamous and vile an action, seized on the city of Zaris, and openly revolting, declared for the establishment of Teriteuchmes's son. But that young man could not hold out long against Darius. He was blocked up in the place with the son of Teriteuchmes, whom he had with him; and all the rest of the family of Hidarnes were put in prison and delivered to Parysatis, to do with them as that mother, exasperated to the last excess by the treatment either done or intended against her daughter Hamestris, should think fit. That cruel princess began by causing Roxana, whose beauty had been the occasion of this evil, to be sawed in two, and ordered all the rest to be put to death, except Statira, whose life she granted to the tears and the most tender and ardent solicitations of Arsaces; whose love for his wife made him spare no pains for her preservation, though Darius, his father, believed it necessary, even for his own good, that she should share the same fate with the rest of her family. Such was the state of the affair at the death of Darius.

Statira, as soon as her husband was upon the throne, caused Udastes to be delivered into her hands. She ordered his tongue to be torn out, and made him die in the most exquisite torments she could invent, to punish the crime which had occasioned the ruin of her family. She gave his government to Mithridates, in recompence for his attachment to the interests of her family. Parysatis on her side took her revenge on the son of Teriteuchmes, whom she caused to be poisoned, and we shall see that Statira's turn was not very remote.

We see here the terrible effects of female revenge, and in general of what excesses they are capable, who find themselves above all laws, and have no other rule for their actions than their will and passions.

Cyrus, having resolved to dethrone his brother, employed Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian general, to raise a body of Grecian troops, under pretence of a war, which that Spartan was to carry into Thrace. I shall defer speaking of this famous expedition, and also of the death of Socrates, which happened about the same time; intending to treat those two great events in all the extent they deserve. It was without doubt with the same view, that Cyrus presented Lyfander a galley of two cubits in length made of ivory and gold, to congratulate him upon his naval victory. That galley was consecrated to Apollo
in

in the temple of Delphos. Lyfander went soon after to Sardis, charged with magnificent presents for Cyrus from the allies.

It was upon that occasion Cyrus had the celebrated conversation with Lyfander related by Xenophan, and which Cicero after him has applied so beautifully. That young prince, who piqued himself more upon his integrity and politeness than nobility and grandeur, pleased himself with conducting in person so illustrious a guest through his gardens, and to make him observe the various beauties of them. Lyfander, struck with so fine a prospect, admired the manner in which the several parts were laid out; the height and projection of the trees; the neatness and disposition of the walks; the abundance of fruits, planted with an art which had known how to unite the useful with the agreeable; the beauty of the parterres, and the glowing variety of flowers, exhaling odours universally throughout the delightful scene. "Every thing charms and transports me in this place," said Lyfander, addressing himself to Cyrus; "but what strikes me most, is the exquisite taste and elegant industry of the person, who drew the plan of the several parts of this garden, and gave it the fine order, wonderful disposition, and happiness of symmetry, which I cannot sufficiently admire." Cyrus, infinitely pleased with this discourse, replied, "It was I that drew the plan, and entirely marked it out; and not only that, many of the trees, which you see, were planted with my own hands." "What," replied Lyfander, considering him from head to foot, "is it possible, with these purple robes and splendid vestments, those strings of jewels, and bracelets of gold, those buskins so richly embroidered, that you could play the gardener, and employ your royal hands in planting trees?" "Does that surprise you," says Cyrus? "I swear by the god * Mithris, that when my health admits, I never sit down to table without having made myself sweat with some fatigue or other, either in military exercise, rural labour, or some other toil, some employment, to which I apply with pleasure, and without sparing myself." Lyfander was amazed at his discourse, and pressing him by the hand; † "Cyrus," said he, "you are truly happy, and deserve your high fortune; because you unite it with virtue."

* The Persians adored the sun under that name, who was their principal god.

† Δικαίως, ὦ Κύρε, ἐνδαιμονίης ἀγαθός, γὰρ ὦν ἐνδαιμονίης. Which Cicero translates: Recte vero te, Cyre, beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuæ fortuna conjuncta est.

Alcibiades was at no small pains to discover the mystery of the levies made by Cyrus, and went into the province of Pharnabazus, with design to proceed to the court of Persia, and to apprise Artaxerxes of the scheme laid against him. Had he arrived there, a discovery of such importance had infallibly procured him the favour of that prince, and the assistance he wanted for the re-establishment of his country. But the Lacedæmonian partisans at Athens, that is to say, the 30 tyrants, apprehended the intrigues of so superior a genius as his, and represented to their masters, that they were inevitably ruined if they did not find means to rid themselves of Alcibiades. The Lacedæmonians thereupon wrote to Pharnabazus, and with an abject meanness not to be excused, and which showed how much Sparta had degenerated from her ancient manners, made pressing instances to him, to deliver them at any rate from so formidable an enemy. The satrap complied to their wish. Alcibiades was then in a small town of Phrygia, where he lived with his concubine * Timandra. Those who were sent to kill him, not daring to enter his house, contented themselves with surrounding and setting it on fire. Alcibiades, having quitted it through the flames sword in hand, the barbarians were afraid to stay to come to blows with him, but flying and retreating as he advanced, they poured their darts and arrows upon him, and he fell dead on the spot. Timandra took up his body, and having adorned and covered it with the finest robes she had, she made as magnificent a funeral for it, as her present condition would admit.

Such was the end of Alcibiades, whose great virtues were stifled and suppressed by still greater vices. † It is not easy to say, whether his good or bad qualities were most pernicious to his country; for with one he deceived, and with the other he oppressed it. In him distinguished valour was united with nobility of blood. His person was beautiful and finely made, he was eloquent, of great ability in affairs, insinuating, and formed for charming all mankind. He loved glory, but without prejudice to his inclination for pleasure; nor was he so fond of pleasure, as to neglect his glory for it. He knew how to give into, or abstract himself from it, according to the situation of his affairs. Never was there ductility of genius equal to his. He metamorphosed himself with incredible facility, like a Pro-

* It was said that Lais the famous courtesan, called the Corinthian, was the daughter of this Timandra.

† Cujus nescio utrum bona an vitia patriæ perniciosiora fuerint; illis enim cives suos decept, his affixit. Val. Max. l. iii. c. 1.

teus, into the most contrary forms, and supported them all with as much ease and grace, as if each had been natural to him.

This convertibility of character, according to occasions, the customs of countries, and his own interests, discovers an heart void of principles, without either truth or justice. He did not confine himself either to religion, virtue, laws, duties, or his country. His sole rule of action was his private ambition, to which he reduced every thing. His aim was to please, to dazzle, and be beloved; but at the same time to subject those he soothed. He favoured them only as they served his purposes, and made his correspondence and society a means for engrossing every thing to himself.

His life was a perpetual mixture of good and evil. His salaries for virtue were ill-sustained, and quickly degenerated into vices and crimes, very little to the honour of the instructions of that great philosopher, who took no small pains to cultivate him into a man of worth. His actions were glorious; but without rule or principle. His character was elevated and grand; but without connection and consistence. He was successively the support and terror of the Lacedæmonians and Persians. He was either the misfortune or refuge of his own country, according to his declaring for or against it. In fine, he was the author of an universal destructive war in Greece, from the sole motive of commanding, by inducing the Athenians to besiege Syracuse, much less from the hope of conquering Sicily, and afterwards Africa, than with the design of keeping Athens in dependence upon himself; convinced, that having to deal with an inconstant, suspicious, ungrateful, jealous people, averse to those that governed, it was necessary to engage them continually in some great affair, in order to make his services always necessary to them, and that they might not be at leisure to examine, censure, and condemn his conduct.

He had the fate generally experienced by persons of his character, and of which they cannot reasonably complain. He never loved any one, himself being his sole motive, nor ever found a friend. He made it his merit and glory to amuse all men, and no body confided in, or adhered to him. His sole view was to live with splendor, and to lord it universally; and he perished miserably, abandoned by the whole world, and obliged at his death to the feeble services and impotent zeal of one only woman for the last honours rendered to his remains.

About this time died Democritus, the philosopher, of whom more will be said elsewhere.

SECTION II.

THE THIRTY EXERCISE THE MOST HORRID CRUELITIES AT ATHENS—THEY PUT THERAMENES TO DEATH—THRASYBULUS ATTACKS THE TYRANTS, IS MASTER OF ATHENS, AND RESTORES ITS LIBERTY.

THE council of thirty*, established at Athens by Lyfander, committed the most execrable cruelties. Upon pretence of restraining the multitude within their duty, and to prevent seditions, they had caused guards to be assigned them, had armed 3000 of the citizens for that service, and at the same time disarmed all the rest. The whole city was in the utmost terror and dismay. Whoever opposed their injustice and violence, became the victims of them. Riches were a crime that never failed of drawing a sentence upon their owners, always followed with death, and the confiscation of estates; which the thirty tyrants divided amongst themselves. They put more people to death, says Xenophon, in eight months of peace, than the enemy had done in a war of 30 years.

The two most considerable persons of the thirty were Critias and Theramenes, who at first lived in great union, and always acted in concert with each other. The latter had some honour, and loved his country. When he saw with what an excess of violence and cruelty his colleagues behaved, he declared openly against them, and thereby drew their resentment upon him. Critias became his most mortal enemy, and acted as informer against him before the senate, accusing him of disturbing the tranquillity of the state, and of designing to subvert the present government. As he perceived, that the defence of Theramenes was heard with silence and approbation, he was afraid, that, if the affair was left to the decision of the senate, they would acquit him. Having therefore caused a band of young men, whom he had armed with poniards, to advance to the bar, he said that he thought it the duty of a supreme magistrate to prevent justice from being abused, and that he should act conformably upon this occasion. "But," continued he, "as the law does not admit, that any of the 3000 should be put to death without the consent of the senate, I exclude Theramenes from that number, and condemn him to die in virtue of my own and my colleagues' authority." Theramenes, upon these words, leaped upon the altar: "I demand," said he, "Athenians,

* Xenoph. Hist. l. ii. p. 462, et 479. Diod. l. xiv. p. 235—238. Justin. l. v. c. 8—10.

“ that I may be tried according to the laws ; which cannot
“ be refused me without manifest injustice. Not that I ima-
“ gine, that the goodness of my cause will avail me any thing,
“ or the sanction of altars protect me, but I would shew at
“ least, that my enemies respect neither the gods nor men.
“ What most astonishes me is, that persons of your wisdom do
“ not see, that your own names may as easily be struck out of
“ the list of the citizens, as that of Theramenes.” Critias
upon this ordered the officers of justice to pull him down from
the altar. An universal silence and terror ensued upon the
sight of the armed soldiers that surrounded the senate. Of
all the senators, only Socrates, whose disciple Theramenes had
been, took upon him his defence, and opposed the officers of
justice. But his weak endeavours could not deliver Thera-
menes, who was led to the place of execution, notwithstanding
all he could do, through crowds of the citizens, who saw with
tears, in the fate of a man equally considerable for his love of
liberty, and the great services he had done his country, what
they had to fear for themselves. When they presented him
the hemlock, that is, the poison, which was the manner of put-
ting the citizens of Athens to death, he took it with an intrep-
id air, and after having drank it, he poured the bottom upon
the table, after the usual manner observed in feasts or public
rejoicings, saying, “ This for the noble Critias.” Xeno-
phon relates this circumstance, inconsiderable in itself, to shew,
says he, the tranquillity of Theramenes in his last moments.

The tyrants, delivered from a colleague whose presence alone
was a continual reproach to them, no longer observed any mea-
sures. Nothing passed throughout the city but imprison-
ments and murders. Every body trembled for themselves or
their friends. The general desolation had no remedy, nor was
there any hope of regaining their liberty. Where had they
then as many * Harmodiuses as they had tyrants ? Terror had
taken entire possession of their minds, whilst the whole city de-
plored in secret their loss of liberty, without having one amongst
them generous enough to attempt the breaking of its chains.
The Athenian people seemed to have lost that valour, which
till then had made them awful and terrible to their neighbours
and enemies. They seemed to have lost the very use of speech :
not daring to vent the least complaint, lest it should be made a
capital crime in them. Socrates only continued intrepid. He

* Harmodius formed a conspiracy for the deliverance of Athens from
the tyranny of the Pisistratides.

consoled the afflicted senate, animated the desponding citizens, and set all men an admirable example of courage and resolution; preserving his liberty, and sustaining his post in the midst of thirty tyrants, who made all else tremble, but could never shake the constancy of Socrates with their menaces. * Critias, who had been his pupil, was the first to declare most openly against him, taking offence at the free and bold discourses which he held against the government of the thirty. He went so far as to prohibit his instructing youth; but Socrates, who neither acknowledged his authority, nor feared the violent effects of it, paid no regard to so unjust an order.

All the citizens of any consideration in Athens, and who retained the love of liberty, quitted a place reduced to so hard and shameful a slavery, and sought elsewhere an asylum and retreat, where they might live in safety. At the head of these was Thrasylabus, a person of extraordinary merit, who beheld with the most lively affliction the miseries of his country. The Lacedæmonians had the inhumanity to endeavour to deprive those unhappy fugitives of this last resource. They published an edict to prohibit the cities of Greece from giving them refuge, decreed that they should be delivered up to the thirty tyrants, and condemned all such as should contravene the execution of this edict, to pay a fine of five talents. Only two cities rejected with disdain so unjust an ordinance, Megara and Thebes; the latter of which made a decree to punish all persons whatsoever, who should see an Athenian attacked by his enemies without doing his utmost to assist him. Lyfias, an orator of Syracuse, who had been banished by the thirty, † raised 500 soldiers at his own expence, and sent them to the aid of the common country of eloquence.

Thrasylabus lost no time. After having taken Phyla, a small fort in Attica, he marched to the Piræus, of which he made himself master. The thirty flew thither with their troops, and a battle sufficiently warm ensued. But as the soldiers on one side fought with valour and vigour for their liberty, and on the other with indolence and neglect for the power of others, the success was not doubtful, but followed the better cause. The tyrants were overthrown. Critias was killed on the spot. And as the rest of the army were taking to flight, Thrasylabus cried out: "Wherefore do you fly from me as from a victor,

* Xenoph. Memorab. l. i. p. 716, 717.

† Quingentos milites, stipendio suo instructos, in auxilium patriæ communis eloquentiæ misit. Justin. l. v. c. 9.

“rather than assist me as the avenger of your liberty? We are not enemies, but fellow-citizens; nor have we declared war against the city, but against the thirty tyrants.” He continued with bidding them remember, that they had the same origin, country, laws, and religion; he exhorted them to compassionate their exiled brethren, to restore their country to them, and resume their liberty to themselves. This discourse had suitable effects. The army, upon their return to Athens, expelled the thirty, and substituted ten persons to govern in their room, whose conduct proved no better than theirs.

It is a matter of surprise, that so sudden, so universal, so tenacious, and so uniform a conspiracy against the public good, should always actuate the several bodies of persons established in the administration of this government. This we have seen in the four hundred formerly chosen by Athens; again in the thirty; and now in the ten. And what augments our wonder is, that this passion for tyranny should possess so immediately republicans, born in the bosom of liberty, accustomed to an equality of condition on which it is founded, and principled from their earliest infancy in an abhorrence of all subjection and dependency.

* There must be on the one side in power and authority some violent impulse to actuate in this manner so many persons, of whom many, no doubt, were not without sentiments of virtue and honour; and to banish so suddenly the principles and manners natural to them: and on the other an excessive propensity in the mind of man to subject his equals, to rule over them imperiously, to carry him on to the last extremes of oppression and cruelty, and to make him forget at once all laws, nature, and religion.

The thirty, being fallen from their power and hopes, sent deputies to Lacedæmon to demand aid. It was not Lyfander's fault, who was sent to them with troops, that the tyrants were not re-established. But king Pausanias, moved with compassion for the deplorable condition to which a city, once so flourishing, was reduced, had the generosity to favour the Athenians in secret, and at length obtained a peace for them. It was sealed with the blood of the tyrants, who, having taken arms to reinstate themselves in the government, and being present at a parley for that purpose, were all put to the sword, and left Athens in the full possession of its liberty. All the exiles were recalled. Thrasylbulus at that time proposed the celebrated amnesty, by which the citizens engaged upon oath,

* Vi dominationis convulsus. Tacit.

that all past transactions should be buried in oblivion. The government was re-established upon its ancient foot, the laws restored to their pristine vigour, and magistrates elected with the usual forms.

I cannot forbear observing in this place the wisdom and moderation of Thrasylbulus, so salutary and essential after so long a continuance of domestic troubles. This is one of the finest events in ancient history, worthy the Athenian lenity and benevolence, and has served as a model to successive ages in good governments.

Never had tyranny been more cruel and bloody than that the Athenians had lately thrown off. Every house was in mourning; every family bewailed the loss of some relation. It had been a series of public robbery and rapine, in which licence and impunity had authorized all manner of crimes. The people seemed to have a right to demand the blood of all accomplices in such notorious malversations, and even the interest of the state to authorize such a claim, that by exemplary severities such enormous crimes might be prevented for the future. But Thrasylbulus rising above those sentiments from the superiority of his more extensive genius, and the views of a more discerning and profound policy, foresaw, that by giving in to the punishment of the guilty, eternal seeds of discord and enmity would remain, to weaken the republic by domestic divisions, which it was necessary to unite against the common enemy, and occasion the loss to the state of a great number of citizens, who might render it important services from the view itself of making amends for past misbehaviour.

Such a conduct, after great troubles in a state, has always seemed, with the ablest politicians, the most certain and ready means to restore the public peace and tranquillity. Cicero, when Rome was divided into two factions upon the occasion of Cæsar's death, who had been killed by the conspirators, calling to mind this celebrated amnesty, proposed, after the example of the Athenians, to bury all that had passed in eternal oblivion. * Cardinal Mazarin observed to Don Lewis de Haro, prime minister of Spain, that this gentle and humane conduct in France had prevented the troubles and revolts of that kingdom from having any fatal consequences, and "that the king had not lost a foot of land by them to that day;" whereas the inflexible severity of the Spaniards "was the occasion, that the subjects of that monarchy, whenever they threw off

* Let. XV. of Card. Maz.

“ the mask, never returned to their obedience but by the
 “ force of arms ; which sufficiently appears,” says he, “ in
 “ the example of the Hollanders, who are in the peaceable pos-
 “ session of many provinces, that not an age ago were the pa-
 “ trimony of the king of Spain.”

Diodorus Siculus takes occasion, from the thirty tyrants of Athens, whose immoderate ambition induced them to treat their country with the most excessive cruelties, to observe how unfortunate it is for * persons in power to want a sense of honour, and to disregard either the present opinion, or the judgment posterity will form of their conduct : for from the contempt of reputation the transition is too common to that of virtue itself. They may perhaps, by the awe of their power, suppress for some time the public voice, and impose a forced silence upon censure ; but the more constraint they lay upon it during their lives, the more liberal will it be after their deaths of complaints and reproaches, and the more infamy and imputation will be affixed to their memories. The power of the thirty was of a very short duration, their guilt immortal, which will be remembered with abhorrence throughout all ages, whilst their names will be recorded in history only to render them odious, and to make their crimes detestable. He applies the same reflection to the Lacedæmonians, who, after having made themselves masters of Greece by a wise and moderate conduct, fell from that glory, through the severity, haughtiness, and injustice, with which they treated their allies. There is doubtless no reader, whom their abject and cruel jealousy, in regard to Athens enslaved and humbled, has not prejudiced against them ; nor is there any resemblance in such behaviour of the greatness of mind and noble generosity of ancient Sparta ; so much power have the lust of dominion and prosperity over even virtuous men. Diodorus concludes his reflection with a maxim very true, though very little known : “ The greatness
 “ and majesty of princes,” says he, (and the same may be said of all persons in high authority) “ can be supported only by
 “ humanity and justice with regard to their subjects : as on
 “ the contrary, they are ruined and destroyed by a cruel and
 “ oppressive government, which never fails to draw upon them
 “ the hatred of their people.”

* Cetera principibus statim adesse : unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam ; nam contempta fama, contemni virtutes—Quo magis scordiam eorum irrideri libet, qui præsentī potentia credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis ævi memoriam—suum cuique decus posteritas repperit. Tacit. Annal. l. iv. c. 30 & 35.

SECTION III.

LYSANDER ABUSES HIS POWER IN AN EXTRAORDINARY MANNER.—HE IS RECALLED TO SPARTA.

As Lysander had the greatest share in the celebrated exploits*, which had raised the glory of the Lacedæmonians to so high a pitch; so he had acquired a degree of power and authority, of which there was no example before in Sparta; but he suffered himself to be carried away by a presumption and vanity still greater than his power. He permitted the Grecian cities to dedicate altars to him as to a god, and to offer sacrifices, and sing hymns and canticles in honour of him. The Samians ordained by a public decree, that the feasts celebrated in honour of Juno, and which bore the name of that goddess, should be called "the Feasts of Lysander." He had always a crowd of poets about him (who are often a tribe of venal flatterers), who emulated each other in singing his great exploits, for which they were magnificently paid. Praise is undoubtedly due to noble deeds, but diminishes their lustre when either forced or excessive.

This sort of vanity and ambition, had he stopt there, would have hurt only himself, by exposing him to envy and contempt; but a natural consequence of it was, that through his arrogance and pride, in conjunction with the incessant flatteries of those around him, he carried the spirit of command and authority to an insupportable excess, and observed no longer any measures, either in rewarding or punishing. The absolute government of cities with tyrannic power were the fruits of his friendship, and the ties of hospitality with him; and only the death of those he hated, could put an end to his resentment and displeasure, without its being possible to escape his vengeance. What Sylla caused to be inscribed upon his tomb, might with equal propriety have been engraved upon Lysander's: That no man had ever surpassed him in doing good to his friends, or evil to his enemies.

Treachery and perjury cost him nothing whenever they promoted his designs; nor was he less cruel than revengeful; of which what he did at Miletus is a sufficient proof. Apprehending that those who were at the head of the people would escape him, he swore not to do them any hurt. Those unfortunates gave credit to his oath, and no sooner appeared in public, than they were put to the sword with his consent by

* Plut. in Lys. p. 443—445.

the nobility, who killed them all, though no less than 800. The number of those in the party of the people, whom he caused to be massacred in the other cities, is incredible; for he did not only destroy to satiate his own resentments, but to serve in all places the enmity, malice, and avarice of his friends, whom he supported in gratifying their passions by the death of their enemies.

There was no kind of injustice and violence which the people did not suffer under the government of Lyfander; whilst the Lacedæmonians, who were sufficiently informed of his conduct, gave themselves no trouble to prevent its effects. It is too common for those in power to be little affected with the vexations and oppressions laid upon persons of low condition and credit, and to be deaf to their just complaints, though authority is principally confided in them for the defence of the weak and poor, who have no other protectors. But if such remonstrances are made by a great or powerful person, from whom they may have any thing to hope or fear, the same authority that was slow and drowsy becomes immediately warm and officious: a certain proof that it is not the love of justice that actuates it. This appears here in the conduct of the Lacedæmonian magistrates. Pharnabasus, weary of Lyfander's repeated injustices, who ravaged and pillaged the provinces under his command, having sent ambassadors to Sparta, to complain of the wrongs he had received from that general, the Ephori recalled him. Lyfander was at that time in the Hellespont. The letter of the Ephori threw him into great consternation. As he principally feared the complaints and accusations of Pharnabasus, he made all the haste he could to come to an explanation with him, from the hope of softening him, and making his peace. He went for that purpose to him, and desired, that he would write another letter to the Ephori, intimating a satisfaction in his conduct. But Lyfander, says Plutarch, in such an application to Pharnabasus, forgot the * proverb, "Set a thief to catch a thief." The satrap promised all he desired, and accordingly wrote such a letter in Lyfander's presence as he had asked of him, but prepared another to a quite different effect. When he was to seal it, as both letters were of the same size and form, he dexterously put that he had wrote in secret into the place of the other, without being observed, which he sealed and gave him.

* The Greek proverb is, Cretan against Cretan, from the people of Crete, who passed for the greatest cheats and liars in the world.

Lyfander departed well fatisfied, and being arrived at Sparta, alighted at the palace where the fenate was afsembled, and delivered Pharnabafus's letter to the Ephori. But he was ftrangely furprifed when he heard the contents, and withdrew in extreme confufion and diforder. Some days after, he returned to the fenate, and told the Ephori, that he was obliged to go to the temple of Ammon to acquit himfelf of the facrifices he had vowed to that god before his battles. That pilgrimage was no more than a pretence to cover the pain it gave him to live as a private perfon in Sparta, and to fubmit to the yoke of obeying; he, who till then had always governed. Accuf-tomed long to commanding armies, and to the flattering diftinc-tions of a kind of fovereignty exercifed by him in Afia, he could not endure the mortifying equality with the multitude, nor refrain himfelf to the fimplicity of a private life. Having obtained permiffion, not without great difficulties, he embarked.

As foon as he was gone, the kings, reflecting that he held all the cities in his dependence, by the means of their governors and magiftrates eftablifhed by him, to whom they were alfo indebted for their unlimited authority, and that he was thereby effectually lord and mafter of all Greece, applied themfelves vigorously to reftore the government of the people, and to depofe all his creatures and friends from any fhare in it. This alteration occafioned great tumults at firft. About this fame time Lyfander, being apprifed of the defign of Thrafybulus, to re-eftablifh the liberty of his country, returned with the ut-moft diligence to Sparta, and endeavoured to engage the Lacedæmonians to fupport the party of the nobility at Athens. We have before obferved, that Paufanias, from a more noble fpirit of equity and generofity, gave peace to Athens, and by that means, fays Plutarch, clipped the wings of Lyfander's ambition.

CHAPTER II.

YOUNG CYRUS, WITH THE AID OF THE GRECIAN TROOPS,
ENDEAVOURS TO DETHRONE HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES.

HE IS KILLED.—FAMOUS RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND.

ANTIQUITY has few events fo memorable, as thofe I am about to relate in this place. We fee on one fide a young prince, abounding otherwife with excellent qualities, abandoned to his violent ambition, carry the war from far againft his brother

brother and sovereign, and go to attack him almost in his own palace, with the view of depriving him at once of his crown and life. We see him, I say, fall dead in the battle at the feet of that brother, and terminate, by so unhappy a fate, an enterprise equally glaring and criminal. On the other hand, the Greeks who follow him, * destitute of all succour after the loss of their chiefs, without allies, provisions, money, horse, or archers, reduced to less than 10,000 men, with no resource but in their own persons and valour, supported only by the warm desire of preserving their liberty, and of returning to their native countries; these Greeks, with bold and intrepid resolution, make their retreat before a victorious army of 1,000,000 of men, traverse 500 or 600 leagues, notwithstanding vast rivers and innumerable passes, and arrive at last in their own country through a thousand fierce and barbarous nations, victorious over all obstacles in their way, and over all the dangers which either concealed fraud or open force reduced them to undergo.

This retreat, in the opinion of the best judges and most experienced in the art of war, is the boldest and best-conducted exploit to be found in ancient history, and is deemed a perfect model in its kind. Happily for us, it is described to the most minute circumstance by an historian, who was not only eye-witness of the facts he relates, but the first mover, the soul of this great enterprise. I shall only abridge it, and abstract its most material circumstances; but I cannot omit advising young persons who make arms their profession, to consult the original, of which there is a good translation extant in French, though far short of the admirable beauties of the text. It is very difficult to meet with a more able master than Xenophon in the art of war, to whom may be well applied here what Homer says of Phoenix the governor of Achilles, “† That he was
“equally capable of forming his pupil for eloquence or arms.”

Μύθων τε ῥητῆρ ἔμεναι, ποικιλήν τε ἔργων.

SECTION I.

CYRUS RAISES TROOPS AGAINST HIS BROTHER ARTAXERXES.

WE have already said, that young Cyrus†, son of Darius Nothus and Parysatis, saw with pain his elder brother Artax-

* Post mortem Cyri, neque armis a tanto exercitu vinci, neque dolo capi potuerunt; revertentesque inter tot indomitas nationes et barbaras gentes, per tanta itineris spatia, virtute se usque terminos patriæ defenderunt. Justin. l. v. c. 11.

† Iliad. x. ver. 443.

‡ A. M. 3600. Ant. J. C. 404. Diod. l. xiv. p. 243—249, et 252. Justin. l. v. c. 11. Xenoph. de Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 243—248.

erxes upon the throne, and that at the very time the latter was taking possession of it, he had attempted to deprive him of his crown and life together. Artaxerxes was not insensible of what he had to fear from a brother of his enterprising and ambitious spirit, but could not refuse pardoning him to the prayers and tears of his mother Paryfatis, who doated upon this youngest son. He removed him therefore into Asia to his government; confiding to him, contrary to all the rules of policy, an absolute authority over the provinces left him by the will of the king his father.

As soon as he arrived there, his thoughts were solely intent upon revenging the supposed affront he had received from his brother, and to dethrone him*. He received all that came from the court with great favour and affability, to induce them insensibly to quit the king's party, and adhere to him. He gained also the hearts of the barbarians under his government; familiarizing himself with them, and mingling with the common soldiery, though without forgetting the dignity of their general; these he formed by various exercises for the trade of war. He applied particularly in secret to raise from several parts, and upon different pretexts, a body of Grecian troops, upon whom he relied much more than upon those of the barbarians. Clearchus retired to his court after having been banished from Sparta, and was of great service to him, being an able, experienced, and valiant captain. † At the same time several cities in the provinces of Tissaphernes revolted from their obedience in favour of Cyrus. This incident, which was not an effect of chance, but of the secret practices of that prince, gave birth to a war between them. Cyrus, under the pretence of arming against Tissaphernes, assembled troops openly; and to amuse the court the more speciously, sent grievous complaints to the king against that governor, demanding his protection and aid in the most submissive manner. Artaxerxes was deceived by these appearances, and believed, that all Cyrus's preparations regarded only Tissaphernes, and continued quiet, from the assurance of having nothing to apprehend for himself.

‡ Cyrus knew well how to improve the imprudent security and indolence of his brother, which some people conceived the effect of his goodness and humanity. And indeed in the beginning of his reign, he seemed to imitate the virtues of the

* A. M. 2601. Ant. J. C. 403.

† A. M. 602. Ant. J. C. 402.

‡ Plut. in Artax. p. 1014.

first Artaxerxes, whose name he bore; for he demeaned himself with great mildness and affability to such as approached him; he honoured and rewarded magnificently all those whose services had merited favour; when he passed sentence to punish, it was without either outrage or insult; and when he made presents, it was with a gracious air, and such obliging circumstances, as infinitely exalted their value, and implied, that he was never better pleased than when he had an opportunity of doing good to his subjects. To all these excellent qualities it had been very necessary for him to have added one no less royal, and which would have put him upon his guard against the enterprises of a brother, whose character he ought to have known; I mean, a wise foresight, that penetrates the future, and renders a prince attentive to prevent or frustrate whatever may disturb the tranquillity of the state.

The emissaries of Cyrus at the court, were perpetually dispersing reports and opinions amongst the people, to prepare their minds for the intended change and revolt. They talked that the state required a king of Cyrus's character; a king, magnificent, liberal, who loved war, and showered his favours upon those that served him; and that it was necessary for the grandeur of the empire to have a prince upon the throne, fired with ambition and valour for the support and augmentation of its glory.

* The young prince lost no time on his side, and hastened the execution of his great design. He was then 23 years old at most. After the important services he had done the Lacedæmonians, without which they had never obtained the victories that had made them masters of Greece, he thought he might safely open himself to them. He therefore imparted to them the present situation of his affairs, and the end he had in view; convinced that such a confidence could not but incline them the more in his favour.

In the letter he wrote them, he spoke of himself in very magnificent terms. He told them he had a greater and more royal heart than his brother; that he was better versed in philosophy and the † knowledge of the Magi, and that he could drink more wine without being disordered in his senses; a very meritorious quality amongst the barbarians, but not so proper to recommend him to the opinion of those he wrote to. The

* A. M. 3603. Ant. J. C. 401.

† By the knowledge of the Magi, amongst the Persians, was meant the science of religion and government.

Lacedæmonians sent orders to their fleet to join that of the prince immediately, and to obey the commands of Tamos his admiral in all things, but without the least mention of Artaxerxes, or seeming in any manner privy to his design. They thought that precaution * necessary for their justification with Artaxerxes, in case affairs should happen to terminate in his favour.

The troops of Cyrus, according to the review afterwards made, consisted of 13,000 Greeks, which were the flower and chief force of his army, and of 100,000 regular men of the barbarous nations. Clearchus, the Lacedæmonian, commanded all the Peloponnesian troops, except the Achæans, who had Socrates of Achaia for their leader. The Bœotians were under Proxenes the Theban, and the Thessalians under Menon. † The barbarians had Persian generals, of whom the chief was Ariæus. The fleet consisted of 35 ships under Pythagoras the Lacedæmonian, and of 25 commanded by Tamos the Egyptian, admiral of the whole fleet. It followed the land-army, coasting along the shore.

Cyrus had opened his design only to Clearchus of all the Greeks, foreseeing aright that the length and boldness of the enterprise could not fail of discouraging and disgusting the officers as well as soldiers. He made it his sole application to gain their affections during the march, by treating them with kindness and humanity, conversing freely with them, and giving effectual orders that they should want for nothing. Proxenes, between whose family and Xenophon's an ancient friendship subsisted, presented that young Athenian to Cyrus‡, who received him very favourably, and gave him an employment in his army amongst the Greeks. He set out for Sardis at length, and marched towards the upper provinces of Asia. The troops knew neither the occasion of the war, nor into what countries they were going. Cyrus had only caused it to be given out, that he should act against the Pisidians, who had infested his provinces by their incursions.

§ Tissaphernes, rightly judging that all these preparations were too great for so small an enterprise as against Pisidia, had set out post from Miletus to give the king an account of them. This news occasioned great trouble at court. Parysatis, the mother of Artaxerxes and Cyrus, was looked upon as the prin-

* Quærentes apud Cyrum gratiam; et apud Artaxerxem, si vicisset, veniæ patrocinia, cum nihil adversus eum aperte decrevisset. Justin. l. vi. c. 11.

† Xenoph. Cyri Exped. l. i. p. 252.

‡ Xenoph. l. ii. p. 294.

§ Plut. in Artax. p. 1014.

principal cause of this war; and all persons in her service and interest were suspected of holding intelligence with Cyrus. Statira especially, the reigning queen, reproached her incessantly in the most violent terms. "Where is now," said she to her, "that faith you have so often engaged for your son's behaviour? Where those ardent prayers you employed to preserve from death that conspirator against his king and brother? It is your unhappy fondness has kindled this war, and plunged us into an abyss of misfortunes." The antipathy and hatred of the two queens for each other was already very great, and much enflamed by such warm reproaches. We shall see what consequences they have. Artaxerxes assembled a numerous army to receive his brother.

* Cyrus advanced continually by great marches. What troubled him most on the way was the pass of Cilicia, which was a narrow defile between very high and steep mountains, that would admit no more than one carriage to pass at a time. Syennesis, king of the country, prepared to dispute this passage with him, and would infallibly have succeeded, but for the diversion made by Tamos with his fleet, in conjunction with that of the Lacedæmonians. To defend the coasts against the insults of the fleet, Syennesis abandoned that important post, which a small body of troops might have made good against the greatest army.

When they arrived at Tarsus, the Greeks refused to march any farther, rightly suspecting that they were intended against the king, and loudly exclaiming that they had not entered into the service upon that condition. Clearchus, who commanded them, had occasion for all his address and ability to stifle this commotion in its birth. At first he made use of authority and force, but with very ill success, and desisted therefore from an open opposition to their sentiments: he even affected to enter into their views, and to support them with his approbation and credit. He declared publicly, that he would not separate himself from them, and advised them to depute persons to the prince, to know from his own mouth against whom they were to be led, that they might follow him voluntarily if they approved his measures; if not, that they might demand his permission to withdraw. By this artful evasion he appeased the tumult, and made them easy, and they chose him and some other officers for their deputies. Cyrus, whom he had secretly apprised

* Xenoph. l. i. p. 248—261.

of every thing, made answer, that he was going to attack Abrocomas* his enemy, at twelve days march from thence upon the Euphrates. When this answer was repeated to them, though they plainly saw against whom they were going, they resolved to proceed, and only demanded an augmentation of their pay. Cyrus, instead of one daric † a month to each soldier, promised to give them one and a half.

Some time after, Cyrus was informed that two of the principal officers, upon account of a private quarrel with Clearchus, had deserted with part of their equipage on board a merchant-ship. Many were of opinion, that it was proper to send two galleys after them; which might be done with great ease; and that when they were brought back, they should be made an example, by suffering death in the sight of the whole army. Cyrus, convinced that favour ‡ was the most certain means to the attainment of affection, and that punishments, like violent remedies, ought never to be used but in extreme necessity, declared publicly, that he would not suffer it to be said, that he had detained any one in his service by force; and added, that he would send them their wives and children, whom they had left as hostages in his hands. An answer of so much wisdom and generosity had a surprising effect, and made even those his firm adherents who were before inclined to retire. This is an excellent lesson for all who govern. There is in the mind of man a fund of natural generosity, which it is necessary to know and apply. Threats exasperate them, and chastisement makes them revolt, when endeavours are used to force them to do their duty against their will. They desire a certain degree of confidence in their honour§, and that the glory of acquitting themselves of it out of choice be left in their power. To show that you believe men faithful, is often the best means to make them so.

Cyrus soon after declared, that he marched against Artaxerxes; upon which some murmuring was heard at first, but it soon gave place to expressions of joy and satisfaction, occasioned by that prince's magnificent promises to the army.

* It is not said where he commanded. It appears to be upon the Euphrates. He marched with 300,000 men to join the king's army, but did not arrive till after the battle.

† The daric was worth ten livres.

‡ Beneficiis potius quam remediis ingenia experiri placuit. Plin. in Traj.

§ Nescio an plus moribus conferat princeps, qui bonos esse patitur, quam qui cogit. Plin. ibid.

Plerumque habita fides ipsam obligat fidem. Liv.

* As Cyrus advanced by long marches, he was informed from all parts that the king did not intend to come directly to a battle, but had resolved to wait in the remote parts of Persia, till all his forces were assembled; and that to stop his enemies, he had ordered an intrenchment to be thrown up in the plains of Babylonia, with a fosse of five fathoms broad, and three deep, extending the space of twelve † parasangas, or leagues, from the Euphrates to the wall of Media. Between the Euphrates and the fosse a way had been left of 20 feet in breadth, by which Cyrus passed with his whole army, having reviewed it the day before. The king had neglected to dispute this pass with him, and suffered him to continue his march towards Babylon. It was Tiribafus, who determined him not to fly in such a manner before an enemy, against whom he had infinite advantages, as well from the number of his troops as the valour of his generals. He resolved therefore to advance against the enemy.

SECTION II.

THE BATTLE OF CUNAXA.—CYRUS IS KILLED.

THE place where the battle was fought ‡, was called Cunaxa, about 25 leagues from Babylon. The army of Cyrus consisted of 13,000 Greeks, 100,000 barbarians, and 20 chariots armed with scythes. The enemy in horse and foot might amount to about 1,200,000, under four generals, Tissaphernes, Gobryas, Arbaces, and Abrocomas, without including 6000 chosen horse, that fought where the king was present, and never quitted his person. But Abrocomas, who had the command of 300,000 men, did not arrive till five days after the battle. In the king's army were only 150 chariots armed with scythes.

Cyrus believed, from the enemy's not having defended the pass at the fosse, that there would be no battle; so that the next day the army marched with great negligence. But on the third, Cyrus being in his chariot, with few soldiers in

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1014.—Xenoph. l. i. p. 261—266.

† The parasanga is a measure of ways peculiar to the Persians. It was commonly 30 stadia, which make about a league and a half French. Some were from 20 to 60 stadia. In the march of Cyrus's army, I suppose the parasanga only 20 stadia, or one league, for reasons I shall give hereafter.

‡ Xenoph. in Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 263—266. Diod. l. xiv. p. 253, 254, Plut. p. 1014—1017.

their ranks before him, and the rest marching without any order, or having their arms carried for them, an horseman came in full speed, crying out as he passed, that the enemy approached in order of battle. Upon this, great confusion ensued, from the apprehension that they should not have time to draw up the army. Cyrus, leaping from his chariot, put on his arms immediately, and getting on horseback with his javelin in his hand, he gave orders universally to the troops to stand to their arms, and fall into their ranks; which was executed with so much expedition, that the troops had not time to refresh themselves.

Cyrus posted upon his right 1000 Paphlagonian horse, supported by the Euphrates, and the light-armed infantry of the Greeks; and next them, Clearchus, Proxenes, and the rest of the general officers, to Menon, at the head of their several corps. The left wing, composed of Lydians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic nations, were commanded by Ariaeus, who had 1000 horse. Cyrus placed himself in the centre, where the chosen troops of the Persians and other barbarians were posted. He had around him 600 horsemen, armed at all points, as were their horses, with head and breast-pieces. The prince's head was uncovered, as were those of all the Persians, whose custom it was to give battle in that manner; the arms of all his people were red, and those of Artaxerxes were white.

A little before the onset, Clearchus advised Cyrus not to charge in person, but to cover himself in the rear of the Grecian battalions. "What is it you say?" replied Cyrus. "At the time I am endeavouring to make myself king, would you have me show myself unworthy of being so?" That wise and generous answer proves, that he knew the duty of a general, especially on a day of battle. Had he withdrawn when his presence was most necessary, it would have argued his want of courage, and intimidated others. It is necessary, always preserving the due distinction between the leader and the troops, that their danger should be common, and no one exempted from it, lest the latter should be alarmed by a different conduct. Courage in an army depends upon example, upon the desire of being distinguished, the fear of dishonour, the incapacity of doing otherwise than the rest, and the equality of danger. The retiring of Cyrus had either ruined, or greatly weakened, all these potent motives, by discouraging as well the officers as soldiers of his army. He thought, that, being their general, it was incumbent upon him to discharge all the functions of that office, and to show himself worthy to be

be the leader and soul of such a number of valiant men, ready to shed their blood for his service.

It was now noon, and the enemy did not yet appear. But about three of the clock a great dust, like a white cloud, arose, followed soon after with a blackness that overcast the whole plain; after which was seen the glittering of armour, lances, and standards. Tissaphernes commanded the left, which consisted of cavalry armed with white cuirasses, and of light-armed infantry; in the centre was the heavy-armed foot, a great part of which had bucklers made of wood, which covered the soldiery entirely: these were Egyptians. The rest of the light-armed infantry and of the horse formed the right wing. The foot were drawn up by nations, with as much depth as front, and in that order composed square battalions. The king had posted himself in the main body with the flower of the whole army, and had 6000 horse for his guard, commanded by Artagerfes. Though he was in the centre, he was beyond the left wing of Cyrus's army, so much did the front of his own exceed that of the enemy in extent. An hundred and fifty chariots armed with scythes were placed in the front of the army at some distance from one another. The scythes were fixed to the axle downwards and aslant, so as to cut down and overthrow all before them.

As Cyrus relied very much upon the valour and experience of the Greeks, he bade Clearchus, as soon as he had beat the enemy in his front, to take care to incline to his left, and fall upon the centre, where the king was posted; the success of the battle depending upon that attack. But Clearchus, finding it very difficult to make his way through so great a body of troops, replied, that he need be in no pain, and that he would take care to do what was necessary.

The enemy in the mean time advanced slowly in good order. Cyrus marched in the space between the two armies, the nearest to his own, and considered both of them with great attention. Xenophon, perceiving him, spurred directly up to him, to know whether he had any further orders to give. He called out to him, that the sacrifices were favourable, and that he should tell the troops so. He then hastened through the ranks to give his orders, and showed himself to the soldiers with such a joy and serenity in his countenance, as inspired them with new courage, and at the same time with an air of kindness and familiarity, that excited their zeal and affection. It is not easy to comprehend, what great effects a word, a kind air, or a look of a general, will have upon a day of action; and with what ardour

dour a common man will rush into danger, when he believes himself not unknown to his general, and thinks his valour will oblige him.

Artaxerxes moved on continually, though with a slow pace, and without noise and confusion. That good order and exact discipline extremely surprised the Greeks, who expected to see much hurry and tumult in so great a multitude, and to hear confused cries, as Cyrus had foretold them.

The armies were not distant above 400 or 500 paces, when the Greeks began to sing the hymn of battle, and to march on, softly at first, and with silence. When they came near the enemy, they set up great cries, striking their darts upon their shields to frighten the horse, and then moving all together, they sprung forwards upon the barbarians with all their force, who did not wait their charge, but took to their heels, and fled universally; except Tissaphernes, who stood his ground with a small part of his troops.

Cyrus saw with pleasure the enemy routed by the Greeks, and was proclaimed king by those around him. But he did not give himself up to a vain joy, nor as yet reckon himself victor. He perceived, that Artaxerxes was wheeling his right to attack him in flank, and marched directly against him with his 600 horse. He killed Artagerfes, who commanded the king's guards of 6000 horse, with his own hand, and put the whole body to flight. Discovering his brother, he cried out, with his eyes sparkling with rage, "I see him," and spurred against him, followed only by his principal officers; for his troops had quitted their ranks to follow the run-aways, which was an essential fault.

* The battle then became a single combat, in some measure, between Artaxerxes and Cyrus, and the two brothers were seen transported with rage and fury, endeavouring, like Eteocles and Polynices, to plunge their swords into each other's hearts, and to assure themselves of the throne by the death of their rival.

Cyrus having opened his way through those who were drawn up in battle before Artaxerxes, joined him, and killed his horse, that fell with him to the ground. He rose and was remounted upon another, when Cyrus attacked him again, gave him a second wound, and was preparing to give him a third, in hopes that it would prove his last. The king, like a lion wounded by the hunters, was only the more furious, from the

smart, and sprung forwards, impetuously pushing his horse against Cyrus, who, running headlong, and without regard to his person, threw himself into the midst of a flight of darts aimed at him from all sides, and received a wound from the king's javelin, at the instant all the rest discharged upon him. Cyrus fell dead: some say, by the wound given him by the king; others affirm, that he was killed by a Carian soldier. Mithridates, a young Persian nobleman, asserted, that he had given him the mortal stroke with a javelin, which entered his temple, and pierced his head quite through. The greatest persons of his court, resolving not to survive so good a master, were all killed around his body; a certain proof, says Xenophon, that he well knew how to chuse his friends, and that he was truly beloved by them. Ariæus, who ought to have been the firmest of all his adherents, fled with the left wing, as soon as he heard of his death.

Artaxerxes, after having caused the head and right hand of his brother to be cut off by the eunuch Meftabates, pursued the enemy into their camp. Ariæus had not stopped there, but having passed through it, continued his retreat to the place where the army had encamped the day before, which was about four leagues distant.

Tissaphernes, after the defeat of the greatest part of his left wing by the Greeks, led on the rest against them, and by the side of the river, passed through the light-armed infantry of the Greeks, who opened to give him passage, and made their discharge upon him as he passed without losing a man. They were commanded by Episthenes of Amphipolis, who was esteemed an able captain. Tissaphernes kept on without returning to the charge, because he perceived he was too weak, and went forward to Cyrus's camp, where he found the king, who was plundering it, but had not been able to force the quarter defended by the Greeks left to guard it, who saved their baggage.

The Greeks on their side, and Artaxerxes on his, who did not know what had passed elsewhere, believed each of them that they had gained the victory; the first, because they had put the enemy to flight, and pursued them: and the king, because he had killed his brother, beat the troops he had fought, and plundered their camp. The event was soon cleared up on both sides. Tissaphernes, upon his arrival at the camp, informed the king, that the Greeks had defeated his left wing, and pursued it with great vigour; and the Greeks on their side learned, that the king, in pursuing Cyrus's left, had penetrat-

ed into the camp. Upon this advice, the king rallied his troops, and marched in quest of the enemy; and Clearchus, being returned from pursuing the Persians, advanced to support the camp.

The two armies were soon very near each other, when by a movement made by the king, he seemed to intend to charge the Greeks by their left, who, fearing to be surrounded on all sides, wheeled about, and halted with the river on their backs, to prevent their being taken in the rear. Upon seeing that, the king changed his form of battle also, drew up his army in front of them, and marched on to the attack. As soon as the Greeks saw him approach, they began to sing the hymn of battle, and advanced against the enemy even with more ardour than in the first action.

The barbarians again took to their heels, ran farther than before, and were pursued to a village at the foot of an hill, upon which their horse halted. The king's standard was observed to be there, which was a golden eagle upon the top of a pike, having its wings displayed. The Greeks preparing to pursue them, they abandoned also the hill, fled precipitately with all their troops, broke, and in the utmost disorder and confusion. Clearchus, having drawn up the Greeks at the bottom of the hill, ordered Lycias the Syracusan and another to go up it, and observe what passed in the plain. They returned with an account that the enemy fled on all sides, and that their whole army was routed.

As it was almost night, the Greeks laid down their arms to rest themselves, much surpris'd, that neither Cyrus, nor any one from him, appeared; and imagining, that he was either engaged in the pursuit of the enemy, or was making haste to possess himself of some important place, for they were still ignorant of his death, and the defeat of the rest of his army. They determined therefore to return to their camp, and found the greatest part of the baggage taken, with all the provisions, and 400 waggon laden with corn and wine, which Cyrus had expressly caused to be carried along with the army for the Greeks in case of any pressing necessity. They passed the night in the camp, the greatest part of them without any refreshment, concluding that Cyrus was alive and victorious.

The success of this battle shows the superiority of valour and military knowledge to multitude without them. The small army of the Greeks did not amount to more than 12 or 13,000 men; but they were seasoned and disciplined troops, inured to fatigues, accustomed to confront dangers, sensible

ble to glory, and who, during the long Peloponnesian war, had not wanted either time or means to acquire, and complete themselves in the art of war, and the methods of battle. Artaxerxes's side was computed at 1,000,000 of men; but they were soldiers only in name, without force, courage, discipline, experience, or any sense of honour. Hence it was, that, as soon as the Greeks appeared, terror and disorder ensued among the enemy; and in the second action, Artaxerxes himself did not dare to wait their attack, but shamefully betook himself to flight.

Plutarch here blames Clearchus the general of the Greeks very much, and imputes to him, as an unpardonable neglect, his not having followed Cyrus's order, who recommended to him above all things to incline and charge Artaxerxes's person. This reproach seems groundless. It is not easy to conceive how it was possible for that captain, who was posted on the right wing, to attack Artaxerxes immediately, who, in the centre of his own army, lay beyond the utmost extent of the enemy's left, as has been said before. It seems that Cyrus, depending as he did with great reason upon the valour of the Greeks, and desiring they should charge Artaxerxes in his post, ought to have placed them in the left wing, which answered directly to the part where the king was; that is, to the main body, and not in the right, which was very remote from it.

Clearchus may indeed be reproached with having followed the pursuit too warmly and too long. If, after having put the left which opposed him into disorder, he had charged the rest of the enemy in flank, and had opened his way to the centre, where Artaxerxes was, it is highly probable that he had gained a complete victory, and placed Cyrus upon the throne. The 600 horse of that prince's guard committed the same fault, and by pursuing the body of troops they had put to flight too eagerly, left their master almost alone, and abandoned to the mercy of the enemy; without considering, that they were chosen from the whole army for the immediate guard of his person, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Too much ardour is often prejudicial in a battle, and it is the duty of an able general to know how to restrain and direct it.

Cyrus himself erred highly in this respect, and abandoned himself too much to his blind passion for glory and revenge. In running headlong to attack his brother, he forgot, that there is a wide difference between a general and a private soldier. He ought not to have exposed himself, but as it was
consistent

consistent with a prince; as the head, and not the hand; as the person who was to give orders, and not as those who were to execute them.

I speak in this manner after the judges in the art of war, and would not chuse to advance my own opinion upon things out of my sphere.

SECTION III.

EULOGY OF CYRUS.

XENOPHON gives us a magnificent character of Cyrus*, and that not upon the credit of others, but from what he saw and knew of him in his own person. He was, says he, in the opinion of all that were acquainted with him, after Cyrus the Great, a prince the most worthy of the supreme authority, and had the most noble, and most truly royal soul. From his infancy he surpassed all of his own age in every exercise, whether it were in managing the horse, drawing the bow, throwing the dart, or in the chase, in which he distinguished himself once by fighting and killing a bear that attacked him. Those advantages were exalted in him by the nobleness of his air, an engaging aspect, and by all the graces of nature, that conduce to recommend merit.

When his father had made him satrap of Lydia and the neighbouring † provinces, his chief care was to make the people sensible, that he had nothing so much at heart, as to keep his word inviolably, not only with regard to public treaties, but the most minute of his promises; a quality very rare among princes, and which however is the basis of all good government, and the source of their own, as well as their people's happiness. Not only the places under his authority, but the enemy themselves, reposed an entire confidence in him.

Whether good or ill were done him, he always desired to return it double, and that he might live no longer, as he said himself, than whilst he surmounted his friends in benefits, and his enemies in vengeance. (It had been more glorious for him to have overcome the latter by the force of favour and benevolence). Nor was there ever prince that people were more afraid to offend, nor for whose sake they were more ready to hazard their possessions, lives, and fortunes.

Less intent upon being feared than beloved, his study was to

* De Exped. Cyr. l. i. p. 266, 267.

† Great Phrygia and Cappadocia.

make his greatness appear only where it was useful and beneficial, and to extinguish all other sentiments, but those which flow from gratitude and affection. He was industrious to do good upon all occasions, to confer his favours with judgment and in season, and to show, that he thought himself rich, powerful, and happy, only as he made others sensible of his being so by his benevolence and liberality. But he took care not to exhaust the means by an imprudent profusion. He did not * lavish, but distribute, his favours. He chose rather to make his liberalities the rewards of merit, than mere donations, and that they should be subservient in promoting virtue, and not in supporting the soft and abject sloth of vice.

He was particularly pleased with conferring his favours upon valiant men, and governments and rewards were only bestowed on those who had distinguished themselves by their actions. He never granted any honour or dignity to favour, intrigue, or faction, but to merit only; upon which depends not only the glory but the prosperity of governments. By these means he soon made virtue estimable, and the pursuit of men, and rendered vice contemptible and horrid. The provinces, animated with a noble emulation to deserve, furnished him in a very short time with a considerable number of excellent subjects of every kind; who under a different government would have remained unknown, obscure, and useless.

Never did any one know how to oblige with a better grace, or to win the hearts of those who could serve him with more engaging behaviour. As he was fully sensible that he stood in need of the assistance of others for the execution of his designs, he thought justice and gratitude required that he should render his adherents all the services in his power. All the presents made him, whether of splendid arms, or rich apparel, he distributed among his friends, according to their several tastes or occasions; and used to say, that the brightest ornament, and most exalted riches, of a prince, consisted in adorning and enriching those who served him well. In effect, says Xenophon, to do good to one's friends; and to excel them in liberality, does not seem so admirable in so high a fortune; but to transcend them in goodness of heart and sentiments of friendship and affection, and to take more pleasure in conferring, than receiving, obligations; in this, I find Cyrus truly worthy of esteem and admiration. The first of these advantages he

* *Habebit sinum facilem, non perforatum: ex quo multa exeat, nihil excidat.* Senec. de vit. beat. c. 23.

derives from his rank; the other from himself and his intrinsic merit.

By these extraordinary qualities he acquired the universal esteem and affection as well of the Greeks as the Barbarians. A great proof of what Xenophon here says, is, that none ever quitted the service of Cyrus for the king's; whereas great numbers went over every day to him from the king's party after the war was declared, and even of such as had most credit at the court; because they were all convinced, that Cyrus knew best how to distinguish and reward their services.

It is most certain, that young Cyrus did not want great virtues, and a superior merit; but I am surprised that Xenophon, in drawing his character, has described only the most beautiful features, and such as are proper to excite our admiration of him, without saying the least word of his defects, and especially of that immoderate ambition, that was the soul of all his actions, and which at length put arms into his hands against his elder brother and king. Is it allowable in an historian, whose chief duty it is to paint virtue and vice in their proper colours, to relate at large an enterprise of such a nature, without intimating the least dislike or imputation against it? But with the Pagans, ambition was so far from being considered as a vice, that it often passed for a virtue.

SECTION IV.

THE KING IS FOR COMPELLING THE GREEKS TO
DELIVER UP THEIR ARMS.

THE Greeks*, having learned, the day after the battle, that Cyrus was dead, sent deputies to Ariæus, the general of the Barbarians, who had retired with his troops to the place from whence they had marched the day before the action, to offer him, as victors, the crown of Persia in the room of Cyrus. At the same time arrived Persian heralds at arms from the king, to summon them to deliver up their arms; to whom they answered with a haughty air, that they talked a strange language to conquerors; that if the king would have their arms, he might come and take them if he could; but that they would die before they would part with them: that if he would receive them into the number of his allies, they would serve

* Xenoph. in exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 272—292. Diod. l. xiv. p. 255—257.

him with fidelity and valour; * but if he imagined to reduce them into slavery as conquered, he might know, they had wherewithal to defend themselves, and were determined to lose their lives and liberty together. The heralds added, that they had orders to tell them, that if they continued in the place where they were, they would be allowed a suspension of arms; but if they advanced or retired, that they would be treated as enemies. The Greeks agreed, and were asked by the heralds what answer they should report. Peace in continuing here, or war in marching, replied Clearchus, without explaining himself further; from the view of keeping the king always in suspense and uncertainty.

The answer of Ariæus to the Grecian deputies was, that there were many Persians more considerable than himself, who would not suffer him upon the throne, and that he should set out early the next day to return into Ionia; that, if they would march thither with him, they might join him in the night. Clearchus, with the advice of the officers, prepared to depart. He commanded from thenceforth, as being the sole person of sufficient capacity; for he had not been actually elected general in chief.

The same night, Mithocytes the Thracian, who commanded 40 horse, and about 300 foot of his country, went and surrendered himself to the king. The rest of the Greeks began their march under the conduct of Clearchus, and arrived about midnight at the camp of Ariæus. After they had drawn up in battle, the principal officers went to wait on him in his tent, where they swore alliance with him; and the barbarian engaged to conduct the army without fraud. In confirmation of the treaty, they sacrificed a wolf, a ram, a boar, and a bull; the Greeks dipped their swords, and the barbarians the points of their javelins, in the blood of the victims.

Ariæus did not think it proper to return by the same route they came, because, having found nothing for their subsistence the last 17 days of their march, they must have suffered much more, had they taken the same way back again. He therefore took another; exhorting them only to make long marches at first, in order to evade the king's pursuit; which they could not effect. Towards the evening, when they were not far from some villages where they proposed to halt, the scouts came in with advice, that they had seen several equipages and

* Sin ut victis servitium indiceretur, esse sibi ferrum et juventutem, et promptum libertati aut ad mortem animum. Tacit. annal. l. iv. c. 46.

convoys, which made it reasonable to judge that the enemy were not far off. Upon which they stood their ground, and waited their coming up; and the next day, before sun-rising, drew up in the same order as in the preceding battle. So bold an appearance terrified the king, who sent heralds, not to demand, as before, the surrender of their arms, but to propose peace and a treaty. Clearchus, who was informed of their arrival, whilst he was busy in drawing up his troops, gave orders to bid them wait, and to tell them, that he was not yet at leisure to hear them. He assumed purposely an air of haughtiness and grandeur, to denote his intrepidity, and at the same time to show the fine appearance and good condition of his phalanx. When he advanced with the most showy of his officers, expressly chosen for the occasion, and had heard what the heralds had to propose; he made answer, that they must begin with giving battle, because the army being in want of provisions, had no time to lose. The heralds having carried back this answer to their master, returned immediately; which showed, that the king, or whoever spoke in his name, was not very distant. They said, they had orders to conduct them to villages, where they would find provisions in abundance, and conducted them thither accordingly.

The army staid there three days, during which Tissaphernes arrived from the king, with the queen's brother and three other Persian grandees, attended by a great number of officers and domestics. After having saluted the generals, who advanced to receive him, he told them by his interpreter, that being a neighbour of Greece, and seeing them engaged in dangers, out of which it would be difficult to extricate themselves, he had used his good offices with the king, to obtain permission to re-conduct them into their own country; being convinced, that neither themselves, nor their cities, would ever be unmindful of that favour: that the king, without having declared himself positively upon that head, had commanded him to come to them, to know for what cause they had taken arms against him; and he advised them to make the king such an answer as might not give any offence, and might enable him to do them service. "We call the gods to witness," replied Clearchus, "that we did not lift ourselves to make war with the king, or to march against him. Cyrus, concealing his true motives under different pretexts, brought us almost hither without explaining himself, the better to surprise you. And when we saw him surrounded with dangers, we thought it infamous to abandon him, after the favours we had received
" from

“from him. But as he is dead, we are released from our
“engagement, and neither desire to contest the crown with
“Artaxerxes, nor to ravage his country; provided he does
“not oppose our return. However, if we are attacked, we
“shall endeavour, with the assistance of the gods, to make a
“good defence; and shall not be ungrateful in regard to those
“who render us any service.” Tissaphernes replied, that he
would let the king know what they said, and return with his
answer. But his not coming the next day gave the Greeks
some anxiety: he however arrived on the third, and told them,
that after much controversy he had at length obtained the
king’s grace for them: for, that it had been represented to the
king, that he ought not to suffer people to return with im-
punity into their country, who had been so insolent as to come
thither to make war upon him. “In fine,” said he, “you
“may now assure yourselves of not finding any obstacle to your
“return, and of being supplied with provisions, or suffered to
“buy them; and you may judge, that you are to pass without
“committing any disorders in your march, and that you are
“to take only what is necessary; provided you are not sur-
“nished with it.” These conditions were sworn to on both
sides. Tissaphernes and the queen’s brother gave their hands
to the colonels and captains in token of amity. After which
Tissaphernes withdrew, to dispose his affairs; promising to
return as soon as they would admit, in order to go back with
them into his government.

The Greeks waited for him above 20 days, continuing en-
camped near Ariæus, who received frequent visits from his
brothers, and other relations, as did the officers of his army
from the Persians of the different party; who assured them
from the king of an entire oblivion of the past; so that the
friendship of Ariæus for the Greeks appeared to cool every
day more and more. This change gave them cause of uneasi-
ness. Several of the officers went to Clearchus and the other
generals, and said to them, “What do we here any longer?
“Are we not sensible, that the king desires to see us all perish,
“that others may be terrified by our example? Perhaps he
“keeps us waiting here, till he re-assembles his dispersed
“troops, or sends to seize the passes in our way; for he will
“never suffer us to return into Greece, to divulge our own
“glory and his shame.” Clearchus made answer to this dis-
course, that to depart without consulting the king, was to
break with him, and to declare war by violating the treaty;
that they should remain without a conductor in a country where

nobody would supply them with provisions; that Ariæus would abandon them; and that even their friends would become their enemies; that he did not know, but there might be other rivers to pass, and that, though the Euphrates were the only one, they could not get over it, were the passage ever so little disputed; that if it were necessary to come to a battle, they should find themselves without cavalry against an enemy, that had a very numerous and excellent body of horse; so that if they gained the victory, they could make no great advantage of it, and if they were overcome, they were utterly and irretrievably lost. “ Besides, why should the king, who has so many other means to destroy us, engage his word only to violate it, and thereby render himself execrable in the sight of gods and men?”

Tissaphernes however arrived with his troops, in order to return into his government, and they set forward all together under the conduct of that satrap, who supplied them with provisions. Ariæus with his troops encamped with the barbarians, and the Greeks separately at some distance, which kept up a continual distrust among them: besides which, there happened frequent quarrels for wood or forage, that augmented their aversion for each other. After three days march, they arrived at the wall of Media, which is 100 feet high, 20 broad, and 20 leagues * in extent, all built of bricks, cemented with bitumen, like the walls of Babylon, from which it was not very distant at one of its extremities. When they had passed it, they marched eight leagues in two days, and came to the river Tygris, after having crossed two of its canals, cut expressly for watering the country. † They then passed the Tygris upon a bridge of 27 boats near Sisacum, a very great and populous city. After four days march, they arrived at another city very powerful also, called Opis. They found there a bastard brother of Artaxerxes with a very considerable body of troops, which he was bringing from Susa and Ecbatana to his aid. He admired the fine order of the Greeks. From thence, having passed the deserts of Media, they came, after a march of six days, to a place called the lands of Parysatis; the

* 20 parasangas.

† The march of the Greeks and the rest of the army, from the day after the battle till the passing of the Tygris, abounds in the text of Xenophon with very great obscurities, to explain which fully requires a long dissertation. My plan does not admit me to enter into such discussions, which I must therefore refer to those who are more able than me.

revenues of which appertained to that princess. Tissaphernes, to insult the memory of her son Cyrus, so dearly beloved by her, gave the villages to be plundered by the Greeks. Continuing their march through the desert on the side of the Tygris, which they had on their left, they arrived at Cænæ, a very great and rich city, and from thence at the river Zabates.

The occasions of distrust increased every day between the Greeks and barbarians. Clearchus thought it incumbent on him to come to an explanation once for all with Tissaphernes. He began with observing upon the sacred and inviolable nature of the treaties subsisting between them. "Can a man," said he, "conscious of the guilt of perjury, be capable of living at ease? How would he shun the wrath of the gods, the witnesses of treaties, and escape their vengeance, whose power is universal?" He added afterwards many things to prove, that the Greeks were obliged by their own interest to continue faithful to him, and that, by renouncing his alliance, they must first inevitably renounce not only all religion, but reason and common sense. Tissaphernes seemed to relish this discourse, and spoke to him with all the appearance of the most perfect sincerity; insinuating at the same time, that some persons had done him bad offices with him. "If you will bring your officers hither," said he, "I will show you those, who have wronged you in their representations." He kept him to supper, and professed more friendship for him than ever:

The next day Clearchus proposed in the assembly, to go with the several commanders of the troops to Tissaphernes. He suspected Menon in particular, whom he knew to have had a secret conference with the satrap in the presence of Ariæus; besides which, they had already differed several times with each other. Some objected, that it was not proper that all the generals should go to Tissaphernes, and that it did not consist with prudence to rely implicitly upon the professions of a Barbarian. But Clearchus continued to insist upon what he had moved, till it was agreed, that the four other commanders, with 20 captains, and about 200 soldiers, under the pretext of buying provisions in the Persian camp, where there was a market, should be sent along with him. When they came to the tent of Tissaphernes, the five commanders, Clearchus, Menon, Proxenes, Agias, and Socrates, were suffered to enter, but the captains remained without at the door. Immediately, on a certain signal before agreed on, those within were seized, and the others put to the sword.

Some

Some Persian horse afterwards scoured the country, and killed all the Greeks they met, whether freemen or slaves. Clearchus, with the other generals, was sent to the king, who ordered their heads to be struck off. Xenophon describes with sufficient extent the characters of those officers.

Clearchus was valiant, bold, intrepid, and of a capacity for forming great enterprizes. His courage was not rash, but directed by prudence, and he retained all the coolness of his temper and presence of mind in the midst of the greatest dangers. He loved the troops, and let them want for nothing. He knew how to make them obey him; but out of fear. His mien was awful and severe; his language rough; his punishments instant and rigorous: he gave way sometimes to passion, but presently came to himself, and always chastised with justice. His great maxim was, that nothing could be done in an army without a severe discipline; and from him came the saying, that a soldier ought to fear his general more than the enemy. The troops * esteemed his valour, and did justice to his merit; but they were afraid of his humour, and did not love to serve under him. In a word, says Xenophon, the soldiers feared him as scholars do a severe pedagogue. We may say of him with Tacitus, that by an excess of severity he made, what had otherwise been well done by him, unamiable; “† *Cupidine severitatis in his etiam, quæ rite faceret, acerbus.*”

Proxenes was of Bceotia. From his infancy he aspired at great things, and was industrious to make himself capable of them. He spared no means for the attainment of instruction, and was the disciple of Gorgias the Leontine, a celebrated rhetorician, who sold his lectures at a very high price. When he found himself capable of commanding, and of doing good to his friends, as well as of being served by them, he entered into Cyrus's service with the view of advancing himself. He did not want ambition, but would take no other path to glory than that of virtue. He had been a perfect captain, had he had to do with none but brave disciplined men, and it had been only necessary to be beloved. He was more apprehensive of being in his soldiers displeasure, than his soldiers in his. He thought it sufficient for a commander to praise good actions, without punishing bad ones; for which reason he was beloved by the worthy; but those of different character abused his facility. He died at 30 years of age.

* *Manebat admiratio viri et fama; sed oderunt.* Tacit. Hist. l. ii. c. 68.

† Tacit. Annal. c. lxxv.

* Could the two great persons we have here drawn after Xenophon, have been moulded into one, something perfect might have been made of them; retrenching their several defects, and retaining only their virtues; but it rarely happens, that the same man, † as Tacitus says of Agricola, behaves, according to the exigency of times and circumstances, sometimes with gentleness, and sometimes with severity, without lessening his authority by the former, or the people's affection by the latter.

Menon was a Theſſalian, avaritious and ambitious, but ambitious only from the motive of avarice, purſuing honour and eſtimation for the mere lucre of money. He courted the friendſhip of the great, and of perſons in authority, that he might have it in his power to commit injuſtice and oppreſſion with impunity. To obtain his ends, all means with him were virtue; falſehood, fraud, perjury; whiſt ſincerity, and integrity of heart, ſtood in his ſcheme for weakneſs and ſtupidity. He loved nobody; and if he profeſſed friendſhip, it was only to deceive. As others made their glory conſiſt in religion, probity and honour, he valued himſelf upon injuſtice, deceit, and treachery. He gained the favour of the great by falſe reports, whiſpering, and calumny; and that of the ſoldiery by licence and impunity. In ſine, he endeavoured to render himſelf terrible by the miſchief it was in his power to do, and imagined he favoured thoſe to whom he did none.

It was in my thoughts to have retrenched theſe characters, which interrupt the thread of the hiſtory. But as they are a lively image of the manners of men, which in all times are the ſame, I thought retaining them would neither be uſeleſs nor diſagreeable to the reader.

SECTION V.

RETREAT OF THE TEN THOUSAND GREEKS FROM THE PROVINCE OF BABYLON TO TREBISOND.

THE generals of the Greeks having been ſeized‡, and the officers who attended them maſſacred, the troops were in the higheſt conſternation. They were 500 or 600 leagues from

* *Egregium principatus temperamentum, ſi, demptis utriuſque vitiis, ſolæ virtutes miſceantur.* Tacit. hiſtor. l. ii. c. 5.

† *Pro-variis temporibus ac negotiis ſeverus et comis—nec illi, quod eſt r-iſſimum, aut facilitas auctoritatem, aut ſeveritas amorem, diminuit.* Tacit. in Agric. c. ix.

‡ Xenoph. in exped. Cyr. l. iii. et iv.

Greece, surrounded with great rivers and enemy-nations, without any supplies of provisions. In this state of general dejection, they could not think of taking either nourishment or repose. In the middle of the night, Xenophon, a young Athenian, but of prudence and capacity superior to his years, went to some of the officers, and represented to them, that they had no time to lose; that it was of the last importance to prevent the bad designs of the enemy; that, however small their number, they would render themselves formidable, if they behaved with boldness and resolution; that valour and not multitude determines the success of arms: and that it was necessary above all things to nominate generals immediately; because an army without commanders is like a body without a soul. A council was immediately held, at which 100 officers were present, and Xenophon, being desired to speak, deduced the reasons at large he had at first but lightly touched upon; and upon his advice commanders were appointed. They were, Timasion for Clearchus, Xanthicles for Socrates, Cleanor for Agias, Philesius for Menon, and Xenophon for Proxenes.

Before the break of day, they assembled the army. The generals made speeches to animate the troops, and Xenophon amongst the rest. "Fellow-soldiers," said he, "the loss of
 " so many brave men by vile treachery, and the being abandoned by our friends, is very deplorable: but we must not
 " sink under our misfortunes; and, if we cannot conquer, let
 " us choose rather to perish gloriously, than to fall into the
 " hands of barbarians, who would inflict upon us the greatest
 " miseries. Let us call to mind the glorious battles of Marathon,
 " Thermopylae, Salamin, and the many others wherein our
 " ancestors, though with a small number, have fought and defeated the innumerable armies of the Persians, and thereby
 " rendered the name alone of Greek for ever formidable. It
 " is to their invincible valour we owe the honour we possess, of
 " acknowledging no masters upon earth but the gods, nor any
 " happiness but what consists with liberty. Those gods, the
 " avengers of perjury, and witnesses of the enemy's treason,
 " will be favourable to us; and as they are attacked in the violation of treaties, and take pleasure in humbling the proud,
 " and exalting the low, they will also follow us to battle, and
 " combat for us. For the rest, fellow-soldiers, as we have no
 " refuge but in victory, which must be our hope, and will make
 " us ample amends for whatever it costs to attain it; I should
 " believe, if it were your opinion, that, for the making a more
 " ready and less difficult retreat, it would be very proper to
 " rid

“ rid ourselves of all the useless baggage, and to keep only “ what is absolutely necessary in our march.” All the soldiers that moment lifted up their hands to signify their approbation and consent to all that had been said, and without loss of time set fire to their tents and carriages ; such of them as had too much equipage giving it to others who had too little, and destroying the rest.

It was resolved to march the army without tumult or violence, if their return was not opposed ; but otherwise to open themselves a passage sword in hand through the enemy. They began their march in the form of a great hollow square, with the baggage in the centre. Chirisophus, the Lacedæmonian, had the van-guard ; two of the oldest captains the right and left ; and Timasion with Xenophon were posted in the rear, as the youngest officers. The first day was rude ; because, having neither horse nor slingers, they were extremely harassed by a detachment sent against them : but they provided against that inconvenience by following Xenophon’s advice. They chose 200 men out of the Rhodians in the army, whom they armed with slings, and augmented their pay for their encouragement. They could throw as far again as the Persians, because they discharged balls of lead, and the others made use of large flints. They mounted also a squadron of 50 men upon the horses intended for the baggage, and supplied their places with other beasts of burden. By the means of this supply, a second detachment of the enemy were very severely handled.

After some days march, Tissaphernes appeared with all his forces. He contented himself with harassing the Greeks, who moved on continually. The latter observing the difficulty of retreating in an hollow square in the face of the enemy, from the unevenness of ground, hedges, and other obstacles, which might oblige them to break it, changed their order of battle, and marched in two columns, with the little baggage they had in the space between them. They formed a body of reserve of 600 chosen men, whom they divided into six companies, and sub-divided by fifties and tens, to facilitate their motions according to occasion. When the columns came close to each other, they either remained in the rear, or filed off upon the flanks on both sides, to avoid disorder ; and when they opened, they fell into the void space in the rear between the two columns. Upon any occasion of attack, they immediately ran where it was necessary. The Greeks stood several charges, but they were neither considerable, nor attended with much loss.

They arrived at the river Tygris. As its depth would not admit

admit them to repass it without boats, they were obliged to cross the Carducian mountains ; because there was no other way, and the prisoners reported, that from thence they would enter Armenia, where they might pass the Tygris at its source, and afterwards the Euphrates, not very distant from it. To gain those defiles before the enemy could seize them, it was thought proper to set forwards in the night, in order to arrive at the foot of the mountains by the break of day ; which was done accordingly. Chirifophus continued at the head of the advanced guard, with the troops armed with missile weapons, besides his ordinary corps ; and Xenophon in the rear, with only the heavy-armed soldiers, because at that time there was nothing to fear on that side. The inhabitants of the country had taken possession of several of the heights, from whence it was necessary to drive them, which could not be done without great danger and difficulty.

The officers, having held a council of war, were of opinion, that it was proper to leave behind them all the beasts of burden not absolutely necessary, with all the slaves lately taken ; because both the one and the other would retard their march too much in the great defiles they had to pass ; besides which, it required a greater quantity of provisions to support them, and those who had the care of the beasts were useless in fight. That regulation was executed without delay ; and they continued their march, sometimes fighting, and sometimes halting. The passing of the mountains, which took up seven days, fatigued the troops exceedingly, and occasioned some loss ; but at length they arrived at villages, where they found provisions in abundance, and rested some days, to recover the severe fatigues the army had suffered ; in comparison with which all they had undergone in Persia was trivial.

They found themselves soon after exposed to new danger. Almost at the foot of the mountains they came to a river, 200 feet in breadth, called Centrites, which stopped their march. They had to defend themselves against the enemy, who pursued them in the rear, and the Armenians, the soldiers of the country, who defended the opposite side of the river. They attempted in vain to pass it in a place where the water came up to their arm-pits, and were carried away by the rapidity of the current, against which the weight of their arms made them unable to resist. By good fortune they discovered another place not so deep, where the soldiers had seen the people of the country pass. It required abundance of address, diligence, and valour, to keep off the enemy on both sides of them. The army however passed the river at length without much loss.

They

They marched afterwards with less interruption ; passed the source of the Tygris, and arrived at the little river Teleboa, which is very beautiful, and has many villages on its banks. Here began the western Armenia ; which was governed by Tiribasus, a satrap much beloved by the king, and who had the honour to help him to * mount on horseback when at the court : he offered to let the army pass, and to suffer the soldiers to take all they wanted, upon condition, that they should commit no ravages in their march ; which proposal was accepted and ratified on each side. Tiribasus kept always a flying camp at a small distance from the army. There fell a great quantity of snow, which gave the troops some inconvenience ; and they learned from a prisoner, that Tiribasus had a design to attack the Greeks at a pass of the mountains, in a defile, through which they must necessarily march. They prevented him by seizing that post, after having put the enemy to flight. After some days march through deserts, they passed the Euphrates near its source, not having the water above their middles.

They suffered exceedingly afterwards from a north wind, which blew in their faces, and prevented respiration ; so that it was thought necessary to sacrifice to the wind, upon which it seemed to abate. They marched on in snow five or six feet deep, which killed several servants and beasts of burden, besides 30 soldiers. They made fires during the night, for they found plenty of wood. All the next day, they continued their march through the snow : when many of them, from the excess of hunger, followed with languor or fainting, continued lying upon the ground through weakness and want of spirits. When something had been given them to eat, they found themselves relieved, and continued their march.

The enemy still pursued them ; of whom many, overtaken by the night, remained on the way without fire or provisions, so that several died of their hardships, and the enemy who followed them took some baggage. Some soldiers were also left behind, that had lost their sight, and others their toes, by the snow. Against the first evil, it was good to wear something black before the eyes ; and against the other, to keep the legs always in motion, and to bare the feet at night. Arriving in a more commodious place, they dispersed themselves into the neighbouring villages, to recover and repose after their fatigues.

* The French translator of Xenophon says, " He held the king's stirrup when he got on horseback," without considering, that the ancients used none.

The houses were built under-ground, with an opening at top, like a well, through which the descent was by a ladder; but there was another entrance for cattle. They found there sheep, cows, goats, poultry; with wheat, barley, and pulse; and for drink, there was beer, which was very strong, when not mingled with water, but was agreeable to those who were used to it. They drank this with a reed out of the vessels that held the beer, upon which they saw the barley swim. The master of the house where Xenophon lay, received him very kindly, and even showed him where he had concealed some wine; besides which, he made him a present of several horses. He taught him also to fasten a kind of hurdles to their feet, and to do the same to the other beasts of burden, to prevent their sinking in the snow; without which they would have been up to the girth in it at every step. The army, after having rested seven days in these villages, resumed their route.

After a march of seven days, they arrived at the river Araxes, called also the Phasus, which is about 100 feet in breadth. Two days after, they discovered the Phasians, the Chalybes, and the Taochians, who kept the pass of the mountains, to prevent their descending into the plain. They saw it was impossible to avoid coming to a battle with them, and resolved to give it the same day. Xenophon, who had observed that the enemy defended only the ordinary passage, and that the mountain was three leagues in extent, proposed the sending of a detachment to take possession of the heights that commanded the enemy; which would not be difficult, as they might prevent all suspicion of their design by a march in the night, and by making a false attack by the main road, to amuse the barbarians. This was accordingly executed, the enemy put to flight, and the pass cleared.

They crossed the country of the Chalybes, who are the most violent of all the barbarians in those parts. When they killed an enemy, they cut off his head, and carried it about in triumph, singing and dancing. They kept themselves close shut up in their cities, and when the army marched, fell suddenly upon the rear, after having carried every thing of value in the country into places of safety. After 12 or 15 days march, they arrived at a very high mountain, called Tecqua, from whence they descried the sea. The first who perceived it, raised great shouts of joy for a considerable time; which made Xenophon imagine, that the van-guard was attacked, and go with all haste to support it. As he approached nearer, the cry of "the sea! the sea!" was heard distinctly, and the
alarm

alarm changed into joy and gaiety ; and when they came to the top, nothing was heard but a confused noise of the whole army, crying out together, “ the sea ! the sea ! ” whilst they could not refrain from tears, nor from embracing their generals and officers. And then, without waiting for orders, they heaped up a pile of stones, and erected a trophy with broken bucklers and other arms.

From thence they advanced to the mountains of Colchis, one of which was higher than the rest, and of that the people of the country had possessed themselves. The Greeks drew up in battle at the bottom of it to ascend, for the access was not impracticable. Xenophon did not judge it proper to march in line of battle, but by files ; because the soldiers could not keep their ranks, from the inequality of the ground, that in some places was easy, and in others difficult to climb, which might discourage them. That advice was approved, and the army formed according to it. The heavy-armed troops amounted to 80 files ; each consisting of about 100 men, with 1800 light-armed soldiers, divided into three bodies, one of which was posted on the right, another on the left, and a third in the centre. After having encouraged his troops, by representing to them, that this was the last obstacle they had to surmount, and implored the assistance of the gods, the army began to ascend the hill. The enemy were not able to support their charge, and dispersed. They passed the mountain, and incamped in villages, where they found provisions in abundance.

A very strange accident happened there to the army, which put them into great consternation. For the soldiers, finding abundance of bee-hives in that place, and eating the honey, they were taken with violent vomiting and fluxes, attended with raving fits ; so that those who were least ill, seemed like drunken men, and the rest, either furiously mad, or dying. The earth was strewed with their bodies as after a defeat ; however, none of them died, and the distemper ceased the next day about the same hour it had taken them. The third or fourth day the soldiers got up, but in the condition people are after having taken a violent medicine.

Two days after, the army arrived near Trebifond, a Greek colony of Sinopians, situated upon the Euxine or Black sea, in the province of Colchis. Here they lay encamped for thirty days, and acquitted themselves of the vows they had made to Jupiter, Hercules, and the other deities, to obtain an happy return into their own country. They also celebrated the games of the horse and foot races, wrestling, boxing, the pancratium : the whole attended with the greatest joy and solemnity.

SECTION VI.

THE GREEKS ARRIVE UPON THE SEA-COAST OPPOSITE TO
BYZANTIUM.—XENOPHON JOINS THIMBRON.

AFTER having offered sacrifices to the several divinities, and celebrated the games, they deliberated upon the proper measures for their return into Greece*. They concluded upon going thither by sea; and for that purpose Chirisophus offered to go to Anaxibus, the admiral of Sparta, who was his friend, to obtain ships of him. He set out directly, and Xenophon regulated the order it was necessary to observe, and the precautions to be taken for the security of the camp, provisions, and forage. He believed it also proper to make sure of some vessels, besides those that were expected, and made some expeditions against the neighbouring people.

As Chirisophus did not return so soon as was expected, and provisions began to be wanting, it was resolved to proceed by land; because there was not a sufficient number of ships to transport the whole army, and those which the precaution of Xenophon had procured, were allotted to carry the women, the old and sick men, with all the unnecessary baggage. The army continued its march, and lay 10 days at † Cerasus, where there was a general review of the troops, who were found to amount to 8600 men, out of about 10,000; the rest having died in the retreat, of their wounds, fatigues, or diseases.

In the small time the Greeks continued in these parts, several divisions arose as well with the inhabitants of the country, as with some of the officers, who were jealous of Xenophon's authority, and endeavoured to render him odious to the army. But his wisdom and moderation put a stop to those disorders; having made the soldiers sensible, that their safety depended upon preserving union and a good understanding among themselves, and obedience to their generals.

From Cerasus they went to Cotyora, which is not very remote from it. They there deliberated again upon the proper measures for their return. The inhabitants of the country represented the almost insuperable difficulties of going by land, from the defiles and rivers they had to pass, and offered to supply the Greeks with ships. This seemed the best expedient,

* Xenoph. l. iii.

† The city of Cerasus became famous for the cherry-trees, which Lucullus first brought into Italy, and which from thence have been dispersed all over the western world.

and the army embarked accordingly. They arrived the next day at Sinope, a city of Paphlagonia, and a colony of the Milesians. Chirisophus repaired thither with galleys, but without money, though the troops expected to receive some. He assured them that the army should be paid, as soon as they were out of the Euxine sea, and that their retreat was universally celebrated, and the subject of the discourse and admiration of all Greece.

The soldiers, finding themselves near enough to Greece, desired to make some booty before they arrived there, and with that view resolved to nominate a general with full authority, whereas, till then, all affairs were determined in the council of war by the plurality of voices. They cast their eyes upon Xenophon, and caused him to be desired to accept that office. He was not insensible of the honour of commanding in chief; but he foresaw the consequences, and desired time to consider. After having expressed the highest sense of gratitude for an offer so much to his honour, he represented, that, to avoid jealousy and division, the success of affairs, and the interest of the army, seemed to require that they should choose a Lacedæmonian for their general; the Spartan state at that time actually ruling Greece, and, in consideration of that choice, would be disposed to support them. This reason was not relished, and they objected to it, that they were far from intending a servile dependence upon Sparta, or to submit to regulate their enterprises by the pleasure or dislike of that state; and pressed him again to accept the command. He was then obliged to explain himself sincerely, and without evasion; and declared, that having consulted the gods by sacrifice, upon the offer they made him, that they had manifested their will by evident signs, from whence it appeared that they did not approve their choice. It was surprising to see the impression which the sole mention of the gods made upon the soldiers, otherwise very warm and tenacious, and who besides are commonly little affected with the motives of religion. Their great ardour abated immediately; and, without making any reply, they proceeded to elect Chirisophus, though a Lacedæmonian, for their general.

His authority was of no long continuance. Discord, as Xenophon had foreseen, arose among the troops, who were angry that their general prevented their plundering the Grecian cities, by which they passed. This disturbance was principally excited by the Peloponnesians, who composed one half of the army, and could not see Xenophon an Athenian in authority

without pain. Different measures were proposed ; but nothing being concluded, the troops divided themselves into three bodies, of which the Achæians and Arcadians, that is, the Peloponnesians, were the principal, amounting to 4500 heavy-armed foot, with Lycon and Callimachus for their generals. Chirifophus commanded another party of about 1400 men, besides 700 light-armed infantry. Xenophon had the third, almost the same in number, of which 300 were light-armed soldiers, with about 40 horse, which were all the cavalry of the army. The first having obtained ships from the people of Heraclea*, to whom they sent to demand them, set out before the rest to make some booty, and made a descent in the port of Calpe. Chirifophus, who was sick, marched by land ; but without quitting the coast. Xenophon landed at Heraclea, and entered into the heart of the country.

New divisions arose. The imprudence of the troops and their leaders had involved them in ill measures, not without loss, from whence the address of Xenophon extricated them more than once. Being all re-united again, after various success, they arrived by land at Chrysopolis in Caledonia facing Byzantium, whither they repaired some days after, having passed the small arm of the sea which separates the two continents. They were upon the point of plundering that rich and powerful city, to revenge a fraud and injury which had been done them, and from the hope of enriching themselves once for all ; when Xenophon made all possible haste thither. He admitted the justness of their revenge, but he made them sensible of the fatal consequences which would attend it. “ After your
“ plundering this city, and destroying the Lacedæmonians
“ established in it, you will be deemed the mortal enemies of
“ their republic, and of all their allies. Athens, my country,
“ that had 400 galleys at sea and in the arsenals, when it took
“ up arms against them, great sums of money in its treasury,
“ a revenue of 1000 talents, and was in possession of all
“ the isles of Greece, and of many cities in Europe and Asia,
“ of which this was one, has nevertheless been reduced to yield
“ to their power, and submit to their sway. And do you
“ hope, who are but an handful of men, without generals, pro-
“ visions, allies, or any resource, either from Tissaphernes,
“ who has betrayed you, or the king of Persia, whom you
“ have attempted to dethrone ; can you hope, I say, in such
“ a condition, to make head against the Lacedæmonians ? Let

* A city of Pontus.

“ us demand satisfaction from the Byzantines, and not avenge
 “ their fault by a much greater of our own, which must draw
 “ upon us inevitable ruin.” He was believed, and the affair
 accommodated.

* From thence he led them to Salmydeffa, to serve Seuthes prince of Thrace, who had before solicited him by his envoys to bring troops to his aid, in order to his re-establishment in his father's dominions, of which his enemies had deprived him. He made Xenophon great promises for himself and his troops; but when they had done him the service he wanted, he was so far from keeping his word, that he did not give them the pay agreed upon. Xenophon reproached him exceedingly with this breach of faith: imputing his perfidy to his minister Heraclides, who thought to make his court to his master, by saving him a sum of money at the expence of justice, faith, and honesty; qualities which ought to be dearer than all others to a prince, as they contribute the most to his reputation, as well as to the success of affairs, and the security of a state. But that treacherous minister, who looked upon honour, probity, and justice, as mere chimeras, and that there was nothing real but the possession of much money, had no thoughts, in consequence, but of enriching himself by any means whatsoever, and robbed his master first with impunity, and all his subjects along with him. “ However,” continued Xenophon, “ every
 “ wise man, especially in authority and command, ought to
 “ regard justice, probity, and the faith of engagements, as the
 “ most precious treasure he can possess; and as an assured re-
 “ source, and an infallible support in all the events than can
 “ happen.” Heraclides was the more in the wrong for acting in this manner with regard to the troops, as he was a native of Greece, and not a Thracian; but avarice had extinguished all sense of honour in him.

Whilst the dispute between Seuthes and Xenophon was warmest, Charminus and Polynices arrived, as ambassadors from Lacedæmon, and brought advice, that the republic had declared war against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus; that Timbron had already embarked with the troops, and promised a daric a month to every soldier, two to each officer, and four to the colonels, who should engage in the service. Xenophon accepted the offer, and having obtained from Seuthes, by the mediation of the ambassadors, part of the pay due to him, he went by sea to Lampascus with the army, which amounted at

that time to almost 6000 men. From thence he advanced to Pergamos, a city in the province of Troas. Having met near Parthenia, where ended the expedition of the Greeks, a great nobleman returning into Persia, he took him, his wife, and children, with all his equipage, and by that means found himself in a condition to bestow great liberalities among the soldiers, and to make them a satisfactory amends for all the losses they had sustained. Thimbron at length arrived, who took upon him the command of the troops, and having joined them with his own, marched against Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus.

* Such was the event of Cyrus's expedition. Xenophon reckons from the first setting out of that prince's army from the city of Ephesus to their arrival where the battle was fought, 530 parasangas or leagues, and 93 days march; † and in their return from the place of battle to Coryora, a city upon the coast of the Euxine or Black Sea, 620 parasangas or leagues, and 120 days march; and adding both together, he says, the way, going and coming, was 1155 ‡ parasangas or leagues §, and 215 days march; and that the whole time the army took to perform that journey, including the days of rest, was 15 months.

It appears by this calculation, that the army of Cyrus marched daily, one day with another, almost six parasangas || or leagues in going, and only five in their return. It was natural, that Cyrus, who desired to surprize his brother, should use all possible diligence for that purpose.

This retreat of the 10,000 Greeks has always passed amongst

* Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. l. ii. p. 276.

† Ibid. l. iii. p. 335.

‡ I add, five, which are left out in the text, to make the total agree with the two parts.

§ Xenoph. de exped. Cyr. l. vii. p. 427.

|| The parasanga is a measure of ways peculiar to the Persians, and consists of three stadia. The stadium is the same with the Greeks, and contains, according to the most received opinion, 125 geometrical paces; 20 of which in consequence are required to the common French league. And this has been my rule hitherto, according to which the parasanga is a league and a half.

I observe here a great difficulty. In this calculation we find, the ordinary days marches of Cyrus, with an army of more than 100,000 men, would have been, one day with another, nine leagues, during so long a time; which, according to the judges in military affairs, is absolutely impossible. This is what has determined me to compute the parasanga at no more than a league. Several authors have remarked, and indeed it is not to be doubted, that the stadium, and all the other measures of ways of the ancients, have differed widely according to times and places, as they still do amongst us.

the judges of the art of war, as I have already observed, for a perfect model in its kind, and never had a parallel. Indeed no enterprize could be formed with more valour and bravery, nor conducted with more prudence, nor executed with more success: 10,000 men, 500 or 600 leagues from their own country, who had lost their generals and best officers, and find themselves in the heart of the enemy's vast empire, undertake, in the sight of a victorious and numerous army, with the king at the head of them, to retire through the seat of his empire, and in a manner from the gates of his palace, and to traverse a vast extent of unknown countries, almost all in arms against them, without being dismayed by the prospect of the innumerable obstacles and dangers, to which they were every moment exposed; passes of rivers, of mountains and defiles; open attacks; secret ambuscades from the people upon their route; famine, almost inevitable in vast and desert regions; and above all, the treachery they had to fear from the troops, who seemed to be employed in escorting them, but in reality had orders to destroy them. For Artaxerxes, who was sensible how much the return of those Greeks into their country would cover him with disgrace, and decry the majesty of the empire in the sense of all nations, had left nothing undone to prevent it; and he desired their destruction, says Plutarch, more passionately, than to conquer Cyrus himself, or to preserve the sovereignty of his estates. Those 10,000 men, however, notwithstanding so many obstacles, carried their point, and arrived, through a thousand dangers, victorious and triumphant in their own country. * Anthony long after, when pursued by the Parthians almost in the same country, finding himself in like danger, cried out in admiration of their invincible valour, "Oh the retreat of the ten thousand!"

And it was the good success of this famous retreat, which filled the people of Greece with contempt for Artaxerxes, by demonstrating to them, that gold, silver, luxury, voluptuousness, and a numerous seraglio of women, were the sole merit of the grand monarch; but that, as to the rest, his opulence and all his boasted power were only pride and vain ostentation. It was this prejudice, more universal than ever in Greece after this celebrated expedition, that gave birth to those bold enterprizes of the Greeks, of which we shall soon treat, that made Artaxerxes tremble upon his throne, and brought the Persian empire to the very brink of destruction.

* Plut. in Anto. p. 937. ὁμολογία

SECTION VII.

CONSEQUENCES OF CYRUS'S DEATH.—PARYSATIS'S
CRUELTY.—STATIRA POISONED.

I RETURN to what passed after the battle of Cunaxa in the court of Artaxerxes*. As he believed that he killed Cyrus with his own hand, and looked upon that action as the most glorious of his life, he desired that all the world should think the same; and it was wounding him in the most tender part, to dispute that honour, or endeavour to divide it, with him. The Carian soldier, whom we mentioned before, not contented with the great presents the king had made him upon a different pretext, perpetually declared to all that would hear him, that none but himself had killed Cyrus, and that the king did him great injustice in depriving him of the glory due to him. The prince, upon being informed of that insolence, conceived a jealousy equally base and cruel, and had the weakness to cause him to be delivered to Parysatis, who had sworn the destruction of all those that had any share in the death of her son. Animated by her barbarous revenge, she commanded the executioners to take that unfortunate wretch, and to make him suffer the most exquisite tortures during ten days; then, after they had torn out his eyes, to pour melted brass into his ears, till he expired in that cruel misery; which was accordingly executed.

Mithridates also, having boasted in an entertainment where he had heated his brain with wine, that it was he gave Cyrus his mortal wound, paid very dear for that sottish and imprudent vanity. He was condemned to suffer the punishment of the troughs, one of the most cruel that was ever invented, and after having languished in torment during 17 days, died at last slowly in exquisite misery.

There only remained, for the final execution of her project, and fully to satiate her vengeance, the punishment of the king's eunuch Mesabates, who by his master's order had cut off the head and hand of Cyrus. But as there was nothing to take hold of his conduct, Parysatis laid this snare for him. She was a woman of great address, had abundance of wit, and excelled in playing at a certain game with dice. After the war, she had been reconciled with the king, played often with him, was of all his parties, had an unbounded complaisance for him, and far from contradicting him in any thing, prevented his desires,

* Plut. in Artax. p. 1018—1021.

did not blush at indulging his passions, and even at supplying him with the means of gratifying them. But she took a special care never to lose sight of him, and to leave Statira as little alone with him as she could, desiring to gain an absolute ascendant over her son.

One day seeing the king entirely unemployed, and with no thoughts but of diverting himself, she proposed playing at dice for 1000 darics*, to which he readily consented. She suffered him to win, and paid down the money. But affecting regret and vexation, she pressed him to begin again and to play with her for an eunuch. The king, who suspected nothing, complied, and they agreed to except five of the favourite eunuchs on each side, that the winner should take their choice out of the rest, and the loser be bound to deliver him. Having made these conditions, they sat down to play. The queen was all attention to the game, and made use of all her skill and address in it; besides which the dice favoured her. She won, and chose Mesabates, for he was not one of the excepted. As soon as she got him into her hands, before the king could have the least suspicion of the revenge she meditated, she delivered him to the executioners, and commanded them to flea him alive, to lay him afterwards upon three cross bars†, and to stretch his skin at large before his eyes upon two stakes prepared for that purpose; which was performed accordingly. When the king knew this, he was very sorry for it, and violently angry with his mother. But without giving herself any further trouble about it, she told him with a smile, and in a jesting way, "Really, you are a great loser, and must be highly in the right, to be so much out of humour for a decrepit wretch of an eunuch, when I, who lost 1000 good darics, and paid them down upon the spot, do not say a word, and am satisfied."

All these cruelties seem to have been only essays and preparations for a greater crime Parysatis meditated. She had retained at heart a violent hatred for queen Statira, which she had suffered to escape her upon many occasions. She perceived plainly, that her credit with the king her son was only the effect of his respect and consideration for her as his mother; whereas that for Statira was founded in love and confidence, the best security of credit with him. Of what is not the jealousy of an ambitious woman capable! She resolved to rid herself, whatever it cost her, of so formidable a rival.

* The daric was worth ten livres.

† Plutarch explains this circumstance no farther.

For the more certain attainment of her ends, she feigned a reconciliation with her daughter-in-law, and treated her with all the exterior marks of sincere friendship and real confidence. The two queens, appearing therefore to have forgot their former suspicions and differences, lived well together, saw one another as before, and ate at each other's apartments. But as both of them knew how much the friendships and caresses of the court were to be relied upon, especially amongst the women, they were neither of them deceived in the other; and the same fears always subsisting, they kept upon their guard, and never ate but of the same dishes and pieces. Could one believe it possible to deceive so attentive and cautious a vigilance? Parysatis one day, when her daughter-in-law was at table with her, took an extremely exquisite bird, that had been served up, cut it in two parts, gave the one half to Statira, and ate the other herself. Statira soon after was seized with sharp pains, and having quitted the table, died in the most horrible convulsions, not without inspiring the king with the most violent suspicions of his mother, of whose cruelty, and implacable and revengeful spirit, he was sufficiently sensible before. He made the strictest inquiry into the crime. All his mother's officers and domestics were seized and put to the question; when Gygis, one of Parysatis's women and confidants, confessed the whole. She caused one side of a knife to be rubbed with poison, so that Parysatis, having cut the bird in two, put the sound part into her own mouth directly, and gave Statira the other that was poisoned. Gygis was put to death after the manner the Persians punished poisoners, which is thus: they lay their heads upon a great and very broad stone, and beat upon it with another till they are entirely crushed, and have no remains of their former figure. As for Parysatis, the king contented himself with confining her to Babylon, where she demanded to retire, and told her, that he would never set his foot within it whilst she was there.

